Hosted by Christina Ruffini and Sir Richard Dearlove
Guest
Yun Sun
Yun Sun, Ph.D., is Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center explaining why Beijing believes 2026 may be a now-or-never moment to 'reunite' Taiwan.
Episode Summary
Is 2026 China's window to “reunite” Taiwan? With Trump’s muted position on Taiwan and focus on the Western Hemisphere, China experts see a "perfect storm" of opportunity. Yun Sun, Ph.D., Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, explains why Beijing believes this may be a now-or-never moment. Dr. Sun unpacks her arguments and warnings from her recent Foreign Affairs essay.
In this episode:
The People's Liberation Army’s military readiness
If the United States won’t intervene, would Japan or South Korea?
Decoding the signals from the purge of PLA generals
Xi Jinping's legacy ambitions
Warning signs to watch in 2026
Show Notes:
A Perfect Storm for Taiwan in 2026? | Foreign Affairs
Yun Sun | Stimson Center
Yun Sun | Brookings
Hosted by Sir Richard Dearlove (former MI6 Chief) and guest co-host Rosanna Lockwood (international journalist).
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Transcript
COLD OPEN
Lockwood: The question's not been sort of if China's gonna take Taiwan, but when.
Dearlove: Is this a power struggle, or is it to do with corruption among senior generals?
Sun: The most essential question for the Chinese military is whether US will intervene.
INTRODUCTION
Lockwood: Hello, and welcome to One Decision. I'm your guest host, Rosanna Lockwood, and I'm joined by our co-host, as ever, Sir Richard Dearlove. Hello, Sir Richard.
Dearlove: Hi, Rosanna. Good to be with you.
Lockwood: Great to see you there in Aspen today. Look. It's a perfect storm brewing for a China takeover of Taiwan this year. That's the perspective of this week's guest. Yun Sun is a senior fellow and director of the China program at the Stimson Center and a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institute. She's argued that with President Donald Trump's attention focused on the Western Hemisphere, China's now got its window of opportunity to move on Taiwan. We're gonna explore all of that on today's show. Welcome, Yun Sun. Great to see you.
Sun: Thank you.
INTERVIEW
Lockwood: And, like, I know some of our listeners will be very familiar with this topic already. But for those who are, let's remind ourselves why China seeks this, quote, reunification with Taiwan.
Sun: The Chinese Communist Party that sees a strong China that is incomplete and must be completed. For the seven decades of history of the People's Republic Of China, the one issue that has remained unaddressed since the civil war period about eighty-ninety years ago was the status of Taiwan. That by this day, remains to be an autonomous region outside the rule of Beijing. So from the Chinese Communist Party's perspective, the first and foremost priority is to make sure that Taiwan does not go independent. Because if it does, then there is a major legitimacy question that if you are not able to protect the territorial integrity of China, where does your legitimacy come from?
Lockwood: And before we get into why 2026 is the supposed perfect storm for Chinese potential control of Taiwan, let's just remind ourselves why The US has to date been interested in protecting Taiwan because there's more than just territorial integrity here. There's economic factors as well as production, isn't there?
Sun: Absolutely. From The US perspective, first and foremost, we have a domestic law, the Taiwan Relations Act, that regulates the executive branch's behavior that we have to protect Taiwan. We have to provide Taiwan with weapons and needs for self protection, for self defense. So there is a legal requirement for the US government. Then in terms of economics, we know that Taiwan produces a good majority of the semiconductor chips the whole world uses. And those semiconductor chips and their technologies are also an integral component of The US economy. If there is going to be a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, then the question is, are we still able to get access to those semiconductor chips? Last but not least, there is also the perspective that if there's going to be a military contingency related to Taiwan, because US should be committed to the defense of Taiwan, then that essentially will lead to a military confrontation between United States and China. And most people would perceive that to be World War three involving nuclear weapons.
Dearlove: Yun, can I ask you also another rather basic question really about the People's Liberation Army? For years, it's been trying to create an amphibious capability because a military invasion of Taiwan is a very complex operation. Does the PLA now have, let's say, a sufficient amphibious capability in theory to undertake such a complex military operation?
Sun: Thank you, sir. That's such a terrific question. So we know that for the past decade, actually, the past eleven years since Xi Jinping took over, we have seen the Chinese defense budget increasing at a fairly steady rate of seven to 8% every year. And given the size of the Chinese economy, that is a very sizable defense spending, especially when China thinks about a defense priority. Most of these priority has been focused on Taiwan. So we know that China has been able to build up significantly its hardware capability. While we can debate on the software capabilities and morale, but the most essential question for the Chinese coming to the question of Taiwan is whether US will intervene. Because once The United States does not intervene between the militaries of China and Taiwan, there is hardly a comparison. The Chinese defense budget last year was $250,000,000,000. The Taiwanese defense budget, after this significant increase, is due just a fraction of the Chinese defense budget. The Chinese PLA has more than 2,000,000 troops, and the Taiwanese active duty military personnel at most is 170,000. So when we talk about amphibious landing, I think for the PLA, of course, amphibious landing itself is a technical challenge. But for them, this technical challenge is almost negligible if United States does not intervene and China only needs to take on Taiwanese military.
Lockwood: When we talk about whether or not The US is gonna intervene or not, let's talk about some of the calculus that's going on in the minds of Chinese leadership at the moment. Yun Sun, you wrote a piece in Foreign Affairs magazine that has garnered quite a lot of interest about 2026 this year and potentially even before the US midterms later this year being what's called a sort of perfect storm of factors. The question's not been sort of if China's gonna take Taiwan, but when. So talk to us about that perfect storm. What's playing into that?
Sun: I think the most significant factor that can be identified here is the position of The United States. Right? US position on the Taiwan Strait or on the issue of Taiwan has been that US does not have a position over the sovereignty. So basically, US does not have a position on the status of Taiwan per se. But US position has been firmly anchored on the notion that any resolution to the Taiwan issue has to be achieved peacefully. So that creates what people call a strategic ambiguity. Is US committed to militarily defending Taiwan if there is going to be an attack from China against Taiwan? Well, different US presidents have come up with slightly different answers. Like, for example, under President Biden, President Biden himself for four times made the public position, public statement that, yes, US will come to Taiwan's defense if there is going to be an attack from China. Well, but if you ask White House during the time that, well, what did President Biden really mean? The answer you would get is, well, it's too subject to how the Taiwan contingency comes about because our strategic ambiguity is aimed at maintaining a deterrence against both sides of the Taiwan Strait. It will deter China from taking an unprovoked aggression against Taiwan, but it will also deter Taiwan from taking positions that would provoke China into attacking Taiwan. And most recently in people's memory, during the period of the presidency of Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan, President Chen was advocating for a referendum in Taiwan about whether Taiwan should join the United Nations, regardless of whether United Nations would accept Taiwan. So at that time, that was perceived as a referendum about Taiwan's independent status. So from The US perspective, strategic ambiguity has always been one, not a part of the official statement of our Taiwan policy, but has been a part of the unspoken anchor. And the President Trump, especially the second term of President Trump, that assumption or that principle has been, I wouldn't say removed, it has been under significant pressure. Because since President Trump took over about a year ago, he has never made any decision about the future of Taiwan, whether The US will come to the defense of Taiwan, or even whether The US is committed to the defense of Taiwan. Similarly, we also have not seen any cabinet members of the second Trump administration coming out with a clear statement on what US would or would not do in the event of a Taiwan contingency. So we all know that in the field of international relations, deterrence has to be implemented. And a part of that implementation was that assertion of deterrence because deterrence is all about the psychological reception of whether the other side feels that you are intending to take the actions that you promise to take. For the Chinese, the most significant factor in their military calculus about Taiwan, it's not about Taiwan itself, but about whether US will intervene. And for the Chinese, if the US is not going to intervene, then the battle over Taiwan will be much more easy for them to fight. And if we think that is no significant factor, we know that the President Trump's second term is going to end by 2028. And no matter who will be the next president, whether it's a republican figure or a democratic president, this level of indifference is going to disappear. So for China, there is a window of opportunity, and there's a second Trump administration. Well, then people would ask why not 2027? The reason is simple. Chinese Communist Party is going to have its twenty first party congress in 2027. And for people who work on China and Chinese domestic politics, any given year of a party congress is a year where the government will require absolute certainty and absolute stability. So it's not imaginable that they would position over time something as significant as an attack on Taiwan during the year of his party congress. Then people might ask why not 2028? Well, the reason is also simple. In 2028, The United States is going to have its presidential election. The Chinese have had a painful memory in the year of 2020 when they believed that President Trump was going to start a war over Taiwan Strait so that he could stay on as a wartime president. If there's going to be a US China War over Taiwan, that will give President Trump what he probably have referred to as a third term, which will be quite unprecedented. So I think from the Chinese perspective, they will avoid the opportunity to give President Trump that excuse to stay on for a third term.
Dearlove: Can I just slightly challenge your analysis? You say, and I think I would know from my experience that the CCP leadership, and you say this in your article anyway, is very risk averse. They are cautious in taking big strategic decisions. Now if you look at the geopolitical situation, I would argue at the moment that Xi Jinping is in a pretty strong position in terms of China's resurgence, China's dominance, in particular Russia's dependence on China's support. Why would Xi, in 2026, disrupt the stability and power of his position in China's regional emergence by the massive risk he would take in the military initiative against Taiwan. It will totally disrupt the international situation, almost certainly massively to China's disadvantage. That seems to me the counterargument. How do you see the situation when I put forward those facts?
Sun: Oh, absolutely, sir. I think the Chinese leadership is extremely risk averse. And on something as significant as a military campaign over Taiwan, I don't think that decision will be made lightly. But for this piece or for this argument that I'm trying to present, I'm arguing that there is a convergence of factors that will make the Chinese see a window of opportunity that may not appear again down the road. Because if you think about the past seven years before the second Trump administration started, it was a narrative or the dominance of the great power competition narrative. Right? So strategic competition between The United States and China, which essentially in The US strategic community means a verdict that US will never allow China to be unified with Taiwan. So if you think about the Chinese time frame and think about the goal that they see that they absolutely have to achieve with a timeline that is undetermined, I think the Chinese leader will see that, well, what is our best opportunity to take on this mission with a relatively low cost? So cost will be high. That's absolutely for sure. But if you think about it down the road, in another four years, when there's another US president, is the cost of China going to pay higher or lower? I think the answer is quite certain that the cost will be significantly higher, which is why that this opportunity offered by the Trump administration could potentially be what the Chinese perceive as a low cost option. It's not cost free. Another point that I would like to make here is that in analysis of international affairs or in intelligence analysis, we consider probability, right? Whether this event is a high probability, high risk, or is low probability, high risk. And I will say that for something as significant as the Chinese war or Chinese takeover campaign against Taiwan, the risk is extremely high. Well, if you wanna talk about probability, do we scale it at 50% chance that China will do it or 25% chance that China will do it? Now with the second Trump administration, I would dial it up to above 25%. Well, some may say that, well, twenty five percent chance is still pretty low chance. But if I frame it in a different way, if we say that there is a twenty five percent of chance that you will have a heart attack in the next twelve months, will you consider that a high risk or low risk event? There are changing factors that are affecting the Chinese calculus, and we may still perceive this as a low probability event. But then again, with Chinese leader, there's also a fairly high level of unpredictability and uncertainty associated with this decision making. Right? Like I would bet that two months ago, nobody was foreseeing that he was going to purge the senior vice chair of his central military commission either. So with a leader that is highly assertive and with a decision making process that is highly opaque, do we still consider the risk to be low?
Lockwood: Building on what Sir Richard was saying there about the disruption it would cause, whether or not it's in China's best interest, takes me back a few years ago to 2022. And I was saying in my great era that there was no cause for Russia to reinvade Ukraine. What interest would it be? It would cause so much disruption. Surely not. So let's think more on the psychology as you introduce there, Yun Sun, and the persona of Xi Jinping, because a lot of the people would say what happened with Russia Ukraine was down to the personal intentions and aims of Vladimir Putin. So with Xi Jinping, how much is this quote reunification, which again has so many echoes with the Russia Ukraine, how much of that has become a personal legacy issue for Xi that could override strategic caution?
Sun: I think it is an essential portion or essential component to what he perceived to be his goal as a fifth generation leader of China since 1949. So we know that from the very beginning of his rule, he has proclaimed that Mao Zedong made China independent and Deng Xiaoping made China rich. Then for him, his goal, as he proclaimed, is to make China strong. Right? The rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, the rise of China, China reclaiming its rightful place in the international arena. And when you think about the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, how could China claim that it is strong if it remains to be incomplete? So I think that has been a defined agenda for his leadership. In the past, the Chinese have always said the time is on our side because of the assumption in the Chinese grand strategy or the strategic community that there will be a day The United States will be so tired of its security commitment to an island so far away from its homeland. Until that day comes, China's opportunity for unification is not going to arise. In the end, US will be giving up its security commitment to Taiwan. And by that time, whether it's a military campaign or some political negotiation about the reunification between China and Taiwan, it will be relatively easy. But I think also for China, what has changed in the past decade is narrative of great power competition, that China has come into the realization that The US is increasingly identified China not only as a challenge, but potentially as a pacing national security threat. And in that framework, the chance of US will willingly allow China and Taiwan to negotiate their peaceful unification is almost nonexistent. So I think for the Chinese, the timing factor is extremely important. And for Xi Jinping himself, he is 73 this year. He'll be 74 next year. While looking into the horizon, the chance of him maybe having another term is pretty good. But for him to have another two terms is increasingly diminishing. So for him, the time is limited, and there is a deadline.
XI AND THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY
Dearlove: Yun, can I ask you about Xi's relationship with the People's Liberation Army? Because I do think this is an important factor in relation to what may happen with Taiwan. We know that a large number of generals from the PLA have been purged, and we've seen the latest purges at the very senior level. And in particular, the thirty first Army Corps, which would be the unit used mainly in the Taiwan operation, has lost its military leadership. Is this a power struggle, or is it to do with corruption amongst senior generals, or is it both? I'm certainly of the view that there is some problem between Xi and the PLA, and that it isn't just an issue of corruption of Chinese generals, but there is, you know, a wish on Xi's part to remove anyone from his immediate entourage who may, as it were, threaten his position.
Sun: Xi Jinping's relationship with PLA has certainly been complicated. Right? And I think it's not necessarily a difference in terms of professional opinion. While we know that they disagree, well, there are certain level of disagreement between the top leader and the PLA about the plan to invade Taiwan. Because I have personally asked PLA generals that, well, if your leader tells you that today is the day that we're going to launch the effective invasion of Taiwan, what are you gonna say? The answer from the PLA is quite clear that, yes, sir. If you tell us to do it, we will do it. But we will also have to tell you what the potential outcome might look like. And I think the implied message there is that we will fight when the top leader tells us to fight, but we will also have to warn him about the potential consequence that we may not be victorious as he would expect us to be. So we know that there have been these professional differences between the leader and the PLA about the campaign or PLA's readiness. But within the Chinese politics, senior leaders are usually, well, I would love to hear an exception. I have not seen a senior leader being removed or purged because of professional differences or professional disagreements over a potential policy issue. All the removal of senior leaders within the Chinese Communist Party, within the Chinese PLA has been because of political struggle or elite politics as we put it. So I think that points to, well, my personal assessment of why Xi Jinping decided to remove such a vast number of senior leaders of the PLA. I think to begin with, Xi Jinping is frustrated with PLA. In a way, I'm sympathetic to his cause because he's looking at the institution that has had business interests and corruption, as someone would put it, embedded in the institution. And I think Xi Jinping's frustration comes from the fact that he has been the top leader. He has been the paramount leader. He has told the PLA again and again, and with rounds and rounds of purges that you have to be clean. And PLA still is not able to be clean. So in a way, I see that the top leader, Xi Jinping, he's fighting a battle not against specific generals, but it's against the institution. And I think that's why I'm not convinced that corruption is the reason that certain generals are removed. Because why is PLA corrupt? I think PLA people don't usually ask this question, that Xi Jinping is so frustrated. But why is PLA corrupt in the first place? It came from 1985 when Deng Xiaoping proclaimed that China's top agenda is going to switch from security to development, that economic development is going to be the overwhelming priority for the whole nation, including for the PLA. So as a result of that, the government cut the PLA's budget. At that time, the party made PLA a promise that we will allow PLA to engage in business activities so that you can raise additional budgets that we are not giving you. So that's the contract that the party had with the military. That's when the PLA started to be engaged in defense contracting, engaged in oil trading, engaged in real estate, and later financial sector. So when we talk about the PLA's corruption, we know that the party later changed his mind, especially under Xi. He made it very clear that the PLA must separate itself from all the business activities because you are the military. You're not supposed to be profit driven. But we also know that how difficult those institutional reforms will be, especially when you are taking away the money or the profit and the business interests that you used to have. So coming back to the PLA generals and senior leaderships, remember this contract started in 1985. That was forty one years ago. What does that mean? It means that in the past forty one years, all the PLA leaders, they were all the beneficiaries of the system. Right? Which is why that when people say, oh, these generals are corrupted. So I think this is the reason what I'm trying to explain is why I do not believe that corruption is a reason that certain generals are removed. Because if you look hard enough, you can always find problems. Essentially, the question we're discussing here is that while with the purge going on, is PLA still able to fight? The first factor here is going back to The US factor. It depends on who they're fighting with. If US is not going to intervene, if there's not going to be Japanese or Korean or The US allies' participation in a military campaign against China to push China back, I think the PLA will be able to take Taiwan even with the purges going on. The second factor here is that, well, if you think about the purges and you think about the psychological effect it creates over the PLA generals, how would you feel if you look at your seniors being purged left to the right, if you look at the top leader has the absolute authority to remove every single one of the generals within the PLA. I think the psychological effect, first and foremost, is going to be a fear factor. It's going to be a factor that the PLA generals will want to say yes to the top leader, regardless of what top leaders desire for them to carry out. I think there is an inflated or there is a rising desire within the PLA leadership to cater to what the leader wants to hear and also to pledge their allegiance and their loyalty to the leader by doing what the leader wants them to do or what they think the leader wants them to do. So that psychological factor is going to be a significant issue here. And the third factor is that if you think about the PLA as an institution and the PLA is being purged again and again and again, I think one inadvertent or unexpected effect that this purge has created is in fact that PLA can be more aggressive on tactical and operational levels. Again, because they want to pledge their allegiance and demonstrate their loyalty to leaders. And that could potentially be an emboldening factor for PLA behavior. And we have seen some of these examples. For example, during the third year of the Biden administration, PLA was using the unsafe unprofessional maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait and in South China Sea to drive the Americans away. And also in last year, in 2025, when we saw that, for example, PLA Navy suddenly appeared in the Northeast Coast Of Australia. You have to ask what drives those decisions of the PLA to act particularly aggressively. And here, I do think that domestic politics with elite politics is a major driving factor.
WHAT A US–CHINA CONFLICT WOULD LOOK LIKE
Lockwood: It is fascinating. And you already, at the beginning of our conversation, Yun Sun, talked about the Taiwanese army or military not being able to stand up to China's. It was purely from a numbers perspective. But if The US was to come to Taiwan's defense, which as you've already stated seems unlikely at this stage, but if they were, give our listeners a sense of what US China conflict in the Pacific, in the South China Sea would actually look like. Because you just mentioned that Japan, South Korea could also join. Yes. I think that's a big hot war that people have been talking about. Right?
Sun: Because if US wants to intervene, we know that US military has had a number of war games throughout the years to decide the consequence or the result of that military contingency. And I think it inevitably points to one question. Are we willing to use nuclear weapons if we are not going to be completely successful in conventional warfare? So once we, well, we know that China is building their 1,000 warheads not to revise their no first use policy, but to use those 1,000 nuclear warheads as a deterrence against The United States. So I think if we are looking at a Taiwan contingency, we're not looking at a partial or a limited conflict. We're very likely looking at a total war of annihilation that nuclear weapons will potentially be used. And if that is the case, I would say that US will mobilize its global alliance system. We know that at least under the Biden administration, there is a question as for what role Europe will play in the Indo Pacific strategy of The United States. And this current administration has a slightly different take on that question. We have seen the claim that, well, we want you to take care of the European theater and leave the West Pacific to us. You hold the Russians back, and we're gonna take care of China. I think in the event of a real conflict between US and China, Europe is not going to be spared from that campaign. At a minimum, I think Europe will have some very difficult decisions to make. Are you going to join a total sanction against Chinese trade, against Chinese financial sectors, against Chinese manufacturing sectors? Are you willing to take on the financial cost that potentially the demand from The United States to contribute troops or make military contribution to such a warfare? I think there is no easy answer to that question, but I think this will be what people have expected to be a World War three.
JAPAN'S EMERGENCE
Dearlove: We have a new government in Japan, but preceding that election, we also see Japan embarking on a policy of rapid rearmament, which does begin to change the strategic equation in the region because of the capability that Japan has to become a very sophisticated military power. In my opinion also, it's the one country which could weaponize nuclear capability within a very short time frame because of the sophistication of its nuclear industry. This doesn't really affect the equation of your analysis of what might happen in 2026, but taking a slightly longer term view, how does China now regard that issue of Japan's emergence really as a competitor for regional dominance?
Sun: From the Chinese perspective, they have always seen there is a competition between China and Japan over regional leadership, over who is going to be the leader of the regional security architecture. Because since the end of the World War II, the West Pacific security architecture is primarily carried by The United States. The US Japan alliance has been the pillar or the foundation of Japan's national security strategy. So when we look at Prime Minister Takaichi, her government and the move to remilitarize or to build up Japan's military capability, I think it's causally associated with the uncertainty that Japan has felt about a US defense commitment to Japan in the region. Well, if you ask everyone, US Japan Security Alliance is still firm. It's still solid. But I think for Japan, Japan is much more at the front line of dealing with the rise of China compared to The United States. US has the option to retreat back to the Eastern Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. Japan does not have that option. So I think from Japan's perspective and considering the many territorial maritime disputes that Japan has with China and historical agony, when Japan looks at China, I think there is such a lurking effect of fear. So for Japan, there's another element. Remember back in the days of the CPTPP, the Trans Pacific Partnership, which is a regional trade framework that US decided not to participate under the first Trump administration and under the Biden administration. But Japan decided to keep it alive. Japan decided to carry it on even without US participation, because I think Japan sees that even if US is going to diminish its role in the region, Japan still has a bigger role to play. The thing is essentially coming to Taiwan. The question is, will Japan steer a military intervention without a US military intervention? If US decides that we're not going to fight a war with China over this, then what will be Japan's position? I think that's also an extremely difficult question for Japan. Right? In the past, the Japanese have hesitated to answer the question. If US intervene in the military contingency related to Taiwan, will Japan participate? By the virtue of the US Japan Security Alliance, by their treaty and by their collective defense, they have to. But then the question for Japan is that, do we want to? Do we wanna be a little bit more clear about the conditions or the assumptions that if this happens, we will intervene. If that happens, we will not intervene. Are we gonna have those criteria? But now I think the question is even more difficult for Japan, which is, let's say US is not going to intervene. What are you going to do? I think even for The US strategic community, there is not one answer to that question. There are plenty of people saying if US is not going to intervene, Japan is not going to do anything. I think that's a very large likelihood. But with the Takaichi government, with Japan's commitment, remember the whole spat between China and Japan since last November was because of Takaichi's answer to the question at the diet session, what will Japan do if there is a Taiwan contingency? And she essentially said, well, if there is going to be a Taiwan contingency, it will be a threat to Japan's national survival. Well, with that commitment, will Japan still refrain from intervening in the Taiwan contingency? I think there is no clear answer on that, especially if US is not intervening.
Dearlove: Yeah. I agree with your analysis. I think for Japan, the crucial issue is what The United States would do. Its actions will be determined by the US administration.
SIGNS TO WATCH
Lockwood: If we think about just the coming months, if we're to buy your argument that 2026 is this perfect storm and it could well happen this year that China tries to take control of Taiwan, give our listeners a sense of signals to look out for. We know that Trump is traveling to Beijing during the first week of April to meet Xi Jinping. What would be the immediate signs that people will be monitoring for an attack that's about to happen?
Sun: Well, this is the beauty of modern technology. There's not going to be a surprise attack because if China wants to attack Taiwan, there will have to be massive mobilization of troops, of their ammunitions, of their missiles, of their boats. So there will be a pretty intensive mobilization campaign leading up to a Chinese military action against Taiwan. And all those can be observed from the military satellites. So I will look for the signs of mobilization because those will be essential for China to prepare for that military campaign.
Lockwood: Yun Sun, what is the one decision you are watching this year with regard to the China Taiwan situation?
Sun: Well, the biggest question, of course, is whether Xi sees an opportunity for him to take actions. Right? I think for China, the priorities this year is to steer the strategic direction of US China relations. I think what the Chinese are looking for is a US commitment to return to a relatively constructive relationship between US and China. And as a result of that, the Chinese are looking for a US position on Taiwan that will give China the hope for peaceful unification. So again, this is a part of the argument that I think the paper that I wrote was trying to serve, which is for China, on any given day, you ask them, what would you prefer? A military takeover of Taiwan or a peaceful unification? Their answer is always going to be peaceful unification. Why? It's less costly, to begin with. Two, also because in the Chinese military strategy, remember Sun Tzu, the ultimate art of war is winning without fighting. If the Chinese have the option, they would not want to fight. A lot of this has to do with the Taiwanese public opinion. Taiwanese public opinion has preferred the status quo because also they have the fallback plan, which is US is committed to Taiwan's defense. So that strategic ambiguity is what has kept this delicate balance of power across Taiwan Strait. But if China is able to get some commitment from The United States, that US might support peaceful unification because the Chinese said, well, US, you just want a peaceful resolution. Right? We're going to give you peaceful resolution. And as long as you state that you support peaceful unification, we're all good. You will not have to be prepared for a war, and we will be unified, everyone happy, make America great again, and make China great again. So I think for China, the biggest decision or the biggest push they're making this year is still on The US side, is to change The US position so China does not need to fight. And the Taiwanese will be forced to negotiate with Mainland China over the unification and their terms.
Lockwood: Thank you to our guest, Yun Sun.
Sun: Thank you.
Lockwood: That is all for this episode. For more conversations with the leading decision makers and thinkers, check out 1decision.com and our YouTube page where you'll find additional commentaries, conversations, and explainers. I'm Rosanna Lockwood. I've been co-hosting with Sir Richard Dearlove. Thank you for listening.
