Hosted by Christina Ruffini and Sir Richard Dearlove
Guest
Evan Medeiros
Evan Medeiros is a former advisor to President Obama and Georgetown University Director of Asia Studies. Evan Medeiros examines China's strategy of 'calculated neutrality' and balancing economic interests in Iran and the Gulf countries.
Episode Summary
The US has moved critical missile defenses and troops from East Asia to the Middle East. With America’s resources stretched thin, is this the ultimate strategic opportunity for China? Former UK Defence Secretary Sir Ben Wallace and Times Radio political editor Kate McCann sit down with former advisor to President Obama and Georgetown University Director of Asia Studies Evan Medeiros to explore what he calls China’s strategy of “calculated neutrality” – protecting Beijing’s economic interests while avoiding direct conflict with the United States. First, for In Brief, Sir Ben and Kate discuss the US’s thinking behind blocking the Strait of Hormuz, Lord George Robertson’s scathing critique of UK foreign policy, and whether Hungary Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s defeat signals the beginning of the end of “strong man” populist politics. Later, Medeiros examines China’s balancing of its economic interests in both Iran and the Gulf countries, China’s Iranian oil “loophole” via the UAE, and if the Iran war is deepening fractures in Western alliances, potentially upending the global rules-based order.
In this episode:
02:05 – US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz
04:59 – Frustration amongst Gulf states
06:45 – UK Role, and Lord George Robertson’s warning to the UK
12:16 – Does Orban’s defeat signal the end of “strong man” politics?
15:39 – Evan Medeiros introduction
17:04 – Defining China’s “calculated neutrality”
18:28 – Is China above the fray of war?
19:32 – Balancing leverage with Iran and the Gulf states
24:03 – Is Beijing arming Iran?
27:45 – China’s Iranian oil loophole
28:54 – China: Displacing vs. replacing the US
32:25 – Why China avoids regional wars
36:54 – One Decision: China’s vision for a post-American world order
42:08 – Sir Ben and Kate discussion
Hosted by Sir Ben Wallace (former UK Defence Secretary) and Kate McCann (Political Editor at Times Radio).
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Transcript
COLD OPEN
Medeiros: It raises some very troubling questions about whether or not the Chinese are prepared to confront The United States.
Mccann: Is China gonna end up just having to take a side here? Does China see itself as being above the fray of the hot war and more of a kind of elder statesman, a partner, a peace broker, a dealmaker?
Medeiros: They know very well the American experience, and they see that as a problem to be avoided.
INTRODUCTION
Mccann: Hello, and welcome to One Decision. I am your guest co-host, Kate McCann, and I'm joined by my fellow co-host and the former UK Defence Secretary, Sir Ben Wallace. Hi, Sir Ben. Hello.
Wallace: I mean, your phone must be constantly ringing with all the news at the moment. Are people asking your advice on how to stop it? Are you one of Donald Trump's imaginary friends? Well, he's got a lot of imaginary friends at the moment. I'm not on his speed dial. I think I've not been the most charitable towards him. Yeah. I've just come back from The Gulf about ten days ago. I think I'm also one of the few people that met mister Ghalibaf when he was mayor of Tehran. He was sort of the de facto leader of Iran at the moment. Yeah, I think there's a lot of people just wanting to know what might happen. And I think, with Donald Trump, for all of us, none of us know. None of us. You can be an Iran watcher, a diplomat, a US watcher trying to predict this White House beyond twenty four hours is very difficult. And some people enjoy that.
Mccann: Some people find that very hard. So picking their way through it means lots of people make lots of phone calls to each other. But ultimately, Donald Trump doesn't seem to ring me very much. Well, that's a shame. Maybe he'll ring me during this podcast recording. You never know. We've got a really exciting guest to join us this week. It's a China expert who can tell us what Iran means for the global balance of power and whether China sees an opportunity to take advantage of a new position and really, I suppose, a new way of being in the world. You can subscribe to One Decision on YouTube or wherever you listen so you don't miss out on any of our fascinating interviews. And we'll come to that interview in just a few moments' time. But, Sir Ben, there is an awful lot of breaking news around at the moment. And I feel like we should start by examining what is actually going on in the Strait Of Hormuz because it's an area of the world I think it's fair to say many of us didn't know a great deal about. You probably did, but I certainly didn't. I now know more than I ever thought I'd need to about what the Strait is and why it matters. But it seems Donald Trump wasn't aware of how important it would be when he waded into this conflict in Iran. He's now committed himself to blockading at least part of it, the Iranian ports. You have a huge background in defense. What kind of a commitment is America making when it talks about this kind of blockade?
Wallace: Well, it's a massive commitment to blockade somewhere. You have to have a sort of navy flotilla that is prepared to shadow, stop, block, board, and if necessary sink anything it wishes to do. Blockade has to be pretty uniform and solid, otherwise it gets ridiculed. So you're going to have to be determined. You're going to have to make it very clear the rules around it. You have to tell your enemies as well as your friends what they are, and you have to see it through. Because if Chinese ships keep just sailing through it, it very quickly gets ridiculed and becomes a paper tiger. So it's a big commitment. And we've already seen The United States have to take resource from The Pacific and elsewhere across the globe to do this. So we'll see. I think the big issue, as you rightly said, everyone has known since the 1980s that one of the key planks of Iranian defense is the Strait Of Hormuz. Intermittently, in the last decade or two, they've done a bit of stuff around there. You get the Houthis to fire missiles in the Red Sea. There were British sailors captured in a rib when they were out to board and taken onto the Iranian coastline. We've seen that happen all the time. It really goes way back. So I don't think anyone should be surprised that when you say to Iran, we want regime change, we're going to bomb you, that Iran doesn't seek this military path. It doesn't make it right, but everyone has known about it, even the most elementary soldier would know about those rules. So I think it's a bit of a surprise that Donald Trump hadn't prepared for it. And I don't know, maybe he did believe he could just regime change the Iranians. And if anyone knows Iranians, and I do know them pretty well. He used to chair for eight years what the Americans would call an Iranian caucus in parliament. They're pretty determined people, so I don't think it's gonna go as smoothly as he hopes.
Mccann: No. And, you know, as you say, a huge military commitment, a significant amount of money, a significant amount of resource, and not very much in the way of backing for what Donald Trump is seeking to do. I mean, you mentioned there you've just got back from The Gulf. I'm really interested to hear how this plan has gone down there. I mean, when you speak to people in that region, do they look at what America's doing and just say, this is nuts. It's never going to work. It's pointless. Or do they think, well, look, at least he's trying to do something. At least Donald Trump is getting stuck in.
Wallace: Well, friend and foe alike in The Gulf are frustrated and disappointed and angry, depending which particular country it is, about this whole war. They didn't ask for it. Their economies have been trashed. I was in one country where I was staying in a hotel, and I was literally the only person in a hotel. And some of these economies are not all super rich countries. So there's definitely that's the start point. But the Strait and that waterway has been part of the history of freedom of navigation. They're all traders. Before oil, Dubai, Oman, Qatar, these people were sailors and traders across the straits. The great empire of Persia was one of the great traders. And so seeing their strait sort of being fought over and also being potentially auctioned to the highest bidder is very, very destabilizing for them. And they don't like it. And you'll notice that while Iran asserts that it's going to charge lots of tolls, you don't hear the voice of the Gulf Arabs being represented by The United States. You don't hear him say, our friends are on the other side of this strait, and we're not going to let this happen. So I think there's quite a fear that some part of a deal may mean the loss of a thousand year tradition of freedom of navigation.
Mccann: Yeah. I think that's a fear within the government here in London in Westminster too. And I think that's worth touching on because Donald Trump has been, I think it's fair to say, up and down, back and forth on his friends, who's coming to help, whether he wants help. He said originally that this blockade of the Strait would have others involved. And then he went on to say, we don't need any help from anybody else. And the UK government has been asked and has said no, as have others across Europe. We won't be involved in any active blockade, but they may well be involved in mine sweeping. How realistic is that prospect for, let's say, The UK? Do we really have the capability to help? Is that something we could really be useful at? And when would that kind of action start?
Wallace: Well, we can help in lots of different ways if we wanted to. We can help in ISR, Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance gathering, in order to facilitate intelligence and information for a task force and for our neighbors. And I think this is the place that the government's got itself in a mess. When it said it's not our war, you've got to be very careful with language. It might not be our war or our part in Donald Trump's war, but our allies up and down The Gulf are in this war whether they like it or not. We have defense agreements with countries like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and Qatar. These are our allies and friends and investors in our country. So it came across, when the prime minister said it's not our war, it's we're off, and we're banning all those people who are our friend. And I think this is the mess that we've slightly got into is, look. We could assist in doing something to support the blockade if it's because Iran is blocking the international seaway. That's not bombing Tehran. That's not going to war. But that is saying, sorry. We're upholding international freedom of navigation. And if Iran is seeking to block it, we have to, to some extent, as JD Vance said, play Iran at its own game if that's what you're going to do. But ultimately, our job is also to support our friends and allies. And we don't have to be at the hawkish side of Donald Trump to come to the support. And if we wanted to come to support Bahrain and Qatar, well, we already are, to some extent. We've got a squadron, I think, in Qatar. We've sent some air defense to Bahrain, and we've got air defense in Saudi. For those allies, it's actually the thought that counts. It's the contribution. They know we're not The United States, but we could do more than we're doing at the moment. And instead, we're getting a sort of on a Tuesday, we will. On a Wednesday, we won't. I mean, as you and I know, here in Britain, it's quite hard to know what the government's policy actually is.
Mccann: Yeah. It's a Craig David approach to policy making for those fans of Craig David. Well, if you're in Britain, it's the Vicki Pollard. Yeah, but no but. Yeah. That may be lost on some of our listeners. You can Google that one. Look, we should talk. I mean, we're gonna come on to talk about a little bit about Israel, a little bit about Hungary, and about the relationships there. But I want to touch on something that happened in The UK this week that I think is quite significant and may have been missed. It's the former secretary general of NATO, Lord George Robertson. He made an intervention. And, you know, when I say he made a speech, it's not one of those speeches that you listen to and it's a run of the mill thing and you think we've heard this all before. For listeners who don't know this man, he is a supporter of the government, of the Labour government. He is a very well spoken, gently spoken, not outspoken man, and he spent his entire career being very moderate. Every time I've ever interviewed him or spoken to him, he's come across as very fair. Now he's made a speech in which he's sort of lifted that veil and is now saying, the government in The UK is not doing enough. We are not safe. We are underprepared. We are not protected. We cannot trade off defense against welfare spending. That, Sir Ben, is a huge moment, isn't it?
Wallace: Yeah. I mean, he uses the word corrosive complacency. That's really pointed. And for a man who is a very considered, wise former defense secretary of Britain and also NATO secretary general, I think he's just lost his patience. He didn't have to come and do their defense review with them. He did it. He held the ring. He made the case to the treasury. And what he is seeing, because he's always talked with all his NATO friends and allies from his time and today, is that Britain is falling, Britain as a nation is losing its leadership, and Britain is failing to make the decision it's going to have to make to invest in itself. And if you've been the secretary general of NATO, you know really well how important an American alliance is. And if we wanna hold and cherish that alliance, Britain has to step up to the plate and invest in its defense. Obama said that. Right? Not Donald Trump. Obama said that. And Donald Trump just says it in his own way. But ultimately, I think he's just had enough. We've all lost our patience a bit. We hear lots of rhetoric and spin and press releases, but we don't see any money. We don't see any tough political decisions that the prime minister is supposed to make.
Mccann: Well, he's lost his patience. You sound like you have a bit. But it's not just you guys. In Italy, there's been a decision made by the government there to end or pause at least a cooperation deal on defense and other things with Israel. That is as a result of some of the decisions taken by the Israeli government, and the voters have lost patience with Viktor Orban in Hungary. They've got rid of him, leader there for sixteen years. It's fair to say that the new guy in post in Hungary after the elections earlier this week, he was a member of the same party as Viktor Orban, but he's come in to sweep the changes. So Ben, do you think we're seeing the end of this kind of strongman politics? That's certainly how some people are reading the decision in Hungary. I think there are question marks over Benjamin Netanyahu's future in Israel. He's definitely got his own domestic political problems. Even Donald Trump, you know, he posted an AI image of himself depicting himself as Jesus Christ. He had to delete it. He's got in a fight with the Pope. He seems to be having some problems with his own MAGA base. Is strongman politics kind of over?
Wallace: I think populist politics is being put in the same dustbin as other politics. I think it's just gonna join the gang. People are getting fed up with politics where everything is pain free and everything's popular. And I think, ultimately, the public know there are tough choices ahead, and they're no longer convinced. I mean, you could argue that the most recent generation of populist politicians were just more populist and more TV presentable than the others. They were still promising a pain free future. We haven't had politicians for many, many years who are prepared to say to the public, you can't have everything. We're not going to spend it on benefits or health care or defense. And I think Orban is just facing that wrath domestically. And we rarely cover everybody else's internal politics. We always obsess, for example, in the foreign policy world that somehow Americans vote on America's foreign policy any more than British people vote on British foreign policy. It's rare it's the number one, two, three, or four priority of a British person. They want to know about the health service and tax and everything else. And we sort of forget that. So I think the reality is domestically, they've all had problems, and they got found out. And ultimately, the midterms in November for Donald Trump, it's going to be about cost of living, inflation, migration, where he'll get an up, but on those other two, he'll probably get a down. And I think that's the reality. But in Hungary, it had a lot of internal problems with its own economy. He wasn't as popular as he might have believed he was. So maybe that ties to his true social. If Donald Trump thinks he is a doctor or a saint, he might like to take a dose of reality and listen to the Pope.
Mccann: You ever posted a picture of yourself as Jesus Christ?
Wallace: No, and it's never really crossed my mind. What about a doctor healing the world? When I was defense secretary, I had an Instagram account, and I had eight posts. I really couldn't get into it.
Mccann: I think Donald Trump has about eight posts in half an hour, so you're definitely off the mark there. Well, look. So Ben, we should take a look at what's going on more broadly, I think, because while we all focus, as you rightly say, on America's foreign policy and on what's going on with Iran in the Strait Of Hormuz, there are other countries who see what's happening and detect a moment for themselves. And China is one of those countries. China has walked a bit of a tightrope between Iran and Donald Trump in America. Iran is one of China's longtime strategic partners in The Middle East, but the war has really made things difficult. China wants to see itself as maybe an arbitrator, a dealmaker, somebody that America can talk to and rely on. I think that's difficult, but there is a really important meeting coming up between Xi Jinping and President Trump, and everybody is watching and waiting to see how that goes. Evan Medeiros joins us today to discuss this pivotal moment for China. He's a distinguished fellow in US-China relations for Georgetown University, where he also teaches. He was also top China advisor at the National Security Council to The US President, Barack Obama. Evan Medeiros joins us now. Hello. Welcome to the podcast.
INTERVIEW WITH EVAN MEDEIROS
Medeiros: Hi, Kate. How are you? Great to be here.
Mccann: I'm really well. And we are really excited to have you with us today because we've been spending some time on the podcast over the last couple of weeks talking about the issues that are going on around the conflict in Iran that people maybe don't have as much of a focus on. And today, we want to talk about China. And that's really where I'd like to start with you today, perhaps to zoom out a little bit, but to ask really, where does China stand in this conflict right now?
Medeiros: Well, the Chinese are trying to implement a posture I would call calculated neutrality. In other words, first and foremost, they want to protect their economic and their commercial interests in the broader Gulf. They want to avoid a confrontation with The United States, maybe generate a little bit of goodwill given the fact that Xi Jinping and President Trump are gonna be meeting in May. And they wanna preserve some leverage with Iran. Iran is an important but not indispensable energy partner. So the way I like to phrase it, Kate, is that the Chinese want to position themselves coming out of this as sort of an indispensable global partner, key to the success or the ultimate resolution of the Iran issue, but also in a way that allows China to generate influence and goodwill with the global South. So it's balancing multiple competing equities at the same time. But this is really classic Chinese statecraft. It's taking the playbook China used in its support for Russia after the invasion of Ukraine, in which it avoids criticism and responsibility but pursues its interests. And in the case of Russia-Ukraine, assisting the Russian defense industrial base and supporting the Russian civilian economy.
Mccann: So in a way, does China see itself as being above the fray of the hot war, at least insofar as it happened in Iran, and more of a kind of elder statesman, a partner, a peace broker, a dealmaker?
Medeiros: That's exactly how the Chinese are trying to position themselves. Now whether they can succeed is a different question. So there may be diplomatic complications in The US-China relationship because of that. There are rumors now in the media or there's media reporting that the Chinese have sold air defense technology to Iran and chemicals to assist their ballistic missile program. If that media reporting on intelligence information is correct, that could create even more complications in The US-China relationship. But you're absolutely right. The Chinese are trying to position themselves above the fray, elder statesman, indispensable country. But to be clear, the Chinese absolutely have economic and energy interests and broader geopolitical interests involved in the war in Iran.
Mccann: And I suppose that may well be what's driving them to take the decisions they're taking in the Strait Of Hormuz. I mean, some people will have interpreted the fact that this Chinese linked vessel seems to have plowed ahead where many others were not willing to go, even in the face of those American threats. I mean, it's taking a risk. Is that risk worthwhile because China does desperately need this energy link?
Medeiros: No. This doesn't have to do with energy security for China. In fact, China among Asian economies is probably the one that is the most resilient. The Chinese have very substantial stockpiles, months and months of both oil and natural gas. They've been stockpiling fertilizer. And then in terms of their domestic demand at home, they enjoy electrification of a lot of cars, long range trucking. So in terms of the economies that have a degree of resilience and buffers, at least in the early stages of the Middle East conflict, the Chinese have a lot. I'm still trying to understand what this Chinese vessel was, why it decided to run the blockade like it did. But you're right. It raises some very troubling questions about whether or not the Chinese are prepared to confront The United States over its effort to sort of manage shipping through the Strait Of Hormuz.
Wallace: I think the test for China is, and that means to understand, China walks a tight line between being as neutral as possible, very often embracing both sides of the Gulf, the Arab states as well as the Iranian state. And they will be acutely aware at the moment that Iran has not only struck out against the Americans, but also damaged some of their own allies or quasi allies on the other side of the Straits. Do you see China trying to actually reach out to the states such as Saudi and others and give them reassurance? Or is China going to end up just having to take a side here?
Medeiros: So the way I see China's position is it's very much a calculated neutrality. So they're balancing multiple objectives simultaneously. So you're absolutely right. The Chinese first and foremost wanna protect their economic and commercial interests. And that is defined in broad terms across The Gulf. So the Saudis, the Emiratis, the Bahrainis, the Iraqis, etcetera. And so that, I think, first and foremost is China's core interest. And you see that reflected in how Chinese diplomacy since the war in Iran began has pivoted. It started out being very pro-Iranian and then pivoted to a much more Gulf oriented position. Now the Chinese do want to preserve some leverage with Iran. And so they're doing that by sort of rhetorically supporting the ceasefire. You know, they tried to support the Pakistanis in their effort to mediate a deal. So you'll see the Chinese supporting Iran in that regard. And then most recently, there have been media reports about China providing some material assistance to Iran, specifically MANPADs and sodium perchlorate, which is used in fuel for ballistic missiles. So I think the Chinese are very careful in their relationship with Iran. They wanna preserve leverage. What's interesting is the Chinese are making the bet that the current regime in Iran will stay in power. Because if the current regime topples, then the Chinese have to start from ground zero. But the Chinese are calculating that is a low probability event. So they're trying to preserve some leverage. The real question is how they manage The United States. And they started out by taking a posture in which they sought to not confront The United States. And now they're trying to use their role in the Iran conflict to actually generate some leverage. Because Donald Trump is going to show up in Beijing on May 14. And I think Xi Jinping wants to say to him, like, hey. I'm trying to bring about a ceasefire. I was trying to help you stabilize the Gulf without overtly supporting the Iranians.
Mccann: You said something really interesting about the fact that there is media reporting now about China arming and helping Iran. I mean, how do you think that that will go down when you see President Trump heading to meet Xi Jinping? With these stories circulating in the background, I mean, there will not be very much separation between those two things. How on earth did the two men get around that?
Medeiros: Yeah. It's a great point, Kate. So first, it's important to remember that intelligence reporting is not always accurate. I don't have any insider information, but the history of The US-China relationship dealing with questions of nonproliferation, specifically nonproliferation toward The Middle East, is littered with examples of intelligence that was both correct and incorrect, of leaked intelligence information. So it's important to just put that caveat out front. Secondly, it's absolutely positively problematic. And I'm sure the administration, in their preparations with the Chinese for Trump's visit, are addressing this very issue. It's entirely possible that the intelligence reporting was of shipments that are about to go and that the intelligence community leaked those to the New York Times to put pressure on the Chinese not to transfer those particular items. It's also possible that, and the Chinese have done this before time and time again, the Chinese government claims it knew nothing about those shipments, that they were private actors in China. But of course, Beijing knows everything when it comes to arms with Iran. And so what Beijing is doing is sort of does these one off types of transfers as a way to just remind Washington that it has leverage. And oh, by the way, remind Washington that if you continue to sell arms to Taiwan, we have a response, which is arms to Iran. This is a game the Chinese have played with the Americans going back to the 1980s.
Wallace: I've just come back from The Gulf, and what is interesting is sources in Iran have actually been quite dissatisfied with the Chinese weapon systems. They didn't work on day one, night one. There was lots of problems. The Americans very quickly countered them. And I think, all the information I've read and sources out of Iran, the Iranians themselves and the IRGC, etcetera, are sort of just disappointed with the quality. And that is a mountain that China always has to climb in its exports of defense capabilities. So I think it's also telling that it's basically the only place Iran can get anything at the moment. Russia is trying a bit. I think the other thing though, Kate, and I saw this for myself, is that there's always two levels with international politics, is that on the one hand, you all meet together in a G8 or a NATO or whatever, but on the other hand, you're all spying on each other. Ultimately, leaders such as Donald Trump and President Xi are used to meeting each other while behind the scenes their agencies are arming, equipping, training, espionaging each other. It's a well trod path. It won't cause too much embarrassment, especially for Donald Trump, who I don't think will really mind that at one level, he'll get the red carpet treatment. And at the other level, I mean, he'll mind that China are arming Iran, but he will like the fact that China have to then suck up to him on his visit. It'll be a different type of power play, I think, in his mind. But ultimately, I think they haven't gone all in, China. That's what I observe. In the scale, it's more titular in its proffering. But interesting thing about Iranian oil exports that I don't think people recognize, China is the biggest buyer of Iranian oil. But a large portion, about 80 percent of that oil, goes via UAE before it goes on to China. It's an extraordinary bizarre relationship locally that only about 10% of Iranian oil is bought directly by the Chinese, as in it goes straight from an Iranian port to China. Most of it bizarrely goes across to UAE where it's refined, blended, bulked out, and then on to China. So I'd be fascinated to know, well, right now, as Iran bombs UAE, what's happened to that source of fuel? Because that's been the main source out to China. So that's going to be an interesting play in the next few months. It's a bit like despite China's view of Taiwan, Taiwan and Beijing, they have direct flights, and Taiwan has factories in Mainland China. It's always, from this side of the Pacific, you'd think, oh, this looks a bit odd. But ultimately, it's the day to day versus the strategic.
Mccann: Yeah. It's so interesting, that point that you make there, about the relationships that go on around the periphery. And I suppose, Evan, that's what we're getting at when we talk about the Trump visit. And it does seem that China is becoming more active. It seems like it's more willing to look outwards. There are EU leader visits, for example, and there've been UK ties, tentative closer ties with The United Kingdom too after a period of coldness, I suppose. What's the long term plan that China has here? Do we know? I don't know. I wish I did.
Medeiros: I mean, my view, Kate, is the Chinese are seeking to displace but not necessarily replace The United States. In other words, the Chinese don't want to become a global hegemon that has global security commitments and is responsible for security assurances with countries and regions all over the world. That's not what Xi Jinping wants. But he does want to be a global power that has far greater freedom of action and far fewer restrictions on him. Both China, Russia, several countries, Iran, North Korea, they all bristle at, you know, the extent of American power. And so that's why I say displacing rather than replacing. China absolutely wants to be a global power, but it doesn't want the level of responsibilities and the commitments that The United States has right now. And so when the Chinese look at what's going on in The Middle East at the moment, absolutely at the front of their mind is this idea that if The United States gets bogged down in another complicated military operation in the Middle East, that redounds to their benefit. Most immediately, it draws resources away from the Indo-Pacific. I mean, in a very specific sense, you have missile defense, THAAD interceptors, were withdrawn from South Korea and deployed to the Middle East. You have a marine expeditionary unit taken from its deployment on Okinawa in Japan. And then you have loads of munitions undoubtedly diverted from the Indo-Pacific theater to the Middle East theater. So when the Chinese look at the American involvement in the Middle East, they see first and foremost a strategic opportunity for them to position themselves to increasingly displace The United States because The United States will be devoting more time, more energy, more resources, the mindshare of American leaders to the Middle East, and especially if we're involved in a long term blockade slash quasi management of the Strait Of Hormuz, that's an extraordinary amount of naval resources. I'm sure Sir Ben, from his experience, can talk about what kind of energy it would take to run that kind of operation. And what that means is The US is not going to be devoting that to the Asia Pacific and preparing for a conflict over Taiwan. And it also means that the Chinese can present themselves globally, especially to global South countries, as a critical source of stability and prosperity. Right? They go to countries in Latin America and Africa that are suffering from these fuel shortages and price hikes and say like, we're here to help you. We want to invest. We're your indispensable economic partner going forward. We're not out there starting wars that challenge your macroeconomic future.
Wallace: Can I just ask about the Chinese view of the Muslim world? I've always been curious what's held China back in the Gulf Region. It's not as present either in the minds of the leadership nor indeed of the sort of infrastructures of the country as it is elsewhere around the world. And I sometimes wonder whether China can work out Europeans and Americans to some extent in its sort of logic and how we function. It can work out its own backyard. But when it comes to The Gulf, does it find it challenging? Does it not understand from almost an ethnic point of view, or do they look at the Muslim world and think, I don't understand these people, and therefore it's hesitant. I mean, what is it that sort of holds them back?
Medeiros: Right. I mean, Sir Ben, it's a very important point. I'm glad you raised it. So with the caveat that you can't generalize about all Chinese, what I would say is when I think about Chinese policymakers, first and foremost, they have a pretty clear prioritization of their national security and their foreign policy interests. Think about it as a series of concentric circles. And first and foremost, of course, is regime security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. So that's Hong Kong, Taiwan, sort of taking care of core interests. And then you go out from there. And the Chinese focus on their great power relationships, The United States, Russia, Europe, etcetera. And then you go to the periphery. And the periphery, of course, is the Asia Pacific because that's China's immediate neighborhood. It's not until you get to arguably the fourth or the fifth concentric circle that the Middle East comes into play. Historically China has not really had a lot of experience or ties with the Middle East. Its real interest in the Middle East didn't begin until 1993 when China became a net oil importer. And even then Chinese relationships were very focused, limited, transactional, episodic on making sure it has access to oil and gas. So what I would say is that in the sort of Chinese view of the world and view of their strategic interests, you know, The Middle East is not primary or secondary. The Chinese feel as if they don't have an enormous amount of experience. They see their interest principally as commercial and economic. And to make a very obvious point, they're wary of getting dragged into a quagmire. They know very well the American experience, and they see that just as a problem to be avoided. So they're very, very careful. I mean, I would note that even though the Chinese have obviously become more present in the Middle East, they're a huge source of capital, big investment partner, you know, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, The Emirates. There were reports in recent years about the Chinese talking with the Emiratis about setting up a naval base. Chinese interests are growing. But there are two issues where the Chinese really don't want to get involved and haven't gotten involved. And that is Arab-Israel and the Iran nuclear issue because they understand that those are big complicated issues that would just, you know, suck the life out of their global diplomatic initiatives. And so I think the Chinese have been exceptionally careful not to get involved. And when you look at some of the things they've done in recent years, like brokering the normalization of diplomatic relations between the Saudis and the Iranians, for example, they didn't really broker it. What they did was they hosted a meeting with the Iranians and the Saudis came together in Beijing and negotiated diplomatic normalization. So the Chinese are very careful. The question is, the age old adage in America is if you don't do the Middle East, the Middle East will do you. And as Chinese economic, commercial, and energy interests in the Middle East grow, the question is, are they going to be able to sort of stay on the sidelines? Have all the benefits without the risks and the costs.
Mccann: And presumably, as you've both said during this conversation, the Chinese military effort is lacking a little bit too, which helps drive a lot of those, I suppose, those points that you've already made. Evan, we are running out of time, sadly. We like to ask all of our guests on this podcast what the one decision they are looking out for this week might be. It can be anything. It can be a big foreign policy decision. It can be something that you've got your eye on, a big meeting or even a small meeting. But what's the one thing that you are watching out for this week?
Medeiros: So I would say this week, the big issue I would watch out for is whether or not recent Chinese actions, potential material support to Iran, and running the American blockade in the Strait Of Hormuz generates difficulty and problems in The US-China relationship, or do Beijing and Washington sort of come to a modus vivendi for how China is going to, you know, sail through the Strait Of Hormuz? Because that is a key step in the planning before Trump and Xi meet. And can I just finish up on one point, Kate, that I think is important, especially, you know, talking to both of you? There's this really interesting conversation among scholars of international relations today about whether or not the US war in Iran will end up in retrospect being America's Suez moment. Of course, referring to the Suez crisis of 1956, which is seen as this turning point where America sort of ascends over Britain as this global power. I don't think the Suez analogy is correct in implying that somehow America is going to cede power to China. I do think that the war in Iran could have an equally consequential effect on it being a turning point in the rupture of unity among Western allies. And those sort of countries, NATO countries, American allies, and partners around the world that sort of believe in the so called global West thesis of adopting a liberal rules based order.
Wallace: I think there was one difference in 1956 when America pretty much put us all in our box, France and Britain. France and Britain didn't lash out at America. We kept our counsel. We went out, cried in our cups, and got on and built a better coalition against the Soviet Union. Donald Trump has chosen the path of lashing out against those allies that haven't come to his support, which I think, as you rightly point out, is potentially a position of growing schism rather than a coming together after an event. And I think the devil will be the detail of whatever deal is done. I fear if the deal allows Iranians some control over the international sea passage of the Straits in order to get things moving and threatens to rupture the sort of most important treaty of all time, the free trade, the freedom of navigation. And Donald Trump's happy to do that. That would cause, I think, a real deep divide. I think it will be interesting to see what the deal's details are, and no one knows yet in Europe.
Medeiros: Sure. So you think that, if Trump decides to do that, that would be seen in Europe among NATO allies as sort of a fundamental breach of the basic principle of freedom of navigation that would really rupture Western solidarity, Ben?
Wallace: Yeah. I mean, we've seen a number of these international treaties that Donald Trump has chosen to junk, either unilaterally. And if you think our Western societies are built on these international treaties layering together, UNCLOS, United Nations Law of the Sea, is one of the most ratified treaties in the globe. But if he were to say, well, I'll tell you what, the deal is we'll stop if you let American shipping pass, but you do something on the nuclear. The Iranians will be very clever at making sure that they'll carry on making the Europeans pay for it. And they'll say to the Europeans, well, if you want to come and get it, well, Donald Trump will. And that could be another nail in the coffin of that international sort of rules based system that has shaped us all post Second World War in the West. So I hope that isn't going to happen. I hope that's not part of it. JD Vance's comments are positive. They are saying you're prepared to have Iranian ultimatums on that space. But you never know with the art of the deal. If doing the deal means junking something that favors the Europeans but doesn't favor The United States, then that would be a very difficult position for many of us. It'd be another bang.
Mccann: Well, what a place to end.
Medeiros: Everybody's speechless. Yeah. The end of Western solidarity for a rules based international order. That's a depressing point.
Mccann: It is indeed. But look, it's been a fascinating conversation, Evan. We really appreciate your time today. Thanks so much for joining us on the podcast.
Medeiros: Yeah. Pleasure to meet both of you. Thank you.
ANALYSIS
Mccann: Thank you, Evan. So, Ben, I found Evan really fascinating. I think it's really interesting when you get somebody who is a China expert who's willing to admit that even he doesn't really know what China's long term goal is, because the reality is getting into the China mindset is really, really hard.
Wallace: Yeah. I mean, I think we are bereft of Chinese experts, and we need to start investing in it. Our grandchildren are going to be able to navigate the world on behalf of Britain or The United States, we need to start investing in that knowledge base. You know? They are going to be and are already really the big superpower in the world, and we need to find people that understand them. They are a different culture and everything else. So I think it's been, you know, a really good opportunity for us all to listen to someone who really understands them.
Mccann: And I can't wait to see how that meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump goes because, I mean, Donald Trump is a man who loves pomp and ceremony. I think he will get plenty of that in China. But do you reckon there'll be any substance to those talks?
Wallace: I don't know. I mean, there could be. I mean, if there is, it'll be on the spur of the moment, I think. Donald Trump will suddenly do it in a meeting or a state banquet or a bilateral about a deal. I think the Chinese would prefer a very well crafted lead up to it where diplomats will meet diplomats and treaties or discussions or bargaining will happen. I don't really know how well that part of The US State Department is functioning, whether it's listened to or not. I think what we'll know is China will desperately try and make sure that its number one mission is stability. It doesn't want a fallout. It will want to keep roughly close to itself, mainly for oil and gas, and at the same time, see if there's a way to put stabilization into The Gulf. That's how China wins, economic stability at all costs. And it's probably watching The Gulf right now in that gracious tradition of never interrupt your enemy while they're making a mistake. I think that is where China is at the moment.
Mccann: Yeah. I think it will be fascinating to watch and to see whether the issue of Taiwan comes up. And as Evan was saying, China always has an eye on the strength of its enemies or the strength of its opponents, depending on how you see America at the moment, and whether or not America is so exposed now in the Strait Of Hormuz and in the Iran conflict. And Donald Trump politically has expended so much capital. Whether if China were to make a move in Taiwan, whether there would be any pushback or whether that would be something that America would be willing to let happen.
Wallace: Well, I think China is moving to a place where it believes it can probably get Taiwan through peaceful and political ways. Very recently, one of the leaders of the Taiwanese party went to Beijing and met the Chinese leadership. I think it may be recalculating and realizing that if you give it a few more years, it is likely that one way or the other, Taiwan can be absorbed into Mainland China. You know, about 25% of the Taiwanese parliament is pro Chinese state to some extent. So I think it's probably realizing that, you know, if you were in Taiwan right now, you wouldn't be entirely betting your house on Donald Trump's administration. So you might cover your bets and start to reach out a bit more to China than you have done in the past. So I think on the plus side, I think we're gonna probably avoid maybe conflict in the next two or three years. And the Pentagon and China used to plan on a 2027 timeline for conflict about Taiwan, and I don't think that's gonna happen now.
Mccann: So interesting. Really, really interesting. So Ben, thank you very much for joining me for this episode. It's been great to have you with us. That is all from us today. You can join us every Thursday for more conversation about world events that goes beyond the usual headlines. Of course, we give you a bit of behind the scenes because that's what we like to do here. You can subscribe to One Decision on YouTube. You'll never miss out on any of our conversations. And for more like this with leading decision makers and thinkers, you can check out onedecision.com where you'll find additional commentaries, conversations, and explainers. I'm Kate McCann, and thank you very much for listening.
