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Episode Summary
Better late than never? As Nato members scramble to organize support and aid for Ukraine, Nato command has pledged to beef up the Eastern Flank - the Alliance's frontier against Russia. With the potential addition of Sweden and Finland - which may yet be stymied by Turkey - Nato's border with Russia looks set to double. For the countries on the edge, of what's known as the 'Eastern Flank', Nato needs to do more than just send more troops and hardware. Our team at the Nato summit in Madrid spoke to a number of leaders, ministers and representatives from across these nations. These are their views.
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Transcript
INTRODUCTION
Lockwood: You're listening to a special edition of One Decision. The three Baltic states, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, were among the loudest voices calling for sanctioning Russia back in 2008 after the invasion of Georgia and again in 2014 after the invasion and annexation of Crimea. Two subsequent NATO summits agreed on an enhanced forward presence, stationing battalions of around a thousand in each of the Baltics and Poland. This year, when Russia launched further invasion into Ukraine in February, they called for an even stronger response from NATO in the West. The news from Madrid saw a concerted effort to beef up NATO's defense posture. I'm sitting here on the sidelines of the NATO summit with Yuri Luik, NATO permanent representative of Estonia. We've just heard Jens Stoltenberg unveil the new strategic concept published from NATO. The last time they did this back in 2010, it talked about NATO seeking active cooperation with Russia. Today, the new strategic concept says that the Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to allies' security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. How much of a long time coming was that reevaluation of the Russian threat in your opinion?
ESTONIA: YURI LUIK
Luik: Well, we are quite pleased because, as you said, there is a US announcement which also says that there will be enhanced rotation of US troops in the Baltic region, in the Baltic States, in fact, but importantly, also three so-called framework countries have announced — three so-called framework countries which cover three Baltic states, UK in Estonia, Canada in Latvia, and Germany in Lithuania have announced additional contributions, both command and control and additional combat forces. Not all of it will be on our territory, but it is also very important that if necessary or during the crisis, these units are designated specifically for Estonia, for instance, and can be moved in as quickly as possible.
Lockwood: The anxiety felt in the Baltics is understandable. All are former Soviet Republics with Russian-speaking minorities on the frontier of Europe and next door to Russia. As Russia shocked the world, plowing into Ukraine beyond the areas in the Donbas that they've contested for years, the Baltics were less shocked. So-called deterrence had not been enough. Egils Levits is the president of Latvia.
LATVIA: PRESIDENT EGILS LEVITS
Levits: I think a lot of people in Europe want to defend their freedom. And of course the alternative is to capitulate, to accept Russian domination, and I think for the majority of Europeans it is not acceptable, and this is the price also which we should pay. We should keep the peace. I will stress that. Keep the peace by showing strength. This is a concept.
LITHUANIA: AMBASSADOR DEIVIDAS MATULIONIS
Lockwood: Of the three Baltic nations, the one under the most pressure right now is Lithuania. The most southern nation, it shares borders with Latvia, Poland, Belarus, and Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea. Recently, it's come under fire from Russia for enforcing EU sanctions and blocking the transit of some goods from Kaliningrad towards Russia, provoking a fiery response from the Kremlin and making it a target for cyber attacks from Russian groups. We spoke to Deividas Matulionis, the Lithuanian ambassador to NATO. What can you tell us about those cyber attacks? Are they ongoing? Are they a huge cause of concern, or are they not something to be hugely worried about?
Matulionis: You know, it's a cause of concern, definitely. But since we got some, I mean, information in advance that there will be some attacks last week, and they started on Monday in principle. Therefore, our cybersecurity people, they were prepared, I mean, to react. And there were some damage especially on Monday, but the time passes. I mean, the damage is lower and lower. Our institutions are more capable, and we have a cybersecurity center, and they are helping us. And today, they are continuing this cyber attacks, but they are not as massive as it was on Monday, and I think yesterday was also.
Lockwood: You said you were warned that the attacks would come. Could you tell us a little more about that? Was that intelligence showing that the cyber attacks were coming? Was it a warning from allies?
Matulionis: I cannot comment on that because we simply knew that there will be attacks.
Lockwood: Right. Okay. Very, very interesting. I had to try. Lithuania is home to a pinch point between Kaliningrad and Belarus, which under Putin ally president Lukashenko is becoming increasingly active in the war against Ukraine. The news from NATO that troops would be beefed up and spending increased could not have come at a better time for Vilnius. Deividas Matulionis again.
Matulionis: In principle, we are reassured, but, having in mind that Russian policy, as they said, military operations, I mean, the war is a part of their foreign and security policy, then we have to do everything that is at our disposal to deter from any military adventures. And why it's so important? Because Lithuania, especially Lithuania, is squeezed between, accomplice, Belarus, which is in principle the same Russia, and Kaliningrad region. And you know this Suwałki gap and Kaliningrad transit issue, it's very volatile. It's fragile, and we have to prepare. We have to be vigilant.
Lockwood: And when Belarus launched missiles into Ukraine, how did you act? Because you share a big border with Belarus. Has that changed any strategic thinking on your part to move any of your military or anyone on your border with Belarus, or is that just something you're watching very closely?
Matulionis: You know, this is — we have been saying that for already several years that there is a very, very close integration between Russia and Belarus. But this, I mean, accomplice role, I mean, a complicity between Russia and Belarus, I mean, providing territory for, I mean, military attacks against neighboring country. This is a game changer, actually. It's a best proof for all allies that we have to consider Belarus in the same line as Russia. They have no, in principle, have no sovereignty when it comes to the security policy. And therefore, it's just the name is different, but in principle, completely integrated into Russian, I mean, military doctrine and military strategy. And is that something you are gonna be pushing with your NATO colleagues while you're here in Madrid? Yes. Definitely. That was one of the reasons. We said, just look. I mean, we have now added 1,200 kilometers additional border, Belarus. Lithuania is bordering. Poland is bordering and Latvia. In addition to one thousand three hundred and one thousand two hundred at Belarus, you know, the NATO has to act and has to show its resolve to defend Eastern allies, and Belarus is part of this.
CYBER DEFENSE: ESTONIA
Lockwood: The increasing amounts of hybrid and asymmetric warfare was a topic on the agenda at NATO. Among those leading the charge of defense is Estonia, a remarkably tech-savvy nation, as well as headquarters for NATO's cyber center of excellence. Yuri Luik, Estonia's permanent representative again.
Luik: Well, unfortunately, Russia attacks Western countries continuously. I mean, some attacks are more kind of minuscule against a particular object infrastructure, but there are wide range attacks. Estonia was a victim of one of those attacks, which really covered a lot of strategically important targets. And I think it's very important that NATO now has underlined in this strategic concept that there is a possibility that a cyber attack might raise to the level of Article 5. But, of course, I mean, we would be talking then of massive attack which would take out massive amounts of infrastructure, would have, I don't know, human victims or what have you. Luckily, we have not seen such attacks of such magnitude, and hopefully, will. But, obviously, we have to be ready to respond if it's necessary. Now the center is working with kind of protocols or kind of developing new techniques of cyber defense, a lot of exercises, which is very important because cyber attacks are becoming more and more complicated. So also the response is more complicated and exercises are often the way of sort of certifying that you are really ready for any type of attack. The center is also looking at the legal aspects because there is always a question whether the laws of warfare, which are natural in, say, conventional warfare, how would they be interpreted in case there is a massive cyber attack?
SLOVAKIA: AMBASSADOR PETER BÁTOR
Lockwood: Perhaps the biggest symbolic change coming out of NATO was the publishing of a new defense strategy, markedly different from the last strategy published back in 2010. This time, there is no mention of efforts to work on strategic cooperation with Russia. It's now described as the single biggest threat in the Euro-Atlantic area. China, totally absent from the last defense concept, gets a mention too. Peter Bátor is the Slovakian ambassador to NATO.
Bator: In the past years, definitely before the 2014, we were striving for very good relations with Russia. In 2010, a strategic concept, we even named Russia as a strategic partner. And then we saw what happened in Ukraine for the first time. And even after that, we started to reinforce the defense on the eastern flank, but it was more symbolic. It was — what is behind the idea is that we would just have multinational forces present there. So should any provocation happen there, it would not be just the armed forces of one respective state. It would be more forces, and then it would be at least a big part of NATO involved in the conflict or in the provocation. Now we have learned that the threat even increased, and then we need something more. It would not be just, you know, having more states being part of the potential conflict, but to have forces that would be able to defend. So whether we underestimated the threat coming from Russia, I would say yes. But we are learning fast now, and even the secretary general's press statement yesterday was quite clear on that, that we are going to increase the number of forces that would be on high readiness, which also means that we will be prepared to defend.
Lockwood: Slovakia, formerly part of Czechoslovakia and a constituent part of the Soviet bloc, is south of the Baltics. The Slovaks have a more nuanced relationship with Russia. Historically suspicious of America and the West more generally, Putin's expansionism has shifted what had been long-standing attitudes in the country.
Bator: Part of it is history. Although, you know, we had Russian troops since 1968, since the invasion of the troops of the Warsaw Pact, and they stayed there for far too long. And so we should have had much more negative stance to Russia, but it was — that was not the case. I think it's partially because of the history and, you know, like being part of the Slavic tribes. So I think there is more — it's more like a romantic view of Russia than anything that would stand on something that would be more realistic. Second, it's not a secret that for several reasons, there have been some anti-US moods in the public, especially since 1999 of the Kosovo campaign. Third, we had parties that — you know, when they were in opposition or sometimes even in the government, you know, they use this Russian card just to influence the public. And, usually, they combine this nationalistic and pro-Russian into one narrative. So that was one of the reasons. And, you know, when you compare the situation — even in December last year when we had tens of thousands of people in the streets protesting against a very, I would say, generic bilateral agreement with The United States on defense cooperation and, you know, people protesting against nuclear bases stationed in Slovakia, which was, of course, more hallucination than anything else, and protesting against the government that wanted to conclude that agreement. And then compare the situation in March when, you know, people just saw the war in Ukraine, and that was one of the main reasons why the public opinion changed that dramatically, I would say, and I would say, for Slovakia, really dramatically. Because they saw people fleeing the country. They saw it was mainly women and children. And, you know, many of them just know Ukrainians because they used to travel to Slovakia or through Slovakia. So it's very close for them even geographically, but also in this human dimension. And then they saw, okay, that there is something wrong, like, with Russia that, you know, has always been claiming they are very peaceful nation. They've been already only defending their own people. Now seeing, you know, Ukrainians fleeing their own country because there are bombs falling on their homes. I think that that was a turning point for many Slovaks. So now I think the pro-Russian sentiment is even decreasing. We woke up one day on the February 24 to a totally different region and to a totally different war from a state that was somewhere in the Central Europe quite far from Russia with having Ukraine on our border, with having Poland. So, I mean, we could not even imagine that there might be a conflict close to our borders, you know, and just in one day, everything has changed. Now we have foreign troops on our territory, which had not been the case before.
ENERGY SECURITY
Lockwood: As Putin faces increasing unity across NATO and grueling sanctions from the European bloc, he's moved to counter back, weaponizing a critical lifeline to many European nations, Russian oil and gas. For many nations in Europe, Russia has long been the principal supplier of fuel. One by one, cutting the supply to many countries just as energy prices spiral worldwide is having a real impact at the consumer level. As Western nations and NATO members resolve to continue punishing Russia, their leaders are increasingly aware of the bitter pill they are having to ask their citizens to swallow. Latvia is in the same situation as other NATO member states.
Levits: Of course, our dependence from till now from Russian gas is used from Russia as a tool to influence the politics. But we are not importing gas and we are going to LNG gas. So this dependence is, in principle, not more existing. So we should see what is more important for us: our freedom, our values, our country, or some millions of euros. And I think if we would ask Spaniards or Latvians, the answer will be the same. Of course, our country and our freedom is much more valuable as, let's say, economic gains.
Lockwood: Slovakia, along with Hungary and the Czech Republic, asked for an exemption from the EU ban on Russian crude oil imports. NATO ambassador Peter Bátor told us about the economic issues his country Slovakia is struggling to balance in the response to Putin's aggression. You're all landlocked countries who are very dependent on Russian energy. Slovakia's only domestic refiner Slovnaft, I understand runs exclusively on Russian oil. And your government at the time argued that Slovakia stood to be the hardest hit by the EU sanctions if you weren't able to get that crucial exemption, which you did. How vulnerable is Slovakia to Russian pressure when it comes to your energy security? Are you moving now to diversify your energy sources, and who are you looking to to replace Russia as a source of energy?
Bator: We learned a lesson few years ago, more than few. I think it was in 2008 or 2009 when Russia stopped the supplies to Slovakia. In few weeks, our GDP went down by several percent. It was a serious hit. At that time, it was more focused on the gas. Now it's more oil. Yes. We are a long landlocked country, and we have been used to supplies coming from Russia just through the pipeline. So we haven't been using any other sort of transport or of these energy sources. Now we need to adapt. I mean, originally, my country asked for even longer periods just to have an exemption. Now it's eighteen months, which does not mean it would be the full eighteen months. It means that up to that. And we have been working hard on just how to find alternative sources. Of course, with the gas, you've got the LNG terminals. With the oil, you've got different routes on how to transport the oil to our country. One technical issue is that the biggest refinery, as you said, Slovnaft, which is part of the Hungarian MOL company also is running on certain technologies that should be changed in order just to be able to effectively produce fuel of something different than the Russian oil. So we need to look at that as well, and we've been looking at that. We know that some of the processes can be changed quite quickly, but some of the others, you know, just take time. So that's why we ask for the exemption just because, you know, you cannot change the technology overnight. But we've been working hard just to find solution as quickly as possible not to be dependent on the Russian oil because you have never a guarantee that Russia would not stop the oil supplies tomorrow. So, I think we have some partial solutions already. Of course, we would suffer more than those countries that have alternative routes, but at the end of the day, we have only one solution, and that is to find new technology, to find a solution, you know, just how to survive. I mean, I think we will. I mean, that's just a matter of time. It's not a matter of whether we could or could not do that. It's just a matter of time when. Yeah, if not if.
Lockwood: You say you think you have some solutions already. What are you able to say what those solutions are? Are there any countries — can you name any countries who you may be looking to buy oil and gas from instead of Russia in the coming months?
Bator: There are several countries. There are several routes. I would not go into details, you know, as the talks are underway, especially our ministry of economy is doing its job very well. And at the same time, we are looking at the technology part, how to change the technology as well. Because those are, you know, interlinked things — if you do not have the technology and you have the supplies, then you might face some challenges. But if we can do both, and I think we can, then we can get rid of the dependency quite quickly. And is eighteen months — up to eighteen months, is that big enough time frame for you to do that, or do you think you're gonna be in time asking for a further extension to that exemption? This has been approved. What I'm hearing from my own capital is that we can do that. Of course, there has been some political criticism by several parties like saying, okay, this was not a good deal, we should have had something more. But, you know, the experts said that, okay, eighteen months. And it was the prime minister who said it in Brussels that eighteen months would be just enough for us to adjust. So why — I, you know, I trust my government. They can do that.
FINLAND: FOREIGN MINISTER PEKKA HAAVISTO
Lockwood: The economic challenges in responding to Russia aren't just to do with energy either. For years, NATO has failed to convince many members to commit to a minimum 2% of GDP spending on national defense forces. The pledges made in Madrid this week are ambitious at a time of rising inflation across the West, but it's a necessary commitment that Finland, a future member of NATO, told us is inevitable. The final word from foreign minister Pekka Haavisto with a brutal truth about Europe's preparedness for the invasion.
Haavisto: But, of course, we also have to admit that the European security architecture has collapsed because it couldn't prevent the war in Europe. The whole security architecture, of course, the main task for that is to prevent the war, and we had two Minsk agreements, and we had the Budapest agreement on the nuclear weapons and so forth, but we still saw a direct attack against the Ukraine.
Lockwood: That's it for the special episode from One Decision, looking at the various priorities and concerns of countries across the Eastern flank, Europe and NATO's frontier against Russia. Don't forget to subscribe to our podcast so you never have to miss an episode. Drop us a line and tell us your thoughts. We're on Twitter at one decision pod, or you can get us on email on 1decision@1decisionpodcast.com. From me and the team in Madrid, thank you for listening to our special coverage of the historic NATO summit. See you next time.
