French Elections: The Far Right, Russia and NATO

Hosted by Christina Ruffini and Sir Richard Dearlove

Guests

Sophie Pedder

Sophie Pedder is The Economist's Paris Bureau Chief discussing how the National Rally's recent stunning European election results sent shockwaves across France.

Idrees Ali

Idrees Ali is Reuters' Defense and Foreign Policy correspondent providing the picture from Washington as preparations are underway for NATO's 75th anniversary.

Episode Summary

As France prepares to vote in the second round of its parliamentary elections, it appears that Marine Le Pen's far-right National Rally may not end up with the majority French President Emmanuel Macron fears—but his troubles are far from over. The Economist's Paris Bureau Chief Sophie Pedder joins One Decision to discuss how the National Rally's recent stunning European election results sent shockwaves across France all the way to the Elysee, prompting Macron to call a snap election that likely has backfired for him and his allies. Plus, Reuters' Defense and Foreign Policy correspondent Idrees Ali gives us the picture from Washington as preparations are underway for the upcoming 75th anniversary of NATO at a time of growing skepticism across Europe.

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Transcript

INTRODUCTION

Mcfarlane: You're listening to One Decision, the podcast that looks at the choices made that shape our world. I'm your host, Julia McFarlane. We're officially halfway through this bumper year of elections, and one country that we perhaps were not expecting to have joined that club was France. That is, until unprecedented gains by the far right party led by firebrand Marine Le Pen prompted the French president Macron to take a gamble and call snap elections. The first round earlier this week saw Le Pen's National Rally walk off in the lead with more than 32% of the vote. Ahead of a decisive second round taking place this Sunday, the leftist opposition have decided to join ranks to block her movement from getting a majority, or so they hope. All of this, of course, comes at a critical time, when does it not, as NATO prepares for a historic seventy fifth summit in Washington next week, as far right movements continue gaining ground in Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands. And of course, have a general election here in the UK. So amid a time of huge change, we at One Decision also have important news of our own. My co-host, Sir Richard Dearlove, is going to be joined on this podcast with a counterpart from the other side of the pond, the former CIA director Leon Panetta. We are thrilled to now have two former spymasters who'll be able to dissect the news and reflect on the key decisions impacting us all around the world. But for now, back to France and to the chain of events that president Macron ignited with that risky call for a snap election. We sat down earlier with The Economist's Paris bureau chief, Sophie Pedder, who's covered France's politics and economics for two decades and is the best place to explain to us what is going on in French politics right now. Also joining us is Reuters' defense and foreign policy correspondent Idrees Ali for the expert view from Washington, where those preparations are underway for that crucial NATO summit.

INTERVIEW

Mcfarlane: Sophie, it's been a wild time in French politics these last couple of months. So let's start from early June when Marine Le Pen's National Rally, the RN, achieved their best ever results in the European parliamentary elections. They won 32% of the votes, more than double what was achieved by President Macron's allies. Far right and populist parties have also won big gains in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. And shortly after this, President Macron made a bold call, which was to dissolve the National Assembly and to call snap legislative elections. Walk us through Macron's risky strategy and the fact that the RN did extremely well in the recent first round of voting.

Pedder: Things might have changed in the last few days. Well, let's go and start with the decision to hold these elections, which has baffled everybody. It baffles most of his, I would say, all the deputies in parliament that I've spoken to, some of the ministers, even the people closest to him were really taken aback by this decision. It's important to know that he didn't have to call it. He's been running a minority government for the last two years, ever since he was reelected president and then was that was followed by a parliamentary election. He lost his majority, and this has made the last couple of years very difficult for him domestically in terms of passing legislation. He's always had to try and find the vote somewhere. And if he hasn't got the votes, he's had to sometimes force things through parliament. And that has been an extremely unpopular way of governing and has led to all sorts of efforts by the opposition parties to try and bring governments down. So he was facing this anyway. This was going to be coming up in September, probably when he passed his budget. And I think that Emmanuel Macron's view was that he didn't want to be boxed into a corner and forced to do this on somebody else's terms. He preferred to take the initiative and do it on his terms. So we called the snap election, and as we can see, the results really look already bad for him in the first round. They're going to look, I think, as bad for him in the second and possibly opening the way to the far right holding the biggest number of seats in parliament.

Mcfarlane: I want to chew over what exactly that means for French politics. The fact that no matter what happens in the second more determinative round of the elections this week on the July 7. But let's just chew over the fact that initially when the first round was called and there were those stunning gains made by the RN, by Marine Le Pen's party, it kind of set off a huge panicked response among the French establishment. We saw the opposition to the far right, the socialists and the far left on the other side, they've really started working together. What they are trying to do is work together amongst themselves, pulling candidates in areas where it's a three way race between the far right and different constituents of Emmanuel Macron's allies and the leftists. And so what we have is a sort of establishment trying to block the RN from winning in the election.

Pedder: What's happened now, and this is you're absolutely right. Because there's a two round election in France and you have a threshold for candidates to qualify, and that means that you can have in a runoff vote in the second round, you can have more than two candidates. You can also be elected straight out in the first round. I mean, it's interesting to note that Marine Le Pen herself, for example, she got 58% of the votes in the Pas-de-Calais, that's in the north of France, in the first round. So she is a reelected deputy. But for most candidates, it's not possible, they go through to the second round. But if you have three candidates, one of them at the top is the RN, the National Rally, her party, then the opposition effectively splits the vote. And so what you've seen is it's an interesting one. It's not really a sort of coordinated let's all sit around a table and carve up the map of France sort of effort. It's much more of a sort of, you know, informal conversations, but also a gradual national consciousness that this is the only way to try and stop it getting this majority. And it has led, after a lot of, you know, bad feeling and difficult negotiations and conversations, it has led to candidates both on the hard left or the left wing alliance or in the center left, and in the center, Macron's party standing down in favor of each other. And some of those have been very difficult decisions. I mean, two ministers last night held out to the absolute last minute before they decided they were gonna pull out and in the name of such a united front against Marine Le Pen. But where I think you're right, and it gets complicated, is that there is you know, we're in an election where Marine Le Pen's party is really sort of a populist party that is playing the people against the elites, the kind of rural areas, the small towns against the governing parties in Paris. And there is a perception, and she's doing her best to amplify that, that this sort of arrangement, these sort of tactical arrangements cooked up in Paris are a sort of denial of democracy for her. And if they do deny her a majority, that's also going to cause a problem, and she's going to make it a problem.

Mcfarlane: So that's really interesting. And the reason why I asked about this is because it is very clear that Marine Le Pen's RN and the party that sort of preceded it, it is a protest vote party. And she certainly sort of tried to court that. And given that Macron is suffering from this image of being very establishment, the fact he's been in power since 2017, and there is this mood, isn't there in France, this disaffected, resentful mood in France that is unhappy with the status quo and wants change. And that is the theme that we are seeing all over the world, really. We're seeing it in the UK. We are of course seeing it in the US as well. So when it comes to France, what kind of impact do you think that's going to have if Macron and his pals are seen to shut out the possibility of Marine Le Pen's majority when it's clear an increasing number of French voters are identifying with her platform?

Pedder: It is an issue. Don't forget that the majority of the French don't want her to be elected, and we shouldn't lose sight of that. If you put together the votes for both Macron's party and the left wing alliance, that is a big majority. So it's complicated. I think that we are in a moment when populist leaders will make what they can of any attempt to deny them power. And even if this is not sort of cooked up by Macron, it's really coming from the parties themselves and from a lot of talk, between parties in constituency by constituency. So a lot of this does actually come from the ground, these discussions. It will be perceived and certainly amplified by Marine Le Pen as a sort of denial of democracy. So I think the reality is we're looking at a really complicated situation, whatever the outcome, because if she wins that majority, we're looking at a very complicated period in which Macron as president remains in office and we have the National Rally in government. Well, that's uncomfortable because they pretty much disagree about everything from fiscal policy to military aid for Ukraine or NATO. And then if she doesn't get a majority, there will be those sorts of claims made, as you pointed out. So there are really no good options here. That's the great difficulty with this situation.

Mcfarlane: Tell us about where did it all go so wrong for you wrote a book on Macron, his mission to remodel France in his own vision. And the way he swept into power only a few years ago was an incredible political story. How has it all gone so wrong for Macron? What are the lessons that other governments, other centrist figures might take from how things have gone for him?

Pedder: Well, I think there are some explanations that are very much specific to France. There are others that are much more generic. I mean, you take the incumbency problem for anyone faced with populist opposition leaders, it is really difficult when you've been in power to make the case for keep for holding onto it. It works against parties of all different colors and political affiliations. So I think the incumbency problem and the sort of time scale by which you become the incumbent who everyone wants to get out has shortened. We're in an accelerated political cycle. So I think Macron's only been there for seven years, and it's only two years since the French reelected him after all. So, you know, he's not been around for that long. So I think that's the sort of generic explanation. I think when it comes to France, there is a couple of things that we should look at. One of them is that it's I think one lesson is that it's not enough to have results or a track record. You have to also maintain a connection with voters and with the citizens of your country. And Macron has actually done a pretty good job, in a lot of respects, things like unemployment. He's brought unemployment down. Job creation has been very strong. This France has got a very strong now, a very strong tech scene. It's attracted a lot of foreign investment. You know, we shouldn't forget that we've got the highest social spending of any country in the OECD as a percentage of GDP. So this isn't a country that's just about, you know, business and tech and, you know, the private sector. This is also a country that redistributes wealth very efficiently on the whole. But as I was saying, the problem is that's not really enough if you aren't perceived as someone, as a leader, who connects with people, that likes people, that seems to be governing for them. And that I think has been it's Macron's style that has got everyone's backs up, that they see him as solitary, as remote, as just someone they can't relate to. And so I think that there is a second lesson there, which is it isn't enough just to have results. You do also need to constantly sort of re-earn the legitimacy and the political authority, even in between electoral cycles, in between electoral moments. And that has been something that Macron has really not managed to do, and it's come back to bite him.

Mcfarlane: I think that's a really important point. I remember there was that time when the Elysée Palace published those photos of him hanging around in a hoodie looking scruffy. But, you know, he hasn't been able to change his image. He is someone who's been referred to as Jupiterian, and he quotes Hegel in some of his interviews, and he just doesn't connect with a lot of French voters. Particularly, you know, there have been the problems with the gilets jaunes and the farmers, a lot of people accusing him of being up there in his ivory tower and not connecting to people, as you say.

Pedder: I think that's right. I mean, if you just listen to the language he uses, you know, he doesn't speak like ordinary people. The French he uses is extremely is quite erudite, sometimes very old fashioned. He uses terms that people's grandmothers would have used. He's always in that suit of his. He's always got these shiny shoes on. I mean, someone put it to me really well, once when they said that, Jacques Chirac, you know, for all his faults, he managed to sort of embody two things as president. He managed to look like someone who could welcome a king and a queen, but also drink a beer with you in your garden. And that is what people expect of their president. It's a very difficult thing to be both. You are a head of state. You're not a British prime minister. You're a head of state, and you have to act like a head of state. But you've also got to have that sort of quality, which is quite intangible. It's a quality of someone that someone wants to sort of sit in a bar and drink with. And that, I think people would be quite intimidated by the idea of sitting in a bar and drinking with Emmanuel Macron because he is, you know, clever, he's well read, he's smart, he will probably quote philosophical references at you. And before you know it, you'll probably feel quite bad about yourself. And that's, I think, part of the problem. It's a style and it gets in the way of people even being able to perceive a lot of the effort and the good things that have actually improved in France on his watch.

Mcfarlane: Someone who I think a lot of people can probably definitely imagine themselves having a beer with is the person in prime position to be a possible future French Prime Minister is the 28 year old Jordan Bardella, who is Marine Le Pen's protégé, who I keep hearing that he's 28 years old. It just makes me feel so depressed.

Pedder: How do you think that makes me feel?

Mcfarlane: Well, I think all of us are pretty depressed, but he's come out of nowhere. I mean, you've written some very interesting things about him and about his very quick rise to the top of French politics and how he has sort of been plucked by Marine Le Pen as a future star of the party, how she's managed to sort of mould him in her image.

Pedder: And he is someone who is obviously very new on the scene, but, you know, he's got millions of views on his TikToks and he is someone who is a lot more approachable. The Jordan Bardella phenomenon is a really interesting one. I was in the south of France yesterday doing a report on the ground, and I was talking to a guy in a butcher's shop and, you know, asking him about local politics. And the first thing he said to me was the one he really liked, he said, is Bardella. And the reason he likes him is, he looks at his TikTok videos. He's a phenomenon of our age, really. He's someone who comes across as likable. He's never held a job in his life outside being a party hack. He's got no experience of governing anything at all besides being a local councillor but in opposition. And he is an absolute star. He's really popular among young people. He looks like the kind of guy that you would like to have a beer with in that bar. And I think this is what, you know, is difficult for people who are much more sort of earnest and worthy about their politics and think it's all about drawing up, you know, nuanced and complex policies in an office in Paris. It's difficult for people like that who take governing very seriously and earnestly to understand how somebody could use social media in such an incredibly effective way to, you know, reaching millions and millions of people and can then be on the threshold of becoming Prime Minister of France at the age of 28. It's partly a reflection of him, it's partly a reflection of Marine Le Pen, but it's also a reflection of our age that this is even conceivable.

Mcfarlane: Back in 2016, you wrote a profile of Marine Le Pen for The Economist's 1843 magazine, and you wrote, Le Pen seeks nothing less than to overturn the liberal order in France and dismantle the post war project of an integrated Europe. That is quite a strong, possibly alarming assessment on this political figure. How does that sit with you today in 2024? Is that still the case, do you think?

Pedder: Gosh, so you're quoting back at me something I wrote in 2016, but actually I think that still holds. I think that what she's after is a different sort of Europe. She has changed her attitude to Europe on paper. She doesn't call for Frexit anymore. She doesn't call for pulling France out of the euro. What she wants is a Europe that is about national identity, about taking back control at the national level, a sort of union of nations. And that is utterly different from the way in which the European Union works today. And certainly the way that Emmanuel Macron has been pursuing the construction and the sort of reinforcement of Europe, his whole project for European strategic autonomy, for sort of strengthening Europe's ability to act as a power is absolutely not in line with her vision. And it is really, I think, probably fair still to say that she is and I'm not even sure she would disagree with that line. It's very similar to Viktor Orbán. It's that kind of, you know, return of the nation, return of sort of old style national identities, and trying to take on Europe as a sort of entity that stops you doing what you ought to be able to do at national level. That's the way she puts it. So it is, I think, about trying to overturn Europe, but from within.

THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

Mcfarlane: Idrees, you are joining us from Washington today. Obviously, the US is keeping a close eye on its many allies that are going to election polls this year. And it probably thought, oh, well, at least we don't have to worry about France. We might get surprises in the UK and in India and other countries, but we don't have to worry about the French. Now they've got this really important election depending on how the second round the runoff takes. How concerned are you do you think, regardless of whether Le Pen gets a majority or not? Clearly, are forces that change in France as there are across Europe. How worried do you think they are in Washington and your contacts in the defense and security establishment over in the US?

Ali: Yeah. I mean, look. Just for some context, there has always been frustration is not the right word, but just sometimes a bit of confusion in Washington when Macron would speak about Ukraine. He was seen as sometimes pushing the envelope on the important issue, bringing up stuff like, oh, we might send French troops into Ukraine. So there's always a bit of consternation when Macron was talking about foreign policy, whether it was about Iran, Ukraine, or really any other issue. I think that obviously is something that they would take any day over what they might potentially get. There was a lot more concern, I think, a couple of weeks ago. They've, I think, seen a lot of the public messaging from Bardella talking about Ukraine, how he's still committed to Ukraine, won't send troops into Ukraine, which is something the US does not want, which is something Biden doesn't want. He's talked specifically about not letting Ukraine use some of the French long range weapons, which is a position that Biden has now reversed and that US weapons being used. It was something he sort of agreed with Bardella pretty recently. I think they're not as worried about whether France will stay committed to Ukraine because Macron obviously is still going to be president. So I think there's a level of comfort knowing that at the president level that they've got a partner that they can work with. But they're also aware, look, the budget goes through not the president, but more domestic politics, and that's something that could affect Ukraine, defense spending. So it's something they're concerned about. But honestly speaking, when leaders come to Washington next week for the NATO summit, France is probably not as high on the list. I think it's more of an inward introspection in Washington right now about who their Democrats, for who their candidate might be, what that's gonna look like. Because you talk about Bardella, French politics. If Trump were to come into power, frankly speaking, for Washington, what the French do wouldn't really matter because some of the policies that Trump has talked about vis-à-vis Ukraine, Asia Pacific are just so different from what we've seen over the past four years that I think worry level is still a bit low in Washington. If Trump comes back, I guess all bets are off.

Mcfarlane: But before we tackle that specter that is looming over Western politics at the moment, Sophie, Idrees is absolutely right to bring up Ukraine and that that is a very important international dimension to what happens in these French elections. And something that is really interesting, possibly quite concerning about Marine Le Pen and the RN is this weird relationship that they have with Russia and Putin. I mean, what is going on there? Marine Le Pen, she secured a loan for her party from a Russian bank with reported links to the Kremlin back in 2017. I think it was for around $10,000,000. In the same year, in the middle of the presidential election in which she was a candidate, she took this random trip to Moscow. Instead of hitting the ground in France campaigning, she decided to go and shake Putin's hand. I mean, only very recently the RN's programme on their website officially called for deepening diplomatic ties with Russia, wanted to halt military cooperation projects with Germany, such as tanks and jets, and also mentioned leaving NATO's command structure. The party did remove all of those things from their website in the run up to these current elections. The leaders such as Jordan Bardella, he has denounced the invasion of Ukraine. But, I mean, have they really changed? And what is the deal with all of these funny links to the Kremlin?

Pedder: Well, two questions there. I mean, let's look at the links to the Kremlin first. I think that Marine Le Pen has always had a sort of fascination with authoritarian leaders of all sorts. I mean, she's been really interested in Viktor Orbán in Hungary, for example. She had in the past expressed, you know, clear admiration for Vladimir Putin as a leader who respects history, his own history, stands up for his nation, revives a kind of national narrative that she thinks needs to be done in France. Now, obviously, it's complicated for her, and the invasion of Ukraine, she did go ahead and denounce that. She even then went ahead and pulped all those flyers that you're referring to, which had a picture of her and Putin shaking hands. Well, she had been proud of that. Suddenly, wasn't. She has then, in recent times, you know, really rode back on some of those positions. If you take the example you mentioned of whether or not France should pull out of NATO's integrated military command, Jordan Bardella has gone on record now during this campaign saying, of course, you couldn't do that while the Ukraine and Russia were still fighting. So that's in a way part of this sort of policy of trying to make her party look more respectable, less scary, and sort of move it into the mainstream of French politics. But I think you just have to look at the people around her. You have to understand that there is a kind of Russian sympathy, instinctive, long standing Russian sympathy in the French far right for sure, in parts of defense establishment even, there are people around her, some people in her circle who have done things like participate in electoral monitoring missions in Russia, for example, the Crimean independence referendum. And that is something that, you know, doesn't go away just because you as a leader say, I no longer want to take France out of NATO's military command. So it is a real issue. I think that the instincts are clearly not pro NATO. They are clearly not pro Atlanticist. They are clearly not pro European. And she's having to, at the moment, put everything on hold because of what Putin has done in Ukraine. But I think one has to be very clear about where she's come from and where she might go in the future.

Mcfarlane: Idrees, given all of that, clearly, you know, there is a campaign going on in France. There is a certain amount of detoxification going on. And of course, any potential, even if they don't get a majority, any potential government isn't going to want to panic important allies by saying things that there is not a wholesome and fulsome commitment to NATO in the middle of a war on Europe's borders when it comes to Ukraine. But I mean, what is the future of NATO when there are increasing movements within its constituent parts, parties that are advocating for less defense spending, for repatriating a lot of domestic concerns rather than supporting allies in their conflicts such as with Ukraine?

Ali: I mean, if you talk to someone who works at the Pentagon or White House, they would say, look, the last few years have shown that NATO is live and thriving. They've added two members. It's growing. It's been given a sense of purpose. But the reality is, if you just go back pre Ukraine invasion, we heard Macron talking about, is NATO brain dead? And that's a pretty fair question. Right? If Ukraine hadn't happened, what would NATO sort of be like today? And we've talked to people about that. And the reality is, it would be chugging along, but it wouldn't have had the momentum that it needed to sort of continue going. There's been a real focus, and this has been public because Biden's done it. Biden's tried. Trump tried to refocus attention on Asia and refocus attention on China as sort of what they call the pacing challenge. And the question pre Russia invasion of Ukraine was, what role does NATO play in that? What role do NATO allies play in that? And that's a question that I think for now has been sort of put on the back burner. And once, you know, however this war ends, whether it's a negotiated settlement or if it's sort of, you know, a sort of permanent sort of stalemate, it's a question that NATO and its allies are gonna have to start answering. And I don't know what the answer is, and I don't know if Washington feels like either they're prepared or NATO allies are prepared to sort of deal with that. So, I think in the short term, limited worry, you're totally right. Look, there are NATO members and Hungary's probably top amongst them, which have sort of far right, illiberal tendencies. And I think they're going to be on display next week getting something approved. The language, for example, on what it should say about Ukrainian membership in NATO is a matter of debate. Right. Some people wanted to say that it's a bridge, is something Ukrainian membership into NATO's bridge, which we're going to work towards. Some people wanted to say something like, you know, it's going to be an irreversible sort of move, and eventually Ukraine will be a part of NATO. So I think those disagreements, I think we're gonna see play out pretty clearly next week in Washington for the NATO summit. And then just, again, further beyond, so the question is, what is NATO's purpose beyond Russia's invasion of Ukraine? And it's a question people in Washington grappling with. They're trying to decide how they play it and how they get allies in Europe to sort of refocus, reposition, and rethink about the world going forward.

Mcfarlane: I think the role of NATO and European security, because I mean European security is largely sort of outsourced to NATO, right? And there have been frustrations voiced by US government officials, president Trump amongst them during his time in office, that member states were not spending enough on security. And Idrees, you said in your last answer that, you know, France as a member of NATO is not a screaming great concern for the military top brass and the security folks in Washington. But I mean, France itself, it's a huge supplier and a huge sort of defense contractor, the big player in the aerospace industry. Hypothetically speaking, if France were to one day be run by a very NATO sceptic Russian neutral government, what does that do to NATO in terms of its European security? Is very largely dependent on some of the big players in Europe, France, Germany, a lot of the Eastern Baltic states who contribute a lot outside of their respective sizes. But we're really talking about the big players and France, as a founding member of Europe, it is a pretty big deal, isn't it?

Ali: No. Look, I should be clear. If election goes the way it appears to be going and, you know, sort of, Bardella comes into power as prime minister, it will cause, for all intents and purposes, a lot of concern about the immediate power. France is seen as the convening power within NATO. It's seen as pushing most of the countries to action. There's a lot of frustration with Germany, frankly, about the way it's moved on Ukraine, for example, seeing it being slow, not allowing a lot of the restrictions being lifted that France has. And so I think there's going to be a lot of concern about who's going to play the leading role for NATO in Europe if France moves away from sort of that role that they've taken. I don't know what the answer is. I don't know if Washington has a sort of good plan B. One example, sort of practical elements has been the US has been convening this, what they call the Ramstein Group for Ukraine, which is bringing NATO and other partners together and sort of every month talking about Ukraine and what should shouldn't be happening. Europe has now started taking a leading role on that to sort of quote unquote Trump proof it. But if France sort of becomes more Eurosceptical, that's a big question. And I don't again, I don't think it's something that's been thought about in defense and White House circles as much as it probably should, because I think, frankly, it took a lot of them by surprise, the call for the election, how well Le Pen's party did. And it's something I think they're finally trying to decide and decipher. I don't think they have a good answer. I don't know if there is a good answer about what is an alternate to French leadership in NATO and European security.

Mcfarlane: Sophie, we don't know what's going to happen this Sunday, even if there are polls indicating that the RN will not get the majority, what do you think is not just the mood in France, but given the growth of this sort of anti establishment. Make France great again, if I can use that, if I can misappropriate that phrase from President Trump. I mean, here we are talking about big global issues and themes, the war on Ukraine, the future of NATO and commitment from European countries and in joint security and things. When there is growing resentment domestically, when people are responding to politicians who are wanting to focus more attention on France's domestic parties, in supporting of allies, not necessarily military spending and spending on Ukraine. How do you think that is going to change France in the months and years to come, regardless of what happens on Sunday?

Pedder: Can I just come back on something Idrees said, which is really interesting, and that's this difficulty in thinking ahead to French foreign policy in the next months, years? You know, it's important to remember that President Macron remains president. This is not a presidential election, it's a parliamentary election. And the constitution theoretically is clear. That's to say that he is head of the armed forces. He's commander in chief. He is responsible for defense and security. But it's a little bit ambiguous about what sort of role the Prime Minister and the government has over the defense of the nation, as it's put in the constitution. And this means that there is a bit of an ambiguous situation ahead where we won't entirely be able to foresee how difficult decision will be taken. Clearly Macron turns up at the NATO summit that he represents France, he's the head of state, that's fine. But if it comes to big decisions, and one of them coming up would be, for example, Macron's announcement that he's going to send French Mirage 2000-5 jets to Ukraine. He made that announcement a matter of weeks ago. And now how does that work out? Because somebody, they've got to be budgeted for somehow. There will be a new defense minister. We don't know who that defense minister is. It could be somebody it's most likely to be somebody from the far right, at least in the initial configuration of a new government. How does that kind of conversation go? Who has the upper hand? Is it a clash? Do they decide to really sort of fight it out? Or do they decide to try and find compromise? When they try and pick battles between the presidency and the prime minister's office, what sort of issues do they consider absolutely critical ones that it's worth fighting for, and where do they just let go? This is all absolutely uncharted territory for France under this sort of a cohabitation. Obviously, we've had this sort of cohabitation, as they call it, between governments and presidents of the opposition, but they've all been more or less, you know, sort of from the mainstream of politics, not this sort of cohabitation. So I think that is where, you know, the difficulty, and it filters all the way down to the policy within the European Union. If you look at the way in which the European Union works, it's the ministers that attend all the council meetings on each subject. So whether it's energy policy or fiscal policy, ministers are sent. It's not the head of state. The head of state attends the summits, the total top level, big political decision making forums. Under this scenario of an RN government, you would have the ministers turning up and making policy or agreeing things or blocking things, most likely blocking things. So, you know, this is where the blurring of the line between what actually the president is responsible for and the government becomes complicated, when we're trying to think through this sort of government. And remember, we're not there yet. The election hasn't taken place. The RN may not get a majority. And even if it does get one, we don't know what sort of government it might look like. But I think we just need to be very clear about the ambiguities in the constitution and the fact that the reality is it may not have sunk in everywhere yet, but Macron will emerge from this weakened. It's difficult to see how he can remain the same kind of impulse behind a lot of the efforts in Europe to shift on European defense, on strategic autonomy, all of those issues, Europe acting together collectively, it's very difficult to see how we would have the same authority after this election as he's had over the last seven years.

Mcfarlane: But let's say you are president Macron. I think it's worth reminding our listeners that the NATO summit starts on the July 9, just after the French election. You're preparing for the annual is it well, it's not just an annual summit. It's the seventy fifth summit. So it's a big anniversary for NATO. And as you say, he's not gonna know just yet what his message to NATO is gonna be, or will he? Is he still going to put forward his vision regardless of who he has to go into government with?

Pedder: I think by the time of the NATO summit, it's so soon after the election, he will go there with exactly the message that he's already carried. I mean, I've been talking to some of the diplomatic advisers, this is very clear. He's not going to change that at all. You know, I'm sure he's not going to turn up with a sort of glum face and look like it's the end of the world. He's going to go there as the chief head of state. He's the president of France, he remains so. But I think what I'm trying to sort of bring up is the concept of where does it go after that. You know, once you've got a government in place, once you see the lineup, once you see who is the defense minister, who is the foreign minister, assuming that there are other governs, and don't forget, this may not actually take place, we may not be looking at an RN government. It really does depend on the second round of the elections. But it's thinking through to what the implications would be then for the shaping of foreign and defense and security policy in the coming months and years.

Mcfarlane: Idrees, you kind of hinted earlier that when I asked you about how worried Washington was when it looks across the Atlantic and sees what its close allies are up to these days, that it's got quite a bit on its own plate to sort out. And so I just wanted to ask what your views were with regard to the current state of that extremely important US campaign. And of course, we've seen recently growing fissures within the Democratic Party, given their candidate in place, President Biden. He had that very appalling appearance on that debate that made international news on this side of the Atlantic. America's allies saw everything that the American voters did. There are questions about President Biden's capacity to run, let alone to currently serve. I mean, obviously Americans are worried about America first, but is there any concern about the view of America overseas and the importance for the US that it's always found this important projecting an image of strength? How much is that in jeopardy at the moment?

Ali: Three weeks ago, I think if you asked anyone abroad to the United States, they probably would have said something like, you know, if Trump becomes president, we're concerned because of x y z. I think today, it's Trump becomes president and we're concerned. But if Biden stays president, we're concerned if he were to win again and he were to complete his term. He would be 86, which is pretty old to be president. But given what we saw at the debate, I think there's a lot of concern. It's interesting because foreign policy usually doesn't play a large role in domestic American politics. I mean, look, if I was an ally, I probably would have been concerned before the election. But I think I really would be quite concerned about, can I rely on the United States or not? And just to give an example of Ukraine, the US barely was able to cobble enough votes to get additional funding. I don't see a situation where Biden or Trump can go back to Congress, if they want to, to get another large weapons package once this runs out, probably at the end of the year.

Mcfarlane: Thanks for joining us today on One Decision, looking into the big choices facing our world today.

CLOSING

Mcfarlane: Looking ahead to the seventy fifth NATO Summit in Washington, DC, starting on July 9, we will have on the ground coverage with our team sitting down with the key players and world leaders at the front lines of European and Western defense. And we can now say that our resident spymaster Sir Richard Dearlove, will be joined by the former CIA Director Leon Panetta, who'll be a regular co-host alongside Sir Richard. We are thrilled to have an incredible team putting together these conversations on the most important challenges facing us all at a time of key decision making. Do subscribe so you never miss an episode. We drop new podcasts every Thursday. From me and the team, thank you for being with us and see you next time.