Hosted by Christina Ruffini and Sir Richard Dearlove
Guests
Ronen Bergman
Ronen Bergman is a Senior Correspondent for Military and Intelligence Affairs for Yedioth Ahronoth and staff writer for The New York Times Magazine and shares reporting on how Netanyahu moved Trump toward a joint strike.
Jonathan Conricus
Jonathan Conricus is a retired Lieutenant Colonel, former Israeli Defence Forces spokesperson, and senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies breaking down major Israeli military objectives.
Episode Summary
What exactly drove President Donald Trump’s decision to join Israel in joint strikes against Iran? Ronen Bergman joins from Tel Aviv where he is a Senior Correspondent for Military and Intelligence Affairs for Yedioth Ahronoth and staff writer for The New York Times Magazine. He shares his reporting of how Netanyahu moved Trump toward a joint strike, and why he's staying quiet about it for now.
Then, retired Lt. Col. Jonathan Conricus, former Israeli Defence Forces spokesperson and senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, breaks down the major Israeli military objectives and how close Israel is to achieving each one. Plus, what Arab Gulf states are privately telling Israel.
In this episode:
01:24 New Leader Wounded
06:42 Israel Aims And Limits
09:36 Regime Change Doubts
16:14 Israeli Public Mood
23:30 Intel Airpower Strategy
25:12 Introducing LT. COL. (RET.) Jonathan Conricus
29:48 Strait of Hormuz Threat
32:45 Stopping Enriched Uranium
36:21 War Communications as Force Multiplier
40:55 Regime Change Scenarios
43:58 Gulf States Defense
Show Notes:
Iran’s New Supreme Leader Was Wounded Early in the War, Iranian and Israeli Officials Say - The New York Times
Hosted by Sir Richard Dearlove (former MI6 Chief) and Rosanna Lockwood (International Journalist)
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Transcript
COLD OPEN
Bergman: I think this is, from the point of view of Netanyahu, the biggest achievement in his political career, which is to convince Trump to go for a joint massive strike on Iran.
Conricus: I think that the days of this regime are numbered, and they are finite, and this regime will be brought down by the Iranian people.
Dearlove: War communications is as much about war strategy as the physical fighting. You can win a war militarily and lose it politically.
INTRODUCTION
Lockwood: Hello, and welcome to One Decision. I'm your guest cohost, Rosanna Lockwood, and I'm joined by our cohost, as ever, Sir Richard Dearlove. Hello, Sir Richard.
Dearlove: Hi, Rosanna. Yep. Busy times still.
Lockwood: The world in crisis. Yeah. Absolutely. Look. This week, a special episode as we enter the second week of warfare in Iran. We have two guests with unique insight into Mossad and the Israel Defense Forces. So what does Israel actually want from all this? And, crucially, does it want the same thing that the US does? Retired lieutenant colonel Jonathan Conricus breaks down the Israeli defense picture. But first, we start with an investigative journalist who knows Mossad better than many other reporters, Ronen Bergman, staff writer for The New York Times Magazine, and senior political and military analyst for Yedioth Ahronoth. He joins us from Tel Aviv. Welcome. Let's just start with one of your latest reports that, at the time of recording this, has basically just been published there in The New York Times, that the new Iranian leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, was wounded early in the war according to Iranian and Israeli officials. What more can you tell us about that?
INTERVIEW: RONEN BERGMAN
Bergman: He was crowned, and there were some rumors that he was elected, and then it turned out to be true, and he was sort of sworn in without his presence. So since the Saturday before us, when the Israeli-American attacks started, he was not seen in public, not even in a video showing him alive. We brought two possible reasons why he was not shown to the public and was not present. One of them is, of course, to protect him. I assume that the Revolutionary Guards, being guilty twice in not protecting a list of VIPs, once at the beginning of the previous war in June of last year, and they started this attack. Of course, they will try to protect him as much as possible, but this still doesn't explain why they didn't release a video from a safe list. And then we have both Iranian and Israeli officials who say that he was wounded on Saturday, the day that his father, his mother, his wife, and his kid were killed in that raid. I think foreign sources in Iran say he was in that same compound. My sources did not say exactly that, but did say that he was injured on Saturday in his legs, and that he's under some kind of medical treatment.
Dearlove: Ronen, just to follow up on that, because I think it's a really important point. What's the point of a new leader if a lot of the command structure has disappeared, if he can't communicate? Because, I mean, the moment he becomes active, he becomes vulnerable in terms of geolocation and the things that you and I understand extremely well. So is this just a gesture, or does it actually mean something in terms of the command and sort of instruction of the IRGC and what remains of the Iranian government?
Bergman: First of all, since I think the afternoon of that Saturday, the raid was at ten minutes past eight in the morning Israel time, 09:40 in the morning Tehran time. So a few hours later, when it was found out, the Israeli BDA, the battle damage assessment, was that the supreme leader is dead. Shortly afterwards, Israel was able to narrow down on intelligence that Mojtaba will be crowned instead of his father. Now this is not an obvious cause, because the father said he doesn't want that. There were many speculations, but at a certain point, the father said, this is not a good thing. It's not appropriate. This is not a kingdom. We are not a king, and it was very important for him to say that he's not inheriting this to his son in the family. The father was not a famous cleric. The son, of course, was not. But I think that their decision to crown him in spite of everything I just said was to show the continuity of the regime, to show the orderly fashion transition of power, and it is a very famous statement to say: you thought you get rid of one Khamenei, you get the other one. To your question, Richard, I think, first of all, there are ways to command the armed forces according to the constitution in Iran. He is the commander of the armed forces and all the other regime apparatuses. There are ways to control them from afar, with notes, with couriers, of course, it makes everything much, much harder. And the Israeli minister of defense said that once he's crowned, he is number one. The Israeli minister of defense, he's number one on the most wanted list. We have reached the time. Mister Richard, imagine, I know the British intelligence doesn't execute assassinations, but imagine that your minister, the British minister of defense, would be tweeting your targets even for surveillance and said, like, this guy, he's our main target for surveillance, not to say for assassination. So it's very, very easy from his point of view to say or to understand he's a target. It was still to be seen if he is a leader or just a face, just a buffoon that behind him has the Revolutionary Guard that are really controlling the country.
Lockwood: Ronen, while we have you, we, of course, must talk about Israel itself and its stated aims and objectives and justifications for all of this. To what extent did Israel, which, I mean, of course, Netanyahu's government, believe that it can remake the region in its interests? And then how would you judge that's gone so far given what we just spoke about with Khamenei?
Bergman: There's a phrase in Hebrew, I don't know, I'm sure that there's something equivalent in English, that with the food comes the appetite, which means that, you know, after the horrible disaster and total failure of all ranks, all leaders, political, governmental, institutional, intelligence wise, and military wise on October 7, Israel was able to sort of flip that move, that narrative, and hit hard on Hamas and then on Hezbollah and then on Iran. And with the last two, do that in a sophisticated way, in a surprising way with many intelligence and operational capabilities that were not seen before. I think that that has, to an extent, confused the Netanyahu government to believe that these successes, as amazing as they are and the cradle for many books and series and TVs and movies in the future, still have a limit to their ability to change history or to shape, you said shaping, reorganizing the Middle East, to shape the Middle East. Now I am a historian. I did my PhD in Cambridge with someone who's a friend of Sir Richard, professor Christopher Andrew. I believe in the impact of people on destiny, on history. If von Stauffenberg would put the bomb on the other side of that table leg, kill Hitler, it would change. But first of all, I don't know how history will change if you kill the leader. And second, when you have a regime that is so strong, that is prepared for a case that the supreme leader dies, he gives orders in case he dies. Then the hope, if there was hope, in any rank in America or in Israel, that they are able to start a revolution, to have a regime change from afar, the first time at least since Operation Ajax in Iran in 1953. If they believe that this is possible, then I don't know what exactly they thought of, and I think now they see the outcome, where we see military, intelligence, operational achievements, but strategic goals still unclear, and in any case, far from being reached.
Dearlove: Ronen, is there any organization at all in Iran which could, as it were, take an initiative to, I wouldn't say create a new regime, but take the government off in a new direction. I mean, in my view, it's possible that you might get some Iranian generals who are nationalists rather than theocrats. But are there any signs that you can see of any fracturing inside Iran which might cause a new political development?
Bergman: The short answer is no. I don't think that both Israeli and American intelligence, the professionals who actually deal with Iran, who are in charge of the surveillance and the collection and the assessment, believe that there is a chance that this regime will be toppled soon by anyone. Inside the regime, outside the regime, even during the protest, there were no seen cracks. And when the regime decided to react with massive, brutal, bloody force, then people had no choice. They are not armed. They had to go back to their houses, those who were not killed. And what we see now is the same regime telling them on television, if you go to the street to protest, we will shoot you. Do not try. And of course, people will not try. So I think that, first of all, the time of war always and everywhere is a very bad time for civil society to rise up and roar. Second, it will take time for the civil society to assess what happened. Third, about internal regime factions. Let us recall that it was, I think, the last straw that took the shah down in late 1978 was when the regular military decided they are going to stay in their camps and not go out to fight the demonstrators. Now the regular army, not the IRGC army, they have two of them since the revolution, the regular army has been taking a hawkish, a very feisty, very militant point of view since the beginning of the attack. For now, I don't see any kind of real danger, real threat to the regime. We saw the president give a speech where he apologizes to other Arab countries for bombing them, but then they rebombed them. We saw Larijani swearing allegiance to the new supreme leader. So there is no sign. But, you know, history with these tyrannic, draconian regimes, they look very strong from afar, and then sometimes they just collapse in one minute. And then we have all the intelligence assessment of how this was an intelligence failure and how we didn't see anything. So maybe there's still, like, some misassessment now, and I am making a mistake.
Lockwood: Given your historical sort of view of all of this, let's think about timing, because as you said, the IRGC has been preparing for this for decades. Netanyahu has been waiting for the right moment. It's been sort of, we could argue, top of the wish list for many years, a full scale assault on Iran to get on top of that issue, the threats it presents to Israel. So talk to us about the sort of the perfect storm, if we can call it that, of ingredients that led to this happening now, specifically the Trump-Netanyahu relationship.
Bergman: It's not just Netanyahu. It's, of course, history. But at the end of the day, when you look at this, Netanyahu, during the last eight months, Netanyahu was able to make Trump, or drive Trump, to the exact point where Netanyahu wanted Trump to be. We had sources, The New York Times, not mine, but other colleagues' sources, who said in April that Trump, April of last year of 2025, who said that Trump said to people, I know what Netanyahu is trying to do. He's trying to tackle me into war. I'm not going to agree. This will not happen. And then in April, Trump put the brakes. He aborted a joint plan of Israel and the United States to attack together, only to reverse two months later, first of all, agree to Netanyahu's request that gave his blessing to an Israeli attack and participation of the US in the defense of Israel. This was one thing that people I know nothing about the American president, and I'm not covering the presidency, but people who know something always said that it's impossible. He will not agree. Trump wants agreement. He is not there to conduct war. And then just a week later, Netanyahu convinced Trump to join the fight and send the bombers to these three sites with the mother of all bombs. After that, he was able to fulfill, and I think this is, from the point of view of Netanyahu, the biggest achievement in his political career, which is to convince Trump to go for a joint massive strike on Iran. Now Netanyahu has been shy about this, not bragging, in the last few weeks because there's a lot of criticism in America that Trump was driven by Netanyahu, and so for the time being, he's shy, but I'm telling you, when we approach the elections, it will be all about how Netanyahu convinced Trump. But, you know, at the end of the day, Netanyahu had a major share in leading Trump to that, but, of course, it was also the protest. And I think the way that Trump sort of trapped himself when he said to the demonstrators, help is on its way. And he has people whispering in his ear, you need to do this, this is, I was told the main trigger to Trump. You need to do more than Obama. You will do what no other president in the history of America. You have the cojones. You have the guts. You will do that. And Trump sent more and more forces to the extent that he couldn't take them back without doing something, and Iran didn't surrender, and Netanyahu pressured. And the chief of staff of the IDF, the Israeli Defense Forces, convinced the chief of CENTCOM that they have a good plan, and Israel took upon itself many of the tasks. So altogether, that led Trump to make this historical decision. And, of course, we need to see how this plays out because I have no idea.
Dearlove: Ronen, in terms of the attitude to the war in Israel, what is the average sort of position on the street amongst Israeli voters? I mean, in the States, it's quite clear that Trump hasn't taken the American population with him. And looking at Israel, it's a massive undertaking, isn't it, to, you know, lead, okay, with American power, a war against a country with a population of 90,000,000 and, you know, a massive established infrastructure, both military and commercial in terms of its power as an energy nation?
Bergman: I'm trying to be concise in what I think worries the Israelis or concerns the Israelis. I speak to you from a house, our house, Yana, my our newborn son, Leo, and myself, that is exactly in the middle of the way between Mossad headquarters and Unit 8200 headquarters, which is the equivalent to GCHQ, to NSA. So we're exactly in the middle. These were the two most popular sites for bombing of Israel by Iran and Hezbollah in the previous rounds. This time, the Iranians apparently preferred to attack central cities, so we feel a bit relieved. But, of course, Israel is being bombed. People didn't sleep the night because there were dozens of sirens all over the country. And this is the heavy price. I think that there is some contradiction that is embedded into the Israeli psyche of, on one hand, always being under the threat, the continuous threat of extinction, and every enemy is immediately equivalent to Hitler. And, of course, not underestimating any enemy, but not always the comparison is right. And at the same time, feeling a superpower that can go for, people think, go for war against this huge country forever, and it doesn't matter, and they don't understand that there are supplies. There's a number of interceptors, number of JDAMs, etcetera. The mood, I think, now is turning to be skeptical, not against, but skeptical. Nobody mourns about Khamenei, and people always tell him it's some kind of a new Hitler. And nobody's sorry for carving out and demolishing parts of the Iranian military capabilities. But I think that people now see that after the two leaders, Netanyahu and Trump, in the last round in June, Trump said the nuclear project is obliterated. And Netanyahu said we removed the ballistic missile threat and the nuclear threat for generations. So if this was removed for generations, what do you do eight months after? So the people understand that these two leaders lied to them. So they are being skeptical about, would they lie to us again, which goes back to the question of what this war is all about, what are the goals, and how do Israeli citizens and, for that sake, the Israeli generals, how would they know that they won? What do they want, what's the bar they need to cross in order to say, okay, we won the war, we can stop? And I'm not sure it's clear. It's not clear to me. I'm not sure it's clear to them.
Lockwood: Well, when we think about off ramps, one potential avenue I'd like to know whether you think this is still explorable. This is another report of yours that a little while ago, that Iran's Ministry of Intelligence actually reached out to the CIA to discuss the terms to end the conflict. This was probably, you know, a few days ago now, near the start of the war, perhaps.
Bergman: Like, ten years ago.
Lockwood: Yeah. Could that type of intelligence realistically bring an end to the exchange of fighting if you've got Iranian intelligence speaking to CIA?
Bergman: We uncovered the existence of a back channel between Iranian Ministry of Intelligence, the MOIS, through a European country and CIA and to American high rank officials close to president Trump. Now this, for the time being, didn't provide any positive outcome, but I believe that this channel or other channels exist as we speak. I think that the last notes that we heard from the American president and some of his team is that the operation is almost complete, the goals are almost achieved, and he even said something about, I'm going, this is gonna be ending in few days, maybe next week. And I think that there could be two goals that would change the picture if achieved. One of them or both. One goal is to secure the 430 kilos of enriched uranium enriched to 60% that are, at least according to US and American belief, stored in a bunker that was bombed in the previous round in one of the main nuclear sites called Isfahan. If Iran is relieved or deprived of this uranium, this decapitates their ability to produce a bomb for very long time because they need to start from the beginning. The second possible achievement is a regime change. Now these two achievements, one of them I think was very unlikely from the beginning, the other one is very hard to achieve, I'm not sure that it's doable. And when you do not have these two, then the only thing that you would have is the US president and the Israeli prime minister coming and saying we won because they can. They said we won, and that's it. Did they win? Will they win? What guarantees the Israeli people or the Iranian people or the American people that they will not have another round in eight months? I don't know.
Lockwood: Ronen, before we let you go, we ask all our guests this on One Decision podcast. What one decision are you looking out for in the coming weeks?
Bergman: It's not just me. I think that a lot of people, I asked a high ranking Israeli defense official, how do you know that you won? And he said, well, it's not up to us to decide. Meaning, it's up to the president of the United States to decide. So Israel is not dealing with the day after or the exit strategy or what are the exact goals because they know it's not up to them, which by itself deserves a different talk, but by itself is very, very, this is a total change of the Israeli-US relations. Israel has become a total subordinate of the United States and of the White House. But everybody in Israel are waiting for Trump to push the button and say, it's enough, we won, end this war. Going back to intelligence, I think that these two rounds, the one in June and the one now, prove what a lethal and effective force is the combination between intelligence, and in most of the cases, I know that it's good for the TV series to think that they have a human spy under every bed and around every corner. But the truth is, we are talking about very different kind of intelligence. Most of it is cyber or SIGINT. The interface between this intelligence coming from a variety of sources that were achieved in the last twenty five years and especially the last five years, we have been building layers of intelligence, that met with Israeli Air Force, their joint force was able to achieve all the tactical successes that we have seen, including the assassinations. And I don't know, maybe God knows why did they let the supreme leader, the number one, protected VIP, to be above the ground in his house in the day that everybody thought the attack will happen. It just means that still, even now, you can do surprise imminent attacks even now. But anyway, this powerful combination of very precise online intelligence with precision of the air force produced a result. But yet, even with all these tactical successes, if you don't have a strategy and you don't know where you are going, you would just end up basically nowhere or in the same place.
Lockwood: Ronen Bergman, thank you very much.
Dearlove: Thanks, Ronen.
Bergman: Thank you.
INTERVIEW: LT. COL. (RET.) JONATHAN CONRICUS
Lockwood: Now joining us to navigate these high stakes military goals is retired lieutenant colonel Jonathan Conricus. He is the former spokesperson for the Israel Defense Forces where he served for twenty four years. He's also the cofounder of Bottom Line Media and currently serves as a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Welcome. Good to see you. And I know a lot of our listeners are gonna be wanting to lean heavily on your military and technical expertise to understand the scope of this war so far and how it could go from here. So let's just open with that. To what extent do you think this war has played out as Israel thought it might?
Conricus: Yes. Hello, and shalom from Israel. Thanks for having me on, first time here. I'd say that from a pure military point of view, which is of course only one part of the events here, diplomacy precedes and supersedes military action. That's the thing that sometimes Israeli leadership kind of forget that and focus on the military. But if we focus only on the military for a second, then I would say that things are proceeding very well, perhaps even excellent, inasmuch as you can use positive terms related to a war. I would say that if we look at where Israel wanted to be and what we're achieving, I'd say we're proceeding quite well, and we'll divide it into different military objectives in order to really put some meat on the bones. First and foremost, the Iranian military nuclear programme. It was significantly degraded, but not really buried and not really destroyed June last year. What Israel and the US are doing now is deepening that achievement and making it even more difficult for the regime, if it indeed survives this war, to go back and really distancing the goalposts for the Iranian regime by simply destroying infrastructure. Now, there's the one question or the one very important topic of the enriched material, which still is an unknown. We know that there's about 400 kilos of highly enriched material in the possession of the Iranian regime, and that probably needs to be dealt with before the war is over, and we'll see how Israel and the US will want to do it. But other than that, enrichment facilities, all of the advanced metal production sites, of course, a lot of the centrifuges and many other things, they've been physically destroyed and taken out of capacity. So that's a future existential threat for Israel and possible horrific threat for the region and the world. We can almost likely, slightly really check that box and say significant progress on its way to full completion. Second are the ballistic missiles. Iran possessed between 2,000 and 3,000 ballistic missiles before two weeks ago. They have fired quite a few. Actually, I think they've fired just as many ballistic missiles at the UAE as they have fired at Israel, which is quite astonishing, but they're expending them relatively quickly. And what Israel has done, Israel and the US, trying to destroy missiles, trying very hard and prioritising to destroy the missile launchers, because they are the most important asset. And what Israel is doing now is basically trying to eradicate the entire supply chain of the Iranian military industry. And the aim is, from a military point of view, that when the fighting stops, the Iranian regime, if still there, will not have the ability to produce ballistic missiles. Leadership, that's a third target. Leaders have been taken out. Khamenei, of course, but really the supreme command of the IRGC. Many other key officials killed in the opening strike, and they are hunted as we speak. Probably some good effect on, you know, disabling or mitigating the Iranian ability to command and control and effectively plan and manage operations, but that is a temporary achievement. It's good for while you're fighting. It has a positive influence on how the war is managed, but that is of course something that if the regime is allowed to survive, they will fill those ranks, maybe with less talented and experienced people, maybe with people that are more fundamentalist than professional, but nevertheless, I think they will be able to overcome that if and when the war ends. In addition to that, what I think that the Americans are focusing on more than what Israel is focusing on is the Strait of Hormuz, the Iranian Navy. Progress, definitely, and we see lots of footage and data from the Americans about how many Iranian vessels have been taken down. However, on the bottom line of it, we see that the Iranians have been able to at least temporarily significantly reduce, or even stop the flow of traffic in the Hormuz Strait, something that the Americans and rest of the world, the Chinese, will probably really want to roll back and do that very quickly. And my assessment is that they're able to do so because they're using naval vessels, what's left of them, mines, perhaps unmanned, below the surface vessels, and they're using the threat of shore to sea missiles. And of course, the Iranian regime has prepared this for a long time. The US has been quite successful in peeling away many of those capabilities, but there are still capabilities left. And what the Iranians are doing, they're basically declaring war on global shipping, on energy, on the global energy market. I think their calculus is, okay, we will apply pressure, we will cause the oil prices to rise, and that will be translated to political pressure on the president, and that will get us out of jail. Last thing, I would say that the Iranian proxies, Hezbollah and the Houthis, Hezbollah did the mistake that we were really hoping that they would do, which is to get involved in the fighting, start firing rockets at Israeli civilians and Israeli cities in Northern Israel. Of course, unprovoked. Israel didn't fire anything at Lebanon in that sense, but Hezbollah said, we're getting into the fray, we're going to fight, and we're doing it for whatever propaganda reasons they said, but they basically said, we're in. To which Israel responded, that is excellent. We have been waiting for the opportunity, and now we are going to correct the last twenty five years of harassment from Hezbollah against Israeli civilians, and hopefully ignite or help boost a political process that is going on in Lebanon by which the Lebanese state will finally, uniquely, actually take control of the sovereign territory and reduce Hezbollah from this ever powerful, notorious state within a state and foreign funded entity to a political party that represents Shiites in the South. That's the current state of play. Early days, less than two weeks into the fight, but I'd say that we are doing quite well, and if I look at the things from my enemy's perspective, which is something that I always try to do, I don't think that the Iranians are running out of options quite fast, and the options that they have left aren't very good.
Dearlove: The first point you mentioned is this remaining quantity of HEU refined to, let's say, 60%. It's not a very large quantity of material, but, of course, it is big enough to be worrying and to give a potential capability to Iran to make some sort of nuclear device. To get rid of it, you can't really do that. I'm now speaking as a former intelligence officer. You can't really do that by bombing. I mean, what I'm envisaging is a commando raid of some sort or a negotiated settlement. So that would imply perhaps, you know, joint Israeli-US intrusion to remove the stuff unless the Iranians come to your front door carrying it and say, here it is, we're gonna hand it over to you. I mean, how do you envisage that playing out? Because it is clearly an absolutely primary aim of both Israel and the United States to put a definitive stop to the nuclear program. And let's face it, I mean, when I retired in 2004, this was pretty much our primary intelligence requirement all of those years ago. I mean, it's been a running sore for years and years and years.
Conricus: Yes, sir, I agree. And yes, it's been a running sore, and the West has ummed and ahhed and, you know, debated what needs to be done, and now, thankfully, the US and Israel are doing something about it. And I think this war will end without that material accessible for the Iranian regime. Whether extracted, as you say, and I agree with your assessment, sir, through boots on the ground special operations, whether destroyed where it is, or by some type of political agreement, some kind of get me out of jail in the last minute for the Iranian regime, handing over that enriched material to, let's say, Russia or someone else, and then getting the US to stop the bombing and to order Israel to stand down. That's perhaps an option. I think Israel will try not to give the Iranian regime that wiggle room and that opportunity, but really take the cards out of Iranian hands by military and definitive means, as in destroying, doing that before the Iranians find the sense and swallow the pride and do what would be a smart move from their part. But we'll see. I know that it's planned, and I'm not revealing state secret in saying that there are contingencies for it. There are IDF special units that have been preparing, rehearsing, collecting intelligence, and readying themselves for exactly this mission, not in a theoretical sense, but in a very specific place, location, and infrastructure sense. And then it'll be about, you know, the political decision by the President and the Israeli cabinet and the Chief of Staff. They'll have to make that decision. It's a decision that comes with costs and risks, obviously. And that's why I think it hasn't been made yet. But I think at the end of the day, I struggle to see a situation where politically this war ends, or this campaign, whatever we want to call it, ends with that enriched uranium still in the hands of the regime or unaccounted for.
Lockwood: Look, this might seem like an esoteric departure from talking about war strategy, but I think you're just the right person to talk to about this because of your prior career as IDF spokesperson and, of course, your current communications career as well, which is that war communications is as much about war strategy as the physical fighting. And I mean that from all sides, from Iran, they use Twitter, or sorry, X, I should say, a lot. The US, when we see Hegseth speaking and how he comes across, and Israel, of course, and their communication strategy too. And it's about what is told to the public and by extension, the enemy that you just named. So with that in mind, how much can we actually take as accurate what we are being told to the public by all sides?
Conricus: That's a good question. And the old axiom of the first casualty of war being truth, I think, is pretty accurate here as well. Up until this conflict, I would have given very high remarks to the Iranians. I'm very respectful of their strategic communications, of their diplomatic skills. I think they have a very talented, deep, and articulate diplomatic corps headed by Araghchi, but not only. There's a lot of professionals behind him who do a lot of work, and you could see that they've done a lot of legwork. They're communicating up until the war started. You can see that I would have given them high remarks for discipline and strategic communications, and trying to find and exasperate the fault lines and tensions in Western society, US politics, Israeli politics, global woke audiences, pro-Palestinian people, and pro-Hamas, and really, I think they do a very good job at finding weaknesses in their enemy and then trying to exploit them. Well, I think their main mistake is they've grown arrogant, and they made the cardinal sin of believing their own communications, which is very tempting, but it's a very dangerous thing to do when you're at war. And we saw that, you know, at full display in June 25. The Iranians, you know, they talked a big game, but at the end of the day, the skies were blown open. Israel dominated every aspect of the fighting, and had it not been for President Trump calling off about 100 Israeli jets above Tehran, I think we would have been in a totally different situation already last year in June. And I think the Iranians were exposed for what they are, essentially a big paper tiger that does very well diplomatically and in negotiations, communicates very well, but then when push comes to shove, not so well. Now, compared to that, Israel has a strategic weakness in our strategic communications. We have, most of the time, excellent military operations, but when I look at it as an Israeli from my pro-Israeli Zionist perspective, I don't like the fact that we're strong on the battlefield, but many times what we don't do well enough is communicate, strategically speaking, during the fighting, and most importantly, the diplomatic finishing leg, to use a sports term, isn't really as good as the military one on the battlefield. And I agree with what you say. Wars are won and achievements are made by actions in the real world, military actions, but the force multiplier are communications and diplomacy. And I would hope that my country would develop better skills, perhaps learn a little bit from the Iranian regime, communicate and invest more in terms of talent, resources, etc, in diplomacy and communications, because that is what has allowed the Iranians to do so many of the negative things that they have done over their tenure, the forty seven years that they've been around, because they've invested in that kind of soft power, and it has had an effect. Israel has invested in hard power, and now that's showing. But I think a cheaper way is to communicate like the Iranians do, and hopefully by the end of this war we can sit back, learn lessons of our own, look at what our enemies did well, look at what we did well, and then enhance our strategic comms and diplomacy in the future.
Dearlove: Jonathan, can I follow up on that thought by making the point that you can win a war militarily and lose it politically. And the big example of that really is the French war in Algeria, which has the title of a great book called A Savage War of Peace, which contains many, many lessons. There really seems to be now a danger that Israel may be vulnerable to that sort of result, particularly if there's no regime change in Iran. I mean, can you imagine circumstances how the regime might change? And I don't mean just change in terms of a different group, but change its character and become a more amenable partner to all the countries in the Middle East, including Israel.
Conricus: I agree with you, sir. The list of wars that were won on the battlefield but lost in the conference rooms is long, and it's ugly. I agree on Algeria, but Iraq, Afghanistan. Afghanistan wasn't really won on the battlefield, but you could claim that Iraq was won on the battlefield. In my history, we could use Yom Kippur. We defeated the Egyptians on the battlefield, but strategically speaking, the Egyptians achieved what they wanted. They got the Sinai back, and luckily, at least we got peace out of it, so we could call it kind of a draw. But many wars have that in them. Regarding the Iranian regime, yes, I think that the days of this regime are numbered, and they are finite, and this regime will be brought down by the Iranian people. Why the confidence? Not because of what Israel and the US are doing, not because of the strategic mistakes that the regime is doing, lashing out at Arab Muslim countries, you know, basically declaring war on global shipping. Those are strategic mistakes that I believe are going to backfire on the Iranian regime, but they are not the ones that are going to bring the regime down. The Iranian people, in their actions before the Israeli and American attack on the regime, have shown that they've had it. They've had it with this regime, and by one way or another, they are willing to face the absolutely dangerous corporal threat to bring down the regime. And they've shown that in numbers, and they've shown their passion to do so. And I think when the dust settles, and when the last Israeli and American bomb explodes in Iran, the Iranian people will be able to come forward, and it could take time, and it could be messy. But I think at the end of the process, months, maybe a year from now, that is where this regime will be relegated to because of how they have wronged the Iranian people.
Lockwood: Just quickly, I think we owe them a place in this conversation because we've touched them a few times. The Arab Gulf states that you mentioned there, specifically United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia. If we cast our minds back just a few years ago, discussing Abraham Accords, normalization of relations with Israel. I'm normally based in Dubai. I'm currently in the US. And in the UAE now, you meet lots of Jewish people that are living very normal, happy lives there, lots of Jewish friends there. And do you think, given the state of the attacks, and you mentioned it yourself, lobbing huge amounts of missiles, Iran is, towards the UAE and Saudi Arabia currently, that the US and Israel owe it to the Arab states to provide a bit more defense at the moment? And if they don't, what's that gonna do to relations?
Conricus: That's an odd way of, I think, looking at the question. They're sovereign states. They're tremendously, fantastically rich, and they have the ability to buy whatever weapons and field whatever army and air defenses that they see fit. I don't think it's anybody's responsibility to defend another country unless there's a treaty in place. But I would say that with the United Arab Emirates, you could see that their success is quite impressive. They are doing a very good job at defending their airspace and defending their infrastructure. The Iranians have fired absolutely ludicrous amounts of drones, more than 1,400 drones, I think more than 300 ballistic missiles, if I'm not mistaken, I could be mistaken by a few, but only a very small percentage have gotten through, and UAE air defences appear to be quite good. And I think the UAE and the Saudis have everything they need in terms of material in order to defend themselves. What they actually need is the political will, the courage to say, okay, we're being attacked. We are now going to defend ourselves. And that's a mindset question, not so much a capacity question. Capacity, they have the capacity. And in terms of what Israel is doing to help, Israel is degrading Iranian missile capabilities every day, every hour. Every day that goes by, the Iranians are capable of firing less lethal missiles, and they have to think long and hard before they fire missiles because they have a very finite supply. Whatever they fire will not be replenished because they have no way of building or importing. So, it's a downward slope for the Iranians, and in that sense, Israel is helping with the UAE and the Saudis. I think what we've seen over the last almost two weeks is a lot of excellent cooperation in air defense between the different countries, all of this quarterbacked by the Americans. This is American infrastructure, American systems that have been integrated, and the various American allies in the region are doing a pretty good job at defending themselves against this Iranian aggression. So, my only advice would be use the weapons that you have in order to defend yourselves. That's the best way of getting rid of a threat is to strike back and showing your aggressor that you're not going to take a beating sitting down.
Dearlove: A final question along those lines. What do you think the political messaging now is to Israel from Saudi Arabia, from Jordan, from Oman, from Qatar? I mean, you know as well as I do, there are those hotlines that connect up key decision makers that have no formal diplomatic recognition. Are the Saudis, for example, saying, look, finish this off, we're giving you another week, two weeks, or are they saying, stop it as soon as possible? Where do these key countries, potential allies of Israel in a sense which isn't necessarily publicized, how do you interpret that situation at the moment?
Conricus: So, you're referring to what I call the Israel mistress syndrome, whereby many Arab states have enjoyed the same type of relationship you would have with a mistress. You would want to spend time with her, but you don't bring her home to meet the parents at the family dinner. And that is how many of the Arab countries, the Saudis, and many others have enjoyed the benefits of security cooperation, cyber, counter terrorism, etc, with Israel without formal recognition and the political baggage that would come attached to it in terms of pan-Arabism and the so-called Palestinian issue. Those hotlines indeed do exist. They are quite busy these days, and there's lots of communications in it. Obviously, I haven't been on it, but I have second or third hand information with regards to the content. I'd say that things are going well. I think the Saudis and the Emiratis and not the Qataris, but Saudi Emiratis and many other countries, Jordan, etc, they see that the Iranians are losing, and they want to be part of the winning team. They want to be part of the coalition that brought the regional bully to its knees, and they want to be part of the ones that are going to shape the future. So, what I see, and you know, I heard this before the war as well, I heard it in June 25, when I actually spoke with Saudi officials, and they said, go on, finish it. You know, we're rooting for you on the sidelines. We're doing it quietly. We're not doing it in Arabic. We're not doing it for our domestic audience to see, and we don't want other Muslims to see, but we are definitely rooting for you, and we really, really wish that you will succeed in doing the hard labor that we haven't been able to do, and get rid of the Iranian menace. I think they also see and understand that this American president actually is going to follow through. He's actually going to make the Iranians pay for their aggression. He's actually not going to allow them to have nuclear bombs, and he's not going to allow them to use the same tactics and diplomatic statecraft that they've been used to doing to get themselves out of trouble. He sees through that, and he puts a stop to it. And I think the Arabs, you know, in this region, words are important, but actions are really the ones that matter, and they see action. They see action from the US, they see action from Israel, they see success on the battlefield, they see the Iranians failing at everything they do, and the Iranians are attacking them. So, it makes a lot of sense for the Arab countries to support the US and Israel, some of them more bravely and publicly, some of them a little bit less bravely, but nevertheless supporting.
Lockwood: Jonathan, just briefly, because we've taken a lot of your time, but we always ask our guests on One Decision podcast, what one decision are you looking out for in the coming days or weeks?
Conricus: One decision, I think, comes back to the beginning of what we spoke about. I think an important decision, perhaps not definitive, but how will Israel and the US deal with the enriched material? That'll be very important because that's probably the last off ramp that the Iranian regime will have in order to stay in power and not be totally, you know, completely militarily defeated by Israel and the US, and left totally without any bargaining chip. What may work is, if the Iranians are smart and say, okay, let's pause here, and let's negotiate about the enriched material, maybe that will get them out of trouble. If Israel takes action before that and pulls the rug, the carpet, under the Iranian feet, then that could be a very meaningful decision. And then obviously, the decision by one man, the president, who will ultimately decide when the war's over.
Lockwood: Jonathan Conricus, thank you for your time.
Conricus: Thank you.
ANALYSIS WITH SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE
Lockwood: Thanks, John. Fascinating discussion. Wow. Okay. So Richard, so much to consider there with both Ronen Bergman and Jonathan Conricus, two very different voices, from Israel, to get the Israeli perspective. I've certainly got some whirring thoughts, but why don't we start with yours?
Dearlove: Yeah. Well, two contrasting views, because you get the first investigative journalist asking a lot of questions and expressing huge uncertainties and concerns about where things are going, how they're gonna end. And, I mean, that reflects, let's say, the major view, I think, in terms of international dialogue about the war. And then speaking to Conricus, he's, well, a former IDF spokesman, and therefore very practiced in what he says. And I think we got from him an excellent military summary of the different objectives covering everything through to ballistic missiles and the regime and, of course, focusing on the HEU, the quantity that might still be in Iranian hands. And I think what surprised me most about our second speaker was his confidence that the Iranian people will get rid of the regime. I mean, he didn't articulate how, and the question I would have liked to ask him if we did a further podcast is, you know, how do you get the IRGC and the Basij militias off the Iranian street so they don't massacre their own population again? So we got a pretty optimistic interpretation. Although, of course, he did say that the breakdown of the regime as and when it happens, because he seems quite convinced of that, would be or could be extremely messy. It won't be clean-cut at all. Well, I think it was very good to have the two interlocutors, and it, I think, gives us a very good spread of Israeli opinion at the moment.
Lockwood: Well, I think that point you make about the confidence and the sort of the optimism almost with the outlook is, like you said, he's a smooth communications professional. That's just what he does. He is that, which is why I did ask him about war communication strategy. It's sort of a question I've been wanting to ask for the last couple of years every time I've interviewed somebody who has worked as an IDF spokesperson or indeed any spokesperson for any military in the world, because it is their job, but they are part of the war strategy. And that sort of confidence of outlook is part of strategy. So I'm glad we got him saying that comms is a force multiplier in times of war. I also, for me, Conricus, the takeaway was asking him about the Arab Gulf states and his response being that they're sovereign countries. They're rich countries. They should be well equipped to defend themselves. Of course, they are currently doing so. But it was sort of like, it's up to them. It's up to them to really kind of sort themselves out. Ronen Bergman, I just, I made a note because he brilliantly summarised his kind of take on the lead up to the assault, the full scale assault on the February 28. The kind of the machinations that were going on potentially in DC and in Tehran and in Israel, what each of the leaders might have been thinking, how Trump got essentially pulled into this. And he did say, I quote, wrote this down, that Benjamin Netanyahu is currently shy about speaking about the role he played in getting Trump to do this. But quote, when Israeli domestic elections come around, he'll be promoting that fact that he managed to do it, and that's gonna be very powerful for him in the polls. That really stood out for me.
Dearlove: And I mean, I think that is an absolutely key issue, because looked at politically for Trump with the midterms arriving, with an unpopular war on his hands, additional pressure on the cost of living through the rise in energy prices, the uncertainty that war causes. That is, as it were, the Gordian political knot is, how on earth did Netanyahu persuade Trump when all the logic would point him in the opposite direction from what he actually did? So I think that's absolutely fascinating. And I think in terms of the podcast, it's essential that we think about that question and we examine it because it's the mystery of this, for me, it's the mystery of this war, really.
Lockwood: Well, that is all for this episode. Join us next Tuesday for One Decision in Brief where we analyze the evolving situation in the Middle East. Subscribe to One Decision on YouTube so you don't miss analysis of the most important global affairs stories of our time. For more conversations with leading decision makers and thinkers, do check out 1decision.com and our YouTube page where you'll find additional commentaries, conversations, and explainers. I'm Rosanna Lockwood. Thank you for listening.
