Taiwan Decides…For the Last Time?

Hosted by Christina Ruffini and Sir Richard Dearlove

Guest

Episode Summary

This weekend, Taiwan will hold the only free and fair elections in the Chinese-speaking world. Whoever wins will lead in a pivotal time—and their term will cover the period during which President Xi Jinping has promised China will annex what it considers a breakaway territory, even by force, if necessary. Could this be Taiwan’s last election? The incumbent Democratic Progressive Party led by Vice President Lai Ching Te is pro-independence, and is being challenged by the China-friendly opposition Kuomintang Party led by Ho Yu-Ih. There’s also a wildcard in the form of Ko Wen-Je, who says both parties are too pro or too anti-Beijing. One Decision—your Global Election Headquarters for 2024—sits down with correspondents in Taipei and Washington, DC to explore potential scenarios coming out of the Taiwanese polls and whether the United States can handle a third potential war, as it already struggles to support allies embroiled in major conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine. Pentagon correspondents also discuss the fallout over the secret hospitalization of America's Defense Chief Lloyd Austin and why top Defense Department officials and even the White House were kept in the dark about his condition.

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Transcript

INTRODUCTION

Mcfarlane: You're listening to One Decision, the podcast that looks at the choices made that shape our world. I'm your host, Julia McFarlane. This week, people in Taiwan will be making their choices known, heading to the polls for presidential and legislative elections on the thirteenth. It's the only free and fair election for the Chinese speaking world. Taiwan, a key US ally, is the biggest manufacturer of advanced microchips, and the waters around it are among the world's most important shipping routes. The stakes are high enough that president Joe Biden is going to be sending a high level delegation to Taipei after the election on Saturday, a move that will surely anger Beijing. Whoever makes it to the top job will be leading the autonomous island of Taiwan until 2028. That's important because Taiwan's imposing neighbor, China, has set a deadline of the year before to annex the island of Taiwan by 2027. Taipei hasn't seen all out conflict with the mainland since 1949. It could be Taiwan's most tense, potentially most dangerous period ever since. The presidential election is essentially a three way race between candidates from three groups. Of the dominant two parties, there's the incumbent, pro independence party, and the main opposition, which is pro Beijing. But there's now a new wild card creating a lot of buzz, arguing for a third way, and that the main parties are either too anti or too pro Beijing. In this episode, we're going to head over to the Pentagon. We're gonna talk to two defense correspondents about why this election matters to The US, both in terms of its rivalry with China and whether there is a risk of escalation over a possible annexation of Taiwan. But first, let's go over to Taipei and speak to Stuart Lau, who's covering the election there for Politico.

INTERVIEW: STUART LAU IN TAIPEI

Mcfarlane: Obviously, this is a very important election. It's one that a lot of people will be watching closely. Whoever wins this weekend is going to succeed President Tsai Ing-wen in May, I believe. And they will serve as president until May 2028. So quite a key term in office, given what's happening later this year. Of course, the US presidential elections and some of those deadlines that President Xi of China has been talking about. We'll get to that a little later. I want to just start with the view from Taiwan. Walk me through, if you will, the three main candidates. Now, want to keep it simple, but is it oversimplifying it if I describe these guys as the incumbent who's basically pro independence, the opposition who are basically pro China, and then the third guy who claims that he can chart like a third way between those two positions. Is that too simplified?

Lau: It's a good way to start giving our audience a broad idea about where things stand. So you're right, The incumbent is definitely more focused on talking about Taiwanese sovereignty. As you said, the incumbent president has been focusing quite a lot on building ties with Western countries, not just The US, but also Japan, but also Europe, exactly because China made it very clear that they didn't want to have any sort of dialogue with this party over the last eight years. And then the main opposition party, as you outlined, is more about engagement with China, and they pitched this election as war versus peace. And, of course, they claim to represent peace because they had a more better track record about talking to Beijing, getting trade deals, and sort of, in their view, de escalating the tension, which is debatable given, you know, China's military buildup also during the previous time when they were in power. And the third party, as we're seeing right now, is a new choice for a lot of people. The main candidate used to be a mayor of Taipei, the capital of Taiwan. He's known to be a straight talker, very easily approachable, personable if you like, doesn't beat around the bush, doesn't use a lot of boring political language, and that's why he has attracted a lot of attention, especially from young people who have been telling me how disillusioned they are, how disappointed they have been about the sort of two main traditional parties. Yes. You mentioned the third choice, the wild card. He is called Ko Wen-je.

Mcfarlane: I saw a really interesting, it was actually pretty hilarious Bloomberg interview with him where the journalist asked him, if you become president, you'll have to meet a lot of people and shake a lot of people's hands and have a lot of small talk. Are you looking forward to that? And he basically said, No, I don't like meeting people. I used to work as a surgeon at an ICU. All my patients were intubated, so I didn't have to talk to any of them. And it

Lau: was really, really funny. And certainly like a straight talker, as you said. So a lot of the supporters, you know, they're younger. The generation is more confined to the young people, which means that the middle aged and the elderly people, they're more loyal to their respective to the two respective parties they've been voting for. Right now, most commentators are speculating that no single party will win a majority in the parliament, which means that the president, the future president, will have to work with more than his own party. And, Ko Wen-je, as he said, is a very funny guy. You know, he doesn't really, you know, sugarcoat his message that much. But then people are also asking what his international policy, what his foreign policy will be. He's been talking, you know, to a lot of American media, as you said. He's been pitching himself as a sort of continuity person insofar as, you know, national defense is concerned. He's been, you know, giving some praise for the outgoing president for what she has done on building up national defense. But then he also talked a bit more about how he plans to engage with Beijing. When he was mayor of Taipei, of course, he focused on a lot of bilateral trips with Shanghai, between Shanghai and Taipei, and he doesn't

Mcfarlane: make it a taboo to have interaction with mainland Chinese officials. Right. You made a really important point there, which is whoever wins is going to have to deal a lot with the international community. And, we've seen Ukraine's President Zelenskyy do that very well. He has done a really good job of being ambassador at large and striking up partnerships with countries abroad. And it's funny because The US, Taiwan's most important international ally and backer, The US doesn't agree with the Taiwanese when it comes to the one China policy. Am I right? And it's interesting because a lot of Western nations, in fact, not just Western nations, but most of the international community, don't actually recognize Taiwan as an independent sovereign state. Actually, most countries in the world don't, only a dozen do, mostly countries in Latin America and Pacific nations. Let's say theoretically, the current incumbent vice president wins the election. This is the guy who is pro independence, but he has tried to walk a careful line because he doesn't want to be too overtly banging on about independence because that is not actually Washington's policy. So let's say he wins the election. How difficult a job does he have to do considering Taiwan really depends on The US as its security guarantee, given that Washington actually is kind of in alignment with Beijing when it comes to the one China policy. It doesn't recognize Taiwan as an independent country and it has this very, very difficult position and it's trying to maintain strategic ambiguity. So how difficult would it be both for Lai if he were to win the election given that he's technically pro independence as are a majority of Taiwanese people versus this difficult relationship he will have to manage with America?

Lau: Lai Ching-te, seven years ago, he called himself a worker for Taiwanese independence, but he's since walked back from that position or that advocacy, if you like, when he was, you know, on the way up in the political ladder. Just a couple of days ago when he was addressing the international media here in Taipei, he made a very clear point that he has no plan to push for or advocate any move towards Taiwanese independence exactly because of the Washington consideration, which is very clear. You know, The US doesn't support any unilateral change to the status quo of the Taiwan Strait. Of course, the main message is for Beijing. They shouldn't resort to military aggression. But it's also a message for Taiwan, for the Taiwanese leadership because they don't want anyone to declare independence or to hold referendum about independence because that would be also be seen as upsetting the status quo. I think that's very clear from American diplomats and officials. And Lai knows that line very well. He's been vice president for the last four years. So yeah. And to Washington, I think, you know, they would be very concerned about maintaining the status quo because, of course, the Ukraine war is still going on. The Middle East crisis is still going on. Having a third theater is definitely not what Washington is hoping for at this particular time.

Mcfarlane: Right. Of course, the big shadow lurking over this election, which is, of course, China, but just walk me through the conditions in which this election is taking place. Obviously, there is a lot of anxiety about Chinese expansionism, but what are the Taiwanese people's priorities here? Is it all about defense and national security and the increasing drills? Or how important is the problems with the Taiwanese economy? You know, the sluggish exports last year, the housing crisis, the cost of living crisis going on over there?

Lau: You're definitely spot on. I think for a lot of people, the China question always hangs in their mind. Of course, it's something that people will be quizzing the candidates for, but people are definitely talking much more about the economic situation, the housing crisis, and the energy transition and what that means for the economic burden as well. And so a lot of societal economic problems that are facing, you know, basically everyone in the world, but also in this part of the world. And so that's also the main pitch from the opposition parties. They're like, you know, we need to focus on the economic discussion. We need to bring better jobs to the people. We need to you know, at least for the Kuomintang, the main opposition party, they're saying that we need to rebuild some of the trade ties with China in order to facilitate more exports to what used to be a very prominent market because, of course, under the last eight years with Tsai Ing-wen, she has been talking about diversifying the focus away from the Chinese market because that's looking less and less secure. But people are questioning whether that approach is translated into real economic gains for the ordinary people.

Mcfarlane: That's very interesting because the former, you're saying the opposition party are in favor of talking with the Chinese about trade. And that's the KMT party, the main opposition party, which is the more pro China of the three groups. Now, when they were last in power, their president wanted to take up talks with Beijing for a trade pact between Taiwan and China. But he was forced to abandon it because there were huge protests in Taiwan. People started occupying the legislature. There were student protests. And so he was forced to abandon that. Now, obviously there is a huge economic argument for Taiwan to have a trade deal with China, their biggest neighbor. It makes a lot of sense. But if they were to do that, of course, there is security issues with that. If Taiwan becomes more economically beholden to China, that comes with risks. How do you feel that argument is playing now? The KMT, the opposition, they are campaigning on a platform about being open to talking to China about trade. How are the voters reacting to that? Are people now open to that idea or are they still very nervous about getting ties with China?

Lau: I think it's a very difficult question for the Taiwanese population. I mean, of course, are talking about two groups of people here. I mean, of course, you have the more independence minded or at least more Beijing skeptical people who don't like the sound of this idea, but you also need to consider the hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese people who actually work in Mainland China. They live there. They work there. They set up business there. And but they still consider themselves Taiwanese, and they would fly back to Taiwan to vote, and they're, you know, taking chartered planes and all that, you know, to to come back and vote. And not to mention the fact that a lot of Taiwanese people who live in Taiwan also consider themselves Chinese in a cultural way, not political way, but in a cultural way. They don't resist or they don't, you know, reject the idea of being Chinese even though they are Taiwanese, and they do consider themselves Taiwanese. So it really depends who you ask. I mean, people who work in the tourism sector, of course, they want to see more tourists back from China. A lot of the farmers, you know, they sell pineapples, sell mangoes, and, you know, they love their products to be exported to China again. But then, you know, they've also been exploring alternative markets over the last few years, so it's not like they still rely on that as much as they used to. But in the meantime, China also makes it very clear that if the DPP wins for a third time, more trade tariffs or more trade friction will follow. You know, they already started talking about reimposing some of the tariffs if the DPP doesn't change tack, especially for the garment industry, for the car parts, and for some manufacturing. And China has been making very clear to the Taiwanese voters that, you know, if they want economic success, they should vote according to what Beijing wishes for, which is the opposition.

Mcfarlane: They're making it very clear they don't want the incumbents to win over in Beijing. That's such an interesting answer from you, Stuart. It makes me wonder what is the level of pro independence support in Taiwan among Taiwanese people?

Lau: The majority of people actually favor the status quo, which means having an autonomous government, having an autonomous system, not being reincorporated into China. I mean, of course, Taiwan never belongs to the PRC since 1949, and they've been running their own government. China has been talking about maybe using the one country, two systems model that they've been using in Hong Kong. Taiwanese people say, no. No. That wouldn't work in our favor. But people are also very skeptical about going down the independence path because that means war, because they know China wouldn't swallow the idea, and China made it very clear that anyone, if they do anything concrete about independence, they will resort to military means. And, of course, you know, Taiwanese people don't want to have a war. They don't want to fight if that can be avoided. And so status quo is the main consensus for a lot of people. It's the social contract between the people and successive administrations. The ball is in Beijing's court. I mean, if the DPP wins for a third time, which would be unprecedented, Beijing will have to reconsider the possibility of winning back Taiwanese people's hearts through peaceful nonmilitary means. They've been trying to do that with trade. They've been trying to do with cultural personal person to person exchanges. They've been trying to do that with education. They've been trying to do that with visa schemes. But if the Taiwanese public do think, you know, the KMT doesn't deserve a chance to come back to power, that would be a great failure on Beijing's part to have, you know, invested in these sorts of policies over the last couple of decades.

Mcfarlane: That's so interesting. How does Taiwan feel to you? You are there on the ground at the moment. You're talking to people there. How does it feel? Does it feel like a country that is seriously worried about potential conflict in any form? How much is that coming up in terms of people's conversations? Does it feel like a country that is facing potential imminent conflict?

Lau: It's the exact opposite, I would say. People are so calm. People are so not concerned about all these geopolitical tensions, all these military buildups that, you know, the whole world or at least the media have been talking about. I went to a couple of rallies over the last weekend. Lots of middle aged and elderly people turned up. They were cheering. They were, you know, super excited. It's almost like an entertainment show. You know, you have, a big screen at the backdrop, you know, so many politicians giving speeches, almost like watching a celebrity show for a lot of local, you know, more rural people, if you like. So it's quite a calm atmosphere, if you like. And, of course, there was a bit of a scary situation just twenty four hours ago when China was launching a satellite. And then on all the mobile phones in Taiwan, suddenly there was this emergency alert warning about an overflight of a satellite, which China was launching, which was a probe satellite. But the crazy thing was actually in the English version of that message, it mistranslated satellite into missile, and people were initially, like, wondering what's going on. And it turned out it was a complete mistranslation. But then, again, you know, it tells you a lot about how easy the people here are because they were so not concerned about this. You know, they were like, this is a satellite. This is not military exercise. This is not military invasion. And then it started, you know, all the media platforms. They were, like, criticizing the the ministry of defense for coming up with this mistake. You know, they so quickly turned the focus back on internal politics on, you know, electioneering rather than what the PLA, the People's Liberation Army may or may not be thinking about. So, again, I mean, of course, this whole China question, China US question it's somewhere in the background of people's mind when they decide how to vote, but that doesn't seem to be the immediate concern.

Mcfarlane: You've walked us through the support for independence and really the current status quo is by far the majority preferred outcome by people. But let's say the choice isn't the status quo. Let's say the choice is outright conflict or reunification with China. It does sound like the Taiwanese are very practical minded people. A lot of them have very close ties with the Chinese. It would make a lot of sense if they were to start trading with their biggest neighbor and close cultural partner. Do you think if Xi Jinping were to make canny decisions when it comes to Taiwan, If the Taiwanese people were presented with the choice of going along with that or stiffer resistance that could lead to a stronger response from China, possibly conflict, Are we getting any sense of the Taiwanese people where they might lean to in that situation, or are people not talking about it? Is that really not on the radar yet in Taiwan, and they're not really wanting to think about that eventuality?

Lau: The last time the Taiwanese people confronted the communist party, it was 1949. That was the last chance when they had a direct sort of confrontation. I mean, of course, the a lot of the Taiwanese people here I'm talking about, they migrated from Mainland China, following the KMT party at that time. And since then, people have been living in well, firstly, a dictatorship under the KMT and then democracy for the last thirty years or close to that. So people have been living in their own world, living on this island, separated with a strait from Mainland China, from what a lot of people consider the troublemaker. And they've built up their own economy. They've built up their own culture. They've built up their democracy, of course. And China is culturally familiar, of course, but politically so far away. Of course, they understand what's going on very well. They receive the news about this. You know, the Chinese politics, what's happening in Hong Kong, or what Xi Jinping says about Taiwan every now and then. But still, it's something distant in people's minds. It's not like they're expecting military aggression right away. I mean, of course, they realize that China is not discounting their possibility. They are having a lot of missiles on the other side of the strait, but they don't have a sense of urgency. There's no sense of urgency. There's no sense of emergency anytime soon. People are still very much focused on living by their life, you know, finding better jobs and keeping the economy afloat and keeping their way of life for the future. That's what people are talking about. People are not talking about war preparedness. In fact, the conscription period was just extended to one year from four months, starting from a few weeks ago. For such a long time, all the men only needed to go to the camps to learn how to use the gun for, like, four months, and that's it for their whole adult life. And the Taiwanese military have also been spending money on not so much about asymmetric warfare. They were spending, you know, money on, you know, big aircraft or bigger ships. And, you know, until recently, people realized, oh, Ukraine didn't actually resist Russia with those big stuff. You know, it's all about portable defense items, and that's prompted the Taiwanese to change their mind. But still, for such a long time, those concerns were so far away from people's minds. They were thinking about, concerned about the economy, livelihood, and China is there, but is definitely not close to them.

THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

Mcfarlane: That's Politico's Stuart Lau talking to us from Taipei, where he is covering the election taking place this weekend. Now let's go to Washington for the view from The US. As we mentioned, The US isn't actually in favor of independence for Taiwan and doesn't recognize it as a sovereign nation, but it is extremely against any future annexation by China. And president Biden is so bullish on this, he has asserted that the US military would defend Taiwan in the event of any invasion. Joining us now is Idris Ali, who covers the Pentagon for Reuters, and Carla Babb, who covers it for Voice of America. I asked both of them, Idris first, what their sources were telling them about how likely they thought war with China over Taiwan really was.

Ali: I think from where I said and the sources that I talked to in the immediate sort of couple of years, the expectation is that things will get more tense, but it won't spill over into active conflict. And I think publicly, the Pentagon has said the, you know, conflict is not inevitable. So I think the next couple of years, the expectation is that they're gonna work towards essentially creating a situation where China isn't comfortable and sees the cost of sort of invading or taking over Taiwan. And I think the expectation is that at least until 2027, the Chinese military is gonna try to build up its forces, its military to be in a position. So I think for the next three years, the expectation is there's not gonna be a hot conflict. You know, the rhetoric's gonna rise. I think the expectation is China's gonna test Taiwan, US sort of deterrence, US commitment to Taiwan. And then after that, I think it's an open question. How far is China willing to go? How much are they willing to invest in terms of not just money, but casualties if they were to take over Taiwan? So I think after sort of the three to five year period, a much more open question. But in the immediate, I I don't think the expectation is of any sort of hot conflict over the island.

Babb: The United States has always looked at China and military officials, especially at the Pentagon, say that they have to take China at its word. And president Xi has said that he wants his military ready, if necessary, to invade Taiwan by 2027. And so what military officials here in The United States are trying to do is they're trying to be prepared for that conflict should that happen. And there were just meetings in Washington DC this week between Chinese officials and US officials, and they were on the opposite ends of the spectrum when it comes to Taiwan. China views a one China policy as Taiwan is inevitably theirs. The United States views a one China policy as maintaining the status quo and supporting Taiwan's self defense. That's why you still see sales going into for military weapons into Taiwan. That's why you see US trainers going in to train the Taiwanese to defend themselves. And so while this election has very much been about jobs and inflation, there is this back burner issue between The United States and China that that nobody seems to be addressing front and center in the Taiwanese elections. But as Idris pointed out, in the next year or two, this is going to have to become a much more focused issue, an issue that is in the forefront because you can see little things happening all the time in Taiwan. They just mentioned Chinese spy balloons. There have been, you know, more than a dozen entering Taiwanese airspace since December.

Ali: They are tying that to the election. Some officials in Taiwan are saying that China is trying to interfere with the election. So even while it's not the forefront and the biggest topic, it's still there, and it's always going to be there for the years to come. And so The US, the officials here want to be prepared. Yeah. I think it's important to also note that I think if Xi could somehow unify Taiwan without going through the military route, that would be preferable. I don't know how that happens, but I think that is his preference. If that doesn't happen, I think, you know, like you said, he has started sort of restructuring the military, taking out generals and admirals who he has you know, believes are corrupt or not not up to the job. You know, the one area they're really investing in is their rocket force, which will be really necessary in terms of taking over Taiwan. The one thing, you know, we're not seeing right now is sort of the focus on amphibious landings. You know, that's a big part of taking over Taiwan would be moving troops from China across the waterway into Taiwan. And it's a very complicated military operation. And that can take years and years and years to sort of practice and master. And that's not something we're seeing the Chinese do. So I think defense officials say, look, on a sort of 30,000 foot, you're seeing China trying to invest in the correct things. But when you sort of narrow and zoom in, some of those specifics aren't there yet, and that can take years. So he's headed in the direction, but they're not seeing the specifics that might be necessary for an invasion of Taiwan.

Mcfarlane: Carla, I have a question. We spoke to the former Secretary of Defense, Bob Gates, in 2022. And his prediction was that he thinks Beijing is going to move in on Taiwan in sort of non military ways. That there are things like economic throttle points that Xi can pressure Taiwan to, economic blockades, other things that he can do to try and by asymmetric means take over Taiwan, not dissimilar to how it was done in Hong Kong. Now, that happens, if asymmetric sort of means are carried out by Beijing to sort of usurp Taiwan surreptitiously, does that make it harder for The US to respond? What can The US do about that? Are people in the Pentagon talking about that eventuality?

Babb: The key there is in in order to stop something like that, you have to be prepared in advance. And so that was why I think you're seeing these groups of US service members going to Taiwan. The Pentagon is frankly not talking about this that much, so we don't have a lot of details on what's going forward. And, also, there's the sensitivities of not wanting to upset China and cause a conflict by trying to prevent one. So that, of course, you know, I I defer to to former secretary Bob Gates. Well, his thoughts are are spot on in the fact that they may want to do this slowly and not do a forceful invasion. And and what Idris said, I think that is the preferred route. But the Pentagon is going to have to figure out how to prevent that, and I think that the best way for The US to be prepared is to think about things like that, to think about what they saw in Hong Kong and to try to be prepared with counters, not just military counters, but also political economic counters, but on the military side to make sure that the US naval forces have a way inside that first island chain to already be set up. The more prepared they are to be closer to Taiwan, the better in any scenario like that.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND MULTIPLE FRONTS

Mcfarlane: Washington, the Biden administration is obviously dealing with two extremely volatile wars at the moment, both of which have global consequence. Ukraine is obviously impacting the security across all of Western Europe and the war in Gaza is doing a lot of things. It's isolating Israel in the international community and to some extent The United States by extension, but we're also seeing spillovers, potential spillovers in neighboring countries and increasing volatility in the Red Sea and shipping routes from the Houthis in Yemen. Carla, how is Biden handling the war between Israel and the Palestinians? I'll ask about Ukraine afterwards, but given how so quickly since October 7, this conflict has jumped right to the top of geo strategic priorities. What's your assessment of how Biden has handled this conflict so far?

Babb: Well, President Joe Biden has been put in sort of a very difficult position. The United States is a strong ally for Israel. So a lot of his supporters that side with Israel don't feel like he has come out strongly enough as the weeks have gone on in support of Israel because he has cautioned that civilians in Gaza really need to be thought of first and foremost when you're going in to do operations inside Gaza. On the flip side, his supporters who are who are very pro the Palestinians and are concerned about those women, children, and civilians that are being killed, they are not happy with how president Biden has handled this. They feel like all of the aid that he has given Israel is only encouraging Israel to do more violence in Gaza. So he's in a very difficult position right now. And meanwhile, everything else is is literally blowing up across the Middle East. There have been more than a 100 attacks since mid October on US forces in Iraq and Syria. There have been responses, but every time there is a response, many critics of the Biden administration say that the responses are not strong enough because the attacks keep happening. Now you see the Houthis. There have been 26 attacks, I believe, in the Southern Red Sea since the Biden administration and several others in the international community came up with this coalition to try to protect ships going through international shipping lanes there. So the attacks keep coming, and he keeps trying to respond. But it's unclear how effective he is being, and he definitely has opposing sides that each want something from him that he's not willing or not able to do to make everyone happy in this scenario.

Mcfarlane: Idris, Carla has pointed out really important context, which is those attacks on US troops who are stationed across the Middle East, what can The US do about the increasing nature of these attacks, American soldiers being targeted? If we weren't dealing with such hot flashpoints in Ukraine and Israel, those attacks would be front and center in the political discussion. And it's incredible that that isn't really discussed on a regular basis, certainly on mainstream news or on headlines. I'm sure they are in defense circles. But what can The US do about that, and what happens if those attacks do not stop?

Ali: So The US, you know, for the past couple of years will get attacked. Its troops will get attacked in Iraq and Syria. It'll periodically reply with a couple of strikes, and then things seem to quiet down until the next cycle. And the reality is I honestly don't know what The US can actually do to stop them. There are only about 2,500 troops in Iraq and 900 troops in Syria, and you're dealing with, in Iraq, specifically Iranian backed militias who are entrenched in the country and parts of the government and the military. And so I don't think realistically there is anything The United States can do to completely stop the attacks. We've seen the Iraqi leadership come out and say that they don't want US troops in the country anymore. I don't think that's something that's gonna happen anytime soon, but to bring the attacks to zero is pretty difficult. And I don't think there is sort of even a realistic expectation that that can happen within the Pentagon. It's sort of dealing with, you know, make sure they're not giving me or any casualties, bolster defensive positions. You know, we're seeing the same sort of tactics in the Red Sea with drones and missiles being fired in the region, in many cases, near navy ships. And, you know, that raises the question, how do you stop attacks on certain, you know, international shipping? And I think it's one of those situations where, you know, The US doesn't wanna get deeply dragged into another war in The Middle East, and I think they're trying to just sort of protect their troops and personnel without responding too forcefully.

Babb: I just wanna add one thing to what Idris said. There is one plan of action that the Biden administration has not done that we have heard critics on both sides call for, and that is when it comes to the Houthis. Right now, you know, in the last attack, the Houthis used a ballistic missile, cruise missiles, drones to attack these shipping lanes. The US responded and knocked down 18 of the drones, the ballistic missile, etcetera, etcetera. But what they didn't do is they didn't target the launch sites in Houthi territory in Yemen. And that is one thing that The US has done in the past. They have targeted sites where the Houthis launched these drones, and we haven't seen that yet. And I think that there's a lot of momentum building in Washington asking why that has not happened yet because that is something that a lot of the critics of the Biden administration say is a relatively easy thing for The United States to do. Not something that necessarily the coalition would do because the international coalition joins to protect international shipping lanes for various reasons. Some are not willing to go on the offensive, and the Pentagon has made that very clear that the international coalition that is working together to protect these ships right now is a defensive coalition. But the Pentagon on its own or The UK or some other country on its own could attack these launch sites in Yemen and has not done so.

Mcfarlane: Both of you are referencing something that I think is really important and doesn't really get outlined or discussed outrightly enough. And that is although America technically is not engaged in any wars, it is very much on the edge of proxy battles, whether it is with advisers helping the Ukrainians, helping to train them up against the Russians, or being attacked by Iranian backed militias in Syria and in Iraq and in Yemen. There is obviously a lot of Iran hawks in the Washington establishment, particularly amongst the Republicans. But as, Carla, as you were just saying, obviously, no one in America wants outright conflict to spill out. And right now we've got wars in Ukraine that The US is kind of very involved in. Obviously the war between Israel and the Palestinians. Everyone has been asking, can The US afford to have a third war breakout when it comes to Taiwan? But there is also, of course, the fact that there are these sort of proxy situations with Iran. And so what kind of a moment are we in? And do you think that we are aware enough that actually we could potentially be on the edge of a really dangerous time, not just for the US military, but for America and its allies overseas?

Ali: I would just say, I think the past couple of years, especially in the Trump administration, we've seen The United States closer to war with countries like Iran and North Korea. So while the situation now, I I think, seems tense is tense, the fact that the leadership in the Pentagon, the White House, the State Department don't wanna get into war is probably something that, at least I think, doesn't make me as concerned as maybe I would have been three or four years ago if we were in this situation.

Babb: And like Idris said, one of the things that's interesting, if you walk around the halls in the Pentagon, Idris just said this, the Pentagon, the top leadership does not want war. And that is something that does not permeate, and that message does not get out to The United States public. A lot of people in The United States think that the Pentagon wants war. And it's actually at least all of the officials that I talked to, it's it's the exact opposite because they've seen war and they know what war does. And so they do want to strengthen the military so no one will be willing to bring The United States into a fight. But I haven't personally talked to any official that wants war in the Pentagon.

Mcfarlane: Do either of you get a sense from military officials that perhaps there's a little bit of exasperation when you get certain China hawks or certain Iran hawks or certain Russia hawks who really try and amp up the rhetoric and engage in this sort of saber rattling with dangerous and volatile leaders like Kim Jong Un or Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping. Is there a bit of friction between political leadership and defense leadership given what Carla was just saying about the fact that defense chiefs, they know what war is like. They don't like it. They don't want it. But politicians can find it useful, hamming up conflicts and provoking enemies and externalizing threats a lot of the time.

Ali: Yeah, I think so. Absolutely. I think especially when you're talking about lawmakers, in this case, many Republican lawmakers who are hawkish on pretty much every country that's not The United States, when they start talking and when they start making threats, it's the Pentagon, right, that has to eventually cash in or not cash in on them. So I think when they make these statements, I think a lot of Pentagon leaders will call up their offices and say, hey, look. The reality is, you know, Iran, you know, did this or didn't do this, but it's not something we, you know, should be responding to and here are the reasons. So I think there's a lot of backroom talks that happen when political leadership make those comments. And, you know, like Carla said, the Pentagon isn't very good at going out and publicly sort of saying we don't want war because that would sort of go against the the concept. But I think privately, when you talk to them, that's really a message they send to politicians, lawmakers, and reporters like us.

Babb: And if I may add, that exact point is why the US military wants to provide military aid to Ukraine. That is the reasoning behind that because the Pentagon, doesn't wanna send The United States to war. And so, the reason that The United States and Western Europe are providing Ukraine with the supplies to defend itself is because they feel that if Russia takes Ukraine, then Russia has stated an interest in Estonia. Russia has stated an interest in Poland as well. Both of those are NATO countries. So should they get invaded by Russia, then The United States is at war. And so that's another message that's not quite clear to a lot of people inside The United States that by providing Ukraine with the ability to fight, it's actually preventing The United States from going to war.

UKRAINE AND COMPETING PRIORITIES

Mcfarlane: Idris, that's such an important point that Carla has made. Would you say I mean, has Ukraine fallen down the wayside since the October seventh attacks and the ensuing war in the Middle East? I mean, it's clearly taking up all of secretary Blinken's scheduling at the moment. He seems to be constantly yo yoing between Washington and The Middle East. President Zelenskyy is currently touring European capitals. Is The US distracted with the war in Israel? And is Ukraine suffering as a result of that?

Ali: I think it is. I think it was already on a downward trajectory in terms of public's not support, but just importance in the day to day lives of the American people. We're heading or we were heading into an election year. You know, the house was in Republican hands, and they didn't really wanna fund the weapons going to Ukraine further. And so there was a downward trajectory, and then it was just sort of just made so much more seep by October 7 and the conflict with Israel and Hamas. And so I think it's a situation that Austin and the Pentagon, the State Department, I think initially tried to juggle, put, you know, sort of on the same level. But as it's become clear, it's just really, really fallen off. And part of the issue is Congress doesn't wanna fund Ukraine any further. And so Austin and Blinken and Biden can go talking about the importance of Ukraine. But if they don't have the money to support them, it almost makes sense for them to no longer talk about it as much because it looks like a failure for the administration and for The United States.

Babb: And this is classic politics. Right? I mean, I don't cover politics very often, but you look at what's happening in congress. This is an election year. They're fighting over funding. A lot of times, I feel like the Republicans are playing checkers with Democrats over this funding where The US and Russia are simultaneously in this chess match. And no one in congress is looking at the clock that's right next to that chessboard. It's time to make a move or your time runs out, and then there's no more funding. And then there's no more weapons for Ukraine. And then Ukraine de facto loses because they don't have the weapons that they need. So it's interesting to watch the prioritization on Capitol Hill because if you're looking at it from a national security perspective, especially from Ukraine, they are just kind of blown away by the fact that Ukraine aid has fallen out of favor because look at what happened immediately after Russia invaded. There was a lot of support for Ukraine, and you've just seen that support chip away in The US public, you know, little by little as time goes by and more money is spent. And, you know, you kinda wonder if this was Russia's plan all along to just chip away at support until The US and and Ukrainian allies no longer decide to fund Ukraine's ability to protect its sovereignty.

Mcfarlane: This may not be a question that you guys can answer. It depends on what defense officials and your contacts are telling you. But out of curiosity, is there a sense from them, I'm not asking about what you guys think, but more what the sort of the Pentagon and the defense establishment feels this. Is there a clear sense of which war between the Ukrainian war and the Israeli war, which war is more important for US strategic interests? Kind of going on from what you were just saying, Carla. I mean, obviously Israel is an incredibly, incredibly close ally of The United States, but a lot of people have argued that Russia and Putin's war ought to be a bigger concern for US interests, particularly given news such as the news we had this week that there is new weapons development going on by the Russians, new kinds of missiles and increasing involvement in that war from its allies like China, like North Korea, like Iran. We've sort of talked about whether the Americans are a bit distracted by the Israeli war in terms of that. But are you guys hearing an evaluation from defense officials about which war strategically ought to be prioritized right now?

Babb: Clearly, Ukraine needs the aid more than Israel needs USA. Israel has a very strong military. Israel can defend itself. Ukraine without Western weaponry, they do not have a chance against Russia. So they really do need not just The United States, but Western Europe to keep supplying them with aid. That is a priority for them. But let's not downplay how important Israel is to The United States. Israel is a very important ally as well. And this conflict, whether Israel wants to or not, has really, you know, turned the Middle East into a tinderbox. It started with the attack from Gaza into Israel. But then as soon as Israel hit back, then you saw all of these other attacks start happening. So that is something that The United States very much needs to get under control as well.

Ali: I would agree. I think since president Obama's administration, The US has tried to disengage from the Middle East as much as possible, and they keep on getting back sucked back in. And I think there is a realization that concentrating on The Middle East will take away from China and from Europe. And so I think I agree with Carla. If United States could magically make Israel, Gaza go away in terms of fighting, they would do that and really focus on Ukraine and Russia, which I think you know, they've publicly said this is a fight for democracy and the international rules based order. And I think that's where I if they could, they would totally focus on rather than Israel and Hamas.

THE MISSING DEFENSE SECRETARY

Mcfarlane: You guys have both given a really brilliant overview of all the different wildfires around the world that Pentagon bosses are having to deal with. It's not just the obvious wars, but obviously, you know, US troops stationed around the world, rising threats and hostility, all kinds of issues. It is not a quiet time for the US military. So why was the defense secretary sort of missing and went into hospital and his commander in chief this week didn't even know what was going on with it? That was quite a shocking story, wasn't it?

Babb: Yeah. Shocking is the exact word that I've been using on air over and over again. I mean, this is just something that you did not expect, and you certainly didn't expect for a hospitalization to go quiet and for people like secretary Austin's deputy not to even know that he was hospitalized for days, for the president of The United States not to find out that secretary Austin had cancer until yesterday. I mean, these are all things that are completely shocking. What's not shocking, I will say, is how private secretary of defense Lloyd Austin is. He's a very private man and frankly, you know, he doesn't like to engage with the media. So the fact that the media and the public found out at a later date is not surprising. But the way that it was rolled out, the amount of time that it took for people to know that he was even in the hospital, I've never seen anything like it. I've been at the Pentagon about ten years. I've never seen anything like it before.

Ali: Yeah. Shocking and unacceptable, I think, are probably two words that should be used. It's a toll on goal. He could have put a simple statement saying he was going to the hospital, complications, and I think people would have moved on. Colin Powell did it when he had it, when he said the State Department and secretary Austin's desire to stay quiet and private, you know, is now backfiring. And he's having to explain in detail what happened, why he made his boss, his deputy, much of the department look silly, really.

Mcfarlane: I mean, all empathy to the man. Obviously, having cancer is a life changing thing. And hopefully, you know, none of us have to experience it. And so obviously, it's an awful thing for secretary Lloyd Austin to be dealing with, as anyone to be dealing with, but it is an issue of transparency. And I guess I just wonder sort of how much of a big deal it is for the Secretary of Defense to go AWOL for a couple of days, even for Biden not to know, given that policy, that decision making on keeping America safe, that doesn't really start with the defense secretary. It all comes from the White House. I mean, defense secretary, your role is to be essentially an ambassador, right? You support and you advocate for the military, but in terms of deciding defense policy, that's really something that comes from the White House, right? I mean, was America in any danger when President Biden didn't know where his defense chief was?

Ali: Obviously, the chief decision maker is the president. But the one advising the president is the secretary. The one enacting those decisions is the secretary. So say, you know, the president wanted to strike the Houthis that day, and he couldn't get ahold of the secretary who was gonna then pass down those orders to central command, etcetera, etcetera. And so I think it is pretty consequential if the person who was supposed to enact your decisions, who was supposed to advise you, is missing. And of course, I wish him a speedy recovery too.

Babb: With his diagnosis, prostate cancer is relatively common. And so I think that what the White House is trying to do now is they're trying to get past this and talk about the future. They have thrown their full support to Austin. But as Idris was saying, you know, he was missing for several days, and that is concerning, especially when you think of the the people in the military and the civilians at the Pentagon who are not allowed to go AWOL essentially for several days and not tell their superiors where they are. You know, you have to tell your superiors where you are, and the president had no idea for several days exactly where Austin was. And so I think that when we look at this review that's gonna be coming out, I would hope that that's one of the things that they look into to prevent this from ever happening again.

Mcfarlane: That's it for this week's episode of One Decision. We drop new episodes every Thursday. Like and subscribe so you never miss an episode. Drop us a line. Tell us your thoughts. What decisions have impacted you and where you live? You can write to us. Our email is 1decision@1decisionpodcast.com. From me and the team, thank you for listening, and see you next time.