Episode Info
- Season19
- Episode5
Hosted by Christina Ruffini and Sir Richard Dearlove
Guest
Episode Summary
The world is still reeling from the shocking invasion of Israel over the weekend, where Hamas militants staged the most audacious and horrific attacks in Israel resulting in the biggest loss of Jewish life since the Holocaust. But questions are now being asked, to how the country's high tech military and sophisticated intelligence services missed what Hamas was planning? Did Mossad drop the ball? What responsibility belongs to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu? One Decision's Sir Richard Dearlove, the former Chief of MI6, examines the issues that may have impacted Israeli intelligence agencies' ability to anticipate the worst attack in the state's history.
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Transcript
INTRODUCTION
Mcfarlane: You're listening to One Decision, the podcast that looks at the choices made that shape our world. I'm your host, Julia McFarlane. And with me today, as always, my cohost, Sir Richard Dearlove, the former chief of Britain's secret intelligence service, MI6. And it's just us today because we are closing in on one week since what Israel is calling Black Saturday, the most brutal, deadly loss of life seen in the history of the state of Israel, a day that saw the biggest civilian death toll in the Jewish community since the Holocaust. We've seen a global outpouring of support for Israel and for the global Jewish diaspora every day since. But now questions are beginning to be asked of the nation's leadership. How did this happen? How is it that Hamas, bound to a tiny blockaded strip of land, was able to carry out such a multifaceted, sophisticated incursion of Israel, the most powerful and well equipped military in the Middle East, among the most high-tech and well armed powers in the world, to such an extent that they were not able to just take Israel by surprise, but hold its territory, taking the IDF days to secure back? Was this an intelligence failure? Did Netanyahu fail to protect his citizens? These are the questions we're exploring today. I got to Richard on the phone to hear his thoughts on how this attack of historic proportions was able to take place.
INTERVIEW
Mcfarlane: So Richard, great to have you down the line for this. I'm keen to get your thoughts now that we are quite a few days on from when this story first broke, that horrific assault by Hamas militants over the weekend. It was such a shocking turn of events. And now that we are a few days on after this, the questions now are mounting as to how on earth this could have happened. There are obviously lots of questions about the intelligence, whether Israel was blind to what was inevitably being planned. And the fact that this was really quite a sophisticated attack from Hamas militants, they managed to break through what we all thought was one of the most secure, one of the most restrictive borders in the world, one of the most high-tech security fences. It was something unlike anything we have seen from Hamas. The Washington Post did a very good piece where it sort of outlined with a lot of graphics exactly sort of step by step what happened and lays out very clearly a sort of a cross section of the fence where there is sort of electrified parts of the fence, razor wire, barbed wire. There is concrete that goes underground so that if you try to dig down underneath the perimeter fence, you are met with a wall of concrete. They have never publicly said how deep that concrete goes. There are observation towers dotted around the perimeter fence, and then there are these big levees on the other side and these big sandbanks. So there are sort of several layers of protection, for the Israelis, for anyone who is trying to get through the Gaza perimeter fence outside the official checkpoint, which is the Erez border crossing. Now what we saw on the Saturday was we saw a number of things. We saw drones, commercial drones that Hamas sent bombing those Israeli observation towers and a lot of their communications infrastructure and weapon systems along the border. There were also around 3,000 rockets launched at the same time, some of those reaching as far as Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. The other thing we saw was also at the same time Hamas militants on hang gliders, these fan powered hang gliders paragliding over the fence and shooting across the border. And then the other thing we also saw was that militants who were on motorcycles were using explosives to blow up sections of the border fence. They were driving through the gaps, and then also bulldozers that had been stationed in sort of parking lots and construction sites in Gaza close to the fence, bulldozed through the fence, allowing larger vehicles to get through after that. So obviously, it was a multifaceted incursion through that fence. And something that Richard surely would have taken weeks, if not months to prepare, would have involved many people knowing about what was happening. And of course, the sort of the more people who know, the more people it is possible to talk and perhaps betray information about what's getting out. None of that happened. The Israelis say that they had not had any sort of prior warning to it. How could they have coordinated all of this, including moving bulldozers and moving bicycles and moving heavy explosives close enough to the border for the moment they would launch the word go and deploy all of this stuff. How is it possible that they could have carried all of this out underneath the nose of the Israelis without them hearing anything about it?
Dearlove: Well, think, you know, two things. The Israelis placed too much dependence on, you know, a physical barrier. And let's face it, the history of physical barriers in history is rather poor. You know, see the Maginot Line in the First World War, one of the most serious defensive fortifications ever built, and it proved to be useless. And, you know, if you have what you think is sophisticated surveillance stuff, fine. You probably lean on it too heavily, and then a lack of penetration at the senior levels of Hamas. And I think that's clear. If the Israelis had known this was coming, they could have stopped it. But let's sort of pick apart a little bit. How might it have been done? As I say, I think it was done with IRGC help. And the sort of techniques they would have used is that they would have split up the attackers into tiny units which would have been isolated from each other. They would have been trained and prepared with just one or two people at the top, knowing what the program is for bringing these people together so that there wasn't widespread knowledge of the bigger plan. It looked like maybe a series of attacks and incidents being planned individually, is ongoing in Hamas the whole time. They would have not used electronic communication. They would have used runners to carry messages as the Romans did, you know, across the battlefield to avoid any problems about intercept. They probably did have some sources who were being run by the Israelis but were under Hamas control, who were, as it were, pushing out misinformation about Hamas not being a threat, not having the capability to do this and that. I mean, I can carry on, you know, as a former professional for a long time describing the sort of measures, but I do not believe for a moment that Hamas on their own could have done this. It's striking that Blinken has already said, well, we don't have any indication on intelligence that the Iranians are behind it. But I would have thought that the professional indications are of an Iranian hand, and the political strategic implications of this are of an Iranian hand. And for me, that sort of answers the question of how it could have happened. It is a failure. I mean, let's face it. I heard my friend Efraim Halevi being interviewed. He was cautious about what he said. But I mean basically Efraim, who's in his late 80s now, but you know super composed and intelligent guy, said you know this is a huge failure and it is a huge failure. The Israelis should have been aware that this was about to happen. But I think there's a lesson here. If you have a whole infrastructure which is basically driven by military observers and you're depending on the sort of physical defenses, you're going to become complacent over time. You're not going to get that sort of in-depth perspective that really high quality human reporting could have given. And if, for example, Mossad did know the government of Israel, the politicians took no notice of the intelligence, I mean, that's an even bigger scandal.
Mcfarlane: I wanted to ask you about these reports that have surfaced in the Israeli media. Israeli journalists have been saying that their sources in Egypt have been telling them that they had gotten some kind of idea that, and I quote, something big was going to come out of Gaza. The Egyptians apparently are insisting that they did communicate this with the Israelis. Netanyahu has responded to these reports. He's called them fake news. He said, no. Egyptians didn't tell us anything. First of all, do you think that's credible? Do you think maybe the Egyptians got whiff of something, but they didn't quite know how it was going to go down? And maybe there was conversations between the Egyptians and the Israelis.
Dearlove: I mean, why would the Egyptians be briefing Israeli journalists this if it was not true? Well, I think the answer to that is they would, wouldn't they? I mean, they would claim that they knew something. The relationship between Hamas and the Egyptians is terrible and not quite as vicious as between Israel and Hamas, but it's pretty bad. I'm sure if the Egyptians had known something precise, they would have told the Israelis, and the Israelis would have been prepared. But to sort of say, well, something big, look, we in the West, before 9/11, had the idea that something big was being planned. You know, if you read the 9/11 commission, it talks about a failure. It doesn't talk about a failure of intelligence, it talks about a failure of imagination. And, you know, we didn't know where, we didn't know when, we didn't know exactly what, but there was a huge amount of noise. There was noise. Maybe what the Egyptians heard was noise. But if it wasn't precise, and, you know, it didn't point to anything specifically, there's a difference. So, I mean, I'm not at all surprised that these sort of stories are emerging, but I would be skeptical about their significance. It's very easy after the event to sort of say things and for them to be misinterpreted. And I think it gets into those sorts of areas. What I think we can be sure of is the Egyptians knew nothing definite. Because if they had done, they would certainly have told the Israelis because they hate Hamas, and they didn't. I mean, one has to conclude that they didn't because the Israelis were not prepared.
Mcfarlane: This week, President Biden, all the Americans have said, we've seen no evidence that Iran was directly involved. They say, yeah. Of course, Hamas are equipped and they're funded by the Iranians. And, actually, Netanyahu and the Israelis have also said this. We have seen no evidence that this attack was masterminded by the Iranians. Do you think they are saying this because if they were to admit that this was an attack that came from the Iranians, that there would be no choice left for Israel but to respond directly to the Iranians and then risk what could be a cataclysmic direct confrontation?
Dearlove: In a way, I think that's probably right because what everybody fears except maybe the immediate conflict between Gaza and the Israelis is the fear of escalation. Blinken is still continuing to talk to the Iranians about reviving the JCPOA, but it doesn't look as though that's got very far. And I mean, when Biden made that statement, he said, if any country is thinking of getting directly involved, don't. That was his statement. But it doesn't detract from the fact that for me, the finger of suspicion, and it is a speculation, I agree, but it's an informed speculation, points towards Iran. Who else? Look, Iran was the supplier and the armorer of Hamas. And all of those rockets, where the hell did they come from? They came from Iran. Iran, you know, delivers instructors with its weapons. And amongst those instructors are members of the IRGC who have the capability to do exactly what Hamas has done.
Mcfarlane: And, you know, why would Iran want to do this at the moment? Before we get into the why, I just want to because there is a really important question that I have for you and I have for everyone else who are the decision makers and the movers and the shakers, which is, you know, it's one thing for Iran to provide all of the capabilities, you know, training everything for Hamas. It's quite another thing if Iran was the real force behind this, if they were the architects, if they planned this, if they were the masterminds of this. And I think it's important because we have seen from the Israelis and the Americans, they have said, we have seen no evidence to support the idea that Iran was really behind this. And I think they all are pretty frank about the fact that Hamas gets its weapons and its funding from Iranians. They're not arguing against that, but I think it is different when we look at the idea that maybe the Iranians were the real masterminds behind this. And the question I have for you, Richard, is what do we do then in that case when, let's say, you are still in your old job at MI6. Let's say you have SIGINT or HUMINT may indicate that the Iranians were the main force behind this, that this plan began with the IRGC, with Tehran. But we have Western governments. We have the Israelis fearful of setting the whole region alight, which is a very legitimate concern for them to be briefing to the world something that is different from what the intelligence says. I guess the question I'm asking you is do we always take what governments say at face value? You know, are there times when in order to preserve wider stability, government officials' public announcements differ to what is actually known through intelligence or through information?
Dearlove: Good question. And I'm puzzled as to why, you know, one has had these, you know, pretty clear statements made. I mean, they're being quite carefully worded. They're not saying Iran is they're saying they had no evidence of Iran's direct involvement. But I mean, I'm sure at the moment, there will be tons of analysts of the Western intelligence community sitting down together and comparing notes to see what material is available. And I think somewhere will be, you know, not the answer, but there will be a clear set of material which points in a particular direction. And I suppose, you know, what I'm basically saying is I don't think that Hamas on its own had the sophistication to prepare all this without, you know, significant assistance in the planning and the help.
Mcfarlane: Is it plausible to you that the Americans might put out a deliberately vague, potentially even misleading statement so as to avoid steps which would inevitably lead to a wider conflict?
Dearlove: If they don't have any evidence, I mean, if they don't have any intelligence at the moment, then in a way it's fair enough that they put out this statement. But if you try to analyze what's happened, and I'm sure that there are a lot of people trying to do the same as I'm doing, you know, one is puzzled. I mean, for example, someone who I talk to quite frequently in the States rang me up and said, you know, Hamas must be mad. They're gonna be annihilated. And I said, well, I don't think that that is sort of Hamas's perspective. And, you know, I think Hamas probably have been, as it were, maneuvered in this direction. Look, I think it is important to talk about the background. What's happened in the Middle East over the last five to ten years is that whereas the Palestinian issue has been central to understanding the politics of the Middle East, the Palestinians to an extent have been sidelined. They've been encased in this terrible little enclave Gaza, and the Middle East, politically to an extent, I wouldn't say stopped worrying about them, but has disengaged from them to a certain level. So they have a lousy relationship with Egypt. You know, the Gulf States are busy opening diplomatic relations with Israel, doing deals with Israel. The Saudis, following the Abraham Accords, which came, you know, through the Trump administration. The Saudis look as though they're on the cusp of doing a deal and having diplomatic relations with Israel. And, you know, if you talk to the Bahrainis, which I've done recently, you get a rather extraordinary view of what they're doing behind the scenes in terms of that bilateral links now with Israel. And, you know, if you want to turn the Middle East upside down and, as it were, try to disrupt all of these initiatives, it looks to me as though Hamas have done it for the moment in one fell swoop. And if Hamas had done it on its own, it wouldn't be thinking in those sorts of terms. That's why I think there's a proxy behind this.
Mcfarlane: I would just say I disagree with you in terms of Hamas' motivations because I think, you know, having been to Gaza and having spoken to a lot of Palestinians who live there, I think the radicalization of the siege since 2005 is one that I think for a lot of Hamas fighters and people who sign up to join the cause, as they call it. You know, the prospects for a life in Gaza do not amount to very much. And the idea that one may go out in a blaze of glory as a martyr by carrying out a huge assault against their enemy, the Israelis. I think it's something that a lot of Hamas fighters would not need a huge amount of persuasion in order to take up. I think a kamikaze assault against Israelis just over the border with Gaza is something that actually a lot of fighters would sign up for even if it is a total suicide mission. Don't forget that in 2019, there were thousands of Gazans who took part in this protest against the border wall, who ran towards Israeli fire. And so a lot of the young people who spoke to the press afterwards when asked why would they, you know, why would they do that, they said that their prospects for life was so bleak that it was better to die fighting for their country. And so I think for a lot of people who are radicalized, who are brainwashed by the Hamas credo, I think that's I mean, I don't think the idea that this was a suicide mission for Hamas is a reason why, you know, they wouldn't do it by themselves.
Dearlove: You've got to get back a little bit. I mean, when Hamas, as it were, became the dominant political force in Gaza, what did they do? They killed off their political opponents. You know, the people of the Fatah era, they threw them off the top of apartment buildings. They took over by fear. They silenced any opposition. Anybody who criticized them was at risk of their life. And then what did they do? They embedded their military installations with a civilian shield around them, so that if they were attacked, you could only attack them by killing civilians. And in fact, you know, they've constructed an enclave of fear. And I don't disagree with what you're saying about, you know, young men being swept up in this cause and seeing that they've got no other options in life. But there are an awful lot of other Palestinians in Gaza who, given the opportunity, wouldn't think like that, wouldn't act like that, wouldn't want to live like that.
Mcfarlane: Oh, entirely. That's not the point that I'm making. And Hamas absolutely hold the civilian population hostage. When I was in Gaza in 2014, I met a young man in the Al-Shifa hospital. And he was receiving treatment in the hospital because he had had both of his legs shot at close range, at point blank range. And he had basically his kneecaps and part of his leg bones were entirely sort of shattered. And he had had his knees shot because one night he lived with his family. He was dragged out of his bed in the middle of the night by Hamas militants, taken to a sort of square just outside the house along with a few of his friends. And this was during the 2014 operation, the war between Israel and Gaza. And he was basically told by these Hamas fighters that they had seen a post that he had posted on Facebook where he was criticizing Hamas saying they keep doing this, and all that means is that more of us die. They keep dragging us into this, you know, this war. He's basically criticizing Hamas for sending rockets and antagonizing Israel who then respond with airstrikes. And they shot his kneecaps. They said, if you'd say anything against the resistance again, we will come back to your house, but it won't be with guns. It will be with axes. And he really wanted to tell his story. And I believe that that was true because I'd seen the Facebook post at the time. And, also, he really wanted to go on the record and tell the story of how Hamas was holding a lot of Gazans hostage like this, that they were terrorizing Palestinians, not just Israelis. And it was clear to me because afterwards, his family members, different family members and his friends afterwards outside around the back of the hospital, they begged me not to interview him. They said, please don't do it. He will be killed if he speaks to journalists about this. There were Hamas officials working in Al-Shifa Hospital and they were concerned already that he had been seen with a journalist. And so, you know, I just want to put that out there because I think a lot of people don't realize that not all the Palestinians, in fact, majority of the Palestinians in Gaza, frankly, who just want to live normal lives, they suffer under Hamas completely. My point was that I think that a lot of militants would not be phased at the idea of a kamikaze assault against Israel.
Dearlove: No. I'm sure. And I mean, I think there's an irony here. If my suppositions are right about Iran, I honestly think the Iranians are deeply cynical, and they probably see Hamas as an expendable asset. And if their bigger objective, you know, is to reignite the tensions in the Middle East, you know, what better way to do it? Look, the Iranians are absolute pass masters at fighting what I would describe as arm's length warfare. They do it through proxies. And they've been doing it in Gaza towards Israel. They've been doing it in Lebanon through Hezbollah in terms of dominating Lebanon. And this seems to me in all probability, and I mean, let's face it, what you've also got to bear in mind that things are not going great for the theocrats in Iran, and their position in relation to internal tensions in the country is maybe over time looking reasonably precarious. They're getting older, they have a highly educated population. And we all can see there are huge social and political tensions. And I'm not suggesting they're about to be overthrown. But, you know, they have every incentive, particularly in their contest, the sort of Sunni Shia contest for power in the Middle East in doing what they're doing. I mean, of course, the irony is that, you know, Gaza is not Shia, it's Sunni, but it's very extremist Sunni. Anyway, I may be wrong, and it may be that this is a completely Hamas constructed initiative.
Mcfarlane: Let's say the Iranians were the architects of this. I mean, it was a strategic time for Hamas to mount an offensive against Israel, given the domestic pressures on Netanyahu and the fact that the whole country has been gripped in these protests. And, crucially, large parts of the military, the reservists, were boycotting, were not showing up for their posts. The fact that a lot of IDF battalions had been redeployed from the perimeter of Gaza. They had been redeployed from stationing around Gaza and redeployed to the West Bank to quell unrest in the West Bank. And what has been interesting is one of my very good friends who is Israeli and her family are still out there. She's been telling me, you know, for weeks and weeks now that former chiefs of Mossad and Shin Bet, and security forces and police forces have been saying for months, we are vulnerable. This mess is leaving Israel vulnerable to attack. Netanyahu is putting all of our lives and our security in danger. There was reason to suppose that anything could happen at a time when Israel was in disarray. And so in terms of if this attack were to have been masterminded by the Iranians, what do you think their primary motivation would have been? Was it taking advantage of Israel's weakness at a time of division? Was it to scupper the as we were increasingly seeing moves towards the Saudi Israeli relations being their diplomatic relations, making further ground in that potential peace summit between the two of them? Was it perhaps to do with Russia? Was it also, you know, the fact that the West would be distracted by another conflagration in the Middle East? I mean, is there a Russian angle to this? Is that sort of a bit too conspiratorial? What do you think about that?
Dearlove: No. I think if you look at the geopolitics, I would put much more emphasis on the sort of international aspects of Saudi's role in the Middle East and the role that the Gulf States are playing in building different sorts of modern Arab states. I would put weight on the concern by Iran of the direction of events in the Middle East. I would also, as a suggestion, say, you know, this plays beautifully into Russia's hands in distracting attention from the war in Ukraine. And, of course, which regime is close to the Iranians? The Russians are. I think it's going a bit far to suggest that there's a sort of active part of this initiative, but it might well have been, you know, a passive undertone to it. As regards the sort of political situation in Israel, well, yes, you know, politically Israel looks as though it's been internally in something of a mess. There's been a lot of dispute. There's been a lot of rioting, particularly over these legal changes and changes over the appointment of judges, which have been so contentious. But on the other hand, I've just saw a Washington Post note this evening saying that Netanyahu has declared a government of national unity until the crisis in Gaza is over. Okay, Netanyahu is a very difficult, intransigent, extreme politician who has manipulated the political system to keep himself out of the hands of the judicial process in Israel. So those factors may have had a short term influence on the timing, I agree, but I don't think they're the predominant. I would look to the geopolitics and I would sort of try to interpret the broader geopolitics. And in that respect, I think the role of Iran in the Middle East, I mean, in one fell swoop, I think what they have managed to do is that they have managed to sort of put the clock back to cast the whole of the Middle East into chaos. And of course, you know, there is that question of oil production and the oil price and how that will affect both Russia and Iran and to an extent, of course, the Saudis.
Mcfarlane: The other thing is the Iranians by, you know, by dint of everything you've said, the Iranians must be feeling pretty good about all of this. They may or may not because, obviously, we don't know how involved they were for sure. Let's say they were very heavily involved. They managed to get a good gut punch to the Israelis, the most horrific attack, the most horrific loss of Israeli, of Jewish life since the Holocaust, certainly in the whole of Israel's history. And they aren't even the ones who get to pay the price. It is the Palestinians. And do you think Israel is falling into a trap here by seeking vengeance and retribution collectively against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. We have already seen reports of more than 260 children in the Gaza Strip being killed in the airstrikes since Israel began retaliating. We have seen a dozen refugee workers confirmed dead in the Israeli airstrikes. The main power plant has run out of fuel. There is no water. There is no food. There is no electricity. This is very quickly turning into an absolute humanitarian catastrophe of an unprecedented scale for the Gazans, and they have lost a lot of people between the number of Israeli operations that have been taking place since 2005. Are the Israelis walking into a trap by hammering Gaza as vengeance for this attack if it is the Iranians who are the ones to blame?
Dearlove: Well, the Iranians may be pulling the strings, but you know Hamas are the people who did it. And of course, in a way, this is exactly Hamas's playbook. If Israel now intervenes in Gaza or there's a full scale ground invasion, then it's going to have exactly the results that you list. It's going to look horrible, will be horrible. It will make, you know, Israel again the apparent pariah, you know, because the loss of civilian life is likely to be so high, including, you know, women and children. No, I think it's hugely problematic. And the whole idea of, you know, how on earth you recover your hostages from Gaza, when they're going to be, you know, split up into little parties and stuck in cellars and tunnels. You can imagine the sort of logistical difficulty. So the outlook looks dreadful. But I think the country that immediately, you know, will apparently benefit in the way that it thinks strategically about the Middle East is Iran.
Mcfarlane: We briefly touched on this, you know, everyone's anticipating a ground invasion and the IDF going into Gaza. I mean, it's very difficult for me to try and visualize how the Israeli military will actually achieve their goal, which is to eradicate Hamas. They've said that's what they need to do. Hamas needs to be ended, the price to pay for this absolutely abhorrent attack. I don't know what your thoughts are, but given, you know, the tunnels, the extensive underground infrastructure, the incredibly built up Gaza City and also the two other towns further south in the Gaza Strip. But given how dense it is, and there are areas of Gaza, you know, where the buildings are, you know, normally spaced out, but there are bits where there are refugee camps in Gaza, in Gaza City, where the buildings are so shambolic. There are shanty towns essentially. It is an absolute sort of hive. And the idea that they will be able to comb through where there is danger on every floor, behind every window, underneath every cellar, behind every car, and be able to pick out all the militants and essentially achieve their goal, eradicating Hamas, as they say, without an absolutely cataclysmic loss of life. Do you think they're gonna attempt that? Do you think they are actually going to try and do that? And, you know, just a reminder that more than 50% of people in Gaza are under the age of 18. The people in the Gaza Strip are predominantly children. Do you think the Israelis are gonna actively try a grand incursion?
Dearlove: Well, they have two problems. The first probably is the more immediate concern, which is recovery of hostages, which I think will be incredibly tricky and difficult for them. You know, maybe they can have partial success. But I think it's difficult given the circumstances you described to see that being more than partial. I think if they try to do anything, what we're probably talking about is for them to sort of decapitate the leadership of the party of Hamas, and as it were to put it out of business by going after key personalities. Now, it's possible to see them doing that by a partial invasion, whereby they send in enough armor to hold the center of the city and then use special forces, which in Israeli terms are formidable, to go after the Hamas leaders. I suppose the other speculation, if the Egyptians were able to open their border, so a lot of the civilians to get out, you know, that might be a sort of precursor for a larger military engagement. But look, the options are frightful for both sides at this point in time. But I think the Israelis are in a very difficult position because they cannot afford not to react. So they have to, as it were, do something significant to punish Hamas and to attempt to release as many of the hostages as they can save. But it's a pretty bleak outlook and I'm glad, well, one is relieved that one isn't faced with those sorts of problems. God, what a responsibility.
Mcfarlane: That's it for this week's episode of One Decision. We drop new episodes every Thursday. Like and subscribe so you never miss an episode. Drop us a line. Tell us your thoughts. What decisions have impacted you and where you live. You can write to us. Our email is 1decision@1decisionpodcast.com. From me and the team, thank you for listening, and see you next time.
