Iran: The Main Mistake of the Last Decade

Hosted by Christina Ruffini and Sir Richard Dearlove

Guest

Danny Citrinowicz

Danny Citrinowicz is a former Israeli military intelligence Iran analyst who says Israel had no plan B after the US pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal.

Episode Summary

When Donald Trump quit the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu showered him with praise. But now, a series of former Israeli security chiefs says the decision was a catastrophe. “The worst mistake of the last decade,” former Israeli Defense Minister Yaalon said. Former Israeli military intelligence Iran analyst Danny Citrinowicz says Israel didn’t really have any plan B for what to do after the US pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal and Iran responded by growing its nuclear program with few constraints. He talks about how Israel and the United States cheered each other on to make a terrible mistake.

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Transcript

INTRODUCTION

Rosen: Welcome back to One Decision. I'm Laura Rosen, your guest cohost for today. I'm thrilled to be here on the podcast where we take an inside look at decisions that have an international impact. I'm joined by former head of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove, for an in-depth discussion about Israel rethinking the Iran nuclear deal.

Rosen: Hi, Sir Richard. It's Laura here. How are you?

Dearlove: Very well, and it's nice to meet you for the first time and do one of these podcasts with you.

Rosen: So I look forward to discussing this important topic. I spoke with the former head of the Israeli defense intelligence Iran section who thinks that Israel kind of missed an opening in Iran that happened in 2013, 2015 when Rouhani was coming to power and trying to reach out to the West, that they missed a genuine change in Iran that now seems to be closing with the departure of Rouhani. And it's gonna be very hard for, you know, the United States and the other countries to get the Iran nuclear deal back. It was a very interesting conversation. In Israel, some people are rethinking one big decision. In recent months, several current and former Israeli national security officials and former cabinet chiefs are more publicly criticizing the decision to press the United States to leave the Iran nuclear deal, which then US president Trump took in 2018. NEWS CLIP [1:30]
Therefore, I am announcing today that the United States will withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal. In a few moments, I will sign a presidential memorandum to begin reinstating US nuclear sanctions on the Iranian regime.

Rosen: But rather than agree to a tougher agreement, Iran responded to Trump's withdrawal from the Iran nuclear pact, formerly known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA, by expanding its nuclear program. Former Israeli defense minister Moshe Ya'alon recently said that Trump's decision to withdraw from the JCPOA was, quote, the main mistake of the last decade, and that the result has been that Iran is closer than ever to becoming a nuclear threshold state. NEWS CLIP [2:25]
Looking back to the policy in the last decade or so, the main mistake was the withdrawal of the US administration from the JCPOA. And now they are in the closest stage that they have been ever to become a threshold.

Rosen: After coming into office last year, the Biden administration and five world powers have been meeting with Iranian officials in Vienna to see if they can come to terms on restoring the deal, but an understanding on what steps each side should take to revive the pact is turning out to be difficult to reach. One of the most knowledgeable, interesting people who've recently emerged on this issue is former Israeli military intelligence official, Danny Citrinowitz. Citrinowitz has served for some twenty five years in Israeli defense intelligence. He previously served as the head of the Iran branch in the Israeli military intelligence research and analysis division during the critical years when the Iran nuclear deal was being negotiated. He then served at the Israeli embassy in Washington as a military intelligence attache when the Trump administration made the decision to leave the deal. He's since left Israeli government service. Citrinowitz says Israel needs to take a more realistic approach towards Iran.

INTERVIEW

Rosen: Danny, thank you so much for joining us. I find your insights incredibly illuminating. Take us back to when the deal was being negotiated in 2013 to 2015. Where were you working when the original deal was being negotiated, and what did you think of prospects for a diplomatic deal with Iran to limit its nuclear program?

Sitrinowitz: Well, first of all, thank you, Laura, for inviting me. I really feel privileged to attend this important podcast. So thank you. Really, I feel honored about that. So I served in those years at the head of the Iranian nuclear desk and then later the head of the Iranian strategic branch in the Israeli Defense Intelligence. And actually, we really worked hard to really understand the Iranian perceptions regarding a deal. And I think that even before, you know, the JCPOA negotiations started, I think that we knew that Rouhani is bringing a new spirit to Iran's political system.

Rosen: Rouhani is Hassan Rouhani, who was elected as Iran's president in 2013 on the platform of urging outreach to the West to reach a diplomatic solution.

Sitrinowitz: Now this is what's crucial. Of course, the president is not the supreme leader. That's obvious. But Rouhani was an interesting guy in a way that he was really connected to the supreme leader, but he has a new way of how he looks at Iran, meaning that he understands that in order to save the revolution, one needs to change the revolution, specifically outreaching the West. So I think that we were really enthusiastic about that in a way that we knew that something is moving in Iran.

Rosen: And as Rouhani took office in Iran in 2013, urging engagement with the West, Israel's defense intelligence chief, Aviv Kochavi, was advising his superiors in Jerusalem that there was some sort of real change going on in Iran that could make way for a diplomatic breakthrough.

Sitrinowitz: This really led to the fact that the then the head of the IDI, now the chief of the Israeli army, lieutenant general Aviv Kochavi, he really felt that, and actually, he wrote a letter to the Israeli seniors saying that in Iran, there is some sort of a real change regarding the possibility of a nuclear agreement. So in that sense, I think that from the moment that Rouhani entered this position, I think that we knew that something is moving in Iranian leadership towards an agreement.

Rosen: But Israel's political leadership at the time, led by then Israeli prime minister Benjamin Bibi Netanyahu, was deeply skeptical of any prospect of moderation from the Iranian regime. And after the deal was reached in 2015, Netanyahu even controversially came to Washington to address congress to lobby American lawmakers to reject the deal negotiated by the American administration. NEWS CLIP [6:47]
Now two years ago, we were told to give president Rouhani and foreign minister Zarif a chance to bring change and moderation to Iran. Some change, some moderation. Rouhani's government hangs gays, persecutes Christians, jails journalists, and executes even more prisoners than before, and that's why this regime will always be an enemy of America.

Rosen: Why do you think some in Israel were more skeptical of the Rouhani administration's intentions on the nuclear deal and nuclear engagement and thought that US diplomacy was naive?

Sitrinowitz: In a way, I think Israel was convinced that the only thing that the Iranians want to do is actually not reaching an agreement, and that in a way, that's a situation that allows them to promote some sort of a secret plan to build an atomic bomb. But I think it also was a failed strategy in so many ways.

Rosen: Citrinowitz says he thinks Israel's political leadership was overly skeptical of an opening in Iran that emerged around 2013 when Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei authorized a secret back channel with US officials that took place in the Persian Gulf country of Oman.

Sitrinowitz: And I think that we didn't make the relevant decision and observation regarding things that are happening in Iran. Iran has changed even before Rouhani. I think the fact that, you know, the Omani negotiations started even before Rouhani came to power. So in that sense, I think that we failed really to understand the domestic issues related to Iran. And that's a major thing because, in a way, when Israel looks at Iran, you know, it looks on the Iranian new ambition, but also on the regional activities. And in that sense, I think that we really failed to understand the inner politics within Iran and the fact that, you know, Iran is not a monolith.

Rosen: Indeed, Iran is not a monolith. And after Rouhani came into office in August 2013, then US secretary of state John Kerry and then Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif and their subordinates frequently held direct talks. Later in 2015, they were joined by the then US energy secretary, Ernest Moniz, and the then head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, who had earned his PhD at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the 1970s before the Islamic revolution in Iran.

Sitrinowitz: But I think those who understand that the change is already happening in Khamenei's head, that's why he allowed the negotiation in Oman, and didn't understand how Rouhani can be a generator, they failed to understand that there will a change in Iranian position towards a nuclear deal. And on top of that, if I may add, one thing that we failed to understand is the importance of relations, direct relations and connection between Zarif and Kerry and also between Moniz and Salehi. I think those really were the key to reaching the JCPOA. So in that regard, I think that the JCPOA was a singular event in time, so unique in so many ways. And now that we see negotiations in Vienna, we really understand how important and how unique the negotiations toward the JCPOA were.

Rosen: Since his presidential campaign, Biden has said he would return the United States to the Iran nuclear deal if Iran agrees to return to its nuclear limits. But by the time Biden came into office last year, Iran's Hassan Rouhani was in the last months of his second term and had become a lame duck. Rouhani's bet on the benefits to Iran of engagement with the West had been badly damaged by Trump's maximum pressure campaign. The Iranian people were exhausted from punishing economic sanctions after Iran had made a deal with the West and kept it only to have the United States renege. And Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei was looking to engineer a successor who would be far more skeptical of Western intentions.

Sitrinowitz: So when I say one thing's ability to highlight a certain point, I think that the JCPOA is unique in so many ways, but I think that people do not realize that in Khamenei's head, the fact that he made a lot of compromises, I think that it's crucial. That was extremely important because I think that if you would have asked Khamenei in 2015, would you agree to such an agreement? He would definitely say no. So something happened in those two years. Something very interesting within the Iranian leadership, within the decision making process that really pushed Khamenei to agree to an agreement that I'm not sure that he wanted to. So I think it was so unique in so many ways, the inner developments into Iran itself.

Rosen: It is not a mistake that Khamenei intends to make again. After Biden came into office, indirect talks on a possible American and Iranian return to the deal got underway in Vienna in April. But no understanding was reached by the time elections for Rouhani's successor were held in Iran in June that brought conservative Ebrahim Raisi to power. Iran's new negotiating team returned to Vienna late last year after Iran had been rapidly increasing its nuclear program, including enriching to 60% purity and restarting enrichment at the underground Fordow facility, all activities prohibited by the nuclear deal. Iran now insisted it wants guarantees that if it returns to the deal, the United States won't just leave it again and resume sanctions.

Sitrinowitz: Look. At the end of the day, the main problem was that the US pulled out from the deal. Of course, Israel wasn't against that, to say the least. But I think the main problem that we have that you didn't have any real plan b how to stop the Iranians if the Iranians will advance in the enrichment, something that happened, and we know that we cannot stop them unless we'll turn back to the JCPOA. So I think this is what may be the biggest failure in that regard because nobody thought ahead. Everything was just short, you know, short period of time and thinking, you know, naively that the maximum pressure campaign will force the Iranians to choose between the nuclear and enrichment capabilities and the survival of the regime. And those people failed to understand that for the Iranian leadership, the Iranian nuclear program, it is a part of their survival, regardless of the fact whether they want a bomb or not. For them, it's a, you know, a source of dignity, of power, and all those stuff. So in that sense, I think it's not only that they didn't have any plan b, actually, the strategy that we endorsed was a failed strategy from the beginning. That's why we are left without any real cards against Iran right now. So in that regard, I think this is something that's extremely important. It really shows people talking about the fact how devastating this decision was, and it was because it really ruined such an important agreement, a unique agreement in time, and now we're facing with the consequences.

Rosen: And the consequences are indeed grave. Now the world is once again soon facing a choice between letting Iran approach nuclear threshold status or contemplating yet more economic sanctions and possibly even military action that could trigger whole new cycles of instability in the Middle East. US secretary of state Antony Blinken said the bad choices the world is facing on Iran are the direct result of Trump's decision to quit a nuclear deal that was working. NEWS CLIP [14:25]
Now we are where we are because of what I consider to be one of the worst decisions made in American foreign policy in the last decade, and that was getting out of the Iran nuclear agreement, the JCPOA, an agreement that had put Iran's nuclear program in a box. And in getting out of that agreement, we were promised that it would be replaced by a stronger one, and at the same time, maximum pressure being exerted against Iran would curb its malicious activities throughout the region. And instead, of course, we've seen just the opposite. There hasn't been a new and improved agreement. To the contrary, Iran has broken loose from the constraints imposed on it by the JCPOA. At the same time, it continues to act aggressively in country after country, in the region.

Rosen: President Biden said there's been modest progress in the talks in Vienna, but it's not yet clear if a deal can be reached. NEWS CLIP [15:13]
It's not time to give up. There is some progress being made. The p five plus one is on the same page, but it remains to be seen.

Rosen: Let me ask because we heard a lot from the Trump administration after they pulled out of the deal. They would kind of cheer when there were protests in Iran, and they declared that their policy was not regime change in Iran. But it seems like they kind of wanted the regime to collapse, or there was this sort of expectation that the regime would be so weakened that they would agree to much harsher terms. And this is something that you hear Israeli officials even say still, more sanctions, more pressure, when to some minds, there's really not that much more you can sanction in the Iranian economy. Where does this view come from that there would be an Iranian revolution and that what comes after would be more satisfactory to the West?

Sitrinowitz: I think it's, again, a great question. I think that we are very naive in so many ways, thinking that we can change something in the Iranian domestic activity by doing here and there bits and bytes of things. I think it's naive. I really find it very hard to find the right word without being assaulted in so many ways. Because, you know, revolution, it's not a plan that you can plan into the future. You know, we can sit now and there will be riots in Iran, and it maybe can take a hundred years from them. Who knows? But the fact of the matter is that all the time we are portraying ourselves the fact that, you know, the revolution is just around the corner. It is the wrong thing to do. Yes. Iran has problems. Yes. The gap between the leadership and the Iranian civilians and especially what we call the bazaar in Tehran. Yes. The gap is there, but we can't assume that something will happen. I'll go even further and say that let's assume that there is a revolution today in Iran. Who vouched for us that the IRGC won't take over? They already are half from the Raisi cabinet, or what we call the men who served in the IRGC. And I'll say even further, let's assume that we find ourselves in a revolution and the liberals are taking over. Let's say miraculously. Well then, do we think that they're really going to dismantle the Iranian nuclear program? No. They're not going to do that. So in that regard, all the times that we are waiting for a real change in Iran and thinking something happened, there are riots in Isfahan. Yes. There are riots, but the regime knows how to handle that in so many ways. The regime is smart, even smarter than one might think. So I think that it's a naive policy in so many ways. That's why I think that we have to be realistic. Yes. We have major problems right now where I see, but this is the call that we're being dealt, and we have to make sure that we make the utmost with that and not thinking about things that cannot be implemented in real time. Or definitely the US cannot support that because it's very hard to change Iranian inner politics from outside players. That's a naive policy and to think that we can implement that in that way.

Rosen: What do you make of prospects for a deal now and the new Iranian government's capability to compromise?

Sitrinowitz: I think that, you know, when I'm looking at the behavior of Raisi, I think that for him, it's not a question whether Iran is willing to return back to a deal or not. I think it's all a question of price. He's not prioritizing that. He really thinks that he has good alternatives, but he understands he's not stupid. And he understands that returning back to a deal will be something that will really help the Iranian economy and help him fulfill his promises to the Iranian population. But I think in that regard, they have some deep mistrust towards the West and especially the US that they really find demanding assurances that will be very hard to implement. And I think the Iranians are really content from what they have now. They will expand, of course, moving to other different types of centrifuges if there won't be any agreement, but they told us so publicly that they're not going to cross the 60% threshold. They truly understand that, that if they're going to do so, then China and Russia won't support them. So I think in that regard, the willingness from both sides will turn back to a deal, but I think that Iran will return to a deal under two conditions. First, that they will have assurances that no administration will deal in the future again. It's very hard to assure them that, maybe economical assurances and other sources, I don't know. But this is one thing, and the other thing, of course, lifting of all sanctions related to that the Trump administration imposed on Iran. And the other thing, making sure that they're not going to turn back in other pretexts. So actually, the ability to impose more new sanctions on Iran would be very limited. I think that if they will find a way to build this kind of structure, I think that Iran will be willing to return back to the agreement because I don't think that they have some sort of secret plan to build the nuclear weapons and continue the negotiation. No. I think if there won't be an agreement, they'll continue pushing forward in the enrichment under the threshold of, you know, keeping the threshold of 60%, and we'll see how things will develop. But in that regard, I think they're willing to return to a deal, but someone in the p five plus one or especially the e three and the US will have to find ways to ease some of the problems or fear of the Iranian leadership if they return back to a deal by giving them the right assurances, lifting sanctions, and, of course, doing things related to timing of the lifting of sanctions comparing to Iran returning to the nuclear restrictions. So in that regard, again, I can't be optimistic because it's taking a long time, but I think that it's not a done deal in a way that the Iranians don't want to return back to the deal. They have to find a magic path in between them. And like I mentioned, the most important thing is making the Iranians sense that nobody can fool them again.

Rosen: And how do you think the Israeli government will manage its ambivalence about a possible restoration of the deal? And does it prefer that the deal succeeds or that it fails?

Sitrinowitz: That's very interesting because I think that when I'm looking at the Israeli strategy right now, it's not like it was. I think that I don't see any coherent strategy. I can hear Prime Minister Bennett is talking about the need to put more pressure on Iran and so forth, but I'm also hearing not only from Minister Lapid, but also the Defense Minister Gantz talking about the importance of any deal, you know, a deal that, of course, will meet the Israeli interests in a way, but the understanding process of a deal. And also, I've heard about the leaks coming from our cabinet meeting, that the head of the Israeli Defense Intelligence, Aharon Haliva, talked about the fact that returning back to the JCPOA is Israel's interest, because it buys time and rolls back Iranian nuclear ambitions in so many ways. So I think looking forward, if the sides will turn back to a deal, I don't think that Israel will do something against this kind of a deal in a way that I think that the Biden administration will make it very clear that he won't accept anything that Israel will do against or trying to undermine the deal itself. That's my, of course, personal impression. But I think that Israel needs the US, needs the Biden administration, so many other things that I don't see something happening. But, yes, what can happen is the fact that Israel maybe will intensify what we call the short of war campaign against Iranian entrenchment in Syria. That really can happen. I don't know if it's why or in the way of compensation or things like that, but I think that maybe you should expect that. But in that regard, again, I think that Israel probably will say publicly that it's against returning back to the original deal and so forth, but, really, I don't see something happening from the Israeli standpoint that will try actively to ruin, to undermine the JCPOA.

Rosen: Yes. And go back to, you mentioned that the current head of Israeli military intelligence was reported to have told the Israeli security cabinet early in January that it's better, in his opinion, for Israel's interest for there to be a restoration of the deal than no deal. And you said that was significant. Why do you think it is important that that report leaked?

Sitrinowitz: Because I think it shows that, when looking at the Israeli decision making process, that the ministers and the prime minister is getting an objective point of view regarding the things that's happening in Iran, and especially regarding the Iranian nuclear activity. And I think it's extremely important because, you know, I think that these generals, like they are doing so, need to be professional in so many ways, making sure that even if they are against what we call the current, they can speak their mind. I think it's extremely important that he said that. And looking into the future, I think it really shows that the decision making process in Israel is really objective in so many ways and looking at the details and facts and not politicizing the Iranian issue also in the decision making process. So in that regard, I really was very pleased to read those leaks coming from the cabinet meeting.

Rosen: And as we were discussing at the top, I've noticed that since maybe October, November, we've seen more prominent former cabinet chiefs in Israel, like Ya'alon, who was not a fan of the deal, criticizing the US leaving it or the decision making behind it. Why is that coming out now?

Sitrinowitz: I think it's a combination of a couple of things. First, Bibi is not anymore a prime minister, and I think it was extremely important because for the politicians, it was very hard because if you are supportive of any deal, then it's easy to describe you as, like I mentioned, like the new Neville Chamberlain. So the fact that Netanyahu is not there anymore, I think it became easier for people to say what they have in mind, we're talking about the politicians. The other thing, I think, that we saw the devastating effect of leaving the JCPOA, and what we are facing right now, and how Israel is really being challenged right now. Okay, let's assume that we want to stop Iran's nuclear advancement in the nuclear route. How are we going to do that? So that's, I think, the combination of two really pushed a lot of seniors that served, even after, under Netanyahu, to speak their mind. I think it's extremely important because I think it also has an influence on the decision making process right now. And I think that the fact that Ya'alon is saying that, and other signals are saying that, I think it's really giving some sort of a backwind for those who really think that returning back to the JCPOA is not that bad. Although it's not the best, ultimate solution, but I think given the other options that we have, I think it's the best that we can find right now.

Rosen: We've seen in recent months the Saudis talking with the Iranians in Iraq, the Emirati national security adviser traveled to Iran. We've seen some of Israel's Gulf Arab allies trying to manage their relationship with Iran through diplomacy, among other means. Do you see prospects for Iran and Israel ever to have less fraught relations?

Sitrinowitz: Well, I think in general terms, we have to remember that before 1979, of course, we were best partners, and we had an embassy in Tehran, and El Al used to fly direct between Tel Aviv and Tehran. And I think in that regard, when you're looking objectively on the map, I think that us and the Shiites are the minorities in the sphere of the Middle East. So I think basically it's, and of course, I think that we've seen a lot of similarities between us and the Iranians. So for the positive side, I think looking into the far future, yes, I think so. But looking, of course, to the, let's say, the short term and the medium term, as long as the Islamic revolution is there, I don't see things that can develop. But I think that it is extremely important to Israel to have some sort of line of communication with the Iranian regime. Like, of course, the US has with the Switzerland embassy or through mediators coming from the Gulf like Oman or the UAE. Again, I'm not talking about diplomatic, of course, it's not relevant. But I think that the discourse between Israel and Iran has to be not only by kinetic means. I think if you want to avoid a war, escalation to war, that could happen. I think that we have to see how we can transfer some sort of messaging back and forth to the Iranian leadership. And I think it's extremely important to avoid escalation, but looking into the near future, no connection whatsoever. Far future, after the days of the Islamic revolution, I think that there is a good prospect for Israeli Iranian relations.

Rosen: Thank you so much. It was fascinating. I deeply appreciate it.

Sitrinowitz: Thank you. Thank you very much for inviting me, Laura. It was really fascinating. I really enjoyed our conversation.

ANALYSIS WITH SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE

Rosen: I think he worries more broadly that, you know, there was a real opening for moderates in Iran, and he thinks that more hardline forces are becoming more prominent in Iran.

Dearlove: Yeah. I was fascinated, and I think one of the characteristics of Israel, and they were seen as reasonable and possibly portrayed a different attitude, but I mean Iran has been very very clever at having a public face, but in practice when you look closely at the policy, even though these guys, the so called moderates, said one thing, Iran always did another thing.

Rosen: So I'm quite intrigued by Danny's theory that there was an opening. So maybe moderate is the wrong word to use in terms of let's say US interests, and you can speak for your own country, but in terms of being able to make a deal with Iran and they would stick to the deal, I think Iran stuck to the nuclear deal that was struck, and it was the United States that reneged. And so, yes, you know, it was Iran's human rights record, you know, terrorism, and there are a lot of issues, you know, that were not covered by the Iran nuclear deal. But I think on this proposition, Iran, you know, implemented it. The IAEA said so for three years every quarter, and it didn't start to renege on the agreement until a year after Trump yanked the US out of it and reimposed sanctions.

Dearlove: Yeah, but I think the problem with Iran is it signs up to the nuclear deal, more or less respects it, I'm not convinced that it fully respected it, but at the same time it took this agreement as a green light really to cause absolute havoc and mayhem across the whole of the Middle East, as if you know we'd sort of let them off the hook. I mean I put a letter here that someone interestingly wrote to the Financial Times which I pulled out. Innate suspicion of Iranian motives was amplified at the conclusion of the agreement when Iran conducted multiple ballistic missile tests, fired rockets close to American warships in international waters, constructed new missile bunkers, specifically rejected conferring with America on any other issue, adopted an intransigent posture with respect to a full accounting of past nuclear research, detained American sailors, harassed ships in the Gulf, dispatched agents to Germany in search of nuclear technology, all of the while fomenting terror and turmoil throughout the Middle East, and I don't think there's anything in there which you can argue with.

Rosen: Well, no, let me argue a little bit. I mean, so I need to go back in the timeline, but for instance, there were these IED attacks in Iraq, and after Rouhani came into office in 2013, those ended. And then you see, and they didn't get worse with the signing of the Iran nuclear deal. So I think there is a propaganda campaign and to try to say what got worse and not before and after the signing of it. And I don't think Iran's, the troubling nature of Iran's behavior in the region was something that existed before the Iran nuclear agreement and continued afterwards. It certainly wasn't improved by the US pulling out of the deal.

Dearlove: Well no, I mean I'm not being totally negative. I mean there was no other option on the table at the time that the JCPOA was signed. I mean that would seem to be the only route for slowing down Iran's nuclear program, but I mean I think overall given my pretty long experience of dealing with Iran, I mean bearing in mind that the UK had diplomatic relations with Iran and had dealings with them for much longer than the US did during my time in office, that you know they say one thing and they do another.

Rosen: In terms of objective measurements, something's been lost with Iran exceeding the limits of the deal because a major party has...

Dearlove: I'm open minded and you know I would be willing to, you know, I wouldn't say be persuaded by Danny's views, but I would be willing to say that you know they have some validity. But I mean on the other hand, you have you know this extraordinary series of events with Qasem Soleimani, you know, and the IRGC behind it, and I mean they have, as it were, dispensed chaos across the Middle East by fighting what I would call distance warfare through proxies. So you know they've been operative in Lebanon, they've been operative in Syria, certainly the Houthis would not be sustaining their struggle if it weren't for solid Iranian backing. I mean I think the one thing that Danny says which is absolutely correct is that you know we need a dialogue with the Iranian regime, that I do not dispute, and clearly I mean Oman has played an important role, particularly in relation to Yemen and the Houthis because of its own involvement in that region. But so I mean I'm left pretty uncomfortable by the idea that somehow Rouhani was a more reasonable individual. I'm really not so sure about that, of course in a way it's irrelevant now because we've got this character Raisi, and I mean Raisi looks like you know the worst kind of Iranian hardliner, and of course his track record as an earlier prosecutor is pretty lethal.

Rosen: Yes yes, and he's much more in the mold of Khamenei, the supreme leader, who seems to be not going to make the mistake again of having an Iranian president who is promoting engagement with the West. I will say one of the interesting things, having, I know you have much longer experience with Iran from your work, but having covered the Iran nuclear deal negotiations a lot from 2012 through now, what was really interesting is seeing all the Iranian media who came to the talks and including state media and journalists. And, you know, partly, it wasn't just about the Iranian government. It was about the Iranian people. And I think there was a desire by a lot of Iranian people to just have more normal relationships with the West. And I felt like they were counting on Zarif, the foreign minister, and Rouhani to sort of give them that, to help normalize Iranian relationships with the West a little bit. And that's what the failure of the JCPOA represents for them.

Dearlove: Yeah I think you certainly have a point, and I think that you know there are vast swathes of the Iranian population who do not want you know theocratic isolation from the rest of the world, which is what the Iranian people have suffered, and you know they would like to live in more normalized circumstances. And I mean there's no question that Zarif in particular you know came across as a sensible and reasonably balanced and open minded, but I think the problem has been that each time you've seen a step in this direction by Iran, you know it's been countermanded pretty rapidly either by their actions or by some event which really points to the ultimate supremacy of the Guardian Council, and the fact that you know it's just stuffed with people nominated by Khamenei, you know who are all clerics or judicial figures, that they're all cut from the same cloth. I mean, the other thing I was fascinated by Danny saying in his discussion, and I think I agree with this to an extent, that you know it is pretty naive to think that somehow, you know, we can change Iranian politics from the outside.

Rosen: Well that was the real thing is, you know, would maximum pressure eventually trigger an Iranian revolution. And maybe, I've talked to diplomats over there who discussed the protests and we saw last year, but it's not a sure thing.

Dearlove: Oh certainly not a sure thing, and of course you know the regime has had years to build you know a Praetorian Guard in terms of the IRGC, more than that they've got these sort of militia biker gangs you know, who can be wheeled out onto the streets you know when there's civil disorder. But there's no question I think, that you know Iran politically is a pretty tense place, and the stuff going on that we probably don't hear about, particularly in provincial cities, you know, because the life of the average Iranian under this regime is pretty unpleasant and difficult. At the moment, well given the rise in oil prices and the rise in gas prices, you know some of the pressure's probably come off the regime at the moment, because you know financially Iran must be doing a bit better, and of course you know because of its relationship with Russia, but China in particular, you know the effect of sanctions really isn't thorough, I mean it doesn't cross the whole of the economy.

Rosen: No, they seem to think that they can survive it for sure, and you saw as we're speaking that the new Iranian president was meeting with Putin this week in Russia. As you mentioned, they're trying to cleave closer to Russia, and we saw the Iranian foreign minister visit China last week. And so they're definitely demonstrating as negotiators meet in Vienna that, you know, they have an alliance with Russia and China and are leaning away from Europe and the United States.

Dearlove: And, you know, that's been sort of characteristic, the sort of aspect of Iranian policy, the relationship with Russia, but I mean the newer one which they pay much more attention to, you know, as China has gotten to a more confrontational position with the West generally, and I mean that's, you know, we've almost pushed the Iranians into the arms of the Chinese, and clearly you know they're massive purchasers of Iranian gas and Iranian oil of course. I mean my own view I think is that you know the crisis between Saudi Arabia and Iran is yet to come. I mean in a way what's surprising is that apart from those missile attacks on US bases and things, there hasn't really been what I would consider a thorough Iranian response to the killing of Qasem Soleimani. I mean that too for them was a major loss, because he was an absolutely key figure in the regime, and possibly probably could have supplanted Khamenei when Khamenei eventually dies. I mean he's getting, I don't know what aged Khamenei is now, but I still think that one is sitting on a powder keg really in terms of what may or could happen. And this recent Houthi attack on the UAE is pretty shocking, and you've seen a repost. I saw something on my internet just a few minutes ago saying that the Saudis had knocked out the Yemeni internet.

Rosen: Yeah I saw that.

Dearlove: Which I mean this shows that you know we're on the point of another escalation probably, and you know will that be confined to Yemen or will it spread further afield? I mean the signs are it is going to spread further afield.

Rosen: One of the interesting things we saw after Trump left and Biden came in, maybe that's too US centric, but we saw that Iran and Saudi Arabia have been meeting in Iraq. And among the different ways they're trying to manage their relationship is through diplomacy, and the Saudis have said they've not been that substantive or substantively successful, but that engagement has been happening. And a few weeks ago, we saw the UAE National Security Adviser go to Iran.

Dearlove: Yeah, well I mean I think that both sides realize you know that they are at risk of you know a major conflict in the Middle East between Sunni and Shia Islam, and you know there have been intermediaries, there have been quite extensive exchanges, and certainly the previous Sultan of Oman, Qaboos, was heavily in a sort of going between the two parties, and my understanding is that the current, the new Sultan, who I don't know, I did know Qaboos quite well, you know is continuing to play the same role. So there's certainly some of these. Keep talking, and I mean in a way Danny makes that point very clearly, and certainly if I was in their shoes, I would be trying to talk to the Iranians. You know, just as the UK tried to talk to the Iranians, you know, before the JCPOA, whilst we had diplomatic relations, you know, there wasn't a total breakdown in the relationship, and there are still exchanges.

Rosen: Yeah, I saw the Iranian foreign minister went to Oman before he went to Qatar and China last week, so it seems like there's some challenges.

Dearlove: On the whole, I mean I was not happy with the JCPOA, but on the other hand it's very hard as it were to see what the alternative might or could have been. Anyway with Iran I think of the present regime they're a recalcitrant bunch, and I don't, I mean we keep talking, but I you know I don't see much progress at the moment back into the JCPOA. But I mean I do think at some point ahead, but this isn't the policy, it's you know just a general prediction, there will be some sort of political upheaval in Iran. The place is fragile, socially fragile, and you know last year one saw, there clearly was some pretty serious social breakdown in some Iranian cities. And I bet you each morning the leadership wake up and they have reports on things going wrong, and they're you know they're sitting on a powder keg. They've got a very efficient mechanism for repression of the country, but you know at some point it'll fall apart. When?

Rosen: That very well may be, but I could see the nuclear agreement being as a way to essentially manage, prevent the need for a war between the West and Iran until whatever happens with their own internal thing. And I agree with Danny, and I think you said you do as well, that the West trying to sort of choreograph internal upheaval in Iran is beyond its, you know...

Dearlove: Well I mean it's never going to happen, and I mean the other thing one should recognize, you know, if there were a different Iranian regime, even if it was well disposed towards the West, it might still want a nuclear program.

Rosen: Exactly, right. There's a lot of continuity from the Shah's program.

Dearlove: So I think this issue of Iranian identity, Iranian pride in their nationhood. We should be cautious in terms of what we might expect from a different type of regime.

Rosen: Agree.

Dearlove: Well it was good fun talking to you.

Rosen: It was great to talk with you, it was an honor. That's it for this episode of One Decision. I'm Laura Rosen. Don't forget to subscribe so you never miss an episode. And get in touch. What decisions have impacted your lives and your part of the world? Find us on Twitter. Our handle is at one decision pod, and we're on Facebook at one decision podcast. See you next time.