They’re Ready for Russia. Are the Rest of Us?

Hosted by Christina Ruffini and Sir Richard Dearlove

Guest

Dalia Grybauskaitė

Dalia Grybauskaitė is a former Lithuanian President who was the country's first female leader and among the first to raise the alarm about Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Episode Summary

Lithuania was the first country to declare independence from the Soviet Union before its dissolution. And when their first female leader, Dalia Grybauskaitė, was among the first to raise the alarm about the new Russian President Vladimir Putin, few listened—at first. One of the most outspoken small countries in the world, Lithuania has not only been among the first to send arms to Ukraine in 2022, right before the invasion but has also publicly supported Taiwan and Tibet to the fury of Beijing. This is a country worth listening to. One Decision sits down with former Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė, who warns that the threat of war is coming, whether the West is prepared for it or not.

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Transcript

INTRODUCTION

Mcfarlane: You're listening to One Decision, the podcast that looks at the choices made that shape our world. I'm your host, Julia McFarlane.

Dearlove: And I'm Richard Dearlove, former chief of British intelligence, otherwise known as MI6. Richard,

Mcfarlane: we had a fascinating guest joining us on the podcast this week. The former president of Lithuania, Dalia Grybauskaitė. She was Lithuania's first female president, and she was president at a time when Russia changed from a country newly under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, who at the start, many Western leaders were optimistic about, Tony Blair, David Cameron, for example. But then with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, things quickly changed. And one of the first leaders to go strong and hard on Putin and the threat that he represented was Lithuania under President Dalia. Leader of a small country, the first country to declare independence before the Soviet Union dismantled, and a country that has Russia on its border with the exclave of Kaliningrad, just 40 miles between that exclave Russian territory and Belarus, what is known as the Suwałki Gap, that is in Lithuania, and analysts have described it as NATO's most vulnerable strip of land. It's a pinch point. In Lithuania, they take the Russian threat very seriously, and they're very worth listening to. Absolutely.

Dearlove: And I mean, I think President Dalia is really almost seminal in her analysis because, you know, she has such a clear and precise view of the way, you know, that Russia has tried to intimidate the states on its periphery. And of course, interestingly, Russia historically has a long record of destabilizing the countries it borders in order to weaken them and to ensure, even if they're not within the realm of Russian influence, that they're, as they were, ineffective as opponents or influencers of Russia's enemies. So I think one sees this picture playing out historically. But it's fascinating to hear from her how, let's say, the forcefulness of Putin's opposition has been a catalyst for the rebuilding of effective defense alliances in the Baltic Republics in particular. And it's remarkable given how overbearing Russian power is if you're sitting in Lithuania or if you're sitting in Latvia or Estonia, that, you know, she can still take such a positive view. And I think we all should, as it were, take inspiration from her ability to think in such a constructive fashion. You know, one would love to see more of that from some of the other leaders sitting close to the Russian border. I mean, ones I'm thinking of are sort of Serbia, Slovakia, and Hungary who have, as it were, I wouldn't say thrown in their cards with Putin, but are much more cautious in the way that they treat him.

Mcfarlane: Well, I think both Lithuania and President Dalia, they have such interesting insight when it comes to Russia. Lithuania was the first FSU nation to declare independence. It did so before the formal breakdown of the Soviet Union. President Dalia herself, she was very forceful in 2014 during the annexation of Crimea. She criticized Putin very strongly. She accused him of terrorism with the annexation of Crimea to the consternation of a lot of European allies at the time. So Lithuania is a bit of a forward looker when it comes to warnings about Russia and Russian aggression, and that perhaps informs how it views other situations such as the aggression of China and how China has been dealing with Taiwan. And we first of all talked to President Dalia about the recent Taiwanese elections, and we got her thoughts on how important they were for Taiwan and why Lithuania was a country that really sticks its neck out when it comes to Taiwan.

INTERVIEW

Mcfarlane: Madam President Dalia Grybauskaitė, the former first female president of Lithuania. President Dalia, thank you so much for joining us today. It's great to have you on One Decision. GRYBAUSKAITĖ [4:45]
Yeah, thank you.

Mcfarlane: I want to first talk to you about Taiwan because they had their elections very recently. We saw the Taiwanese population elect the pro independence candidate, something that Beijing had warned them not to do. They said that it was going to be a vote for war if they were gonna go for that candidate. Lithuania has a very interesting and very close relationship with Taiwan. I'd love to get into that with you, but I'd like to just start off by asking you, since you went on a delegation last summer to Taiwan, you visited them, what did you hear from the Taiwanese officials about the situation with Beijing and what was your reaction to the recent elections? GRYBAUSKAITĖ [5:20]
I had a chance to lead the delegation of a Madrid Club council last summer. And for me it was a very interesting visit, of course, because it's a very far region, but the hope of people to live in freedom and to live independently, it's very much reminded how we were fighting thirty three years ago for our freedom and independence. So of course it's not the same situation, but anyway the aspirations of people for a free and democratic life is the same. So after these elections, of course, we hope that it will be political continuity of democratic governance. That's what is important generally, geopolitically in the world, because more or less we can say that recently the autocratic regimes are trying to fight against democratic governance, persuading that autocracies are more efficient than democracy. So from this point of view, it is very important that Taiwanese people will be able to continue their democratic life, their independent governance life, while of course there is ambiguity in the international community, how we call them, still we try to use this kind of One China policy. I will say that we're a little bit playing a game with the words and trying to avoid direct conflict with China, everybody, including European Union, but de facto, we're supporting very much Taiwan's aspirations, and especially in our region, because we understand what that means to be free, to be independent and to be democratic.

Mcfarlane: You point out the ambiguity and this game that we play with China over Taiwan. The ambiguity with Taiwan is interesting because the Taiwanese themselves perhaps don't want all out independence. Certainly a lot of its allies don't want all out independence. They favor the status quo. And so the idea of democracy and freedom for Taiwan and it's so completely bang on that you talk about the play on words because that's not really what Taiwan or its allies really want for itself, not total freedom. They have this delicate dance to play with China. Lithuania is also a very strong ally of the Tibetans. They've spoken out very strongly against oppression of minorities. Is your support for Taiwan more about what you stand against when it comes to Beijing? GRYBAUSKAITĖ [8:02]
It is sensitive and difficult because nobody can be more Taiwanese than Taiwanese themselves. As much as Taiwanese people want, that's what we support. We do not impose anything or enforce anything for them, because in our case, the Lithuanian case, we have been occupied by Russians for fifty years. That's a different story. And we were fighting for our real independence and freedom from occupation. For Taiwanese, it's a different choice. That's the choice to be free in their decision making, is the choice to be democratic governance, and is the choice to create their Taiwanese identity as much as they would like themselves. And here, international community, no one can impose to them what they need to do and how they will go about it. There are still different opinions inside the country between generations. It's probably normal. So from this point of view, we will support Taiwanese people in their decision of being democratic and free as much as they want themselves.

Dearlove: President Dalia, I'm very encouraged to hear your analysis and I agree with it. But one of the problems that we face is that Xi Jinping seems to have staked the credibility of his administration or his rule in China on eventually incorporating the Republic of China, I mean i.e. Taiwan, into the People's Republic of China. And therefore we seem to be, you know, moving inexorably in a direction where Xi Jinping, particularly if things start going badly for him economically in China, where the pressure, you know, will mount continuously on Taiwan. So the chances of, you know, one China, two systems and jogging along in the way that we've done in the past seems to me to be a diminishing rather than a constant possibility. GRYBAUSKAITĖ [9:59]
As I said, there's a jangling a little bit with the words. And this is not an ambiguity which is not clear, which we try to keep ourselves in, and it's not the best thing to have. Why it is important for Taiwanese themselves to decide what exactly they want and how fast they would like to have. And of course, the geopolitical tensions and danger and balance between Mainland China and Taiwan, how their relations will be in future will depend on both sides, absolutely, because only to think that somebody will attack or others will immediately jump into defence and to help Taiwanese militarily to defend themselves probably will be a mistake at all to go to that phase because it's incomparable entities by force, by military capacities, by everything. But I don't want to speculate at all. I think unity enforced by force, unity will not serve neither Mainland China, neither President Xi, neither Taiwanese people, because by force you will never be loved and the union will be only just for a few years and maybe the case, but it will be enforced and very difficult to acknowledge by both sides. So from this point of view, I just wish for Taiwanese people to have freedom, to have democratic governance and not to be disturbed by any enforcement by force. If in future Taiwanese people will decide to have different and better relations with Mainland China, that's up to Taiwanese people to decide.

Dearlove: The president's party, the DPP, doesn't actually have a majority, does it, in the Taiwanese parliament? The largest party is still the Kuomintang. And in a way, that's, I think, an advantage in securing a compromise because the Kuomintang, you know, are part, you know, of of the sort of ruling structure of Taiwan, and they clearly have a different attitude towards the Chinese relationship. I mean, did you sense this when you were there talking to different politicians? GRYBAUSKAITĖ [12:13]
I did meet opposition, different generations. And that was clear very much that even between the generations, there is different understanding of identity, the history and what future for Taiwan will be. So why I'm again emphasizing it's up to Taiwanese people to decide about their future and let them do it. It's better nobody intervened, nobody dictates, nobody imposed by force. And for that, it still will need few generations to come in democracy. Because only democracy can filter real feelings, real hopes, real desires of people.

Mcfarlane: And I just wish them to have democracy as long as it's possible and to define their own future by themselves, by anybody else. The last time we spoke to a representative of your government a couple of years ago, Lithuania was embroiled in a pretty bitter row with the Chinese over the renaming of your embassy to Taiwan. Beijing was angered by the renaming of it from Taipei, the city, to Taiwan, the country, although obviously its status as a country is not one that is recognised by much of the international community. But there was a lot of blowback from China. They were very angry by that move. What has the blowback been? GRYBAUSKAITĖ [13:31]
After two years it's cost nothing. In the very beginning we were expecting a more serious impact, but in two years our businesses were able to find different markets and economically we were able to avoid a large impact. But of course, politically it was our stance and our understanding and respect to the Taiwanese people. And it was surprising for us, of course, such reaction from Beijing, of course, because for such large countries, we demonstrate anger. I think it's not solid at all. And I mean not only Chinese in this situation, but also care the same on our borders with another country. So it's surprising that such kind of large countries are so irritated by smaller countries' efforts to protect their resilience, their independence, their freedoms. But it's typical probably everywhere around the world.

Dearlove: But with a land border with your large neighbor, which of course Taiwan doesn't have with its neighbor, you're very vulnerable to the sort of sophisticated interference that the Russians can mount. And I mean clearly China plays a bit the same game with Taiwan, and you have to have presumably quite a sophisticated resistance in terms of your own capability to mitigate this impact on your country. I mean, I do admire, you know, you're a small country, Lithuania, but standing up to the giant bear, that is breathing over your border, is quite a challenge. GRYBAUSKAITĖ [15:13]
It's our survival skills. We were able to survive for centuries, being in very sensitive strategic geopolitical, geographical situations between the West and between the East, somewhere in between, and after Soviet occupation and our independence, now in twenty first century, twice in twentieth century from Russia, we became resilient and for us it was quite a different story. It was occupied. It was deportation of our people. It was destroying our country. It was suppression to our language, to our heritage, to our culture. So that's very much a different story. So from this point of view, we became resilient because of how historically Russia was behaving with us. And our generations are not forgetting and not forgotten the so called Siberia, the deportation of our practically every family, we had people who suffered from deportation and disappearance of our people. So during the Second World War, after the Second World War and during all period until the beginning of the 1990s. So from this point of view, it's not so easy to impact us, especially for Russians. And it's not so easy to insert ideology which is against us. We learn how to resist, we learn how to survive. And we do now, all the time, we are under pressure of so called hybrid warfare from Russia. It's propaganda, it's ideological interference, it's even we do have now cyber attacks practically every day and the other provocations every day. And this makes us more strong, more resilient. And from this point of view, for us it's easier because today Russia is declaring themselves as enemy of the West, as enemy on the border. So it's for us a lot easier. We do not need to look and define. It is clear.

Mcfarlane: Can you go into a bit more detail about that hybrid warfare and how the Russians are targeting Lithuania? I mean, attacks kind of speak for themselves, the information warfare you mentioned, the propaganda, are they finding a foothold in Lithuania given how Lithuanians are very strongly, very aware of the history of Soviet Russian aggression? And is there really a foothold for the Russians to try and wage a disinformation war in Lithuania? GRYBAUSKAITĖ [17:46]
They try. They think that they are doing well, but it is not the case. We even do not have any anti European or anti democratic political party in Lithuania at all, not because we don't allow, but because there is no people who will be supporting such kind of attitude. And from this point of view, any provocation we're able to dismantle very, very fast. Any lie, we are able to dismantle very fast. But for example, after the Ukrainian occupation, we started to invest in our security in the region a lot more and we agreed in NATO that we will have forward presence NATO forces in all Baltic states and in all eastern flanks. Lithuania agreed with Germany for Germans to take responsibility. And the first Luftwaffe plane landed in Lithuania, and in a week time there was a false alarm that German soldiers raped a Lithuanian girl. And it was in an hour. We checked the name of the girl, we checked the situation, and it occurred that there is even no such name of girl in Lithuania at all. But they try to say that Germans are back, I mean, after Second World War, again back and they're raping. So if such aggressive, such lies, which are so angry, they are not clever. And we can recognise them very fast. And after each such kind of events, the more resilience we've grown ourselves. So from this point of view, recently it was, for example, the letters for all our institutions, the kindergartens, schools, that there is a bomb placed in kindergartens and in the schools. It was 3,000 a day. And of course it is, you know, if it will be one or two, maybe we will be frightened. But if 3,000, it's clear that it is just a bluff and just attack. So, you know, if enemy is just very angry, he's not clever. And that also helps us to beat him back.

Dearlove: President Dalia, you, I think, tried to dialogue with Putin when you first came to power. And I mean, maybe there's a little bit of experience we share here, because I too met Putin with Tony Blair when he first came to power. And, you know, we started off maybe being a little bit optimistic that he could be a different sort of Russian leader, and that we might have a different relationship with Russia under his administration. Unfortunately, that didn't last very long. And you probably know the history and the deterioration in the relationship between the UK and Russia. I mean, what do you think happened to Putin? Why? You know, when he started off in a rather different place politically, or that's what it appeared from the outside, or was he always like he is and, you know, turned into this extraordinarily isolated and dangerous political leader. GRYBAUSKAITĖ [21:09]
You know, I can only speculate, and we speculate about the people who we cannot know everything about. Of course, in the very beginning, all of us, then you come to power, you have illusions, you have optimism, you want to have better relations and you are trying to contact your neighbor with open hands and open heart. And I tried to have the first meeting, it was in 2010 in Finland, we have been in conference and at that time Prime Minister Putin met with all Baltic leaders in Finland. And at that time for us it was, for me, I was about six months in office. For me it was a surprise very much that we in Lithuania were paying for gas 30% more than Germany was paying. And I tried in the meeting to clarify why, what we did wrong and why the price is so different even if we are closer to the pipeline and border than Germany is. So it was clear that we were paying for our stance, we were paying for our dignity, we were paying that we were not given in, and we were paying because we wanted to be free and independent. And he gave me the list of what Lithuania must do. I started to read the list, a lot of things which are unacceptable for a country, of course, including energy dependency on them and all these kind of things. And after the meeting I realised that we need to cut energy ties immediately because via energy, they are making pressure on country, political, economic and corrupting political system, corrupting individuals, corrupting political parties. And my main goal was to cut Gazprom out from our side and we did this via LNG terminal and we built the LNG terminal the first in Europe in 2014. It started fully in 2015 and we rejected European budget because with Europe negotiations it took a lot of time, two, three years to discuss only the project. So we went on our own and we, in 2015, we became absolutely independent from Gazprom and we were able to provide gas even to our neighbors, Latvia and Estonia. And in 2022 then Europe got the crisis after the war in Ukraine started, so Lithuania was absolutely able, capable to help the neighbours in this situation and we were not affected. So the first meeting made me to decide what we need to do. I realised that this person and country is not willing to accept their neighbours humorably, that they are trying to make you knee on your knees or you became enemy or you give in or you're enemy. So the choice with such a neighbor is or you corrupted or they attempt to corrupt or destroy or poison or whatever. So that's your choice, you take it. I took the choice to become independent and that's how Lithuania now energetically and politically because the main tool for political corruption was energy in Russia's hands all the time with all countries in Europe and in the world of course. It was energy, monies and political corruption and this we avoided already in 2015 at all fully. I'm saying this that in our role of strengthening our resilience all the time, I'm saying this ironically now, Putin helped us to be prepared and to fight him back. If the Russians will be more respectful with neighbors from Russia's side, this will be not the case at all. And we will be not in this situation today at all.

Mcfarlane: President Dalia, I just want to take you back to the start of the all out invasion of Ukraine. President Zelensky, very shortly after Putin launched the all out invasion, he made that very alarming warning at the time. He said, if Ukraine is no more, then God forbid Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia will be next. There have been some very alarming warnings in recent weeks from Europe. We've had the German Defence Minister suggesting in a media interview that a Russian attack on NATO could occur within five to eight years. We've had Admiral Rob Bauer, who is a chair of NATO's military committee, in recent weeks describing the current global situation as the most dangerous world in decades. And the Swedes are now, their commander in chief urged Swedes to mentally prepare for war with the Swedish minister for civil defense warning of war's potential arrival in Sweden. I mean, these warnings have appeared in the media. They've been discussed and debated in the news and on the airwaves, but there hasn't really seemed to be much of a change in mentality, really. And part of this may be because we are sort of damned by our short term electoral cycles, we are sort of forced to think in short term strategies. Will things change? Will it be soon enough? And what do you make of those warnings from within Europe in recent weeks? GRYBAUSKAITĖ [26:46]
It's good that these warnings are appearing because after 2014, then Crimea was occupied. I was the first and probably alone politician I called Russia as terrorist. And I was criticized inside my country. I was criticized by my colleagues in Europe. They said I am too hawkish, too extreme. And in reality, nothing happened. We got symbolic sanctions and we left Russia with this occupation of Crimea as it is. And Russia was building on, building on. They realized that they are not really punished at all. So the problem today is that Russia has, and Putin's Russia, let's say clearly, no way back but to be in the war mode. They did a mistake, then they started the war. Now they have no way back. And my personal understanding and opinion is that Russia will be in the war mode until the end of the physical life of Putin. He will never stop. Or Ukraine or somewhere else. But that's only the way left for him how to rule the country, how to rally the country behind him. Because he's still wrong in office. And now only war measures, an external enemy left. For that, all ideology, all laws now, all economy is put on the war mode. And it's good that we're starting to realize that deterrence, as we imagined, is not deterring, neither terrorists, neither war criminals. And Putin's Russia today is a terrorist state in my mind and war criminal state. The same we saw that terrorists of Hamas were not deterred by Israel. So that means no matter how much we think we can deter, deterrence is not working with such mentality people. Because of that, we need to prepare for defense. Not anymore for deterrence, defense. No matter in three years, in two years, in five or eight, today our goal in NATO is for every country, not only on the border, to prepare for defense. And second cold war already has started because of this hybrid measures they are using. But for us today, and it's very good that not only military but politicians also starting to talk about it, now it's not only to talk about it, we need better act and fast as soon as possible. Ironically, I'm saying that Putin is helping us to understand. Putin showed us how they will fight, how aggressive and barbaric they are, and that no civilized war is anymore. And that the war, also character of conventional war changed, that new technologies are used in the war and we are not prepared for that in the West. The West still, we live in the peace mode, while all society and economy in the war mode in Russia. So it's discrepancy, it is mismatch in speed and preparedness, yes, still, but we are starting to understand and speed up with defence investments into defence on European level, on each country's level. For example, Baltic states were already investing close to 3%. Poland goes in and up to 4% and we will accelerate this. We are talking about general conscription introduction, we are talking about defence taxes to be introduced. So we are speeding up and we changed the defence plans to regional plans and the concept of how we will defend NATO territory. If it was before that you withdrawing a little bit, then returning back, so after Ukraine's example, we realised that if you withdraw and recent back, will be nothing to defend, everything will be flattened. So now the defence plans are rendered towards defence on the first inch of territory and we will be prepared.

Mcfarlane: President Dalia, that warning that you've given about how Ukraine has shown if you have to retreat and then try and re defend yourself, there is nothing to regain. And obviously all the Baltic states, they're small countries, you don't have much territory to lose and then regain. GRYBAUSKAITĖ [31:15]
Two days ago we signed an agreement between the three Baltic states that we will create joint defence capacities on the border, physical defence capacities. So we're doing this on our own, not waiting for others, the same as we did with stopping from Belarus organised immigration, which was organised also by Belarus and Russia.

Mcfarlane: I wanted to ask about the relationship with your neighbour Belarus. Obviously many consider Alexander Lukashenko to be under the thumb of Putin. How concerned are you about Belarus? Do you see it as an indistinguishable threat as Russia? GRYBAUSKAITĖ [31:56]
We do not treat Belarus as an independent state. We have two Russians on our border, Kaliningrad and Belarus. That's it. So the threat we saw in Ukraine was that the Russian territory was used for attacks to the North of Ukraine and Kyiv in the very beginning of the Ukrainian war. So for us, and now with the placement of nuclear weaponry on Belarus border, so we know that in Kaliningrad also there are nukes placed, so we are squeezed between two Russians with nukes on our borders. But this is not threatening us, no. We're used to this. We know this enemy. And if enemy wants to be enemy, if enemy wants to be not neighbor but enemy, it will become an enemy. We try to explain to our Western partners that it is serious sooner or later, we will not be able to avoid as we are avoiding now to confront Russia in Ukraine because we think that if we will give some weaponry not sufficient enough but just them to keep afloat and not sinking, it's enough. It is not enough because this is taken as a weakness of the West. And if it is treated in the east of our border as weakness, that means they will try further to check our resilience and check our strength to defend ourselves. Not only I mean border states but in general. And from this point of view, we pushed to create different defence plans now to implement them, because then I came to office, I realised we have been already six years in NATO. There was no defense plans at all for Baltic states at all.

Dearlove: You're so close to Russia, you know them well. And I noticed that you used a phrase which I agree with, Putin's Russia. There must be, you know, many, many, many Russians who are desperate about the current situation. I mean, in your view, is there any chance that that sort of different political view inside Russia will be articulated, will be represented, or is, you know, the suppression of the current regime so total that there's no chance of that happening? Because, you know, I think we would all hope, knowing Russia to an extent and knowing the positive aspects of its culture rather than its politics, that there could at some point in the future be a change. GRYBAUSKAITĖ [34:16]
I don't think that in the near future we will see any change unless the regime would like to change the structure of itself. Because the suppression of people is so strong and after elections, presidential elections in Russia in spring, I'm sure that these repressions will increase only because Putin cannot rule the country without suppressing opinions and any disobedience. And his idealization of Stalin's time will give him examples how he can manage and how people will be under pressure and obedient. From this point of view, I don't think that a lot of people who were capable, they left Russia, who were more liberal and more freedom minded, but the rest is the mass who is just willing to survive and not to talk about and not even to think about what's happening around. And they are very simply eager even to believe to official propaganda. From this point of view, we're seeing that the repeat of Stalin times with gulags, with disappearance of people, with suppression of any mind or beliefs are taking place in Russia faster and faster. And that's what I envisage in the nearest future because this is the easiest way for authoritarian regime, which became an autocratic regime, to govern country, to have external wars or war or wars, external enemies and to suppress its own people. So they have a lot of territory, they know how to manage, they had experience in twentieth century how to do it, and they are already starting to do it. But after elections, I think that the treacherous people will suffer a lot.

Mcfarlane: Obviously, the role of the US is so paramount. It is the centrifugal force behind NATO. It is the big money spender. So far it has put its money where its mouth is up to a point. I know obviously the US are struggling to get the latest Ukraine spending bill through Congress, but it really has been because of the US that Russia has not yet managed to retake all of Ukraine. We are obviously looking at a year in which the US is going to the polls. Former president Trump has repeatedly said that he would threaten to abandon Europe's defense. And he's boasted recently that while he was president, he had told a fellow head of government, I will not protect you if Russia attacks. Now you gave an interesting interview to the Financial Times recently where you have said it's very worrying that NATO could be weakened by the outcome of the US 2024 elections. And you went on to say that you doubt some of Lithuania's Western allies. And they quoted you saying: We have leadership in the East who are willing to fight to go to war to change the world. We do not have such leadership in the West. I just wanted to ask you about what are your fears for your Western allies, how important are the next US elections? And given that a lot of countries in Europe and in NATO perhaps are overly reliant on the security guarantee from NATO, and yet there was a recent pro Russian government in Slovakia that was elected, Hungary's Viktor Orbán, both of these countries are in NATO. Could NATO fracture? GRYBAUSKAITĖ [37:55]
It is a very difficult situation to explain, but it's not so frightening and not so catastrophic as it sounds. Because I had an experience in working with President Trump. He was around the table when he first came to Brussels for his first meeting and was even ready to walk out because of very little the allies were spending on defense. And I remember the hard talk from his side towards Germany, the chancellor Merkel and others. And that was, I think, justified because at that time it was 2017 or 2018, it was only about six countries who were spending about 2%. The rest, Germany at that time even was spending less than 1% of GDP. But now that situation radically changed. Now it's more than 20 countries paying more than 2% and even Germany is climbing up to 2% and situation has radically changed. Yes, if President Trump will return, there will be a lot of unpredictability, predictably unpredictable. And he likes it himself to be unpredictable. And that means also that even enemies, our enemies, will not know exactly what he will do because he will rely a lot on emotion, on information, on concrete situation and it's not 100% guaranteed that he will do something very, very wrong for us or destroy something. It is possible to talk with him. It is possible to work with him. And that's my own experience. Yes, it will be a lot more unpredictability and more difficult and let our enemy don't be happy so much and be enjoying that it will be for them perfect timing. No, no. If he will be touched, he will be back. He will not allow Putin to put his fingers on his toes. No. But of course it will be a lot of risk for all of us, especially having in mind that today in Ukraine, for example, the support of the US is about 50% and all Europeans are about 50%. I mean Europeans, Canada and other non European partners. But what we got, we got different NATO. We got enlarged NATO. We got different spending and different understanding that it's not only deterrence but defense. And this is also good because of threat, of course, of President Trump's return and because of Putin's war in Ukraine. We are definitely seeing the threats, we are different in analytics and they are definitely investing into our defence. Yes, today there is a lack of Western leadership. Yes, it's elections, it's, let's say, different understanding. In some countries they think that things can return back after the war in Ukraine as usually with Russia. It is not the case. This situation changed so much, the war changed so much that Russia changed so much. There will be no the same Russia anymore. There will be no relations with Russia anymore the same. So the world changed. And geopolitically what we see, this global fight, not only Russia's, it is a global fight of authoritarian East against democratic West. It's becoming more global than only regional conflicts and regional wars. And I'm sure that we will be able to defend ourselves. I'm sure that we will be able to strengthen ourselves and in difficult crisis always leaders arise. Today I do not see them, but it's not yet the situation. We know how Churchill arrived during the Second World War. I'm sure that the leadership, somebody will take responsibility. Leadership is to take responsibility and this will occur if the situation will deteriorate. But yes, elections are sensitive everywhere, in the US especially. It could be quite difficult for us but it is not catastrophic. It's not catastrophic.

Dearlove: President Dalia, you make a key point. Effective deterrence depends on uncertainty about how your opponent will behave. GRYBAUSKAITĖ [42:21]
It's my experience, you can manage but you need to know how to manage it and you need to be not afraid to manage. That's the game about leadership, the game about leadership.

Dearlove: It's a great concluding observation for this important podcast. It's been absolutely wonderful talking to you and inspirational to hear your views of how these events can be managed, let's put it like that.

Mcfarlane: We will survive in any situation. Thank you for ending on such a positive note of optimism. We don't get enough of that. GRYBAUSKAITĖ [42:52]
I crisis myself because I know that if you are under crisis, you are receiving additional strength and creativity to manage it and reforms usually done during the crisis, not in peaceful times. So from this point of view, I think it is not a challenge. It will be an opportunity to go for new order, new peace and new wealth.

ANALYSIS WITH SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE

Mcfarlane: I thought that was a really interesting conversation. I thought President Dalia was a fascinating interviewee. The one thing that although she is quite optimistic about how we may rise to the challenge of potential conflict, she did say a few things that did concern me at the end. She hinted towards a looming conflict between authoritarian East and democratic West. And it just made me feel like there is an inevitability of a clash that could result in conflict on a much wider scale. Is that melodramatic of me? And you know, we did mention in that conversation some of the really concerning warnings in recent weeks. The Swedes are now preparing for war, the German defense minister is saying we need to prepare for war. Admiral Rob Bauer is saying we are at a dangerous precipice. I mean, is wider conflict between East and West inevitable?

Dearlove: No, I don't think it is. And I would remind you of the phrase, I can't remember who said it, if you wish for peace, prepare for war. And I think that we're very much in that phase because President Dalia's thesis overall is that the provocation that Russia has created has massively strengthened NATO. And I mean she made the point about, you know, if Trump is re elected and comes to Europe, he's going to face a totally different situation where the GDP of the majority of NATO members has risen above 2%. And in the case, for example, of Poland and the Baltic Republics, I mean, Poland's up to 4%, and the Baltic Republics are above 3% and rising. Similarly, the UK is increasing its defense expenditure. And of course, the other thing that we didn't discuss with her, but is crucially important, is the addition of Finland and Sweden to NATO, both of whom have very, very sophisticated armed forces, particularly the Finns, because of their own historical experience. So I think the point she makes is, you know, very much the one, if you wish for peace, prepare for war. And that means having all of this infrastructure paid for, developed. And she made an interesting point about this agreement amongst the Baltic Republics, which I was not aware of, for a physical common defensive line, which they're clearly now beginning to build and construct. So I think what she's really talking about is a standoff between, you know, autocracy and democracy. And the line will be drawn no longer, you know, through the middle of Europe, but the line will be drawn along the border of Russia and Belarus as well. So I mean, I think her analysis holds together in my opinion. And it may sound alarmist, but I don't think one necessarily has to be that alarmist. One just has to be forensic in one's analysis and prepared for the threat, the military threat, which we now know. And the other thing which is important, which she didn't say, is that the performance of the Russian military in Ukraine has been appallingly bad. And, you know, NATO should take heart from that and understand that it isn't inevitable as we used to think that, you know, if there was a war, Russian tanks would roll across the Northern European Plain. I mean, it's clear that's not gonna happen.

Mcfarlane: I think all of that is correct. Although NATO has never really been challenged to act before. It did in the aftermath of 9/11, but that was a very externalized war. It was one that took place far away from many NATO countries' borders. It was a different situation to rationalize than I think if Putin were to do something beyond Ukraine. And I guess what concerns me is that NATO is an alliance made up of very specific and different constituent parts. And there are dozens of countries in NATO, and that includes countries who, as you mentioned at the top of our conversation, have been more willing to be open, to be pragmatic with Russia and Putin. Hungary has not wanted to stick its neck out either with sanctions or with supporting the Ukrainians. We now have someone who's described as being pro Putin and pro Russia, leading Slovakia. There are some countries that if any of the Baltic nations, for example, or Moldova or other countries which are hoping to join both Euro and NATO are attacked, that they will not want to do anything about it, will not want to stick their neck out, perhaps could complicate a NATO response. I'm not even really talking about Article 5, but could individual parts of NATO complicate and hamstring its response to any further Russian aggression on its borders?

Dearlove: Possibly. But I think my general answer to your quite complex question is a relatively simple one, which is I do not believe that the Russian general staff, after what has happened to them in Ukraine where they held all the cards, will risk a conflict with NATO. I just do not think that that will happen at the moment. Maybe if Russia rearms in ten years' time, but it's gonna take it years to do that. But in terms of an imminent threat, no. And it's quite clear that Article 5 obliges NATO as a whole to intervene on behalf of a member state, which, you know, is in crisis or is threatened. The Russian general staff at the moment will not go there. And I'd make that as a prediction.

Mcfarlane: That's it for this week's episode of One Decision. We drop new episodes every Thursday. Like and subscribe so you never miss an episode. Drop us a line. Tell us your thoughts. What decisions have impacted you and where you live? You can write to us. Our email is 1decision@1decisionpodcast.com. From me and the team, thank you for listening, and see you next time.