For the Gulf states, the Iran war has almost certainly been a disorienting experience. They did not seek it. Several had spent years trying to build a working accommodation with Tehran. They do not appear to have been consulted before the United States and Israel launched their strikes on February 28. But within hours, Iranian missiles and drones were falling on Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE — every member of the Gulf Cooperation Council targeted in a single night, by a neighbor that had, until that point, largely avoided striking them directly.
The Iran war did not create the Gulf’s dependence on Washington. But it has made clear, with some brutality, how few alternatives exist.
In the weeks since, oil and gas production has slowed or been shut in, cutting off vital financial flows. In short, the Gulf states have found themselves paying the costs of a war they did not choose.
There is an evident irony in this situation. The Gulf state governments, which have fretted about the danger of Iranian aggression for decades, went to great lengths to secure a permanent US military presence to deter Tehran and keep the peace. But acting with Israel and without consulting its Gulf partners, the US instigated the conflict that turned the Iranian threat from potential into real. Unfortunately for these same Gulf states, however, Washington now appears to be the only outside power with both the capability and the will to shield them from the consequences of its own actions. They may find themselves with no alternative.
WHO ELSE?
The Gulf’s security challenge is not only Iran. What the Gulf states have required, in effect, is dual deterrence: an outside power capable of constraining Iran while also moderating Israel. Washington’s ability to deter Iran was ultimately military, reinforced by sanctions and periodic intelligence actions, sometimes in collaboration with Israel. Its leverage over Israel — as the supplier of the weapons, the intelligence, and ultimately the political cover without which Israel cannot sustain a prolonged campaign — is of a different but equally significant kind.
The current conflict reflects a complete breakdown of this compact on all sides. The US appears to have voluntarily followed rather than restrained Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and has shown little inclination to limit Israel’s prosecution of the war since the first missiles were fired. As the commentator Fareed Zakaria recently observed, Netanyahu “is very comfortable with an Iran that lapses into chaos” and thus has incentives to aggressively take the fight to the Iranians, subjecting the region to a degree of instability that is inimical to the Gulf states’ efforts to transform their economies for a post-petroleum future. On at least some occasions, Israeli aggressiveness appears to have stymied Trump’s natural inclination towards deal-making. At a press conference in late March, Trump commented that it is “hard to find leaders in Iran to talk to because they keep getting killed.” “What he’s really saying,” Zakaria observed, is that “the Israelis are killing these people,” without seeking clearance from the US.
It is an open question whether the US will be able to bring Israel to heel to end the war. It is a less open question whether any other outside power could plausibly fulfil the dual deterrence role going forward, assuming that some version of the Iranian regime remains.
Russia’s clear alignment with Iran would rule it out even if it were not consumed with Ukraine. Europe has a long history of engagement with Gulf security and genuine concern about Iranian nuclear ambitions. But longstanding shortcomings in defense coordination and force projection mean that neither the EU nor its major military powers — France and the UK — can act credibly in the region without American support. Europe also has negligible leverage over Israel, whose government has shown consistent indifference to European diplomatic pressure.
China might seem better placed. It has real economic interests in Gulf stability — roughly half its oil imports transit the Strait of Hormuz — and genuine diplomatic standing in the region, having brokered the 2023 Saudi-Iranian rapprochement. But China has built that standing precisely by refusing to take sides. It cultivates Gulf states and Iran simultaneously, presenting itself as a partner to all. That strategy is incompatible with functioning as a security guarantor, which requires a willingness to stand with one party against another. When the Gulf states introduced UN Security Council Resolution 2817 condemning Iran’s attacks — a text that passed 13-0 with 135 co-sponsors — China abstained. It has never acted as a security guarantor for any state anywhere in the world; its naval deployments in the region are exercises and port visits, not commitments to defend. China also has no ability to restrain Israel’s military actions — a point that matters as much to the Gulf as deterring Iran. Its absence in this conflict is entirely consistent with its record.
NO ILLUSIONS
Amr Hamzawy of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace wrote in early March that Iran’s direct attacks on Arab neighbors had “eroded trust and reinforce[d] the logic of alliances with the United States over regional frameworks.” For Gulf governments that had spent years trying to reduce their dependence on any single outside power, the attacks have made that project harder, not easier. As I have argued, the US is the Gulf’s essential security partner, and is likely to remain so. The Gulf states would almost certainly prefer a more reliable, consultative, and rational guarantor. They are working with the one they have.
