Episode Info
- Season21
- Episode4
Hosted by Christina Ruffini and Sir Richard Dearlove
Guests
Bel Trew
Bel Trew is a journalist from The Independent.
Prashant Rao
Prashant Rao is a journalist from Semafor.
Robbie Gramer
Robbie Gramer is a journalist from Foreign Policy.
Episode Summary
What decision had the most international impact in 2023? The war in Ukraine continued to loom large among Western nations’ foreign policy priorities. The sudden, shocking resurgence of war in the Middle East quickly dominated the global agenda, raised questions about how long the Israeli-Hamas conflict could drag on and whether peace there can even be achieved. One Decision's annual roundtable of top world affairs reporters takes stock of 2023 and what big decisions are coming up next year. One major moment the whole world will be watching is the outcome of the United States presidential elections, which could potentially see the return of Donald Trump to the White House. Host Julia Macfarlane is joined by The Independent's Bel Trew, Semafor's Prashant Rao, and Foreign Policy's Robbie Gramer.
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Transcript
INTRODUCTION
Mcfarlane: You're listening to One Decision, the podcast that looks at the choices made that shape our world. I'm your host, Julia McFarlane. And since this is our final podcast of 2023, we thought we'd take stock of the big decisions made this year that had global impact and will continue to shape the world in the year ahead. No surprises on what we landed on, but the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, the fallout from the Hamas terror attacks against Israel on October 7, and the crushing Israeli military response on Gaza have all dominated conversations on foreign policy this year to the detriment of ongoing crises in Sudan, Ethiopia, Myanmar, the challenge posed by Beijing, and, of course, climate change. Looming large over the horizon in 2024 is, of course, the US election, which will impact all of these issues and more. So to help me chew over where we are with the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, as always, for our end of year episodes, is a brilliant panel of wonderful journalists who've been deeply involved in coverage of these stories. Bel Trew is senior international correspondent for The Independent. Bel has spent most of the last two years in Ukraine covering the Russian invasion. She was previously based in Cairo covering the Arab Spring and is joining us from Jerusalem. Also with us is Prashant Rao, formerly of The Atlantic and The New York Times. He's now senior editor at Semafor, where he runs the Net Zero newsletter and the Flagship newsletter, which is truly excellent. I read it pretty much every morning, and I'm not just saying that because he's a friend of the pod. And last but not least is Foreign Policy's Robbie Gramer, who covers the State Department and is very worth following for his coverage of American diplomacy and the impact of US foreign policy overseas. Robbie previously managed the NATO portfolio at the Atlantic Council. Let's get right to the discussion. Let's start with the situation between Israel and the Palestinians. What's happening in Israel and Palestine took us all by surprise, but this is actually something I feel we should have seen coming. I mean, there were plenty of signs whether or not there were the Abraham Accords, for one, the Saudis being on the cusp of normalizing ties with Israel. The fact that the Israeli government was horrifically weak after months of these incredible protests against Netanyahu. There were IDF reservists refusing to go to their posts, soldiers boycotting the army. We even had intelligence and defense chiefs who were actually going on television saying that the country was being horrifically vulnerable to attack. I mean, it should have been obvious to us that something was going to happen. Why did we all miss this?
ISRAEL AND GAZA
True: I mean, it was obviously not predicted by the Israeli side, and there are some very angry people here in Israel, and there will be very hard, very hard questions asked in the coming months when this immediate military operation ends to find out exactly what the intelligence failures were because it's, you know, pretty catastrophic. But I think what the Palestinian side would say is that although I don't think anyone would have imagined there would be, you know, thousands of people crossing over into Southern Israel and the horrific scenes that we saw, there was a surge in a crackdown and a very sort of violent behavior towards Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and pressure being put on Gaza with this fifteen year siege by Israel and Egypt that had really turned the region into a powder keg. And I think probably from the Western perspective, we've just unfortunately got this view that this area is just synonymous with conflict, and we've got almost, I guess, immune to it. But, you know, in the occupied West Bank, we were already seeing unprecedented levels of settler violence. This is before October 7 in terms of and also displacement of Palestinians, forced displacement of Palestinians. Also, surge in the numbers of administrative detention of Palestinians. So that's where people are held without trial or charge indefinitely, which some rights groups say could amount to a violation of international law. And so for their side, this was a powder keg that was happening. And this had been going on for years. We were seeing lots of, you know, attacks in places like Jenin and Tulkarem, a lot of rising anger. So there, I think, was a more clear pathway to how we got there from the Palestinian side.
Rao: I think there's multiple ways to answer this question. One is, of course, there's the intelligence failure. There is, as has been cited by multiple people, the kind of 9/11 Commission quote of a failure of imagination. There was a failure of strategic foresight by Benjamin Netanyahu in his handling of Hamas, and there was a failure of the Israeli body politic in the long term to prioritize a long term resolution to a conflict that they believe they could manage rather than solve in the long run. And that actually, you know, maybe it's unfair to sort of blame the Israeli body politic because, actually, Western leaders, Arab leaders really wanted to move past the Israel Palestinian dispute. And so why didn't we see this coming? I mean, how long do we have? There's just innumerable reasons, all of which really get at the depth of how this problem felt like for a while, like, just wasn't a priority. And frankly, you know, in the years after the Arab Spring, it really wasn't. And I don't mean that in a kind of judgmental way. It just wasn't. There wasn't a single diplomat who really sort of made that their life's mission to solve this issue. The Obama administration didn't. The Trump administration didn't. And the Biden administration didn't until now. Ursula von der Leyen said this on our recent sort of discussion with Politico, but maybe, hopefully, one silver lining of this horrific couple of months is that the momentum for a two state solution finally seems to have potentially restarted. But again, I mean, who knows?
Mcfarlane: Robbie, I think what Prashant is saying, and particularly about the importance of the two state solution and how this has shown us that this problem is actually not something that is going to go away. I think the momentum, particularly over in the US, is really interesting. There has been a shift, has it not, in how this conflict is being discussed in America. And I remember the last time things were this bad between Israel and the Palestinians back in 2014, and I think it was Operation Pillar of Defense. It was another series of really tragic events that basically tipped both sides into all out war with each other. And there was a very heavy Israeli response like there is now, but it still didn't push things forward in a way that they have now. And why do you think that is? There were of course factions of the Democratic Party that were very against the Israeli response back in 2014, but why is it more of a divisive issue in America? Why are more politicians, more influencers, more people, almost sort of breaking cover and criticizing Israel in a way that they haven't before? I mean, it can't all just be because the Zoomers are on TikTok talking about the occupation, right?
Gramer: No, I mean, I think you hit on a great point. You know, I've talked to dozens of progressive foreign policy experts and lawmakers on both sides of the issue about just that. And there are two things that are clear. The first is that for President Biden himself, support for Israel is innate. It's in his foreign policy DNA. It's a very establishment centrist democratic foreign policy platform. One of the few things that centrist Democrats and Republicans really agree on here is support for Israel. Biden has shown an ability to really bend and shift politics to the progressive flank of his party on every issue except this. But that brings me to the second point, which is that it's very clear that within the Democratic Party, the ground is shifting under Biden's feet. Among young voters, among the more progressive, the more active flank of the party. There is a real skepticism of Israel here. I think part of it is spurred by the horrific scenes that are coming out of Gaza right now. Even in 2014, you know, you didn't see this level of dire humanitarian crisis, this level of full scale war in such a highly concentrated urban area. And the second is there is just this generational shift. How that plays out remains to be seen, but Biden is facing a lot of pressure from within his own party on how he's balancing this. They're trying to balance on this precarious fence here of showing full unfettered support for Israel while also trying to get Israel to tamp back its operations in Gaza to try to limit the humanitarian crisis. And it's clear Biden's facing this massive pushback, not only on the international stage here, but from within his own party.
Mcfarlane: Right. You mentioned the international stage and this growing pushback against US support. Something I did not have on my bingo card for 2023 was Pope Francis essentially accusing Israel of terrorism, referring to the killing of Catholics inside a church in Gaza. He said, some people say it's war. Some people say it's terrorism. It is war. It is terrorism. We've seen also the former Defense Secretary of the UK say that Israel is conducting a killing rage, which he says is going to make this conflict last another fifty years. He's referring to sort of the radicalizing effect of the Israeli bombardment. Prashant, I'd love to get your thoughts on this. What is the wider impact of growing isolation of Israel? Is it just limited to the Middle East where we may see the Saudis turn their back on normalizing with Israel for a generation, maybe no more countries join the accords? Or does it go further than that? Is there an impact on America here? Is this going to negatively impact America's standing in the world and how it is seen given the political capital that Biden continues to spend. And the fact that the Israelis are basically in open defiance of the White House with representatives of the Israeli government who've said in media interviews recently that there will never be a two state solution. They are against a Palestinian state. What's the impact of this and how far does this contagion spread?
Rao: Yes. To all of it, it's all of these impacts. I mean, I just don't think you can understate the breadth of what is happening to global diplomacy. So the diplomatic cost to the White House is, I think, we are only beginning to understand. If you had asked this question maybe in the week or two immediately following the attack, my initial thought was in a very kind of realpolitik sense, some of the alliances that were shifting around the world were in the long term benefit of the United States, one of which was India shifting quite radically. I mean, maybe not radically, but quite significantly in favor of Israel and really sort of several American allies cementing their alliances to the United States by showing, you know, more support for Israel than we had thought. There was the initial, you know, period following the October seventh attacks where Saudi Arabia seemed to be saying via back channels that they were still open to the Israel deal that they've been talking to the White House about. Now, I mean, the longer this goes on, and it certainly looks like it'll go into the new year and beyond, it remains a huge priority of Netanyahu's government so long as he remains in power. All of those sort of things seem to be slipping away for the White House. At least that's what it seems like from afar and sort of the people I've talked to. I think the cost to the White House will be enormous. The efforts that were expended to unite developing countries, the kind of quote unquote West in the aftermath of the Ukraine war, I think a lot of that has been undermined.
Mcfarlane: And, Bel, you're talking to us from Jerusalem this evening. What is the conversation that is happening in Israel? Obviously, there is, I think, a huge number of Israelis who are against the Israeli military operation, against the IDF tactics. A lot of people speaking on channels like N12, and we're just not really hearing about that in international news coverage. But there is a lot of opposition to what is happening in Gaza. But in terms of the domestic conversation that Israelis are having amongst themselves, what are they saying about the growing international rebuking of Israel, particularly with, you know, as we mentioned, the Pope, senior government officials, some of the strong words that we've seen from the former Defense Secretary Ben Wallace, and increasing numbers of people coming out to say, we need a ceasefire.
True: Yeah. I mean, we had Joe Biden saying that Israel was launching indiscriminate attacks on Gaza as well, which was a slightly shocking statement in the sense that the US has almost greenlit this operation by saying they're 100% behind Israel, and it's right to defend itself. I think talking to people on the streets, you know, in places like Tel Aviv, also being in the occupied West Bank and talking to people every day in Gaza, from the Israeli side, from the families of the hostages and the people that support them, they want a ceasefire because they're extremely concerned about the well-being of their loved ones in Gaza. They've made it very clear that military action is not going to bring their loved ones back alive. And this was highlighted recently with the news that the Israeli military admitted shooting dead three hostages in Gaza who were shirtless, waving a white flag, and shouting help in Hebrew, which Israeli rights groups have pointed out would be a massive violation of international law even if they were Hamas combatants. Anyone who's surrendering and holding a white flag is protected. So that has made people here even more alarmed because they are concerned with the military action, with the potential for hostages who have managed to get to freedom. If they then get shot by the Israeli military or they're caught in the crossfire or they're killed in a bombing or they die of starvation or the lack of water, then this is the worst case scenario for them. But I will say that that is not necessarily coming from a position of focusing on the plight of Palestinian civilians. Talking to some groups, they're saying to me they want to have a ceasefire deal, you know, whatever it takes to get the hostages out of Israel, and then they can continue the military offensive in Gaza. There seems to be widespread support for the Israeli military and in this idea to eliminate Hamas, whatever that means practically.
Mcfarlane: And what are Israelis saying about the growing international isolationism? I mean, there is obviously not a huge amount of love for Netanyahu and his government right now. But are Israelis saying, you know, this is causing us harm, our closest friends are criticizing us and abandoning us? Is there any of that being discussed widely among Israelis? Or is the priority still very much to just get the remaining hostages out before they look up and pick up the pieces and try and work out where Israel's standing in the world has been affected by all this?
True: When you talk to the families of the hostages, they say they don't want to talk about politics. They're obviously very angry with the war cabinet. They're very careful to say they support the Israeli military, but whatever it takes to get the hostages out. Now we're seeing quite worrying language coming from other parts of Israel who are supporting whatever's happening in Gaza in terms of this horrific offensive. But in terms of international criticism, I think for Israelis, they really see October 7 as a paradigm shift moment. For them, they've compared it to the Holocaust. They say it was this horrific attack. You know, usually, when we've looked at past conflicts between Israel and Hamas, the death toll on the Israeli side and the actual impact to Israelis is tiny in comparison to what the Palestinians have had to suffer. So this was huge for them at the beginning. And so I don't think they quite understand why the world, you know, wants to criticize them and to see this as, you know, indiscriminate. So I think there is some disappointment there. But, you know, really, the scenes that we're seeing coming out of Gaza are so horrific. The numbers are unprecedented in terms of the rate of killing and the number of children being killed. And we're also seeing unprecedented violence in the West Bank in terms of, you know, settler attacks, and killing of West Bank Palestinians as well. But I think that it's got to the point now where the world leaders really have to say something.
Mcfarlane: And I want to move on from Israel and Gaza, but before I do, because we are trying to look into our crystal balls a little bit, can I ask, Bel, from where you're standing? I mean, Benjamin Netanyahu, the great survivor, his political obituary has been preemptively written so many times before. Is 2024 going to be the year where Israelis finally get rid of him?
True: There's so much anger against him and confusion. I mean, definitely the anger is against him and the war cabinet and why this, you know, ever happened in the first place. And I think there's a lot of anger that he's not pushing for an anything goes deal to get the hostages out. And a lot of people, I think, see him as doing that to save his political career. So I don't know. I mean, I think there's so many questions about what's going to happen because, you know, even if they manage to be a ceasefire, what happens the next day? You know, what's going to happen with the occupied West Bank? What's going to happen? And regionally, there's still a war that's taking place on the northern border of Israel with Lebanon as well. I think that's all going to play out to whether Netanyahu survives this or not, you know, in the next few months.
UKRAINE AND RUSSIA
Mcfarlane: I want to move to Ukraine and Russia now, which was of course the big story that dominated not just this year, but also last year. I mean, Prashant, where are we now nearly two years on from the full scale invasion of Ukraine? The widely anticipated counteroffensive that was meant to take place this summer, it was delayed for a few months because the Ukrainians felt they didn't have enough weaponry to carry it out to much of an effective degree. That's largely classed as failed by a lot of observers. Where are we right now two years on?
Rao: If you were to take the analysis of Ukraine's own commander in chief of the military or the head of Ukraine's military, we're at a stalemate. You know, both sides make sort of tactical gains here and there, but there hasn't been a strategic shift in the war in quite some time. I mean, from where I sit at least, the longer there is a stalemate, the more that is beneficial to Russia because the patience in Western capitals is clearly wearing out. We all see what's happening in the halls of Congress at the moment, that there's an inability to agree this border security deal that could provide some military aid to Ukraine, and there's also a failure in Brussels to agree this €50 billion aid package to Ukraine. And so the longer this goes on, I think Moscow has shown an ability to just gear its economy towards a war. And, you know, there are obviously continual signs that the Russian economy is vulnerable, but I think the continual mistake that we as analysts and broadly the analyst, journalist community may have made in thinking about Russia is seeing this as a purely rational calculation. And, actually, it is, by definition, an irrational calculation, which means that, like, the collapse of the Russian economy is not necessarily the thing that will end this war or the deterioration of the Russian economy is not necessarily a thing that will end this war because this is not a rational actor in our conception of one. And so, you know, inflation that may reach 10% next year according to some analytical projections and, you know, growing debt and sort of various deficits, broadly, that doesn't matter. Or if it does, it's more of a fringe issue than it would be if it was happening in the United States or the UK, which have different sort of calculations and understandings of what a benchmark should be doing. So my sense is that the longer this goes on, you know, particularly as we run into this March election cycle for Russia, I mean, use election with air quotes, obviously. The closer we get to that and beyond that, I just, this sort of the long term does benefit, I think, Moscow over time.
Mcfarlane: Robbie, time is really of the essence, and certainly the American money for Ukraine runs out at the end of the month. And we have seen the US struggle to make good on its promise of support for Ukraine. We've seen a divided Congress fail to pass this huge aid bill, which is so desperately needed for Ukraine. I mean, we saw a very high level Ukrainian delegation, including Volodymyr Zelensky in Washington this month. They have been talking to a lot of lawmakers from both sides. They say that there is still bipartisan support for their cause. I think the issue with this bill that failed to pass before Christmas, yes, it is domestic politics. The Republicans want more money for the border to be tacked on to this bill, which has slowed it from being passed in Congress. But that doesn't mean Republicans don't support Ukraine. Right?
Gramer: Yeah. I think that's absolutely right. There's a lot of, frankly, misguided analysis out there about where the Republican Party stands on Ukraine right now. The reality is if you could magically take a bill that is just for funding for Ukraine and put it before the House and Senate, it would pass in the House with 350, maybe 360 out of 435 votes. It would pass in the Senate with probably 90 to 95 votes. The issue here is the dynamics in the House where the Republicans have a razor thin majority and therefore have to cater to some of these far right wing provocateurs. And also the fact that the Biden administration made what at the time seemed like a politically convenient gamble and turned out to blow up in their face to pair this big national security package for Israel, for Taiwan, for Ukraine with the southern border. Right now, you know, talking to people on Capitol Hill, it's clear that these negotiations are going to extend into January even as the administration sounds the alarm bells that the taps are running dry on what it can legally authorize to send to Ukraine. I think going back to Prashant's point, after it was clear that this war would not be a swift week long Russian victory to conquer Ukraine, Putin has made a bet that Russia cares about Ukraine more and for longer than the West will care about Ukraine. And the cracks are starting to show in a way that says maybe Putin's gamble will pay off. We've seen some, but not all elections in Europe elect, you know, looking at Slovakia, elect more what's seen as more pro Putin candidates. Obviously, Hungary is a big blocker there with Viktor Orbán, seen as Putin's closest ally in the EU, blocking aid, making talks on Ukraine's accession to the EU incredibly difficult. And here in the United States, you know, there's obviously going to be this big question looming over everything, which is what happens in 2024 when Trump takes over. I do think that where the Republicans stand on Ukraine is a bit more complex than what some media puts out there. Yes. The right wing provocateurs like Marjorie Taylor Greene and Matt Gaetz, they get a lot more interviews. They get a lot more retweets. The center of mass in the party is still very pro Ukraine. Jury's still out on how Donald Trump would handle that if he was elected. I think it's a bit more complicated. But even with that said, it's clear that all of Ukraine's allies across the West are incredibly worried about what's going on in Washington right now, and really they should be. And just as a final point here, I mean, I've been talking to some, you know, Ukrainian lawmakers, some Ukrainian officials, as well as Eastern European defense officials. And what they're worried about this winter is Russia really ramping up the cost in terms of civilian casualties on Ukraine, stocking up missiles and ammunition, probing Ukrainian lines to see if there are any weaknesses here. There's the saying that amateurs talk strategy and professionals talk logistics. I think this war is coming down to a war of attrition and a war of logistics here. And Russia is transforming itself into a wartime economy in a way where it can mass produce artillery shells in a way that the West hasn't.
Mcfarlane: I think that's a really important point. I think the ramping up the human cost, that's something, Bel, I would love to talk to you about because you spent much of the last two years in Ukraine covering the war there. You made a really incredible documentary film called The Body in the Woods, which started off, you had this mission to identify and name the body of this 16 year old boy who had been tied up and shot in the back and dumped in a ditch in these Ukrainian woods at this abandoned Russian camp. And you followed the journey of other Ukrainians, including a young man called Vladimir, who was looking for his mom, who he knew had died somewhere in Ukraine, but had no idea where her body was and was desperate to lay her to rest and get some sense of closure. I mean, the Ukrainians started off this war with a huge sense of morale, but they've lost so much. There are now so many people scarred and traumatized two years on. How long is that morale going to last? I mean, when you were last there, what did you feel was the sense among the Ukrainians sort of mental fortitude and ability to keep taking much of this war?
True: Well, I think morale has dipped since this war where I am right now has erupted, because I think there's a feeling that the focus has shifted, as we've just been talking about. And I think there's a deep concern that those stunning gains we saw in the Northeast of the country around Kharkiv towards Kupiansk, Lyman, and as we saw down in the South when they retook Kherson City. And those gains are just not happening right now because we are in a war of attrition, and that there just isn't enough artillery shells in the West that can be made and given to Ukraine to be able to sustain any movement forward. There was a big hope, and there was a lot of attention drawn towards what was supposed to be the counteroffensive in the summer where they were going to push forward in the Southeast. I was down on those front lines in the Zaporizhzhia region and in Donetsk. That didn't happen. Right now, they are about to lose ground that they took back in the North in a place called Kupiansk. They've pretty much lost Avdiivka, which is in Donetsk. And these areas, you know, I've covered war for over I don't know how many years now, twelve years, thirteen years. And the fighting is absolutely brutal. It is a meat grinder, to use a horrific phrase. There is just so much artillery, and there's so much destruction. These areas that they're fighting over are literally like craters, apocalyptic moonscapes that where they're moving one or two meters a day back and forth over a destroyed hedge with just a huge death toll. So I think the feeling right now, although there is a sense of morale because this is an existential threat to their very national identity, there is a feeling that the West is letting them down. I think just talking about artillery shells there that Robbie was talking about, I think the Estonian defense ministry put out a report saying that Kyiv needed a minimum of 200,000 artillery shells a month to retain its edge against Russia. There just isn't that many shells being made in Europe and the West to be able to sustain that. I think that's the big worry. I think in the next few months, as we go deep into winter and we see those gains that we saw in the Northeast and in the East, we see them being lost to Russia. That's going to impact people back at home who are also facing, you know, long range drone attacks and missile attacks, you know, disturbances to electricity and just the general exhaustion of having to live through war for over two years.
Mcfarlane: I want to move on, but just lastly Prashant, obviously we're talking about how the Ukrainians are running out of people, morale, ammunition, and time. All these things Putin has and is willing to expend to fight the war. I guess, given the real issues and questions that the Ukrainian war raises for European security and defense, Prashant, what are your predictions for 2024? I mean, do you think Zelensky will be forced to come to the table before Putin senses an advantage to push the Ukrainians from staunch defense into retreat and gaining more territory? I mean, Robbie mentioned the changes in European politics in Slovakia, and of course, Geert Wilders' re-entrance in Dutch politics at a time when the Netherlands was supposed to lead the F-16 programmes for Ukraine next year along with Denmark. What would your sort of predictions for 2024 be?
Rao: My predictions would actually be pretty grim for Ukraine. I think European and American support is going to deteriorate further, I think, as we get into a 2024 election cycle in the United States. I think the biggest thing that Ukraine, to some degree, has reminded us of, which we should have known before, is that there is a, you know, too often in military tactics, we think about strategy versus tactics. And, actually, there's a third level that I often think about, and this is the one that kind of Robbie touched on, which is there's existential. And Europe and the United States just do not grasp how important this is to Russia. At a real visceral level, this is not a strategic move by Vladimir Putin. This is in his perception. Now you can disagree with the rationality of it. This is a sort of existential play, and that is just not the game that the West is playing. This is not a strategic war from Russia's point of view. And so they will continue to fight until the very end because Vladimir Putin's politics, his legacy, his entire the structure he has built in the Russian economy is geared towards this now in a way that is just not the case. And, you know, Bel hit on this as well. Yeah. I mean, the 200,000 artillery shells, you know, Europe has this commitment to provide a million. That's, you know, they're nowhere close to that, and even that would just be a sort of temporary gauze over what is just this horrific wound. I mean, they pledged that almost this time last year, didn't they? And that's just entirely failed to materialize. I mean, we talked about it the last time we recorded this podcast last Christmas.
True: Can I add there that so far, they've only delivered about 480,000, so less than half. And if you think about 200,000 a month, then that sort of puts it into perspective here. As everyone's been saying, Russia's got time. And it doesn't matter that the casualties are apparently according to the US, 315,000 casualties now. They don't mind. And Ukraine is just being absolutely pulverized, and they're fighting over patches of land that look like hell, basically.
Rao: This goes back to this possibly apocryphal quote that, you know, I heard in Iraq, but then was often used in Afghanistan as well, which is the sort of militants who are fighting the United States would often say, you know, you've got the clocks and we've got the time. And I really feel like this is what's playing out here too.
THE US ELECTION AND A YEAR OF ELECTIONS
Mcfarlane: Well, I want to move on to the US election. We're at a funny point in the race at the moment. Robbie, I can see you smiling already. So I'm looking forward to hearing you talk on this. I mean, the Iowa caucuses, they actually start in January. I was horrified to find out. And then we have also the New Hampshire primary start at the end of the month. Also, one of Trump's civil trials begins in January, E. Jean Carroll versus Donald Trump. I mean, Robbie, the world is obviously watching this. The world is obviously very anxious about the result. There's a lot riding on this election, not just for America, but obviously for frankly all of us. So Robbie, who is going to win in November?
Gramer: Oh, I'm so glad you asked because I absolutely know. No. It is, to use a technical term, a giant dumpster fire here in American politics. I think people in Washington and maybe in other capitals and in allied countries follow sort of every turn of the screw, every TikTok on who's up, who's down this week or that week. You know, most voters just don't pay attention to that. But I do think as poll numbers start coming out in January, February, March, those are going to matter a lot more than what we saw six months ago when everyone was talking about DeSantis. There is a big push right now to try to vault either Haley or DeSantis to the top among all of the never Trumper faction of the party, just a lot bigger in Washington than it is in the rest of the country. How that works out remains to be seen. Haley in recent polls has surged to almost 30%, almost doubled her numbers in New Hampshire, a really key early first state in the primary caucus here compared to Trump's 44%. She's inching her way up, but all of these anyone but Trump initiatives from the political right just sort of reek of desperation here. And it's clear, you know, voters have shown that the more, you know, these establishment political machineries push back on Trump that, you know, the more the support for Trump surges here. I think if you asked every single American voter, do they want a Trump Biden rematch? A lot of people would be in agreement that the answer to that is a resounding no, but it looks like that is where things are going.
Mcfarlane: Because it was so fun the first time. It was a blast. It was fun. It was relaxing. Everyone, it was just very amusing.
Gramer: Yeah. I mean, I think this time, a lot of concerns we've heard on the foreign policy and the domestic front here is that a Trump term two would not be the same as a Trump term one by any means. You know, he had the so called adults in the room, this axis of very experienced foreign policy heavyweights. All of them eventually turned on him, his former chief of staff, defense secretary, national security adviser, secretary of state. He's not going to have that, and his team has made clear to reporters, to his constituents that they're going to come back with a vengeance. And the most important thing for joining Trump's administration above all else, above skills, experience will be loyalty. And that's incredibly concerning for a lot of these foreign policy issues that we've been talking about.
Mcfarlane: Well, Prashant, I want to ask your thoughts on what Robbie has just said, but also given that it is going to be a bumper year for elections, I think more than half of the global population will be going to the ballot box at some point in 2024.
Rao: Well, I mean, first, can I just share your despair that the US election campaign is now thought to be in full swing and we're eleven months away? I don't know how American political reporters have the stamina to just relentlessly do this. Six weeks in Britain feels just terminally too long. This will sound sort of gauzy to some degree, but these are actually moments where we see what these populations think when the rubber hits the road. India is going to be a fascinating one because, you know, Narendra Modi is, for reasons to do with my heritage as well as my family, I'm sort of disproportionately interested in the Indian election, but also because I think it is geopolitically extremely significant. His poll numbers, kind of depending on how you look, they're not as good as they were in 2019, but it doesn't look like he's going to be booted from power. The question with Modi is always, you know, who comes after him? What does the kind of post Modi era look like in India, whether that's Yogi Adityanath in Uttar Pradesh or some likely more radical figure than Narendra Modi, and what that does to the kind of broader fabric. India's, you know, a friend of mine once told me that India has always been a conservative country that's sort of grafted a liberal elite on top of it that has moderated a lot of the sort of structural difficulties that the country faces. And Modi is obviously not part of that liberal elite. He often kind of disparages them using the Khan Market set and things like that. So the longer this goes on, I think the more divided Indian politics becomes, which has, I think, long term consequences for the sort of secular history of India. And we can interpret this purely as a domestic political thing for a very big country. But actually, this has huge international ramifications because depending on how you see it, India is a real kind of geopolitical swing state. There's a reason the United States is really courting India, and it's partly to do with China, partly because, you know, the United States for decades has had this dream that India is, like, a sort of emerging democracy that will help the United States sort of promote its worldview, neither of which has purely been the case. But the election in India, I do think after the United States election will be the most globally significant by a long way, and not just because of India's size, but because the way India moves in the next sort of five, ten, fifteen years will really define how, you know, liberal values, but also the kind of hard realpolitik move and shift and develop.
Mcfarlane: And Bel, you are now international correspondent for The Independent. You've been unleashed from being permanently based in the Middle East where you, of course, you saw the pointy end of US policy and how it affects people overseas. How do you think the world is going to be watching who wins the White House? And given that you're now, your patch is the world now rather than just one region in particular. Talk to me about what 2024 has in store for you.
True: Well, absolutely. I just wanted to quickly add that Egypt's election results were announced, and Sisi won, surprisingly. He won by 89.6%, which is down from his last two wins of 97%, but I thought I'd just add that in there as we're talking, as Prashant was talking about a festival of democracy starting. Talking about elections in this part of the world, I mean, I think one of the biggest subjects, and this is the Middle East at the moment, is the impact of Biden's chances because of what's happening here right now where I am in Jerusalem. There's clearly a lot of young Americans who care about the Palestinian situation. And I think the US greenlighting, as they see it, of a very, the most intense bombardment of Gaza that has resulted in over nineteen thousand people being killed according to the health ministry, seventy percent of them women and children, has impacted Biden's popularity. And I think there was an NBC poll that talked, I think, about 70% of people aged between 18 and 34 were saying that Biden had got it wrong. So I think that could actually end up being quite a major part of the US elections as we see this conflict roll on, particularly if there isn't a ceasefire and the death toll keeps rising. I think there's going to be a lot of concern from Ukraine about this election as well. I mean, they're already worried by, you know, the outcome of a Republican win. At least that's what people have been saying to me on the ground. They're, to be honest, worried that the Democrats don't care so much anymore. But for the Ukrainians, they need that lifeline of military support, not just words, not just statements, but actual hard artillery. I think they are very, very concerned as these key months drag on and as that front line moves against them. That an election that doesn't go well for them could be a major problem. So I think that's what will be the two biggest sort of foreign international spins on elections globally next year, at least from where I'm standing.
Mcfarlane: And Robbie, since you cover the State Department, I thought what Prashant was saying in terms of the role that the US plays in terms of promoting, as far as it can, I guess, a well functioning democracy may be impacted in the years since January 6 and the risk that we could have efforts to undermine US democracy once again? I mean, big, big elections next year, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Mexico, Brazil, this country, Britain, we may have a few more prime ministers before we next go to the polls next year. I think the State Department, I think, must be one of the most interesting beats because you get to cover the view from the US and how the US is trying to steer itself in the world, but also the view reflected back at you and what people overseas are telling you about America's standing in the world. I mean, in your time covering US foreign policy, what has been sort of the impact of the tests to American democracy? And do you think there is an impact for struggling democracies overseas?
Gramer: I think you hit the nail on the head there. To sum it up in one sentence, everyone's really worried. You know, I think also two other elections that I think are just as important for US foreign policy wonks that you didn't mention. The first is Taiwan, where that election goes in terms of how they approach Beijing, their relationship with Beijing. There's a lot of fear here over China making a play to grab Taiwan in the same way Russia did Ukraine, and would that drag the United States into a war with China? Those are coming up in January. Another one is South Africa's elections where the ANC, the ruling party is just hemorrhaging support left and right after years of graft and corruption and mismanagement. There's a worry that they could end up being forced to form a coalition with a far left party. And because the United States has anchored a lot of its engagement with Africa with the so called global South, this term here, I'm using in air quotes that I kind of hate, but everyone seems to be using now, a lot of that through South Africa and the BRICS. That could have another outsized impact on African elections. Going back to US elections, everyone's worried, particularly at the State Department, which was sort of at the epicenter of Trump's Washington fights with the so called swamp and what he saw as a deep state, in terms of his foreign policy was obviously at the center of his first impeachment scandal here too. How that plays out, I think we'll get a preview of that in how the election happens even before the results come in. If Trump starts laying the groundwork for doubting election results in the months before the election, if he comes out with more provocative foreign policy platforms that would cast doubt on US commitments to NATO, on US commitments to Ukraine. Even talking about that before the election, I think, could have a real outsized impact on morale in Ukraine, on how Russia views the next phase of the war strategically. And, yeah, and since you were asking us to make predictions, I will go ahead and make predictions that I think it will be a Trump Biden election. Biden will narrowly eke out a win. The Democrats will narrowly lose the Senate and gain a narrow majority in the House, and it will be another four years of muddling through political quagmires and headaches and crisis after crisis, and then we can come back for another podcast to talk about how messed up US politics are and how it's impacting the world. So there is my bold, happy, rosy prediction for you.
Mcfarlane: I'm reminded by the fact that President Xi instructed the People's Liberation Army to be in a position whereby they could attack and seize Taiwan by 2027. There is a chance that whoever is in the White House, whoever wins the 2024 election, may be the president who could potentially be facing a confrontation with China. Now if you think Biden is going to win, just humor me with this. If it is President Trump 2.0, are we sleepwalking our way into a conflict with China, a superpower conflict?
Gramer: The short answer is we are absolutely sleepwalking into a new cold war with China. How that would translate into a hot war remains to be seen. It's clear that, you know, part of the anti Ukraine faction of the Republican party are national security hawks who say, we have to stop delivering all these ammo, supply munitions to Ukraine because we have to bulk up for the big one against China here. That argument is disingenuous in my mind given that they're very different wars that would require very different munitions and equipment and logistics and supply lines, etcetera, etcetera, but it is one that has taken root. So you could see a Trump 2.0 if Beijing decides to start making a play toward Taiwan, sort of pull up the drawbridge on all of its Ukraine aid to look at that. I think it's too soon to tell. I think that no matter who wins, there's going to be a really hawkish, hard posture toward China here. But, obviously, the tenor and tone of that is going to change vastly if Biden wins versus if Trump wins. I mean, the one thing that both left and right can agree on in Washington right now is we need to get tough on China. And so I think you'll see that be pretty consistent across the board ahead of the 2024 elections.
True: In terms of next year, from my side, at the moment, I seem to be very much focused on multiple different conflicts, and I'm less looking at a sort of wider, you know, elections political side of it just because this violence in front of my eyes is happening every day. My biggest concern for next year is that we are going to see lots more bloodshed. In the last few months, we've seen already historic high levels of people being killed if you look at the statistics of those people killed in Gaza. Ukraine is going to drag on. There's no way this is going to end soon. We haven't even discussed Sudan that is still happening, and I'm getting messages from Darfur of the horrific killings that are happening there, and that's really dropped off the international global arena. So my concern really next year is whilst maybe parts of the world are distracted by elections, we're going to see civilians really, you know, horrifically impacted with a surge in death toll and horrific conditions in places like Gaza and in Ukraine. And that, actually, next year is going to be a very, very grim year for people because I don't see any immediate, short term solutions to these crises.
Mcfarlane: That's it for this episode of One Decision, and that's all from us in 2023. Without sounding too soppy, thank you so much for joining us this year. I hope you've enjoyed all the fascinating conversations about big global decisions as much as I have. I have learned so much from all of our guests and our cohost, Sir Richard Dearlove, and I really hope you have too. If you enjoyed the conversation today, why not subscribe to our podcast so you never miss an episode? We have new episodes every Thursday. From me and the team, thank you so much for listening, and see you in 2024.
