Episode Info
- Season8
- Episode6
Hosted by Christina Ruffini and Sir Richard Dearlove
Guest
Episode Summary
This week, Julia Macfarlane is in Madrid for the historic NATO summit as it’s considered to be the most important gathering of the alliance in a generation. One Decision secured exclusive interviews with world leaders, foreign ministers, ambassadors to discuss NATO’s new strategic concept, the reclassification of Russia as the greatest threat to the Euro-Atlantic area, and also the need for member states to invest in Defense as war returns to Europe once again. Together with her co-host Sir Richard Dearlove, former chief of Mi6, Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, they break down the biggest decisions coming out of Madrid.
Listen & Subscribe
- Watch on YouTube
- Listen on Apple Podcasts
- Listen on Spotify
Transcript
INTRODUCTION
Lockwood: You're listening to One Decision. This week, we've been in Madrid for the historic NATO summit, billed as the most important gathering of the alliance in a generation. We've been speaking to world leaders, foreign ministers, ambassadors, and senators from a bipartisan delegation here in Spain discussing NATO's new strategic concept, the reclassification of Russia as the greatest threat to the Euro-Atlantic area, and also the need for member states to invest in defense as war returns to Europe once again. My co-hosts are Richard Dearlove is the former chief of MI6, Britain's secret intelligence service. He's been listening to all of our interviews this week, and he's joined us to give us his take on the new announcements from Madrid. So Richard, it's 2022 and NATO have a new strategic concept that they have published. Last time they did this in 2010, there was no mention of China in the text and they had outlined the intent to cooperate strategically with Russia. So it's been quite a sea change of a stance since then. We've had the news of Finland and Sweden, their pathway to membership opening up after Turkey dropped their veto. Although there has been some news with President Erdogan saying in a press conference that actually he reserves the right to essentially block Finland and Sweden from membership because of course the protocols might be signed but their membership, it still has to be ratified by parliaments and of course President Erdogan's party has a majority in the Turkish parliament. So the accession of Finland and Sweden remains to be seen. We've had big announcements from Joe Biden, an additional $800,000,000 of military aid to Ukraine, Boris Johnson pledging £1,000,000,000 more than The US to the Ukrainians. There's gonna be a new permanent US base in Poland. Lots of new things. Do you think it is all enough, and do you think it is going to make the difference in Ukraine's fight against Russia?
ANALYSIS WITH SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE
Dearlove: Well, I think the basics point I would make is that, you know, you can make decisions, and the decisions in their own right are impressive. But I think one of the things I learned in my career, which was quite long, was that there is a big difference between taking a decision and implementing decisions. And the question now for NATO is the effectiveness of the implementation of the decisions that they have taken. I mean, as you have described, this is an extraordinary transformation. In the immediate post Cold War period, we were asking ourselves, what's the point of NATO? Do we need NATO any longer? And it survived. I think the best expression is to say in French, There was nothing to replace it. So, you know, it staggered along without a clear purpose, without a clear objective. But, of course, what you're describing in that period between 2010 and 2022 is a complete re-identification of what NATO is about and its adaption to a new world situation. I think this is incredibly important. It is part of the basic map for global security in the future. But as I have stressed, think one needs to look at the issue of implementation now and how these decisions and how quickly these decisions are put into practice.
Lockwood: Right. And I mean, we've had some interesting developments. I mean, that announcement that the secretary general Jens Stoltenberg made before the summit had even started that there were going to be now 300,000 troops placed on high alert. The current level is 40,000. The details of that haven't been worked out. We do not know countries are providing those troops. We do not know where they will be, where they will be stationed. And the other thing that I think is interesting from, you say that NATO has had to reevaluate purpose. We had like a week ago, we had the Estonian Prime Minister saying that NATO's plans for defending the Baltic states involved liberating them only one hundred and eighty days after they were overrun. She said that their plan was involved allowing Baltic nations to be invaded before NATO was to do anything. I mean, it's just it's extraordinary hearing that sort of thing because of course, operational plans are not made public, but as prime minister, she will have seen some of NATO's contingency plans and raising that really crucial issue. We don't know, we assume that those plans have been updated. But certainly the Baltic states who have been anxious about Russian expansionism for a really, really long time, they seemed very, very pleased with the new attitude that NATO is now taking on the Russian threat and it was the Lithuanian representative that we spoke to David Asma, Matulionis, the Lithuanian permanent representative to NATO. He described it as a NATO renaissance.
Dearlove: Yeah. I think in practice, it is a NATO renaissance. I certainly was not aware of that a hundred and eighty day assessment, but I think what it reflects is the belief in NATO or the precedent belief in NATO that if there were a conventional war in Europe, the massive armored forces of Russia, you know, would roll across the North European Plain, and it would take a significant amount of time for NATO to gather its strength and, as it were, mount a counter offensive. But in practice, what we are seeing is, on the one hand, a reassessment of the effectiveness of the conventional Russian military as shown by their performance in Ukraine, which, let's face it, is very striking and gives us a different view of how this might operate. But on the other hand, I think what we're seeing now is with this figure of 300,000, you know, frontline deployments, a completely different approach to this problem. I mean, you're absolutely right to say, you know, where are these troops gonna be based? How are they going to be deployed? How's the equipment gonna be stored? What is the readiness and preparation of this material? I mean, there's a whole range of complex questions. But, I mean, what we're looking at is a completely new security architecture for Europe. And I've been very struck by this phrase that people are using a new cold war. I mean, it isn't a new cold war. It's a new hot war. I mean, there's a major war in front of us on the European continent in Ukraine. And the question is now how we sustain and win what is a proxy fight. And, I mean, one of the interesting things about the current global situation is that we have proxy wars. And the proxy war that, you know, gives me a parallel is and it's a minor parallel in a way, is with Saudi Arabia and Iran fighting it out in Yemen through proxies. And we have exactly the similar situation now confronting us in Europe, but on a much bigger scale with much bigger strategic implications. And, you know, if you have been an observer of, you know, the geopolitical situation since World War Two, what one might call Pax Americana, you know, we're now having completely to reassess our view of the future. And this Madrid summit, I think, is seminally important. But, I mean, I'm not convinced of its effectiveness until we see in practice what actually happens. And, I mean, the crucial point for me is how fast the Americans react, whether Scholz's guarantee on, you know, the rearmament of Germany goes through quickly, and exactly how the French are gonna behave because the French have always been reluctant members of NATO, as you well know. So there are a whole range of fascinating, and important questions which, you know, for example, on this podcast, we can look at the different elements of these changes, which over the next year are gonna be of huge strategic importance. And I think we're in an extraordinary situation in international affairs at the moment, almost unprecedented. I mean, I keep saying this, you know, the end of the Cold War was unprecedented. Nine-eleven was unprecedented. You know, and the financial crisis. But suddenly, we have found ourselves in this quite extraordinary situation.
Lockwood: I think what's not sort of disappointing, but I think sort of remains to be seen is that NATO still needs to make important decisions about where it draws certain lines and at what stage it may take action. And clearly we don't know what conversations are having, what conversations are taking place behind the scenes. But I mean, question which I asked a lot of our guests this week and I asked our panel of experts is is there consensus in NATO as far as how to what extent they will help Ukraine? You know, will they help Ukraine push the Russians back from the areas they are currently advancing to? Or are they prepared to help Ukraine push the Russians out of territory they have taken and claimed, particularly in the Donbas, a huge chunk of Eastern Ukraine. The Russians now claim the areas that they have taken and the cities that they have taken as sovereign territory belonging to the Russian Federation. And the Kremlin has said very, very clearly, any attack from NATO weaponry, from NATO on Russian soil will be a direct provocation. That means that we will have to respond to that in kind. And I didn't get the sense that NATO have a clear consensus on that.
Dearlove: Yeah. That's a really important question, but I think one can make distinctions. And what I mean by that is that there is a difference between nation states in Europe helping the Ukrainians and NATO helping the Ukrainians. And although one, you know, can conceive after the NATO conference of a coordination and united approach to the Ukrainian problem, I think it's also important that there is this specificity in The UK saying we're giving a billion dollars, with the Americans saying we're giving this much. Because whatever the Russians say publicly, I think the Russians too understand the difference between sovereign nation help to the Ukrainians and NATO help to the Ukrainians. And I think if there is any human interest in this conflict, and what I mean by that is interpretation, it's important that military initiatives in Ukraine are not perceived by the Russians to be NATO initiatives. They're perceived to be Ukrainian initiatives backed by foreign independent nation states. I mean, that may sound rather esoteric, but I really don't believe the Russians themselves in this military venture wish to be drawn into a direct conflict with NATO on Ukrainian territory or if you're Russian, former Ukrainian territory. So these distinctions may sound sort of legalistic, but I think it's important to understand that there are some conceptual acceptances probably both by Ukraine, by Russia, by NATO, by the individual nations, which are, as it were, the parameters for this conflict. Now that may sound overcomplicated, and, of course, the danger is how you interpret potential violations, but I think there is a common interest in both parties, the Ukrainians and their allies and the Russians not crossing or violating certain red lines. But, I mean, I do accept that this is a highly sensitive and difficult area.
Lockwood: Yeah. I take your point, and a lot of the representatives we spoke to were very, very keen to stress that as far as military aid is concerned, it is very much done on a bilateral basis between those individual nation states and Ukraine. NATO is providing non-lethal assistance to Ukraine. But I would expect that the Russians don't really distinguish between the actions of individual nation states and NATO. And frankly, Russia really sees what NATO does as being directed by The United States. But what I think is very interesting with what you say about nation states being attacked, Lithuania is under attack right now ever since it sought to move to implement those sanctions restricting the transit of goods from the exclave Kaliningrad to Russian territory that goes across Lithuanian territory. They've attracted huge ire from the Russians as non-state actor hacking groups which are Russian who have been bombarding the Lithuanians with distributed denial of service attacks where they basically flood websites, government websites with traffic and shut them down. They've been dealing with that a lot. The Lithuanian representative that we spoke to, the ambassador to NATO, he said something that was very, very interesting. What can you tell us about those cyber attacks? Are they ongoing? Are they a huge cause of concern or are they not something to be hugely worried about?
INTERVIEW: LITHUANIAN AMBASSADOR
Matulionis: You know, it's a cause of concern definitely. But since we got some, I mean, in advance that there will be some attacks last week, and they started on Monday. Our cybersecurity people, they were prepared, I mean, to react.
Lockwood: You said you were warned that the attacks would come. Could you tell us a little more about that? Was that intelligence showing that the cyber attacks were coming? Was it a warning from allies?
Matulionis: Cannot comment on that because we simply knew that there will be attacks.
Lockwood: Right. Okay. Very, very interesting. I had to try.
Dearlove: It's a very good question, and it's an important question. And I don't have, obviously, a clear cut answer. I mean, cyber competition, cyber conflict, between competitors, between potential enemies, between enemies is an important part now of, you know, the international scene. And for example, we have seen very aggressive Chinese activity against The United States. We have seen very aggressive Chinese activity against other players, and, similarly, the Russians have a significant capability in this area and have already used it extensively, whether it was in Georgia, whether it was earlier in the Baltics, whether it's now in terms of the present conflict and their problems with the Baltic states over free access to Kaliningrad. So it's I suppose what I would say, it's an unregulated area of international relations. And what I mean by that is we have had over the years, you know, disarmament negotiations with the Russians. We have had, you know, with the Warsaw Pact back in the Cold War. We had an international convention on chemical and biological weapons. There's a nonproliferation treaty, but we have not yet reached a point in terms of global security where there is any regulation of cyber conflict. And, you know, if you look beyond the Ukraine conflict and perhaps a different period in international relations, I would predict that you will have some sort of Geneva initiative where this has to be negotiated, and there have to be some basic rules placed into the sphere of international relations, but we're miles away from that. I mean, I think a very good parallel, it's a rather banal one, is the invention of the motor car. If you go back to the invention of the internal combustion engine and the regulation of traffic and driving, it developed sort of autonomously in various areas of the world. It was a very, very long time before, you know, you had driving on the left, driving on the right, a system of licensing, a system of insurance. And it took the global community years to regulate how road transport should actually work and operate. Okay. This is rather more serious because we're talking about conflict. We're not talking about facilities that improve well, we are talking about facilities that improve the quality of life. We're talking about information technology. But, you know, the aggressive side of information technology now, you know, has advanced way, way beyond the point of regulation. But at some point, we have to pull back the frontiers. And you're right to identify this as an area of potential danger because without regulation or without some concept of what both sides think do we draw the line as to what I wouldn't say what's acceptable, but, you know, what constitutes an act of war, I suppose, is, you know, in terms of our current
Lockwood: way that we view aggression between nation states. I think you're absolutely right. And I think the parallel of motor car analogy, think is spot on. And I mean, we are eventually at some point, we are going to see a hostile action either by state services or non-state actor, likely the latter because it's plausible deniability. We're going to see some country's national grid get taken down. We're going to see air traffic control being attacked. We're going to see huge amounts of damage wreaked from the internet. And look, if we consider how well Russia's planning of this invasion has gone, you know, it's been a huge logistical nightmare for the Russians. They've had to deal with food rationing, they've had to deal with all their troops and their tanks running out of petrol. You've had to deal with Ukrainian mud. Whereas a couple of guys in a basement underneath Red Square could attack millions of people by turning the lights off in a country. And so I think it's an inevitability that we are going to see cyber attacks, which are threatening on a national scale. And we are just waiting for the international community to decide actually if it's going to have some kind of contingency plan, if and when that happens. I mean, the NHS was hit by a really, really damaging cyber attack, then that was years ago. And there's been very, very little since to give much confidence that public infrastructure in The UK, for example, can withstand attacks like that in the future. I want to ask you something that was interesting from again the Lithuanian ambassador. He said that he wanted NATO and the West to reframe its perceptions on Belarus. He told us that there was this accomplice role that Belarus was playing by providing territory for military attacks against neighboring countries. Belarus was recently the launching pad of missiles directly into Ukraine, Russian missiles. And he said that, you know, we have to consider Belarus as basically being in the same line as Russia. Do you agree with him?
Dearlove: Yes. I do. I mean, I think that Belarus is completely complicit with the Russians now and has a staging place, you know, facilitated aggression against Ukraine. And, I mean, effectively, there's very little distinction between Russia in terms of what's happened in Ukraine. I think that anxiety, that expression of Belarus' aggression is absolutely spot on. I don't disagree with that at all. I think we just have to classify them as almost part of Russia in relation to this particular crisis. I mean, maybe I'll just add one further point, which is I mean, I think Lukashenko's position in Ukraine is fragile. I mean, Putin's perhaps as fragile as well for different reasons.
Lockwood: Robin Niblett, the director of Chatham House, he said something that I thought was very interesting. When I suggested maybe the two extreme options we have left are either Ukrainian capitulation and where we would see Zelenskyy conceding some areas of the Donbas to Putin in exchange for a ceasefire, or there is a dramatic escalation in military support to Ukraine, which brings us very dangerously close to the West getting directly involved in an open conflict with Russia. And he said he doesn't think that's likely, he thinks what the most probable eventuality is a new form of frozen conflict in Europe. And he made parallels with Cyprus and the situation in the Korean Peninsula. And essentially a situation where the Russians can't win definitively and the Ukrainians cannot lose because of our arms delivery, which basically ends up implementing a new form of the iron curtain back down again in Europe. I mean, what are your thoughts on that?
Dearlove: Yeah. I wouldn't call it an iron curtain. I would call it more an armistice line. I mean, I think that the parallel with North And South Korea, if you've been to the Demilitarized Zone and the green line in Cyprus between the Turkish and Greek parts of the island is probably a valid parallel. I mean, if you ask me what I think will happen is I think that now running into the winter, we're likely to see something of a stalemate with the conflict stabilizing along roughly where the Russian forces have got to now. I don't see at the moment the Ukrainians being able to recover territory. But if you take that as the likely line for winter and assuming that the Ukrainians can hold that, which they probably can, I think one would see a process of rearmament of Ukraine during the winter, which, of course, includes extensive training on the material that they will get from The United States, from The UK, to an extent from Germany and from the French, hopefully? Hopefully, then one might expect a Ukrainian offensive in May, June next year with possibly pushing the Russians back to the 2014 line. But, I mean, in a way, I think at the moment, it's very hard to imagine that the Ukrainians would have the capability to retake Crimea. And if the Russians are pushed back to the 2014 line, then that may well be the point that you come to a frozen conflict. I mean, I don't think I would compare that with the Iron Curtain because, you know, the Iron Curtain was a political ideological divide. It was like, you know, the edge of the Russian empire. This is, you know, literally a frozen conflict, and it could remain like that for a very long time. I mean, certainly, Zelensky, and, I mean, I think we have to recognize it's a Ukrainian right to identify at what point they want to negotiate with the Russians. They are the country that has been subject to aggression. I don't think we can impose on the Ukrainians any conditions whatsoever. The Ukrainians themselves have to decide at what point negotiating for a frozen conflict might be appropriate. And, obviously, for the moment, that's a long way off. The Ukrainians are far from having exhausted their military capabilities. And if my predictions are right and we have a winter of reduced conflict with both sides dug in and, of course, the weather, you know, it's banal, but the weather does play a part in this, I think it's highly likely that there will be an attempted Ukrainian offensive. And the Russians might find that very hard to deal with when the Ukrainians have been rearmed and retrained with more sophisticated long distance artillery in particular?
Lockwood: Yeah. I mean, what you say about it being up to the Ukrainians to decide at what point they start negotiating a frozen conflict. We cannot impose conditions on Zelensky that's something that everyone has been really, really keen to stress. But I mean, then begs the question to how long will we continue to sending an awful lot of money and military equipment to Ukraine? There was a report by CNN recently, which claimed that White House officials privately believed that actually despite all the latest heavy sophisticated weaponry that was destined for Ukraine, despite the new additional pledges, they do not think that the Ukrainians can push the Russians back to the February 24 border, nevermind Crimea. They do not think that that's going to work. And so for how long are we gonna see, particularly amid a worsening economic environment, countries like The UK sending £1,000,000,000 as Boris Johnson announced today to Ukraine, 800,000,000 from Joe Biden just today. So if the Ukrainians are not able to push the Russians out and take them back to the international border as it was on in February, how long will the West continue to help Ukraine?
Dearlove: Good question. But I think the fact is we have to stick with it. We are, as it were, fighting, as I've said already, proxy war. Having made this commitment to Ukraine, we can't step back. I mean, if Ukraine themselves reached the conclusion that they can't regain territory militarily, they're not gonna concede on the principle. They might, as it were, concede on an armistice line, which, you know, reflects a cessation of the conflict or the conflict in its most extreme form that we've got now. But, I mean, we have to go with it. I mean, billion is a lot of money, but, you know, the overall expenditure of the government annually where what is it? 350 I mean, it's one less than one three hundredth of the government's annual expenditure. It's probably less than that. And, you know, maybe we have to make sacrifices in order to establish the rights of democratic countries to exist on the European continent? I mean, I think this is a fascinating question. I mean, our security The UK's national security is tied very closely to the security of European nations. It always has been historically. And what happens on the continent is crucial to our own security. So this is a problem, that we cannot walk away from. And, you know, personally, I'm very pleased that as we're not any longer part of the EU's attempts to have a common foreign policy, we actually can act supportively of the European nations, but also make our own independent decisions. And I think that at the moment is crucially important in terms of this conflict. But we're a long way away from a situation where we accept that the Ukrainians militarily maybe cannot achieve any further significant victories. I mean, I've certainly been concerned myself that after that initial success in saving Kyiv from, you know, a Russian invasion, that Russia would resort to the sort of tactics that we now see, which is to grind down and slowly occupy territory in the East, which of course originally was their primary objective. And we have to continue our policy. There's no question. And so do the other major nations of Europe. And I think crucial in the medium to longer term is what the Germans do and how the Germans behave. And, I mean, Germany, having that different historical relationship with Russia, this is of primary importance in the ultimate resolution of this conflict.
TURKEY, FINLAND AND SWEDEN
Lockwood: I wanna ask you, let's turn to Turkey because one of the biggest stories coming out of the summit is Turkey dropping its veto against Finland and Sweden, who announced a month ago that they wanted to join the alliance. And it was only two weeks ago that the Turks were refusing to even enter into talks with them brokered by the Secretary General. And then we saw a surprise announcement that all sides had reached an agreement. They signed this memorandum of understanding here in Madrid, which basically sets out that Finland and Sweden promised to respect Turkey's fight against terrorism to end all cooperation and funding for the PYD, Kurdish militia groups who were Western partners in the fight against ISIS in Syria. And since then, since the signing of that memorandum, Turkey has since claimed that Sweden has promised the extradition of 73 people who they see as terrorists. Now this was not in the text in that memorandum of understanding. And we sat down with the Finnish foreign minister who said that there had been no guarantees made that they would extradite anyone to Turkey. Minister Haavisto, first of all, it was just two weeks ago when Turkey was refusing to enter into talks with you and Sweden, accusing both of your countries of being incubators for terrorists. Now you've made quite a breakthrough this week. The memorandum of understanding signed by your three nations shows a raft of new commitments that you have made in order to placate Ankara. You've reaffirmed your commitments to Turkey's security. You've promised not to provide any support to the YPG, or the PYD. You've also promised to address Turkey's pending deportation or extradition requests of terror suspects. What exactly does addressing Turkey's extradition requests mean and are they likely to be granted?
Havisto: On the deportation we actually promise to process things without delay and so forth. Well, when we promise to process, then of course we didn't guarantee any outcome of that processing. Of course in that process, different arguments are can be very heavy, the human rights arguments and some people might need protection and so forth.
Lockwood: So now we're in a situation where there's a little bit of confusion as to what's actually gonna happen and if Sweden and Finland are actually going to get their membership after all. So what do you make of Turkey's maneuvering in all of this?
Dearlove: Well, the first point I would make is that Turkey suffers a fundamental distortion in its foreign policy, and it sees almost every issue that affects Turkey's national security through the optic of the threat of an independent Kurdistan. And it's difficult, particularly for this Turkish government, think logically because every issue has this distortion laid across the top of it. And, of course, Sweden in particular, not so much Finland, has been important in terms of receiving refugees both from Iraq and the Kurdish areas of Iraq. So there are a number of people in Sweden whom the current Turkish government would class as they're probably members of KDP, I mean, or various Kurdish organizations, Kurdish movements, who the Turks, of course, regard not as an independence movement, but as a terrorist movement. I mean, my prediction is the Turks will continue to be bloody difficult. Excuse my language. You know, I can go back to the Iraqi crisis, you know, invasion of Iraq, at the beginning of the war when the original British plan was to send the British military and units in through the North. But, you know, following a meeting with the Turkish general staff, and I had certain status in that meeting, the Turks just absolutely said no way. So that's why the British army went into Basra, not into the North of Iraq. I mean, the Turks were completely unhelpful, uncooperative, and very, very difficult. I think in this particular instance, the Turks are in a different situation, and they will concede and Sweden and Finland will become members of NATO because the issues are much, much bigger than the issue of, you know, the invasion of Iraq, as it was at that particular time. But, I mean, I don't think one should be at all surprised. I mean, Erdogan is an incredibly difficult individual. And has this specific view, which, you know, he can't look at any of these issues except looking through this particular glass plate that has, you know, Kurdistan written across it. And, of course, this is anathema to the current Turkish sense of identity.
Lockwood: Right. And, I mean, you say Erdogan is a different character. We actually got a question to President Erdogan in his press conference on his track record. The NATO charter sets out a commitment to safeguard the freedom of the peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. Türkiye was once the world's worst jailer of journalists. It is consistently ranked among the countries with the least press freedom and freedom of opinion in the world. More than a thousand human rights lawyers have been arrested following the coup. You have suppressed opposition to your rule. Türkiye, under your leadership, doesn't really fit in NATO? Are you asking where I'm from? Freedom House, Amnesty International. Freedom House.
Erdogan: In the last forty years, these terrorists have killed 40,000 civilians, and mothers of the have been waiting for their children before the doors of a political party known by the abbreviation HDP. Their children are 13, 14, and 15 years of age, and they were snatched away to be taken up to the mountains. Where's the Freedom House? The members of HDP political party, the PKK members, the PYD members,
Lockwood: are they doing what they're doing in the name of freedom? With respect, mister president, what about the journalists you've jailed? What about the civil rights activists you've jailed? The human rights lawyers that you have jailed?
Erdogan: In my country, nobody is incarcerated without any criminal reasoning. If you're not subjected to any legal sanctions, nobody has been incarcerated due to the things they have written, due to the criticisms they have voiced, and due to the things they have stated. All this is about disinformation.
Lockwood: I'll ask you the same question as I asked him. Do you think Turkey really belongs in NATO under Erdogan's leadership?
Dearlove: Well, let's put it like this. You know, in terms of NATO membership, we can't necessarily choose who should be the government of the countries that are member nations. Turkey is important to NATO because of the size and sophistication of its military and its position on the southern flank. Turkey has had a checkered very checkered political history. And at the moment, we have this extraordinary Islamist nationalist party ruling the roost. And, of course, there are massive tensions inside Turkey, and Erdogan's position politically is not necessarily secure in the medium to longer term. I mean, you know as well as I do the history of Turkey's attempts to join the EU, the postponement of Turkey's candidature because of its record on human rights, because of the way that it's behaved politically in various crises. I mean, all I would say is, I think, on this issue, the strategy of NATO, the importance of the southern flank, the importance of the Turkish military, you have to take a pragmatic and not a judgmental. I mean, personally, I'm not a believer in moral foreign policy. I think we do the right thing in criticizing Erdogan and maybe hoping that one of these Turkish elections will turn up a majority which can defeat his Islamist party, and I think that probably will occur, because the strength of Turkish opposition amongst Turkish middle class intellectuals who are gaining purchase in the rural areas will make a difference over time. But, I mean, I think when you have an alliance of 30 nations, which will grow to 32, you have to accept the political warts. And of all member states, Turkey's political warts are bigger than any other and more difficult to accommodate, but that still doesn't mean that Turkey should be out of NATO. It's important that Turkey is in NATO.
LOOKING AHEAD
Lockwood: Right. You say we should take a practical view on Turkey. Some, not necessarily me, some may say NATO is selling out on its principles in order to get Turkish Bayraktar drones, which are proving very, very useful in Ukraine's fight against Russia. But let's drop that for now. After this week, what would you say that Putin's next steps are going to be? I mean, he's just been handed a note from Zelensky delivered by the Indonesian president, Joko Widodo, who's just landed in Moscow. What do you think Putin's next decision is going to be? What would you expect his next steps after all of these announcements from NATO, the strong words of support for Ukraine? How do you think this is all going down in the Kremlin?
Dearlove: Well, I think the riposte will be typically Putin-esque. There will be aggressive statements from Moscow, in response to NATO's unified decisions, in response to the threat of Finland and Sweden joining. And let's emphasize, you know, Sweden and Finland joining is hugely significant because of the size of the Finnish armed forces, their sophistication. I mean, interestingly, they have some of the best artillery in the world, and Sweden also has a very, very sophisticated defense, and armed forces capability. So, you know, Putin has achieved exactly the opposite of what he said was the problem, you know, which was the confrontation with NATO. At a stroke, he's given NATO identity. He's given NATO clear objective and aims. He has, as it were, reinforced the concept of NATO, and he has ensured that most of the main NATO members will now rearm and, massively, relatively speaking, increase their defense budgets. So, I mean, I think the Moscow response is gonna be more of the same in Ukraine. And what I mean by that is this sort of meat grinder approach to taking more territory. Maybe they will continue to advance slowly. Maybe the Ukrainians will begin to hold the line. I think it's Putin who is in a difficult situation. It's not NATO. I mean, Putin's difficult situation is that his army is doing a bad job. The casualties are very high. There will certainly be massive problems behind the scenes in the Kremlin. There will be elements of the Russian leadership who are deeply unhappy with what is happening. And, you know, Putin is ill. Let's face it. We're not sure how ill. We don't know the timing. But it is Russia that is facing a crisis, both politically, morally, socially. And the question is how that plays out over the next year or so. And I think as regards the situation on the ground in Ukraine, more of the same. And NATO will strengthen its resolve and will strengthen its defenses and will massively increase its defense spending. And I don't think that we have for the moment any alternative. Let us hope that maybe in 2023, we see signs of change in the Kremlin with the departure. We don't necessarily see a more accommodating Kremlin, but we might see a change in the leadership. And what I mean by that is a more rational Kremlin, because at the moment, the path that Russia is on is totally irrational and destructive of the Russian national interest in the medium to long term.
Lockwood: You've anticipated my last question to you, which was gonna be, what do you think the situation will be a year from now, but it sounds like you think Putin may very well be out of power and we might be looking at a new leadership from the Kremlin.
Dearlove: Yeah. I think we can only guess at the timing. I don't think we are guessing at the outcome. We're guessing at the timing when will it happen. It will happen. Will it happen in six months, a year, or two years? I don't know. I don't think any of us know, but we are in a set of geopolitical circumstances which signal the end of Putin's regime. The question is when that end comes.
Lockwood: I would agree with that. I'll stick my neck out and say I think in a year from now, what will have happened is that Zelensky will have been leaned on to, if not concede the areas that Russia has taken, at least as you put it earlier, agree to an armistice line in order that there may be a ceasefire, that Ukrainians can start to come back to their cities, that they can try and get their economy going back and they can try and rebuild. But I personally think it's pretty inevitable Zelensky is going to have to give something to Putin. And I do think that Western help is conditional. And on the Ukrainians finding a practical solution, I think the economic climate is really going to bite and all of the constituent parts of NATO are going to have increasingly loud, dissenting voices on the expense of helping Ukraine at a time when there are large parts of the population who are really, really struggling with the cost of living across the continent.
Dearlove: All I'll say, Julia, is I hope you're wrong.
Lockwood: Me too. Me too. Well, we'll see how it goes. Richard, thank you so much for joining.
Dearlove: It's great. Well, that was a good discussion.
Lockwood: That's it for this week's episode of One Decision. Follow us wherever you get your podcasts. We've got continuing special coverage of the NATO Summit from here in Madrid and our exclusive interviews with world leaders, senior officials, and ambassadors from across NATO. Thank you for listening. From me and the team, see you next time.
