Hosted by John Raine and Sir Richard Dearlove
Guest
Ali Vaez
Ali Vaez is the International Crisis Group's Iran Project Director and Senior Adviser to the President. He led Crisis Group's work bridging gaps between Iran and the P5+1 in the run-up to the 2015 nuclear deal, and is widely regarded as one of the leading outside experts on Iran's nuclear and missile programs.
Before Crisis Group he was a Senior Political Affairs Officer at the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Iran Project Director at the Federation of American Scientists. He is an adjunct professor at Georgetown's Walsh School of Foreign Service and a fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS.
Originally from Shiraz, he was trained as a scientist and spent over a decade in journalism, including a stint as a foreign correspondent for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. He co-wrote How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare, writes regularly for the New York Times, Washington Post, The Guardian, The Atlantic, Foreign Policy, and Foreign Affairs, and appears often on CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, and NPR.
He was a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard from 2008 to 2010, holds a PhD from the University of Geneva and a master's from Johns Hopkins SAIS.
Episode Summary
Israel and the US may have extraordinary intelligence on Iran. But intelligence isn't the same as comprehension, according to nuclear physicist and 2015 Iran deal negotiator Ali Vaez.
Vaez joins John Raine and Sir Richard Dearlove to break down what Iran's nuclear capabilities really look like after the 12-day war. Plus, how Iran's Supreme National Security Council stays united under duress, how the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps maintains primacy over the regular army, and why sanctions now at "nine out of ten" still won't force collapse. Iran doesn't need to win this standoff. It just needs not to lose.
In this episode:
(00:00) Ali Vaez on wartime Iran
(02:39) Is Iran's leadership a monolith or divided?
(03:55) Power centers: the SNSC, the Basij, and the IRGC
(10:09) The mystery of Mojtaba Khamenei
(12:00) Economic and military pressure on Iran
(15:00) A forever war? Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, and the Houthis
(27:47) What does the Iranian public actually think?
(32:33) Iran's nuclear program: what do we really know?
(42:18) Israeli intelligence, diplomacy, and the Ahmadinejad theory
(52:19) The decision only Donald Trump can make
Hosted by Sir Richard Dearlove (former MI6 Chief) and co-host John Raine (International Institute for Strategic Studies).
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Transcript
COLD OPEN
[00:00] VAEZ: Israel has extraordinary intelligence about Iran. But intelligence is not the same as comprehension. Even when you understand it, you have to be able to translate that to policymakers in a way that is not tainted by biases or by hubris. And in this case we have two systems — both the Trump administration and the Netanyahu government — that have almost destroyed the policy process. There is not a lot of debate within these systems about pros and cons, or the main decision maker often chooses to ignore voices that seem to be critical.
INTRODUCTION
[00:52] RAINE: Welcome to One Decision, conversations about intelligence, statecraft, and the forces that drive world politics, with people who've been in the room and on the ground. I'm your co-host, John Raine, formerly of the UK Diplomatic Service. And I'm Sir Richard Dearlove, the former Chief of British Intelligence, MI6. Hi, John. It's good to be with you again, and we have got a very timely and interesting topic to discuss today.
Yeah, always a pleasure to see you too, Richard. We have indeed a very insightful interview ahead about the internal politics of wartime Iran. To keep up with all of our content, do subscribe wherever you get your podcasts, and we would be grateful if you could like this episode or drop us a comment on YouTube. That will help others find the show. But now, let's get to the business in hand.
The US and Iran are locked in a costly standoff that imperils the Iranian economy, which has already been strained for decades. From the outside, Iran can come across as a monolithic state. But how unified is the government in choosing continued confrontation over diplomacy? Could internal divisions widen to the point that they force a change of course or threaten the ruling order itself?
Ali Vaez joins us today to shed light on the internal dynamics of the Iranian regime and the state of Iran's nuclear program. He's also going to help us sketch possible pathways out of the present impasse. Ali is a leading authority on Iranian politics. He holds a PhD in nuclear physics and played a significant behind-the-scenes role in the negotiations that led to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Ali is currently the Deputy Program Director for the Middle East and North Africa at the International Crisis Group. Ali, welcome to One Decision.
IS TEHRAN A MONOLITH?
[03:28] RAINE: Ali, welcome to One Decision. The war, the on-off war between Iran and the US, continues. And it's a notoriously difficult country to read and a very different conflict. And one of the elements that it would be wonderful to hear your views on is the Iranian leadership itself. Is it a revolutionary monolith? Or does it represent several power centers and differing views on how to take the conflict forward, or indeed whether to settle now through negotiations. How would you characterize what's going on in Tehran?
[04:08] VAEZ: First of all, it's great to be with you. Second, you're putting your finger on one of the most difficult questions to answer because it's a very opaque political system. It has always been, but especially in the aftermath of this conflict, a lot of us look at it from the outside, we don't have a lot of visibility. But there are certain things that we can say with a high degree of certainty.
Number one is the fact that the system has survived precisely because it has developed a set of mechanisms to be able to make decisions under duress. One of those mechanisms that is a legacy of the Iran-Iraq war is the so-called Supreme National Security Council. This brings together, unlike for instance in the United States where you have the NSC, which is an executive body — everybody around the table is appointed by the president, whether it's military or civilian leadership — the SNSC in Iran brings together all elements of the government. So the head of the judiciary is sitting there, the head of the parliament is sitting there, every relevant military, security, intelligence, and foreign policy stakeholder is around the table. And they vote based on majority or preferably consensus. Once they settle on a policy and it gets the Supreme Leader's imprimatur, it becomes state policy.
This is, as I said, a legacy of the Iran-Iraq war, because during that war they realized that there were too many power centers in the Islamic Republic and that created a degree of chaos that made wartime decision making very difficult. And that mechanism over the years has been honed and has become very effective. They can make decisions very quickly. And the discussions we hear in Iran about the memorandum of understanding with the US in June — it all refers to how 12 out of the 13 members of the SNSC voted in favor of it — which demonstrates that it is still a mechanism that is functioning. So I would say the kind of decision making that you still have is collective, based on consensus.
Now, of course, like any other country in wartime, the military has a louder voice. It doesn't necessarily have a veto, but it does have a significant amount of influence in policymaking. And you see President Pezeshkian, for instance, saying time and time again, of course the military has been involved in everything we do and they matter a lot.
HOSSEIN TAEB AND THE HARD-LINERS
[07:24] RAINE: Talking about the people round the table — you rightly say some voices are stronger than others, particularly in wartime. There's the interesting hybrid entity in Iran of the Basij, who aren't technically the military but are essential to security. And what do you make of the role of Hossein Taeb, the leader of the Basij at the moment? In some narratives he's a sort of éminence grise who's pushing a very hard line, maybe getting out ahead, setting the pace. Where do you situate him and other hard-liners?
[08:01] DEARLOVE: So
[08:02] VAEZ: First of all, Hossein Taeb doesn't have a seat at that table that I was describing to you. His commander, the commander of Revolutionary Guards, does. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs does. But Hossein Taeb himself doesn't have a vote at that meeting. Having said that, he's an extremely influential figure because he's always been very close to the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, and was in fact trying to make him a serious candidate for the leadership at the time that his father was still alive, and was ostracized as a result of his push for a hereditary succession system. But now he's back and he's in charge of, as you said, the Basij, which is the militia of the Revolutionary Guards in charge of domestic security.
He was formerly the head of Revolutionary Guards Intelligence. And if you look at the order in which he's been appointed to this position, basically the new Supreme Leader wants him to merge this internal militia with an internal security organization so that the Basij does more than just enforcing social norms or looking after internal security, but it actually does even intelligence collection on the citizenry. But I do not believe that Hossein Taeb, for instance, would be able to dictate foreign policy. If you end up in a system like that, it would be absolutely chaotic and there would be different people fighting for position and influence and it would be totally unmanageable. So this is why it's fundamental to understand that this is a system that still sees itself in an existential battle for its survival and therefore cannot afford to end up in a chaotic situation. There are debates about everything, there are disagreements about everything. That's again the norm in Iran, the norm in Iranian culture — you put three Iranians in a room, you have five different opinions. But I don't see serious strategic divisions within the system, regardless of what's reported in the international and mainstream media.
THE IRGC VS. THE REGULAR ARMY
[10:35] RAINE: When you talk about the military though, is there a distinction to be made between the IRGC and the actual mainline Iranian military? Or are we looking at them as a solid group? I mean, if you take the parallel with Iraq — okay, maybe it's not entirely fair to do that — you knew the Special Republican Guard was quite different from the Iraqi army. Do you have that degree of distinction in the Iranian system?
[11:04] VAEZ: Well, yes, there is the Revolutionary Guards and there is the official army, the Artesh. But the reality is that the Revolutionary Guards has completely co-opted the traditional army and is much more influential than the army. And that's a 20-year process, it's not a new thing. Almost every chairman of the joint chiefs, almost every defense minister has hailed from the Revolutionary Guards. And so the Guards, even though it's smaller in terms of numbers and ranks and file, is disproportionately much more powerful.
WHERE IS MOJTABA KHAMENEI?
[11:46] RAINE: The picture you paint, Ali, is of a system that is designed — or at least can cope — with differing, sometimes deeply differing views at the top, yet remain cohesive. What role in all of this do you think Mojtaba himself is playing? Where is he? What is his political and constitutional role and activity at the moment?
[12:17] VAEZ: Well, he's a ghost, right? I mean honestly, when I was describing to you the certainties about what we know and how the SNSC functions, etc., how it's still consistently making decisions — the uncertainty is really about the man with the final say, which is Mojtaba. No one has seen him, no one has heard his voice, other than President Pezeshkian, who contends that he has met him twice. But again there are different accounts about whether it was in person or on video, or whether it was really seeing him or somebody conveying messages on Mojtaba's behalf. It's unclear. The simple answer is that we don't know. And a few weeks ago, Mojtaba made a few national security appointments, which I think were primarily aimed at putting his stamp on the system and saying, I'm here and I can make these decisions. The reality is that, unlike his father, who was very present and very public in taking positions, Mojtaba is missing in action. And that in and of itself creates, I would say, a degree of uncertainty in the system, which they might be able to manage as long as they are in a war footing, but not permanently. In the Islamic Republic the Supreme Leader is supposed to represent the hidden Imam, the twelfth Imam of the Shias. He's not supposed to be a hidden Imam himself.
ECONOMIC AND MILITARY PRESSURE
[13:55] RAINE: There's a certain amount of solidity in the way that this council conducts itself in terms of economic decision making. But if one looks in the direction of the economy now, how severe is the economic pressure and how severe is the military pressure on them?
[14:17] VAEZ: So the economic pressure was severe even before the war started. Right after the 12-day war, the Iranians were really struggling even to keep the lights on. There were serious water shortages, energy shortages, inflation, unemployment — all chronic issues in Iran. Now, as a result of the war and the US naval blockade and the tightening of sanctions, the economic pressure they are under is tremendous. However, having said this, we have to put it in context. The context is: if the dial of sanctions prior to the current situation was eight out of ten, it is now nine out of ten. So yes, it's higher, but they had already resisted, tolerated, and absorbed eight degrees of pressure. Is the one extra degree going to break the bank? Unclear. I don't think so, but unclear. And plus we can never get to ten. We can never get to eleven, because this is a country that has 15 neighbors through land and sea. So you can't really impose a hermetic seal on it. It will always find a way through the Caspian Sea, through the Caucasus, through Turkey, through Iraq, through Pakistan. It's really impossible to turn it into another Cuba. Plus it has great power support — China, Russia — and has a lot of experience in circumventing US sanctions. So yes, economic pressure is enormous, but I don't think it would result in economic collapse, at least not in the short run.
And militarily, this is one of the only countries in the world that has spotted the mightiest military power in the world — the United States — the mightiest intelligence agency in the world — Israel — and is still bold enough to launch preemptive strikes against the United States. Yes, it's not winning, but it doesn't need to win. It just needs not to lose, and it is achieving that objective. So on both fronts, both economically and militarily, it is under tremendous pressure. I'm not trying to downplay that. But it has survived the former for many years and is no longer afraid of the latter.
A FOREVER WAR AT LOW INTENSITY?
[16:57] RAINE: Ali, given that characterization of the regime and its resilience — a question a lot of people are asking is: are we stuck now with a new norm in which the US and Iran, a little bit like Israel and Lebanon, are locked in this protracted conflict with periodic spikes, which simply means you can never be confident that it's over? Is that a new norm, or do you see a way, perhaps through negotiations, eventually out of this and back to something that's just more recognizable, even if it's not actually the status quo ante?
[17:41] VAEZ: That's a very good question. My sense is that the status quo is not sustainable. And this is because this is not a bilateral conflict that only affects the main antagonists, right? So Israel and Lebanon can fight for many months or many years and it does affect the Israeli population in the north and the Lebanese population in the south, but it doesn't paralyze the global economy. The current state of the conflict between Iran and the United States is affecting everyone. Everyone around the world, in Europe, in Latin America, in South Africa — whoever goes to a gas station would feel it. People would feel it at supermarkets around the world and would feel it even more in the coming months because of the shortages of fertilizer and so on.
So this is not something that at this level can continue. But having said this, I do believe that the Trump administration is fundamentally unable to reach a comprehensive agreement with Iran that would settle everything once and for all. It is fundamentally unable to win, meaning defeat the Iranian regime or change the Iranian regime. So if you can't really solve the problem one way or another, what does it mean? It means that you probably would go through cycles of ad hoc truce — like what we experienced a few months ago, a ceasefire, a memorandum of understanding — that would just create a reprieve, a short-term reprieve. And then that would fall apart because it's not really addressing the main substantive issues between the two sides. They would get back into a series of tit-for-tats or short and sharp conflicts. But then again they would have to get back into some kind of an ad hoc truce and the cycle would repeat itself. So it's some form of a forever war, but I would say at a low intensity.
CAN THE GULF STATES CHANGE THE DYNAMIC?
[19:55] RAINE: And do you think, Ali, that other actors here — most notably the Gulf states, who are not only actors but victims — is it within their power to change that very unsatisfactory outcome? Could they, through bilateral agreements with Iran, perhaps a collective agreement between the GCC states and Iran, compensate for the absence of what you describe as a strategic solution with the US? Or is it incidental what the Gulf states do?
[20:30] VAEZ: Look, the Gulf states are stuck in a terrible position. They didn't want this war to start, but they're unable to end it on their own. They don't really have much control over it. They have tried through mediation to try to bring it to an end. But the continuation of the current situation is really disastrous, especially for those who don't have alternative routes around the Strait of Hormuz, like Kuwait or Bahrain or Qatar. But even those who do, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, they're now coming under increasing pressure because of what's happening in the Red Sea with the Houthis. They would have loved this conflict to be over yesterday. The problem again is they have limited leverage with the United States and Iran.
There is really only so much that they can do other than trying to encourage both sides to get back into an MOU or some sort of understanding. They tried another path through negotiating arrangements for administrating traffic in the Strait of Hormuz once it reopens — the so-called Hormuz deal that Iran and Oman, in consultation with the other GCC states, had put together — in the hope that that would generate momentum that would then lead Iran and the US to come back into the MOU or some version of it. But the current tensions have even derailed that diplomatic initiative. Again, if this situation continues, the entire business model of places like Qatar or the UAE, where there's supposed to be safe havens for travel, for business, for finance, tourism, etc., really comes into question. So the scenario that I described to you, which is a forever war, would be an absolute calamity for them. But again, there's not much that they have been able to do about it so far.
SAUDI ARABIA AND THE HOUTHIS
[22:55] RAINE: But what about the Saudi dimension? Because in the last few weeks, with the loss of control of the coastal areas in the south of Yemen to the Houthis and the Houthi advance on Mecca, it seems to me that the Saudis are weighty players — or they should be weighty players — and I'm surprised at their inability either to draw the United States in more to support them, or on the other hand, to achieve more on their own. And it seems to me that this is a quite severe deterioration in the overall conflict.
[23:40] VAEZ: Well, yes, it really exacerbated the situation just in the past few days. But the reality is that the Houthi problem for Saudi Arabia is of course not a new phenomenon. They organized an entire coalition to try to resolve the problem. It didn't work. The United States last year engaged in two months of very severe bombardment of the Houthis, and finally withdrew through an understanding with the Houthis. The Israelis have even wiped out the Houthis' government as prime minister and have inflicted sharp pain on the Houthis by targeting the Hodeidah port and so on. None of it has worked. This issue simply does not have a military solution.
But at this moment I think there are a few elements we can discuss as to why the situation has exacerbated so much. One is that there were differences between the UAE and Saudi Arabia a few months ago over the groups that the Emiratis were supporting in the south. And the Saudis basically forced the Emiratis to withdraw their support and try to unify the pro-government forces. But clearly they were not there. They were taken by surprise. They're now trying to regroup and push back against the Houthis, but the setbacks they suffered in the past few days is indicative of how unprepared they were. So that's one element.
The second element is that the United States is now overstretched as a result of this conflict with Iran. As I told you last year, President Trump decided that especially when the Houthis came pretty close to targeting two US warships, the cost-benefit of this conflict doesn't make sense for him. Now that the US is dealing with a dwindling number of interceptors, it is simply an overstretch to join in the Saudi campaign against the Houthis — which again they know is not necessarily going to succeed. So it's only going to add to the strain on US military capabilities and commitments.
And finally it's the Iranian element here, which is that although I don't believe that the Iranians were really dictating the timing of the Houthi advances in the past few weeks, they do benefit from it enormously. Because the key objective of Iran at this moment — in this race against time that it sees itself in — is trying to increase the pain on the US and the global economy so that President Trump blinks first, in the same way that the US is trying to exert enormous economic pressure on the Iranians so that they would blink first. The one thing that could increase energy prices, and has in the past few days, is the pressure that the Houthis have put on Saudi oil production, on the East-West pipeline that takes a few million barrels of Saudi oil to the Red Sea, on traffic in the Red Sea, on even attacks in the past few weeks on a Mediterranean port in Egypt. Which basically signals that if this conflict continues or escalates further, it's not just the Strait of Hormuz that will be at play, but we will be talking about three critical choke points. So it's a very high-stakes and dangerous dynamic that we're witnessing right now.
IRAN'S MASTER PLAN FOR THE CHOKE POINTS?
[27:57] RAINE: Ali, we could face a scenario where both of the critical seaways for oil exports — the Red Sea and the Gulf — are closed or controlled by Iran and or its allies. The state that's going to feel that most will be Saudi Arabia. Now the Saudis have an arrangement, an accommodation, call it what you will, with the Iranians, and reportedly they've used that. They've used the hotline between Riyadh and Tehran, including when they were bombing one another. So my question really is: are the Iranians intentionally squeezing Saudi Arabia, with whom they have a very long-standing history of contestation — with of course a religious dimension as well? Or have the Houthis here broadly acted in what they think is in line with Iranian interests? Or have they indeed been acting entirely independently and it's coincidental? Is there an Iranian master plan here to control both the choke points and the fate of Saudi Arabia's economy? Or has that come about through a cluster of reasons?
[29:15] VAEZ: Well, it's a bit of both. This investment that Iran made in the Houthis many years ago is being cashed out right now, but it is also because the Houthis wanted to break their own embargo — the embargo that the Saudis have imposed on them. So it is also coincidental because of the regional dynamics and the Houthis' sense that now there is an opportunity to try to break their own embargo. But the Iranians have said very openly — they don't try to hide the fact — that if they cannot export oil, nobody else would be able to export oil. And their oil exports have now been dwindling close to zero. There is speculation that some of the Iraqi oil that is still coming out of the Strait of Hormuz might have Iranian oil mixed with it, but other than that, the Iranian oil exports have almost virtually stopped. They have said that they would put pressure on other countries, so the Iranian motivation is clear.
But again, it's not as if the Houthis wanted to live in peace and quiet with the Saudis and they were strong-armed by the Iranians. They too wanted to try to get out of their own embargo. Remember that all of this started with the Saudis bombing the Sana'a airport back in July. An Iranian plane was trying to land, bringing back some of the Houthi officials who had been to Iran for the funeral of the Supreme Leader. It's a bit of both. It's an opportunity but it's also part of the grand strategy of Iran.
THE IRANIAN POPULACE — DIVIDED OR SUPPRESSED?
[31:09] RAINE: We've talked about the Iranian leadership and the economy a bit, but what about the state of the populace in Iran, if you can generalize to that extent? Because it has been this huge source of tension on a regular rolling basis for the leadership, and there have been what I guess the best way to describe them as uprisings of degrees of seriousness on a number of issues. Is the Iranian populace now in a state of Iranian nationalism and therefore equivocal towards the regime? Or is there still this element of huge opposition to the regime but completely suppressed by a violent and vindictive leadership? How do you read that?
[32:00] VAEZ: So as you said, it's very hard to generalize the sentiments of 94 million people, especially in the absence of reliable surveys. But my sense is that there are a few groups that we can talk about. One is basically the regime's core constituents — the regime supporters who we always believe are probably around 15-20% of the Iranian people — and they support the regime for different reasons: financial interests, ideological beliefs, and so on. That group I think is now more energized than it has ever been in the past, because of what has happened. The very fact that the regime's narrative has been vindicated by the United States and Israel. For years the Islamic Republic used to say that US-Israeli animosity is not against the Iranian regime, but it's against the Iranian state. And when President Trump goes out there and talks about civilizational erasure or hitting the Iranian energy grid or civilian infrastructure, or publishes a photo of using a hammer to break up Iran — it again underlines that the regime's narrative was correct. And this energizes the revolutionary base that was almost on the verge of being completely disillusioned prior to the recent confrontations with Israel and the US.
The other group I would say are those who are opponents of the regime. And we know that 70-80% of the Iranian population — and I'm saying this based on some of the surveys that the regime itself had done in the past few years, and also participation in the elections — there was 70-80% discontent within Iranian society. And from that group, probably again around 20-30% are more hardcore opponents of the regime who hated it and now hate it even more because of the January massacre of the protesters and because it is continuing to repress very severely even as it executes this war.
And then you have the group in between, the so-called silent majority. That group I think is now really torn, because it understands that defending the country, the state, is important — and the entity that is doing it is the Revolutionary Guards, which is also responsible for corruption and repression. But it also remembers the trauma of the massacre that was just a few months ago. I would say that silent majority — if it was possible to bring it to the streets a few months ago, if some elements of that group were hoping for a solution that would come from the outside, whether it's the United States or Israel or Iranian opposition leaders in the diaspora — that group I think is now less energized and less enthusiastic about the possibility of some kind of radical change that would make things better. And in fact doesn't see really much light at the end of a tunnel. So there is a great sense of despair within that group. And if you put these three in a balance, you would realize that this war has actually strengthened the regime because its opponents are less hopeful, less energized, and its proponents are much more electrified and enthusiastic about resisting and fighting for it.
THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM — SIX DAYS AND SIX MONTHS
[36:11] RAINE: Ali, thank you very much. That is quite a bleak picture of a cowed population. There's one war aim which has endured for the US, and that's been that Iran should never have a nuclear program. Regime change came and went as a war aim. But it's not often that we have not only a distinguished commentator but also a nuclear physicist to talk about this issue. So I think the first question is: given that there's been no access for inspectors since the June 12-day war — and as Rafael Grossi himself, head of the IAEA, has said, we don't really know what's going on inside the program now — what's your best estimate as to what the regime, as you say energized and defined, is doing? Do you think they're rebuilding? Do you think they've hidden that 440 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium stockpiled somewhere? What's your best estimate?
[37:15] VAEZ: So let me answer this question in a few different ways, because I don't have a very clear-cut answer. Simply, I think we don't know. The only way of knowing is to have people on the ground, whether it's boots on the ground or inspectors on the ground, and we don't have that. This program went from being one of the most transparent programs in the world — when we had a nuclear deal negotiated in 2015 and was implemented from 2016 to 2019, it was the most transparent program in the world — to becoming translucent as the Iranians started reducing their compliance with the agreement that President Trump had reneged on. And it's now, after the 12-day war, totally opaque.
My sense is that at a strategic level, the Iranian leadership has not yet made a decision about weaponization. And again, the reason is simple. They are fighting for their life. The decision to go nuclear requires a lot of debate within the system — calculating costs and benefits, making sure that the security loopholes that were used in the past to either sabotage the program or kill Iranian senior nuclear scientists or senior leadership are all closed. It's a very difficult thing to do when you're in the middle of a war like this — to make a decision as to what is the role of nuclear deterrence in Iran's new national security doctrine in the aftermath of this war. What's the role of Iranian proxies, the so-called forward defense policy? What's the role of Iran's conventional capabilities as missiles and drones, which played such a huge role in this war? What's the role of the Strait of Hormuz and so on? So this requires the dust to settle for that debate to happen.
But I can tell you there is now much more pressure, both bottom up and top down, for weaponization. The bottom-up part of it you can understand, because the population that was exposed to Israeli and US fighter jets maneuvering in Iranian skies does feel that it needs some kind of protection that nothing else has provided. And given how close they are to the verge of nuclear weapons, it has become so much more popular within segments of society. And top down also, because they think that they've paid the economic price for a bomb, they've been attacked twice, and nothing else has proven to be an effective deterrent — they need to take the last step. And again, when President Trump says, you know, if Iran had a nuclear weapon, he would have to call the Supreme Leader and be respectful, the way that he is to Kim Jong-un — again, it underlines that maybe they should do this. That debate is still taking place. But I don't think strategically they have made a decision.
Then the second problem they have is at the logistical level, which is that if they try to move this material — which is buried — if they try to fire up centrifuges in one of their bunkered facilities, most importantly the so-called pickaxe mountain that President Trump has threatened to bomb a few times, it might actually become a casus belli itself. It might invite another strike. And so they might not be able to get there in time. And even if they do — let's imagine they manage to have one nuclear warhead and they test it — is it really enough? Does it really create deterrence? Because they have attacked Israel multiple times, which has dozens of nuclear warheads. I think as a result of all of this, that decision hasn't been made and they haven't really taken steps.
But I'll end with this: if you had asked me prior to the 12-day war how long it would take for Iran to enrich enough uranium for a single nuclear weapon, I would tell you six days. And if you had asked me how long it would take Iran to then fashion that material into some kind of rudimentary nuclear weapon, I would say six months. And if you ask me today what that timeline is, it's exactly the same.
ISN'T THERE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A BOMB AND A PROGRAM?
[42:01] RAINE: Isn't there a difference though between, let's say, crafting a bomb — a one-off — but having a nuclear weapons program? What you're suggesting is that they've got the material left to make a weapon or a couple of weapons, as it were, they can put that together. But it's not like having a whole program of weaponization running. I'm assuming that more or less has been destroyed. Is that your understanding too?
[42:35] VAEZ: So look, what do you need for a nuclear weapon? You need material, you need the machinery, you need manpower, and you need know-how. They have it all. They have a stockpile of half a ton of 60% enriched uranium, which is really a stone's throw away from weapons grade. It literally is as close as you can get with weapons grade, and plus you can actually do a nuclear detonation even with 60% enriched uranium. You don't need to enrich it further.
They had produced hundreds of advanced centrifuges that, as a result of President Trump's withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal, we no longer know where they were storing. But they probably still have dozens, or enough for a dash towards nuclear weapons, stockpiled somewhere. Israel killed about two dozen nuclear scientists — they have hundreds of nuclear scientists. And we know that for years they've been experimenting, especially with computer modeling, on how to develop a nuclear warhead. And again, here we're talking about a rudimentary one, not a very sophisticated one that goes into the cone of a missile and will have to survive reentry into the atmosphere with a ballistic missile. We're talking about a flash in a desert, and Iran declaring itself to have joined the nuclear club — to be the tenth country to join the nuclear club. That kind of thing doesn't require at this point a dedicated nuclear weapons program. They have all the elements for it.
COULD IRAN BUILD A BOMB IN SECRET?
[44:15] RAINE: Ali, we've been surprised before by the Iranian nuclear program. They have been undertaking research at a scale that we didn't fully understand. Can I ask you — given that very sobering statement you made, six days and six months effectively to produce a bomb — could we be surprised? Do you think they could, in secrecy, without triggering a preemptive Israeli or US strike, produce such a device?
[44:49] VAEZ: Honestly, I would not be able to rule it out. Again, I'm skeptical because I don't think the decision has been made. I'm skeptical because I don't think that they have been able to close those security loopholes that could result in a preemptive strike. But having said all of this, the motivation is certainly much higher than it has been in the past. And the capabilities that have been lost were the capabilities that were mostly for a civilian nuclear program. If you want to do a very dedicated military nuclear weapons program, you can do it in a basement or in a cave. It really doesn't require much. Some people talk about the metalwork that would have to be done. But again, that you can do in any laboratory, and this is a vast country with so many academic and non-academic laboratories that could be used for a purpose like this. So yes, I mean I really cannot rule out the possibility that they might surprise us. But again, I want to put it in a context that doesn't necessarily resolve Iran's dilemma, which is: does it provide the deterrence that — as you know, in the minds of Iran's strategic thinkers — is what they have lost since October 7th. And I doubt that having one or even a few rudimentary nuclear weapons would really resolve that problem for them.
ISRAEL'S INTELLIGENCE VS. COMPREHENSION
[46:33] RAINE: One of the dimensions of this conflict, going right back to the beginning, which puzzles me — it's quite clear from the evidence that Mossad's intelligence coverage inside Iran has been pretty extraordinary. Their ability to mount their military operations and take out individuals, particularly during that 12-day conflict. Do you think that the Israelis deliberately misled the Trump administration over the fragility of the regime initially? Or did both the Americans and the Israelis share that view? And the follow-on from that is: one would expect Israeli intelligence coverage of what's going on in Iran to be pretty detailed. If it was so good before, they must have clear insights into what's happening amongst the governing elite — whether there is a group that wants some sort of deal or settlement, or whether the hard-liners are calling all the shots. How do you read that situation? Because I find it very surprising that the Americans seem to be in a really confused situation if you believe all the media commentary. Whereas the Israelis themselves shouldn't be.
[48:26] VAEZ: Well, you're absolutely right that Israel has extraordinary intelligence about Iran. But intelligence is not the same as comprehension. And that's because you really have to understand the culture of a country, the political culture of a country, to be able to understand what all the information you have actually means. So that's one dimension here. And the second is that even when you understand it, you have to be able to translate that to policymakers in a way that is not tainted by biases or by hubris. And in this case we have two systems — both the Trump administration and the Netanyahu government — that have almost destroyed the policy process. There is not a lot of debate within these systems about pros and cons, or the main decision maker often chooses to ignore voices that seem to be critical. In Netanyahu's case, I would say because he's ideological about the question of Iran. And in President Trump's case, I would say it was because he was coming out of the Venezuela experience. He had a hot hand. He believed that this was going to be yet another pivotal moment in which he can change the future of the Middle East in ways that none of his predecessors has been able to do. And that resulted in, I think, misjudgments, even though information was pretty extraordinary, but it did lead to misguided decisions.
Now I think it's actually harder, because without any doubt, when you have two major conflicts in which you draw a lot from your sources within the Iranian system and society, by definition you burn a lot of them. I feel that now it's much harder for Israel to do what it did last year and this year. It would take some time for them to find new ways, develop new assets, and so on. So at this moment it's harder. The Iranian regime has its guards up and it's probably not going to bring them down anytime soon.
The conversation we had about Taeb and the plans to basically turn Iran into another East German kind of society — in and of itself tells you about how difficult it will be to recreate the kind of influence that Israel had. And moving forward, the reason that the options are limited is that the US and Israel have thrown almost the entire kitchen sink of policy options at the Iranians. So there's not much left to do. When you do maximum pressure of sanctions, you by definition max yourself out of leverage because there's not much else left to sanction. When the Europeans snap back the UN sanctions on Iran or refer Iran's dossier to the Security Council, again there's not much else that could be done. When you use your military prowess to try to degrade Iranian military capabilities, but they have been planning for the stay for years — and especially since the 12-day war last year — again, there are not a lot of options that are immediately available. So this is partly, I would say, an intelligence failure. But for the most part I would say it's a failure of imagination and comprehension.
WHAT'S THE PATHWAY TO NEGOTIATIONS?
[52:30] RAINE: Ali, we've probably exhausted the coercive options and indeed sadly we've almost exhausted our time. But a couple of questions. First, if we're not coercing Iran to get a result, does that mean it's going to have to be negotiations? And if you think it is negotiations, what's the pathway? And a second slightly off-beat question — Richard and I did a session on the plot that was revealed to resurrect Ahmadinejad as the placement president in Iran, which is an extraordinary thing. And I just throw this in now because some people might still say — bearing in mind everything that you've said about the regime being cohesive, there are cracks in the regime, there is pressure, there's a sort of exhaustion with the revolution — so why not take a punt on another character? Two questions then, Ali: what might be the process to negotiations, and would negotiations either require or result in a new-look regime with American approval, possibly handpicked by the Americans?
[53:50] VAEZ: The only thing that has worked, if you look at the long history of using different tools against Iran, the only thing that has delivered results is actually diplomacy. In 2015 we did manage to roll back their program and put it in a box under rigorous monitoring. Nothing else has. Sabotage, covert operations, military options as I described to you — none of it has really resolved the problem. Whereas diplomacy — Iran was supposed to have only 300 kilograms of enriched uranium below 3.67% until 2031. You know, still a few years from now. The problem with diplomacy, I think, is that it requires doing a deal that is win-win. It requires really giving Iran the kind of incentives that are politically unattractive for any US president — especially a president who had condemned his predecessors for giving Iran cash, and even when he had an MOU with Iran was brutally criticized by both sides of the aisle in Washington for rewarding Iran with money. So diplomacy with Iran unfortunately is not attractive politically, but I don't see another way, because again we've tried everything else. And by the way, even the MOU with all of its shortcomings — in the one week that it was in force, it restored 50% of the traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. So again, we know what works and what doesn't work.
In terms of US ability or Israeli ability to shape domestic political dynamics in Iran, the Ahmadinejad case is actually a very good example. Because it shows you not just the limit of military power but the limit of being able to influence a complex political structure overlaid on top of a very complex society. Ahmadinejad was sidelined by the former Supreme Leader. He was always a very ambitious man who was angry at having been sidelined. And so I can see that he was susceptible to outreach by foreign intelligence. But the very fact that he is still living, walking the streets of Iran, going to official ceremonies — also tells you something else, which is that probably the Iranians also figured out what Israel was trying to do and turned Ahmadinejad into a double agent. And that's why not only the plan with him didn't work, but he's still alive. That again gives you a sense of not underestimating the enemy and not engaging in wishful thinking. I used to say to my students at Georgetown University: half of the battle is really understanding your enemy. And if you don't understand your enemy, by definition whatever you do is bound to fail.
[57:03] RAINE: That's a great note to conclude on, and that's a comment that would resonate with Richard and me. Yeah, we agreed with you on the Ahmadinejad double agent theory. I just couldn't believe that he wasn't under Iranian control. Can't wait for the movie.
ONE DECISION TO WATCH
[57:33] RAINE: The one decision that could break the impasse that we seem to be in now.
[57:39] VAEZ: The most critical decision is really President Trump's, because for the Iranians, there is no decision to be made. They have no choice other than trying to absorb as much pain as possible. And they can't afford to give in or give up, because that would validate pressure — and from the perspective of a weaker state, that's fatal. But President Trump at some point will have to make a decision. The question is whether he would make a decision along the lines that I described — some sort of a tactical reprieve to buy time, and maybe get back at it at a later point after the midterms — or that he would make a decision that he would do something that no one else has really seriously done, which is to engage in the kind of deal-making with Iran that is extremely unpopular. But if there's one president who can do it — especially a president after the midterm elections who has very little to lose — it is him.
[58:40] RAINE: Ali Vaez, thank you very much for your insights and sharing your expertise with us today on a number of subjects. Been a pleasure. Thank you. Very good discussion.
[58:50] VAEZ: Great pleasure. Thanks for having me.
POST-INTERVIEW DISCUSSION
[58:56] RAINE: Well, that was a very thought-provoking conversation, I thought, Richard. Yeah, I was quite locked into listening to him because he's really painting a pretty black picture. What we're looking at in his opinion is — I wouldn't say a frozen conflict, but a conflict which is going to be incredibly difficult to resolve. I didn't detect many cracks or alternatives in his analysis which might take us down in a different direction. What he said about the nuclear program was riveting. But I personally would draw a distinction between a program — which is a program — and you know crafting an explosive device which you let off in the desert to show that you can do it. There is a distinction there, because you're not talking about a tested weapons program. But that's a technical point that you and I probably understand, although he's a nuclear scientist.
I'm well, you can say I'm slightly lost for words, because he's indicating a real blockage and a continuation of a conflict which could go on for months. And I don't see personally either side being able to sustain the patience or the capability to let it just roll on and on without some sort of exit. I just wonder whether there's more fragility inside Iran than he is saying. And that's one of the reasons why I pressed him on the intelligence issue. Because it could well be that the Americans know from the Israelis — or both of them know — that there are some strains and stresses, and that if they sit tight for long enough, those will come to the surface. That's the only thing which he doesn't appear to admit or agree with. So how do you read it, John? Because you both have been dealing with this country for many years.
[01:01:02] RAINE: Similarly, Richard, I thought it was quite a bleak characterization of the mood amongst Iranians, the options — or complete lack of them — that they have for change. And similarly, quite bleak in terms of the picture of a beleaguered but united and still combative Iranian leadership. And perhaps more realist than bleak, his description of exhausted options. I think one has to accept that the coercive options are exhausted. Unfortunately the one that leaves, which is engagement and negotiations, is not one which currently the Americans want to pursue.
And I'm always reminded of the adage around Iran, which is that ultimately the one country Iran wants to talk to and befriend is the US. And negotiations with almost anybody else is either a route to that possibly, but it's never a place to stop. And he was very clear on how negotiations they may be having with Gulf states are not really going to solve the problem. No, but I quite agree with you. I've always said that the Middle East in its historic configuration — the issue which would, as it were, make the Middle East look different is the relationship between the United States and Iran. Because when both the Sunni and the Shia leaderships have a balanced relationship with the US administration, despite all the fault lines, political and religious, in the Middle East, it's been made to work reasonably well — obviously not without crisis and conflict.
[01:03:25] RAINE: And the other country that we didn't discuss, that is being gradually sucked into the conflict and of course has significant military power, is Egypt. And I just wonder how strategic discussions are going on amongst the Egyptian leadership. Because if they closed the bottom of the Red Sea, I mean the follow-on from that is a possible closure of the Suez Canal. And certainly a very heavy hit on revenues. Yemen historically is a country in which they have a record of intervention. Is that close to their existential concerns?
And I was surprised by his rather dismissive attitude towards the Saudis. I mean the Saudis are a major power in the Middle East and they certainly still have massive financial clout internationally. And they're very, very squeezed. So going back to your comment — this could go on for months, and that was a clear impression that Ali gave. But I was also thinking, and this is something you've seen firsthand, Richard — the end can come very quickly, as it does with bankruptcy, which can appear so solid. That's why I just personally don't feel — it's a great analysis and I think it was a great exposure of the complexity of the situation and the blockage that we've got. But I think in 48 hours something could trigger and it could look very different very quickly. Where that comes from, how that comes from, is hard to predict. And I'm not sure that the Iranian populace, 80% of them as he said, are going to sit there and suffer in silence indefinitely. Judging by what's happened elsewhere in Eastern Europe and in Middle Eastern states, that could be a scenario that everyone is surprised by.
Well, that's all for this episode. Please do join us every Thursday for new episodes and subscribe to One Decision on YouTube so you never miss out on a conversation. If you could leave us your comments on YouTube too. Email us at hello@onedecision.com. That would be appreciated. Please do check out onedecision.com for commentaries and explainers and for episodes that you might have missed. I'm John Raine. Thank you for listening.
