Hosted by Christina Ruffini and Sir Richard Dearlove
Guest
Episode Summary
In this week’s One Decision In Brief, hosts Kate McCann and former MI6 Chief Sir Richard Dearlove unpack President Donald Trump’s Middle East peace deal—what it means for Israel, Hamas, and the shifting balance of power across the region. They assess Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s precarious position at home, the risk of a new extremist movement, and whether Arab states can enforce a fragile truce and fund Gaza’s reconstruction.
Episode produced by Situation Room Studios. Original music composed and produced by Leo Sidran.
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Transcript
INTRODUCTION
Mccann: Hello and welcome to One Decision in Brief. I'm Kate McCann and I'm joined today by my co-host Sir Richard Dearlove. Hi Richard.
Dearlove: Hi Kate, how are you?
Mccann: I'm good. It's been a while though since you and I have been here together. I suppose one of the things that both of us have been talking about no matter where we've been, partly because it's been dominating the conversation, is the Middle East peace deal. Some people are calling it Donald Trump's Middle East peace deal, and there's lots of optimism. We've seen the living hostages released, we've seen Palestinian prisoners released, and there is some hope now that there could be a lasting agreement. There's also though some criticism. Benjamin Netanyahu's political situation remains difficult. Donald Trump has suggested that he ought to get a pardon. So Richard, where are you in terms of optimism? How hopeful are you of a realistic deal from here?
ANALYSIS WITH SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE
Dearlove: I think this one's got real momentum behind it, and the reason I think that is because the biggest problem hitherto has been release of hostages. And Hamas are in the middle of, well, they've released all the living hostages. They've now got to repatriate the bodies of those who were killed or died. And there's no question that ceasefire deals of this complexity usually break down because of the detailed arrangements. But having got over the worst hurdle, I've got a feeling that, you know, the other issues are gonna follow in sequence. I think the next big problem is going to be the disarmament of Hamas and what actually happens to the Hamas fighters. I think some of them apparently already being evacuated to Egypt and other Arab countries. But I mean, we haven't got a clear picture of that, and I'm sure you've read in the newspapers that there have been these shootouts already in Gaza between these tribal militia family groups and, you know, Hamas coming back on the street supposedly to ensure some sort of street security. But it strikes me that that is a fragile part of the agreement to date. But so far, it's pretty surprising how far they've got. I think what you have to bear in mind is that the Egyptians and the Saudis are desperate to see Hamas out of the way, so that brings pressure from the Arab side of the equation, and that they would have lent incredibly hard on the Qataris and on the Hamas leadership. And then on the other side of the equation, it's really the fact that, you know, Trump himself has had Netanyahu in a half Nelson, speaking metaphorically, and has managed to force him to accept an agreement, which would have been acceptable, I think, to most of Israel, but not to his extreme right wing who, you know, composed an element in his government.
Mccann: And that, I mean, there are so many things there to pick up on, I suppose. The domestic situation that Benjamin Netanyahu now faces, let's come back to that. But I mean, in terms of securing the actual zone itself, how do you think, with your kind of prior knowledge of international relations, how will that work now? Because, you know, I've spoken to people inside the UK government. The UK wants no part in any work on the ground in terms of ensuring that that region is rebuilt, that the money that's spent goes to the right places, that they don't want an active role on the ground, but someone's going to have to take that. And how do we ensure, how does Israel ensure, how does the world ensure that those Hamas leaders and those Hamas fighters who have been asked to down tools or leave actually do do that? Is there a realistic mechanism for that?
Dearlove: Very good question, and I think this is, you put your finger on the point of weakness going forward. I mean obviously the Palestinian Authority, which would eventually be responsible for the administration of Gaza, is not gonna be happy if it's placed in the hands of some sort of international supervisory body. And it seems, you know, that they're gonna use Tony Blair to run a type of body which will, I guess, then be composed of other technocrats. But you've still got to have some armed muscle on the streets, and the obvious countries to provide that would be Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, in my view, maybe some of the Gulf States as well. But, you know, we've all seen the photographs of Gaza. It's chaotic. And the only thing that one can imagine is that the Saudis will come in with all the money that they have got from, as it were, the last summer of fossil prices, and maybe last summer, you know, they have been awash with cash for a period. And, you know, there'll be some supposed progress towards rebuilding. But I think what one's gonna see is huge prefab tented camps, you know, massive aid effort. And I can't imagine that the rebuilding will, you know, what we're looking at is a decade of reconstruction, aren't we, at least? I mean, it's like Germany after World War Two. It took Germany an awful long time. I mean, with obliterated cities to rebuild them, and it's a problem of similar dimensions.
Mccann: I mean, how, I mean, there's obviously the question of appetite in the region for rebuilding, that's one side of it. The other side is the security aspect for for Israel, and I suppose that is where you do get into that naughty question about the domestic politics here, because, you know, there are elections coming down the track anyway in Israel, and that has long been the case, it's not related to this, but there are questions about people like Smotrich and Ben-Gvir inside the cabinet of Netanyahu who are deeply, deeply unhappy, and others who are pushing publicly for Netanyahu to guarantee if security is threatened, he will relaunch the war, which is clearly at odds with the promise that he's made to Donald Trump, who as you say has had him over a barrel. What likelihood that Benjamin Netanyahu can carry on? Is he really the only one who can, or is he in a very weak position now?
Dearlove: Well, I think he's in a strong position internationally because of what's happened, but he's in a weak position domestically because of the complexity of Israeli politics. And, you know, in a way, you can look in his direction and say, you know, because of this strange conjunction of circumstance, you know, his intransigence has been instrumental in changing the politics of the Middle East, which, of course, is massively in favor of the Sunni Arab states because, basically, what they've done is taken down Iran's axis of resistance. And, you know, Iran as a power has been shown to be rather hollow. So that's a really important aspect. You can't just look at the bits individually. But on the other hand, I think that he, because a lot of Israelis blame him for October 7, and his neglect of the security issue vis-à-vis Hamas and Gaza, and I would have thought there's a very fair chance that he won't win another election, that you would have a more moderate government with a different composition, which of course would be for the benefit of a more general settlement. But what we must be hoping for that comes out of this is some sort of survival of the Abraham Accords. That now looks quite optimistic in terms of the ceasefire agreement, and there is this succession issue in Iran. And I think my prediction now is that when the supreme leader dies or is incapacitated, and he's very old.
Mccann: I was gonna say, we're not far off that point, are we?
Dearlove: No. We're not far off. And I think, you know, I think what might trigger a political change in Iran, in favor of these events so that Iran is not the problem it's been in the past, is possibly how the succession issue plays out because it will trigger all sorts of movement politically inside the country, which at the moment is in a state of sort of continued shock.
Mccann: What is the attraction for Iran of coming back into the fold? Because there will be an opportunity for Iran to make a change in its direction of travel, as you say, after the death of the supreme leader, which is not, you know, it's not unlikely to happen in the next couple of years, I suppose. What do you think is the incentive for Iran?
Dearlove: Well, the obvious immediate one is the lifting of sanctions and, you know, an economy which starts to reintegrate with the West. I mean, let's face it, Iran historically is an important Middle Eastern player, and a less confrontational relationship with the Sunni Arab states and in particular with the West. And let's say a move away from its alliance, which in my view is unnatural, with Russia, China, and North Korea, so that it, you know, it becomes a more normal player. I mean, those of us who are sort of historically acquainted with the Middle East over the last fifty to sixty years, I mean, the Middle East worked better, although, you know, it's a peculiar political creation where the borders are drawn, when Iran and Saudi Arabia had good working relations with the West. And I think that that is a prize which would be sort of cherished by the West. But it's also, for many Iranians, is what they, I think, would wish to happen. They're highly educated. They're potentially quite westernized, and I think you could say that the theocracy has been something of a recent, you know, aberration in the aspiration of Iran's population.
Mccann: But I guess that's the problem, isn't it? Because the way that that leadership has operated is suppression and, you know, not allowing women freedom, not allowing people to wear what they want, and we've seen rising up against that over the last couple of years and repression again. So, yeah, it's that balance, isn't it? But it's a fascinating aspect to this because Iran is a huge part of what happens next with Hamas in terms of sponsorship and leadership and questions about literally where Hamas goes. There are some people who are concerned about regrouping. You know, if you move all of the leaders out of Gaza, you move them somewhere else, so is there a likelihood they just regroup?
Dearlove: Well, I think that's the problem, and you know, you could say, will a new extremist movement grow out of what has happened in Gaza, whether it's, you know, Hamas Mark Two, a new generation of radicals who, you know, are gonna devote themselves to violence against the West, violence against Israel in particular. And, you know, there must be a real risk of that when you see what's happened. And, you know, how do you prevent that? How do you stop that? And that's what the Arab leaderships, the Sunni leadership themselves, they'll be terrified of that possibility. So how they deal, I mean, they can't stand back and do nothing. I think they've got to get more involved themselves. And one of the ways to do that is to have a rapid and generous plan for the rebuilding of Gaza. But the only country that can afford that are the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. The Egyptians can't, nor can Jordan.
Mccann: You know, one of the questions, and it's sort of an irrelevance really, it feels a bit of an irrelevance in this conversation. One of the questions that people here in the UK have is what role for our Prime Minister? What role for the UK? You know, is there a convening role? Is there a sort of a helpful leadership role that the UK can play, and look, Tony Blair as part of this conversation? But does it shift the power balance away from the UK for sure, away from Europe, and again towards the US but also those players that you've already mentioned?
Dearlove: Yeah, that's a good question. I mean, I think that obviously for the UK we're becoming less consequential in the region, although you know we're respected because of professionalism and aspects of diplomacy and our knowledge of the past and our involvement in the past. But, I mean, you could make the same argument about France, which has been an influential player. And I wouldn't count out Europe completely. I think Europe will have an important role to play because of its closeness geographically and because of its economic weight. And to an extent, if it can get its act together, its political weight. I think part of the problem is the EU has not been able to act as a consistent unit with a single foreign policy towards the Middle East, but that could change thanks to the impetus that Trump has given to a settlement. But, I mean, clearly, the major players still are gonna be massively the Americans. And, of course, whatever's happened inside the Middle East, I mean, what has emerged is the raw military power of Israel and the fact that, you know, you can't muck around with Israel, and that if you try to do so, the retribution that's gonna be landed on you is going to be extreme. You know, this is what we've seen. This is what happened. I mean, if Hamas ever made a miscalculation, it was October 7. Look what they've brought down on the Palestinian people as a consequence. And look what they've brought down on Syria. I mean, you know, the Syrian regime has collapsed. It's quite extraordinary what's happened.
Mccann: Well, it's definitely something that we will come back to cover on this podcast. So, Richard, it's been great speaking to you.
Dearlove: Great, Kate. Love talking to you, and we've covered, I think, a really important topic today.
Mccann: Yeah. I agree. And plenty more to come, of course, from One Decision. You can find all of our episodes, previous and the ones to come, wherever you get your podcasts from or on our YouTube channel. And we will be back later on this week with a new episode for you.
