Hosted by Christina Ruffini and Sir Richard Dearlove
Guest
Sushant Singh
Sushant Singh is a lecturer in South Asian Studies at Yale. Sushant Singh explains the unexpected rise of Pakistan as mediator for peace talks between Washington and Tehran.
Episode Summary
As Pakistan steps into its role as peace broker, is India being left in the cold? Former head of MI6 Sir Richard Dearlove and international journalist Rosanna Lockwood are joined by lecturer in South Asian Studies at Yale, Sushant Singh, to unpack this dramatic shift in South Asian and Middle Eastern geopolitics. Starting with In Brief, Sir Richard and Rosanna look at how the Iran and US blockades of the Strait of Hormuz are putting the global energy economy in peril. They also discuss the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire in relation to the stability of Lebanon’s government, as well as whether secret US talks with Cuba will lead to military or economic intervention in the country. Then, Singh explains the unexpected rise of Pakistan as mediator for peace talks between Washington and Tehran, the diminishing influence of India Prime Minister Narendra Modi globally and at home, and how balancing its relationships with China and Russia may come at the cost of eroding India’s alliance with the US.
In this episode:
03:36 – Standoff in the Strait of Hormuz
08:00 – Latest on the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire
13:53 – Cuba is back on Washington’s radar
18:43 – Sushant Singh introduction
19:30 – Pakistan’s surprise mediator role
23:00 – Explaining India’s ‘dalal’ remark
25:42 – Modi’s weakening at home
27:59 – Muslim-Hindu divide in India
28:56 – Modi’s Pakistan dilemma
30:18 – Pakistan’s Middle East reclassification
32:04 – The growing irrelevance of the Quad
34:08 – India’s dependence on Russia
39:39 – Erosion of US-India relationship
44:04 – India’s Israeli ties
48:19 – Risks for Pakistan as a mediator
51:21 – One Decision: Can India and Pakistan start talking again?
53:01 – Sir Richard and Rosanna discussion
Read more: Pakistan’s Peacemaking Is a Setback for India
Hosted by Sir Richard Dearlove (former MI6 Chief) and Rosanna Lockwood (International Journalist).
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Transcript
COLD OPEN
Singh: Mister Modi's government has been completely stunned by this turnaround that Pakistan has executed over the last one year. It seems to me that one of Modi's skills, let's say, is playing both ends against the middle and keeping his options open. You don't talk about South Asia without going to Modi, without considering India as this huge power player. Mister Modi is trying to be friends to everyone. And I think at the times of a major global crisis, that is the point at which you realize that you are friends with no one.
INTRODUCTION
Lockwood: Hello, and welcome to One Decision. I'm your guest cohost Rosanna Lockwood, and I'm joined by my cohost and former head of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove. Hello, Sir Richard. Coming to you with a stinking cold head, I don't know if you can hear that, from Los Angeles as ever.
Dearlove: I can slightly hear the change in your voice, but you seem to be coping with it extremely well. And I'm not at my usual place as people who follow the podcast will probably notice. I'm sitting in a room in my club in London, which is the notorious Garrick Club.
Lockwood: Oh my. Do they allow women?
Dearlove: Yes. They do. There was a big controversy about this about eighteen months to two years ago, and the admission of women to the club as members is now an issue of the past, I'm pleased to say. But it is still predominantly men as it takes time to, as it were, bring people into the club given the complicated procedures. But it's a club which is famous for its links with theater, television, and everything to do with that profession. I'm not part of that profession. Maybe we should now add podcasters to that list. Yeah.
Lockwood: I don't see why not. I only bring that up for our non British listeners who might not have been aware of that furor a couple of years ago about women being admitted to gentlemen's only clubs, especially on the sort of Mayfair Central London area. But I have been to a couple of those clubs as the guest of various gentlemen and women over the years, Bucks Club, Garrick's, they are good fun. They're really nice spaces. They have some pretty amazing facilities there.
Dearlove: And there's a big dinner tonight here for members only, and I'm being honored as the member who's on the dinner that's being given. So I'm not quite sure how I qualified for that distinction, but it's a pretty I have to be on form, not give a podcast but give a speech.
Lockwood: I'm preparing myself for that. Taking one for the team, Sir Richard, and truly well deserved. And I hope you have a glass of port when it's all done. Look. Enough enough of our social lives. We've got a lot to cover today. We're gonna start with our in brief segment this week where we make sense of the biggest geopolitical news. Coming up, we'll turn our attention to the world's third largest oil importer, India. As the Indian economy absorbs significant shocks from rising oil prices, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is closely watching Pakistan step into an unexpected role as mediator. The former Indian military official now journalist Sushant Singh, joining us from Yale to break it all down. And if you're not already subscribed to One Decision on YouTube or wherever you listen, now is the time. You won't want to miss a single conversation. But first, in brief, we'll examine the global energy crisis, assess the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, and look at what a potential US military operation in Cuba could mean for the region. So, Richard, let's start with the Strait Of Hormuz because how could we not? A lot changing, especially from the time recording this to when this airs. So we're not gonna get into the nitty gritty of so he said, she said this boat was allowed and that not because in surprise to few, but dismay of many, over the weekend, the fragile ceasefire really not holding together very well, fraying at the edges, barely holding together, severe lack of trust, ships being held, warning shots being fired. I mean, take it as we can. Where do you see this all heading in the coming days? I mean, it just looks like there's a total breakdown in trust between both sides, US and Iran. But I think it's boiling down to a game of chicken, isn't it? Who blinks first?
Dearlove: Does Trump blink because of the domestic consequences in terms of the price of petrol and the impact on the cost of living and the position politically, you know, towards the midterm elections. But on the other hand, Iran's economy is effectively blockaded now by the American blockade of the straits. It's always been as it were the financial situation, the economic situation for the average Iranian, which has recently caused uprising on the street. And it just strikes me whether Israel and The United States working together haven't decided to try and go for bust. What I mean by that is an uprising on the street that would eventually, you know, prejudice the existence of the regime in Iran. And the other interesting thing is there seems to be divisions appearing in the Iranian leadership with the IRGC continuing to take an intransigent line, but at the same time, the foreign minister starting to say, well, the straits are open and then they're not being open. So I think the situation is pretty confusing. I'm still of the view that the conflict has some way to run and that the American military resources, are now in the region, will be used in some manner. And I still think that's likely to be pressure on Iran, pressure on the economy, possibly the invasion of Kharg Island, possibly the invasion of one of the big islands in the Straits Of Hormuz, possibly intervention along the littoral Iranian coast, know, where their resources are to keep the Straits closed. So I'm certainly of the view that we're not anywhere near an end game yet.
Lockwood: I find it particularly striking you mentioned there the pressure that they may be inflicting deliberately to cause uprising on streets. So I feel like we haven't touched on that topic for a few weeks now because it was all, you know, all go for so much of the time, missiles being fired, concept of troops on the ground, Kharg Island, all of those things you mentioned, that the idea of revolution or popular uprising had become a thing of the past, but now you're saying it may still have been part of the strategy. And with regards to that hardware still being in the region and still increasing in the region, a member of the Iranian parliament who was part of the talks more than a week ago in Islamabad, warning this saying, quote, on social media, the entry of enemy equipment into the region under the pretext of Iran's maritime blockade, like the negotiation process and the claim of the war's end, is nothing more than a deception, and it appears the enemy is seeking renewed military operations as a general say towards the sort of lack of trust that Iran has to The US. But this idea of kind of restocking, reloading, rearmament during the ceasefire, do you think that's still a legitimate allegation?
Dearlove: Yeah. I do. I think that the American military buildup is something we should watch closely because ultimately, that was the trigger to an intervention in Venezuela when people thought, well, isn't anything gonna happen? But you don't deploy those massive forces then sit there on your hands and accept an unsatisfactory negotiation. Well, that's my reading of the situation. And Iran is still negotiating with what I would describe as bravado as if they are in a strong position. I think, actually, their position now is incredibly fragile. But I may be wrong.
Lockwood: Now we look at Israel and Lebanon because that ceasefire separately well, as part of the overall ceasefire at the time of this recording seems to be somewhat holding and looking ahead to meetings between Israel and Lebanon in The US. They had meetings a week ago, and now there's gonna be further meetings, historic meetings, in fact. So if we can sort of I try not to make subjective statements, but on the positive side, we are seeing that Israel and Lebanon are gonna be in the same room in The US, having discussions for the first time in a long time. On the other side of the ledger, though, what we're seeing is Israel still in Southern Lebanon declaring what it's called this buffer zone to protect, for its part, Northern Israel and stop these Hezbollah attacks into Northern Israel, but concerns across many in other parts of the Middle East that you've also seen Israel create buffer zones in Syria and in Gaza. And there are, of course, questions about whether buffer zones are temporary or something more permanent. And for the Lebanese, of course, they wanna see those buffer zones gone.
Dearlove: Yeah. I think the crucial issue though is really whether the Lebanese government can regain sovereignty of its own country. And that's the concern of the Israelis because basically what had happened was that Hezbollah has hollowed out the state of Lebanon and has become a government within a government and a government more powerful than the state of Lebanon. But I mean, do remember the complexity of Lebanon's makeup. And the Israelis have close allies of the Maronite Christian community and the Druze community. So they do, as it were, have a presence in Lebanon through those groups, which is sympathetic to their objectives to an extent. And it's the sheer concentration in Beirut which, you know, is the problem. And what surprises me actually is the extent to which Hezbollah has proved durable militarily. And obviously, the Israelis have had quite a problem, not only decapitating but decommissioning the military power of Hezbollah. I think they're well down that track. But I think they're going for broke because a lot of Israelis are not returning to the northern border because of the danger still to them, even despite the military operation, you know, which as you say, have moved up into the southern part of Lebanon, which the Israelis of course occupied before in previous conflicts. But it's a complicated situation. And I think what surprised me was the speed with which Israel conceded to Trump on calling for a ceasefire with Hezbollah, which suggests to me that maybe they're closer to achieving their military objectives than we had thought.
Lockwood: That's interesting because some have pointed out that same point in saying that The US managing to pull off this ceasefire. You know, for example, other Iranian proxies, the Houthis declaring this a historic victory for Hezbollah, for Lebanon over, quote, the Zionist enemy. It was this sense that, is Trump finally seeing the non Israeli side to this, and is that how they've managed to get this over the line? What do you make of that? Do you make it that it was just a necessary part of securing the wider ceasefire?
Dearlove: Yeah, I think so. And I think these Houthi statements need to be taken with a large pinch of salt. I mean, clearly the axis of resistance is well practiced, claiming victory from the jaws of defeat, let's say, by making appropriate statements. Of course, the Houthis are the remaining group, which hasn't been significantly deteriorated by Israeli attack, although they have been pretty heavily reduced for some months back, but they're not part of the current conflict. And I'm surprised that they've stayed out of it. But I think in Lebanon now, Hezbollah probably are in a powerless situation. But are they weakened sufficiently for the Lebanese now in negotiation with the Americans to get a result which puts them back in control, particularly in Beirut where the Lebanese government virtually had no remit whatsoever. It was run by Hezbollah. Fragile, complicated domestic situation for Lebanon.
Lockwood: And we've had the Lebanese president saying he's appointed Simon Karam, a former ambassador to The US, to lead the bilateral talks with Israel. The objective for Lebanon being the negotiation to halt hostile actions in the Israeli occupation of southern areas and deploy the army up to the internationally recognized southern borders.
Dearlove: But one big change which, you know, one has to bear in mind, okay, it happened quite some time ago, is that the major influence in Lebanon partly exercised through Hezbollah was Syria. And I mean, Syria almost treated Lebanon as what the French would call their own hunting ground and territory. But with the fall of the Syrian government and the change of government in Syria, that really is strategically important in looking at the future in Lebanon because Syria had very often called the shots, not directly but indirectly as they've sort of puppeted the situation. But they're not doing that now. They just haven't got the capability and they've got their own concerns about unifying the different ethnic groups of Syria.
Lockwood: Fascinating. That knock on effect from Syria to Lebanon. I hadn't actually considered that. We do have one more story we wanna get to in brief. Let's look at the decisions which are shaping Cuba on the other side of the world. Remember the Monroe Doctrine that we were talking about felt like months ago? Well, it's back again. Cuba, very much back on the menu. The New York Times reporting a State Department delegation was sent from The US to Cuba last week for secret talks, and it's the first time US has landed a government plane in Cuba since 2016. They're proposing bringing Starlink satellite Internet to the island, also urging Cuba to grow their private sector and attract foreign investment. The sort of idea here, being Sir Richard, seems to be that they're trying to avoid military action, The US and Cuba, and that they're gonna try and find some ways of agreeing their way out of this. Do you think that's possible?
Dearlove: I think it might be because I think what one's looking at is not necessarily a change of regime, but a change of economy. And what I mean is the movement away from a, you know, communist control central economy and the development of new initiatives. I mean, the Americans allowed that Russian tanker in, which was a sort of brief palliative because of the desperate lack of energy supply. So that only was a brief solution. I mean, it would give Cuba enough resources for eight to ten days, I think, and even that's not petrol for private cars. We're talking about hospitals and generating power and other basics. But, I mean, clearly, we did this podcast recently. Cuba is in a parlous state, and you've got I think it is the grandson of Raul, is it? Actually, negotiating with the Americans. I think I've read, you know, real concern in the American press that, obviously, the American media are calling for a proper change of government and a move towards democracy, whereas I've got a feeling that Trump and Rubio might not be looking for quite such a fundamental change, i.e. some economic liberalization without big political change at this point in time. Although my prediction would be that that would definitely come further down the road, but maybe not for several years. But it's clear that Cuba, as an enemy of The United States, which the regime has been, is on the point of inflation and maybe complete disappearance.
Lockwood: I find myself questioning whether president Trump will be able to resist the temptation of military intervention, especially on his way home from Iran as we heard him sort of referring to previously. Because the rhetoric, I know a lot of it's signaling and a lot of it's sort of almost diplomacy. But from Cuban president Miguel Diaz Canel saying, we will battle, we will defend ourselves. Should we fall in battle to die, for the homeland is to live. And then we've also had president Trump of The US saying he expects to have the honor of taking Cuba in some form. Whether I free it, take it, I think I can do anything I want with it. Now, obviously, you've got a sort of a deteriorated condition of Cuba's military equipment and Cuba generally economically, socially on the ground. So a lot of analysts saying it would be a very fast and overwhelming success were The US to do that. And given the, quote unquote, success of the Venezuela operation militarily and how much it achieved for Donald Trump's aims back then, do you think he can resist the temptation of doing that just for his sort of domestic appeal back home in The US if it were to be that?
Dearlove: I'm not sure politically whether that would be wise even for Trump because he's taking another massive risk, and I think that the Cuban population, opposed as they are to the current regime, are themselves quite patriotic about their own country. So I think the economic road to change is the wiser one to take, but you never know. There's a huge Cuban diaspora which would love to see the regime militarily knocked over. And clearly at the moment, it's in a completely fragile state. It wouldn't have the capability to resist is my view. So maybe Trump will fall for the temptation, but I'm not predicting it at the moment. I'm predicting something more Venezuelan in terms of a pathway forward. Because the Venezuelan model is fascinating. And, you know, the Venezuelan military is still there. Gradual change, but it's very slow.
INTERVIEW
Lockwood: You do never know, though, as you say there. Look. Now it is time for our interview. This episode with the Strait Of Hormuz under blockade, the ripple effects are hitting India hard. India is the third largest importer of oil in the world. Prime minister Narendra Modi is watching inflation tick higher. Meanwhile, Pakistan is the unlikely diplomatic mediator between Washington and Iran. To understand what this means for the region and The US India relationship, we've brought in one of the sharpest analysts working on South Asian security today. Sushant Singh is a lecturer in South Asian studies at Yale, a former Indian military officer with two decades of service, and a journalist. He is a consulting editor with India's Caravan magazine. His latest piece in Foreign Policy analyzes Pakistan's peacemaking. Sushant, welcome to One Decision. And perhaps just as an opener, can you give our listeners a sense just how bold this play has been by Pakistan to put itself forward as a mediator for these talks?
Singh: Thank you so much, Rosanna. It's a pleasure and an honor to be on your show. Oh, absolutely. It has been completely you know, this was in no one's script. If you were to look at any of these scripts, Pakistan was in economic distress, in political trouble. Its most popular political leader put behind bars, fighting a war with Afghanistan on one border, having trouble, constant tensions with India on the other border. So a country which is gripped by security crisis, hit by terror attacks in two of its provinces, Balochistan and Khyber, suddenly becomes the country everyone is speaking to. You know, president Trump is speaking to them. Iranians are speaking to them. Chinese are speaking to them. Saudis are speaking to them. Virtually, you know, other than Israel, India, and UAE, everyone is speaking to them. And vice president Vance was there, he's likely to be there again. And there is buzz that president Trump may be there. So, you know, Pakistan has traveled a long way in the last one year to become this center of the diplomatic hub, a new kind of Geneva or a new kind of Switzerland, which nobody ever expected.
Dearlove: Sushant, I agree with you that this is a sort of bizarre development. None of us really expected it. But I'm very much in mind that negotiation is a continuation of war by other means. And okay, in certain circumstances that may not be, you know, a very good description, but in this particular case, it seems to be that the negotiations are almost part of the conflict. And I mean, I would suggest a little bit that Field Marshal Munir is being led up the garden path because, you know, he's become part of this contest between The United States and Iran. I'd love your observations on that.
Singh: So, Richard, I would completely agree with you that Field Marshal Munir could get into trouble, but I think they were struggling with irrelevance. They were struggling with finding ways to be relevant. And as you know, Sir Richard, Pakistani military leadership historically has been always a very risk taking leadership. You know, you can look at Ayub Khan. You can look at Yahya doing the negotiation between Nixon, Kissinger on one side and Mao and Zhou on the other side in 1970. You can look at Zia. You can look at Musharraf. Zia going into Afghanistan. You look at Musharraf suddenly flipping and getting onto The US side, on the Western side after 9/11 while still supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan. So, you know, there is this whole track record where the Pakistani military leadership suddenly takes these very bold and dynamic decisions, very risky decisions. And I completely agree with you that the risk of failure is huge and it may completely fall on his face and he may be domestically discredited as well as internationally completely marginalized and become an enemy of everyone, the Iranians, the Saudis, the Americans, the Chinese, everyone. But I think because they were so irrelevant and they were in such deep trouble, that Field Marshal Munir perhaps thought it best to take this opportunity and take whatever little chance was there to regain some relevance and to get into a position where he becomes domestically stronger vis a vis Imran Khan while also making Pakistan more secure against the troubles that it is having with India and with Afghanistan. So it works for him in both ways. The risk is high, but the rewards are also going to be high.
Lockwood: There is so much to get into domestically with Pakistan and also its history as a mediator. I wanna come back to that, but we can't begin this conversation without talking about the India factor as well. We just introduced the piece you wrote for Foreign Policy leading into this, where you said that Narendra Modi's foreign policy has long sought to diplomatically isolate Islamabad, and it has now been, quote, bypassed in the real corridors of power. Now, amidst all of that, we've seen this extraordinary diplomatic fray where India's foreign minister wrote on social media that for its part, India, quote, cannot act as a Dalal nation in global geopolitics with reference to Pakistan. Can you explain to our audience what the significance of being a Dalal is and the offense it caused?
Singh: Yeah. So I think in an all party meeting, which was convened in Delhi a few weeks back, a lot of opposition politicians in India asked India's foreign minister as to, you know, what's going on, you know, with the Pakistanis at the forefront of it. Where is India amidst all this? You know, you talk about a strategic partnership with The United States. Why is India missing from all this? And the India's foreign minister, doctor Jaishankar, who has been a career diplomat, he was India's foreign secretary, ambassador to China, ambassador to The United States, etcetera, etcetera, has a distinguished diplomatic career and is now a political appointee. He went out and said that Pakistan has a history of being a Dalal country. Dalal in Hindi or Urdu essentially means, you know, a more polite version of this would be a mediator or a broker. But I think what Jaishankar meant in this context was more like a pimp, somebody who's acting in a degrading manner as a kind of a snub that, you know, we don't do this kind of low stuff. These guys keep on doing this kind of stuff. I think there are two parts to this. One is, of course, the Indians have been stunned. Mister Modi's government has been completely stunned by this turnaround that Pakistan has executed over the last one year. And this clearly, you know, is something which has negated what mister Modi has tried to do over the last decade of his prime ministership, which is, as you said, you know, isolate Pakistan diplomatically. So India became close to United States. India started engaging with UAE. India started engaging with the Saudis. Mister Modi even tried to engage with China. So to somehow isolate Pakistan and make Pakistan this kind of a country where it could not get any of the external support that it was looking for. But clearly, after a decade of pursuing that policy, since the military clash last May with India and Pakistan, that policy seems to be unraveling. And this one has particularly hurt Mr. Modi very hard, because a lot of his domestic standing depends on the fact that his supporters, and the Indian people are being told that he is this great world leader. So then this becomes a particularly embarrassing fact politically for mister Modi and his government. And that's why this kind of a snub both it was an expression of frustration as well as a put down to Pakistan that Doctor Jaishankar had attempted.
Dearlove: So, Sushant, how much is Modi actually now being beaten up in the Indian media? I mean, given the sort of dominance of Modi and, as it were, the extent of his influence, and I mean, I'm fascinated by your interpretation with which I think, you know, I certainly agree. But on the other hand, is it undermining Modi's position within India? Because the influence he exercises is pretty extensive and pretty far reaching, and of course, beneath this, you've got the whole issue of the sort of Hindu Islam divide as well, and I'd be fascinated by your comments on that aspect.
Singh: No. Sir Richard, you're absolutely right. Mister Modi has been a very dominant figure in Indian politics for the last decade and a half. He has been, in fact, he's a third term prime minister. But even in 2024, which was the last parliamentary elections that were fought in India, mister Modi's own party did not win a majority. It is not a single party majority government. He depends on a coalition. So he had already been weakened. There were signs of fatigue. And this particular crisis, the crisis with Iran and in The Middle East, has particularly hit him in two ways. Two of his prongs. One was the fact that India's economy, that I'm going to make India this economic superpower, the next China or whatever in the world. And the second fact was that I have raised India's status in the world. Both of those prongs have been hit very badly. And so what happened is this is the first time last week that mister Modi's party, mister Modi's government lost, you know, a bill that they were trying to pilot to the Indian parliament. A constitutional amendment bill, they lost it badly in parliament. So there is clearly signs of political weakening. Energy prices have shot up. You know, cooking gas bottles are not available in India. There is all these other second order effects, you know, because exports are not happening, so industries are laying off people. So all those crises, the economic effects of the crisis in West Asia, plus the decline in the foreign policy standing has clearly damaged him politically. Is the damage good enough to, you know, let's say, defeat him in the next elections or have a kind of a Gen Z uprising what we saw in Nepal or in Bangladesh against Sheikh Hasina? No. Definitely not. But his reputation, his political standing, his image has been dented, and the effect of that was visible, you know, the indicator of it was the fact that they lost the bill in the parliament. On the Hindu Muslim thing, you know, Sir Richard, that's a reality of today's India. Mister Modi's party is a Hindu nationalist party. It has a historical record of wanting to make a Hindu India, just on the lines of how Pakistan is a Muslim Pakistan. Of course, India, as you know, has as many Muslims as Pakistan has. It has 15% Muslims. It has two and a half percent Christians, Sikhs, and all these other religious minorities. So it has been a huge challenge. You know, Muslims are being marginalized politically. Mister Modi's party does not have a single member of parliament who is a Muslim or a minister who's Muslim. So this is the first time in India's history that has happened. So politically, economically, otherwise, Muslims are being marginalized and are facing a difficult situation in India at this point in time. But because they are also a significant number, they are just not a constitutional minority in that sense. They are a political minority, and they are political actors. It also brings its own challenges for mister Modi. The problem with the whole thing is because Pakistan continues to support, you know, violence in Kashmir and other kind of activities and terrorism. It makes it very easy for Indians who may not be Hindu nationalists, but just pure nationalists or pure wanting to work for their country, to not support Pakistan or to engage with Pakistan in any way. It is very difficult in India to bat for Pakistan in any way because of what Pakistan has historically done. Even you may be opposed to Modi, but the fact is you will still say that Pakistan is not the kind of country we should be friendly with. And I think that's the thin edge of the wedge that a lot of people are traversing.
Lockwood: Just so domestically, lot of pressures for Modi at home as you just went through there. And then internationally, the idea being that you don't talk about South Asia without going to Modi, without considering India as this huge power player. But then things are shifting around. What we're seeing with happening with Pakistan now, you've got this emerging middle power bloc, Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, that's sort of arisen during these Iran war negotiations. You've got people asking whether the Quad is dead. That's the quadrilateral security dialogue between The US, India, Japan, Australia, very much pushed by Modi as being the kind of sort of Asian hemisphere for which India was gonna take the lead. And then I wouldn't say this is anything but coincidental timing, but the World Bank reclassified Pakistan from South Asia to Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan region. What kind of impact does that have, even if just psychologically, on Pakistan India relations? Because, you know, it's very much saying Pakistan's not South Asia. It's Middle East now.
Singh: So, you know, since 1971 when India fought against Pakistan and helped create Bangladesh, the whole idea in Pakistan is that they started looking towards West Asia because of, you know, the Islamic factor, the fact they were getting support from Saudi Arabia, you know, the whole petrodollar thing which was coming in. And Pakistan also started pursuing a nuclear weapon at that point in time. So there's always been this fault line in Pakistan where they want to be straddled both the things while being South Asian in a certain sense culturally, linguistically, etcetera, but also seeing that West Asian identity on the religious side, on the Islamic side. And that's been something that they've been trying to straddle all throughout. The World Bank voting and the reorientation primarily comes, as you rightly said, because once you club it with South Asia, India determines what happens in South Asia because the share of voting that India has is much more than what Pakistan can have. And in this case, once it is relocated into Middle East and North Africa, etcetera, Pakistan will continue to have a lot of weight because of its strategic partnerships with Saudi Arabia and, as you said, Turkey and others. So there is a practical aspect to it, but you're right. There is an ideological aspect to it, a Pakistani desire to also be seen as part of the larger West Asian Islamic network where it is the number one military. Pakistan has also the nuclear weapon device, the only Muslim country with a nuclear weapon. So clearly, it fits that kind of narrative which you see within Pakistan. So those two things are happening at the same time. And Rosanna, coming back to your question about the Quad and this new kind of grouping that the middle powers are creating in the Middle East, the whole impetus to Quad has completely gone away after president Biden left office. President Trump has shown no interest in holding any Quad summit or coming to India or doing anything with Quad. So the primary rationale for Quad was essentially to counter Chinese influence in the Indo Pacific, non militarily, you know, doing non security stuff, but eventually having the next step available to upgrade to the security stuff. But what we see now is President Trump trying to be friendly to Xi Jinping, to try and go and visit China, have this big visit with China, trying to make all kinds of friendly treaties to Xi Jinping. And that makes it very difficult to actually do anything. So Quad has been quite a loss for India in that sense, which essentially means that then India has to try and be friendly with China. India can't afford to stand up to China. The premise on which India was willing to stand up to China was there is some kind of internal balancing that they can do within, you know, in terms of military and security and the border. But the real thing was that there would be some kind of external balancing where The United States would provide the bulk of support, but Japan and Australia would also provide some kind of support. That would allow India to stand up to China or to take on China. But if the Quad support is not there, if that external balancing is not there, then India has to, in a certain sense, find a new modus vivendi with Beijing and find a way to deal with Beijing without really being confrontational or adversarial in that sense. And that's something which we are seeing happen in the last few months where Indians are trying to engage with China with more trade, with more flights, with, you know, more visits, more meetings, more friendly conversations around China. So that's been a major and big shift that has taken place since president Trump's new administration came in Washington DC.
Dearlove: Sushant, can I ask you then about Modi's relations with Russia, obviously, with Putin? Because clearly, in terms of energy supplies, Russia becomes a more important partner, particularly when The US, as it were, raises sanctions temporarily. And the other relationship that I'm fascinated by is India's relationship with Japan. It seems to me that one of Modi's skills, let's say, is playing both ends against the middle and keeping his options open. But with regard to Russia, that now seems to be a much more weighted relationship in the light of what's happening with Iran, with Pakistan. And I'd like your comments on those two aspects of, you know, India's geopolitics.
Singh: Well, Sir Richard, you're absolutely right. As you rightly said, India has historically had very close ties with the Soviet Union and then thereafter with Russia. So primarily, Sir Richard, if you just step back, there are three kinds of vulnerabilities that today's India has. One is that it needs the strategic benevolence of The United States to become the global power or achieve whatever status that it wants on the world stage, can only become if it has strategic support from The United States. It needs military and energy support, defense supplies and energy supplies from Russia. That is the second vulnerability. And it needs to have extensive trade with China, which is the third vulnerability. As you pointed out, the vulnerability with Russia is strong. As you know, around 60% of India's military equipment, defense supplies, all the military equipment that India has is of Russian origin. Some of the aircraft carrier, the main battle tank, the maximum number of fighter jets. And it has earlier happened that whenever India has tried to kind of break away from Russia, try to buy more stuff from the Americans or the British or the French or other European vendors, the Russians have tightened the squeeze on supplies of spare parts and ammunition, which makes it very, very difficult for India then. Because if your military is 60 to 70% dependent on Russian equipment, every squeeze on supplies makes you very vulnerable and very, you know, susceptible to all kinds of blackmail. And that is something Russians have been able to do. So that's why you'll see every time there's a visit, you'll find some random equipment being bought because that gives a lot of money to the Russians. Although Indians may not be wanting to buy it, they may be wanting to buy it from somewhere else, but there is a kind of a big money which has to go to Rosoboronexport and has to be done. So that is the bigger dependency. Of course, energy supplies are important, but India can always find another energy source, even if not in West Asia. It could be the Americans. It could be Venezuela. It could be Brazil, it could be anyone else. But it is on the defense supplies part, especially on modern technology, on critical equipment, particularly think of S-400. That's the only thing which India has to counter the Pakistanis or the Chinese or the BrahMos missiles, which was so effective last May against Pakistan. And that vulnerability of defense supplies makes it very difficult for India to stand up. But that having said, I think mister Modi has a personal relationship which goes beyond these vulnerabilities with president Putin. Primarily, the two questions which the Russian invasion of Ukraine raises are questions of territorial integrity and sovereignty. And those are the questions India faces vis a vis China. So it was critical for India to raise those questions because tomorrow India will have to raise the same questions against China about territorial integrity and sovereignty. As for the larger policies, Sir Richard, that you said that India is playing both sides, I think mister Modi is trying to be friends to everyone. And I think at the times of a major global crisis, that is the point at which you realize that you are friends with no one. If you're trying to be friendly with everyone, you know, when everything is going hunky dory, everything is fine. You can be friends with everyone. You are partying. It's all fine. But it's only in a time of a crisis that you realize that you can't afford to be friends with everyone. And I think it is this moment where this is becoming pretty visible. You know, you're really struggling to find who your friends are. Are Saudis your friends? Are Americans your friends? Are Russians really your friend? Who's your friend? And I think this is that moment of vulnerability. This is that moment of calling where mister Modi is finding it very difficult. The Japanese leader with whom India has that very good relationship was Shinzo Abe, and Shinzo Abe, you know, is no longer there. And the new leadership which has come in, of course, they are friendly with India. They provide a lot of economic support to India. They provide a lot of infrastructure support, technological support. But Japan has its own limitations in terms of what it can do as a security partner or as a defense partner. Though the relationship with Japan is very strong. Japan was one of the few countries which has supported India through thick and thin. But India being a nuclear weapon state, India not signing NPT also makes India's relationship with Japan very, very tricky because Japanese have very strong views on nuclear weapons and everything to do with nuclear weapons. So the relationship is strong, but strong in a limited manner in certain domains, in domains of economy, in domains of trade, in domains of, you know, providing infrastructural support, starting metro lines, starting bullet train, and so on and so forth, but not really in the security domain or in the domain of defense cooperation.
Lockwood: As much as anything else, that close relationship that we're alleging there between Modi and Putin makes the relationship with The US and India particularly difficult, continuing with the import of Russian energy as well in India. And as you mentioned there, Trump has evaded Quad meetings. And socially, at the regular population level, we're seeing things like the limits on H-1B visas in The US put lots of limits on Indian tech talent that has long had a relationship heading over to The US. With all of that in mind, the sort of general picture, where does The US and India stand at the moment in terms of that relationship?
Singh: So, Rosanna, The US India relationship seems to be at a very tricky point. President Trump continues to be very polite and very full of praise for mister Modi. You know, whenever a journalist asks him about mister Modi, he says he's my personal friend, etcetera, etcetera. But the fact of the matter is, you know, when president Trump came in his first term, mister Modi held two election rallies for him, one in Houston with the Indian diaspora there in 2019 and another one in Ahmedabad, mister Modi's home state, a big rally of 100,000 people in a cricket stadium. But Trump, of course, lost that poll to president Biden. And so the expectation was that the Indian ministers, etcetera, were on record saying that unlike other countries, we are not worried about Trump 2.0. We are going to do very fine because he's very nice to mister Modi, and mister Modi has this great relationship with him. But when president Trump came, whether it was the issue of tariffs, India got the highest tariffs, which really shocked Indians at that point in time. And then when the India Pakistan military conflict happened, president Trump came down on the side of the Pakistanis in a certain sense because the Pakistani military leadership said that, you know, you should get the Nobel Peace Prize, etcetera, etcetera. He embarrassed the Indians by now, as per my account, more than 100 times claiming that he was the one who did the ceasefire between India and Pakistan. He announced the ceasefire even before the Indian government or the Pakistani government could announce it, and the Indians have always claimed that we stopped on our own or we stopped shooting Pakistanis on our own. Otherwise, we would have continued to hit them. That was particularly embarrassing for mister Modi because president Trump was going and publicly claiming again and again. It reached such a point that prime minister Modi was avoiding meeting president Trump. He would not go to the same global meetings, APEC or others, where president Trump was present. Because president Trump, in his presence, would then claim that he had done the ceasefire and mister Modi would not be able to counter it, or if he countered it, it would be very tricky. So it has reached a stage where the Indo-US ties have kind of cooled down to a certain extent. That kind of personal bonhomie, that kind of, you know, support where India could get away with lots of stuff, that's no longer happening. Indians are trying to salvage the relationship and in a certain sense buy time, hoping that the next three years that president Trump is going to be there or at least till the midterm and after the midterm, as everyone expects here in The United States, that the Democrats will do very well. Perhaps the congress will act as a check on president Trump, and then we can get back to some form of the relationship that existed earlier. So the relationship is at a tricky spot. But what I will also say, Rosanna, is that the whole thing that president Trump has done, not only vis a vis India, but vis a vis Pakistan, vis a vis Iran, has really hurt the American reputation in many countries of the global South, particularly in the population of these countries. And I think among Indians, there is a kind of a belief that you cannot trust the Americans anymore. And I think I'm sure this is the kind of view where you hear in Europe as well. And I think that's the bigger problem because any political leader who comes in India, whether mister Modi or anybody who follows him, would have to really go out of his way to convince the Indian people that America is still a trustworthy country and a trustworthy partner. So the practical answers are, of course, very much there that it's the most powerful country in the world. Therefore, we need to work with it. There is no other choice. But the fact that the trust factor is gone, something which you saw at its peak under president Obama or even under president Bush earlier, that thing is gone. And I think that's something which will take a lot from whoever replaces president Trump to really rebuild again, and also on the Indian side for the Indian political leadership to really rebuild that trust and convince the Indian people that we can work as if not an equal partner, but as a friendly partner with The United States.
Dearlove: So, Sushant, maybe this is a very sensitive question I'm going to ask you, but when A. Q. Khan took Pakistan nuclear, I do recall that there was indications, let's put it, of a clandestine relationship between Israel and India over the development obviously of an Indian nuclear capability, given that neither country are signatories of the NPT treaty as Pakistan isn't. You know, which would indicate a quite trusting and close relationship probably conducted through RAW, the research and analysis wing, which for our listeners is the Indian intelligence service. So it seems to me that India probably has quite a complex relationship with Israel, even projected to the present time. And I would imagine there is still quite a close dialogue between the two countries. Can you speculate on that? Give us your view.
Singh: Okay, I appreciate it's a sensitive area. No, no, perfectly fine, Sir Richard. You know the history of India Israel ties. India acknowledged the existence of Israel in the nineteen fifties, but only established full fledged diplomatic ties in the early nineteen nineties after the end of the Cold War. But the fact of the matter is that even in earlier wars that India fought against Pakistan, whether in 1971 or in 1965, Israel did provide a lot of support to India. And Israeli intelligence and Israeli military and Israeli defense companies were providing support to India even during the nineteen eighties, particularly after when the Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi was shot down and Indians were trying to devise security and other things. Even after the 2008 Mumbai terror attack, it was the Israeli experts who came down and said, you know, how to safeguard your urban centers and how to deal with hotels, etcetera. In the last fifteen to twenty years, India and Israel have had very, very close ties, both in terms of defense, in terms of technology, in terms of diplomatic support. And under mister Modi, this has really gone to the next level. So there is a kind of an ideological affiliation that the Hindu nationalists feel with, you know, the Zionists in Israel. And also mister Modi is personally very close to Bibi Netanyahu. When Bibi Netanyahu was in trouble recently, just before the decapitation strikes on Iran, mister Modi was there for two days before the decapitation strike going all out in support of Bibi Netanyahu. They are genuinely friendly and share great vibes with each other. I don't know if you remember this, Sir Richard. When Modi was there in Israel, he actually went out and said that I will support Bibi Netanyahu in Israel in everything that Israel does in the future. So very clearly, there is a kind of a relationship that is there. Mister Modi's favorite Indian businessman, mister Adani, Gautam Adani, Asia's richest man, has invested money in Haifa Port, has invested money in other things. Israeli defense companies work in India. Lot of Israeli defense companies work in India. So the relationship which was under the radar, let's say, thirty years back is no longer under the radar. Israel and India are close partners in security, in intelligence, in defense, politically coordinating on other issues, and India is even willing to go out and diplomatically support Israel. So India has not criticized Israel for what it has done in Gaza or what it has done in Lebanon or even what it did in Iran. India has never condemned the decapitation strike on Iran. So mister Modi, India's ties with Israel at this point in time are pretty open, pretty strong, and I think even within the region, India's strongest ties may be with Israel followed by The UAE. Those are the two countries India currently has strongest ties with. And, of course, the fact that the Israeli defense technology is also such a high level, and it can provide the kind of intelligence support that Indians really crave for, Indians really ask. And, of course, Pakistan being the common adversary also helps in a big way.
Lockwood: Well, to the extent that Pakistan members of government wrote, I believe, on social media that India is acting as a Dalal for Benjamin Netanyahu in response to that Dalal comment. Look, I'm conscious that we need to delve just more into Pakistan's role as mediator, given a lot is changing by the time this episode airs with talks planned in Islamabad at the time we're recording this. You laid out at the beginning of this conversation a lot of the risks that Pakistan exposes itself to being the mediator in this. It's got a lot happening domestically at home, socially, economically, politically, but also conflicts along the Afghanistan border. A lot to handle. So there is a lot of risk here. Shares a long land border with Iran, Pakistan, so doesn't wanna see that go south. But the other big risk is, as you mentioned, the president Trump. And at the moment, he loves a Dalal. He loves a mediator. He loves a fix. He loves somebody with access, somebody who can broker information and deals and provide the setting for these talks. But as we know from watching president Trump, he can change his mind. Things can happen. What happens if he turns his back on Pakistan? Does that create a massive exposure risk?
Singh: Yes. That would be a huge risk. The whole edifice is dependent on the fact that Field Marshal Munir has direct access to president Trump and can call him, and president Trump goes out of his way to call him his favorite field marshal and whatnot. You know? And the whole thing can only happen if there's that kind of a personal relationship where they can engage. If president Trump changes his views, then the whole thing collapses. Then Pakistan is back to where it was. It's still friendly with China. It's still kind of trying to have friendly ties with the Saudis, but not really in the position that it currently is in to act as this kind of a mediator where it can engage with everyone, with Iran and everyone. So far over the last one year, Rosanna, there's been no indication that president Trump is going to change his views about Pakistan. You know, he hosted Field Marshal Munir last June, if I'm not wrong, at the White House with no political leader present. This has never happened. No US president has ever met a military ruler who's not also a political leader without any political leader present. And since then, there've been partnerships on crypto. There've been talk about mining within Pakistan. There've been financial dealings. Some of president Trump's close business allies have visited Pakistan and attended crypto summits and so on and so forth. So somehow there seems to be a kind of an equation which seems to go beyond just the geopolitical and the geostrategic aspect of it. As of now, there are no signs of that equation weakening because despite president Trump going and changing his views on Iran constantly, as you just mentioned, and we don't know what his views would be by the time this episode is aired, he still seems to be constantly and consistently backing Pakistan, much to the embarrassment of India. But you are right. If president Trump withdraws his bet, his favor towards Pakistan or stops engaging with Pakistan or turns on Pakistan, Pakistan would be left in a very tough spot.
Lockwood: Sushant, I'm gonna ask you. What is the one decision you're looking out for in the coming weeks with regards to either this conflict or the relations between India Pakistan?
Singh: So the one big thing which I'm looking forward to is can India and Pakistan start talking again? And I'll tell you the reason for it. Please remember that both India and Pakistan are nuclear weapon states, and they were shooting missiles at each other. They were shooting down their fighter jets last year. And I think that's a very risky scenario. I would want India and Pakistan to engage and find some kind of guardrails, some kind of mechanism. Think of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. If The United States and The Soviet Union came close to that kind of a nuclear escalation or a conflict, thereafter they decided there have to be guardrails, there have to be mechanisms so that this is not repeated. It has not happened in the case of India and Pakistan. They are very close. It takes barely a minute or two for the missile to come to hit the other country. And so therefore, the one thing which I would desperately want to see in India and Pakistan, whether through back channels, whether through third party mediation, some form of engagement where this risk of escalation to the nuclear level goes away. I would not want to see another military conflict where it escalates into the nuclear thing. And I hope that all that that is going on globally with Pakistan coming back into the limelight and getting all the support from president Trump, etcetera, somehow gives some sense to the Indian side, to mister Modi, that it is prudent to talk to Pakistan at this point in time and find a new kind of relationship, which is different from what we have witnessed in the last ten years. That is something I would desperately want to see.
Lockwood: Sushant Singh, it's been a fascinating conversation. Thank you.
Dearlove: Thank you, Sushant.
ANALYSIS WITH SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE
Lockwood: Very, very interesting indeed. Thank you, Sir Richard. Well, Sir Richard, we've been sort of touching on the India Pakistan relationship for a couple of episodes now, especially Pakistan's role in sort of providing the format for the mediation and for the ceasefire. That was a really interesting conversation. What were your main takeaways? Anything you thought was new analysis?
Dearlove: He sees Modi as being in a really disadvantageous position. I mean, I hadn't quite calculated myself just how much this has operated against India's interests and the way that Munir has taken advantage in a situation where, you know, he described Munir as being really beleaguered politically, but having suddenly produced this rabbit out of a hat. And, you know, looked at from the perspective of the subcontinent, this is clearly a very big deal indeed because it does, for the time being at least, change the dynamics. The one thing that somewhat concerns me is Trump leading Munir up the garden path a bit. Because the first question I asked him was about negotiation being a continuation of conflict. I don't think we're anywhere out of that complexity. The other thing I'm really pleased he explained, because you see very little reference to it, is the Indian relationship with Israel, which is really important. I mean, I had underestimated the extent to which it's now public domain. Everybody can see that closeness, but it has very deep roots and deep strategic roots and a defense dimension, which I think is quite important too.
Lockwood: Yeah. Certainly for me, was very interesting, that insight, that analysis, but also the way he described the lack of trust that now exists between India and The US, and the way that India at large may be looking at America and Americans now and president Trump. That word trust, I think, is so redolent of everything that is going on at the moment because we know for their part, the Iranians are really struggling to trust The US in these negotiations. And it's just that the way that President Trump is behaving and his administration is behaving, the decisions they're taking on all sides, all the time, even before this, will have led to a disintegration of trust between many in South Asia and the other side of the world against The US. So how that gets restored potentially after midterms, as Sushant was saying, or beyond that will be interesting to see.
Dearlove: Yeah. The other thing which is ironical in a way is most of us have always considered the relationship between the world's two largest democracies as important from the point of, let's say, an expression of democratic confidence. But you could say you've got a somewhat authoritarian president in The United States, you've got a very authoritarian president in Modi, and both sides to an extent compromising their principles. So a relationship which is clearly tense at the moment with Trump, you know, not paying attention to the Quad. Because actually, you go back with previous US administrations, they've always regarded India as a really important player, and the rebuilding of relationships with India has been a big deal in American foreign policy. But at the moment, that clearly seems from Sushant's interpretation to be somewhat in abeyance. And I hadn't appreciated or noticed just how little attention Trump has paid to the Quad and the fact that he hasn't, as it were, celebrated Modi or Modi's regime despite being polite about it anyway. So I think there's an awful lot in that podcast which is really important in terms of judging current geopolitics because India is such an important player.
Lockwood: It is. When I was based in Singapore covering Asia, anchoring out of there, Quad and AUKUS, the Australia, US, UK partnerships as well. That was all we spoke about a few years ago under the Biden administration. The Quad was all important. I remember Kamala Harris's visit through Asia, and it was top of the agenda. And now it's just been pushed to one side. That is all we've got time for this week's episode. Join us every Thursday for more exciting conversation about world events that goes beyond the usual headlines. Subscribe to One Decision on YouTube so you never miss out on a conversation putting the global news in context. For more conversations with leading decision makers and thinkers, do check out 1decision.com where you'll find additional commentaries, conversations, and explainers. I'm Rosanna Lockwood joined as ever by Sir Richard Dearlove. Thank you for listening.
