Episode Info
- Season16
- Episode3
Hosted by Christina Ruffini and Sir Richard Dearlove
Guests
Jendayi E. Frazier
Jendayi E. Frazier is a former United States Ambassador to South Africa discussing emerging challenges from Moscow and Beijing's engagement with African nations.
John Simon
John Simon is a former Ambassador to the African Union discussing emerging challenges from Moscow and Beijing's engagement with African nations.
Bobby J. Pittman
Bobby J. Pittman is a former Senior Director for African Affairs in the White House discussing the Biden administration's race to reinvigorate America's standing with the African continent.
Episode Summary
In recent months the Biden administration has put a concerted effort into wooing the African continent. It’s not a moment too soon, because China is busy forging ties and building infrastructure across African countries - with a growing number of African economies, such as Ghana’s, becoming increasingly dependent on the Chinese to bail out their debt. Russia has also been busy, deploying Wagner mercenaries across countries in Africa, where they are making a fortune out of the bountiful resources and minerals that African nations like the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Central African Republic have to offer. One Decision's Julia Macfarlane leads a roundtable of three veteran White House specialists on Africa, Jendayi E. Frazier, former United States Ambassador to South Africa, John Simon, former Ambassador to the African Union, and Bobby J. Pittman, former Senior Director for African Affairs in the White House. They discuss the emerging challenge from Moscow and Beijing's engagement with the aim of displacing Western interests, the damage to relations after former President Donald Trump reportedly used the word "shithole" to describe African countries, and the Biden administration's race to reinvigorate America’s standing with the African continent and boost investment.
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Transcript
COLD OPEN
Mcfarlane: You are listening to One Decision. I'm your host, Julia McFarlane. NEWS CLIP [0:04] Remember this. President Trump deriding immigrants from Haiti and some nations in Africa, asking a group of lawmakers, why are we having all these people from shithole countries come here? The United States hasn't always had what you might describe as a successful engagement with Africa.
INTRODUCTION
Mcfarlane: The vast diverse continent can often be treated as a single entity. But with some of the youngest and most dynamic populations on Earth coupled with its bountiful resources, there are big reasons for prioritizing engagement with Africa. It's something that has definitely occurred to those in the corridors of power in both Beijing and Moscow. Chinese engagement on the continent was put into top gear with the unveiling of Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese leader's flagship global infrastructure plan aimed at boosting global connectivity and Chinese soft power abroad. Meanwhile, Russia has been busy deploying its mercenaries across Africa, building ties with many of its governments, and in some cases, displacing Western influence entirely, such as is the case in Mali and the Central African Republic. Recently, the Biden administration has seemingly recognized the need to recharge and reinvigorate America's standing with Africa. Just last year at a summit in Washington, the president declared that the US is now all in on Africa's future and announced a package worth tens of billions of dollars in investment. NEWS CLIP [1:36] My administration engagement with Africa and the priority we placed on these relationships began on day one.
Mcfarlane: We've been working steadily with regional diplomacy and investments to demonstrate our commitment. We wanted to take a look at these efforts, and we've enlisted three veteran US government specialists on Africa who all worked for the Bush administration. Our discussion today follows on from our recent chat with President Bush's national security adviser, Stephen Hadley, whose latest book reveals declassified foreign policy memos and analysis that was handed off to Obama's incoming administration back in 2009. Our three guests this week, former ambassador to South Africa, Jendayi Frazer, the former White House director of African affairs, Bobby Pittman, and the former US ambassador to the African Union, John Simon, all contributed to a chapter of Hadley's book, Handoff, looking at US policy on Africa. We sat down with them to discuss how even in the dying days of the Bush administration, there were already signs that a canny China was moving in and starting to sow the seeds of engagement in Africa with the aim of displacing Western interests.
INTERVIEW
Mcfarlane: So I guess I wanted to start off this discussion with a few timely developments. We have Vice President Kamala Harris has been on a nine day trip to Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia on a charm offensive to try and woo the continent away from China. President Biden is expected to visit Africa later this year. Tony Blinken was in Ethiopia, South Africa, the DRC, Rwanda last August. There was also that US Africa Leaders Summit in Washington last December where President Biden said that the US was all in on Africa's future. The US is really on a bit of a back foot, is it not? I mean, Biden may claim that the US is all in on Africa, but so are Russia and China. I mean, Tony Blinken's visit last year took place just days after the Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov visited several nations in Africa aimed at expanding the Russian president's presence on the continent and trying to drum up support for Putin's war in Ukraine. And just recently in Moscow, there was this gathering of more than 40 lawmakers from African countries. Putin said that he was going to continue to supply them with grain. That's been a huge priority for them despite the grain supply being disrupted by the Ukraine war. But then the Ghanaian finance minister has also just been in China negotiating in Beijing, trying to restructure Ghana's debt. So I just wanted to start this conversation by asking what you think is driving the Biden administration's interest. Is it trying to play catch up with Putin and Xi Jinping? Is it because we've all woken up and realized that we need Africa's rare earth minerals for all of our electronic devices? Or is it because the war in Ukraine has shown us that the West's sphere of influence is actually a lot smaller globally than we all previously realized, having been largely unsuccessful in bringing much of the global South to the cause of Ukraine fighting back against Putin, or is it frankly just a case of the US trying to play catch up with Putin and Xi Jinping?
Frazer: Well, this is Jendayi Frazer, and I'm sure that we all probably have different perspectives on this. My perspective is that in many ways, the United States or the Biden administration is, in fact, just continuing having Africa engagement like previous administrations with the exception of the Trump administration. And so I think that during that period of time of President Trump, there was a retrenchment of US engagement in Africa, but that doesn't reflect historically how we've engaged. And so it may seem like there's a significant increase of engagement of the Biden administration, but it's just getting us back to where we used to be, what is our tradition of engagement in Africa. That said, of course, there is this sense to which during that period of time, and even before administration as well, the Chinese have significantly increased their engagement, particularly from the change between Hu Jintao, who saw Africa primarily as an area for raw materials, minerals, and a market to export. So they needed Africa's raw materials to fuel their economy, and they needed some place to dump their exports. Whereas Xi Jinping has a very different perspective and much more ambitious global or much more ambitious go global aspirations that include trying to create alignments to change the sort of global system that was a system that was established after World War Two.
Mcfarlane: Do you think there is some sort of residual resentment from a lot of countries in Africa from the time of European colonialism. And perhaps maybe that's why it was that there was this window for Chinese investment. I mean, I think it's really interesting because they present themselves as a very different partner to African countries. Through the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the US has historically given out billions and billions of dollars of grants to African nations to build on their infrastructure and to promote democracy. But China, China historically gives out loans, not grants, and loans which many have said have ended up being predatory and debt ridden. And you point out that Africa is a means to an end for the Chinese. And even, you know, many people say Chinese loans have in fact contributed to countries like Zambia and Ghana's current economic woes. I think Janet Yellen was in Africa in January this year, and that was something that she pointed out. In 2020, the World Bank deemed half a dozen African countries to be in debt distress or at risk of debt distress largely related to the scale of Chinese lending. Why do we then see things like the Ghanaian finance minister heading to Beijing to seek out help on restructuring debt? Why do we see a lot of African countries phasing out partnerships with the West? There is the military partnership that Mali, they kicked out the French troops that were stationed in that country. Why are we seeing a lot of moving away from the West and turning to Russia and China?
Simon: So this is John Simon. I don't think you see predominantly African countries turning away from the West and particularly from the United States. I do think African leaders are very practical. They need capital to build roads, to build ports, to generate their economy. And when China was in the market offering to finance a whole lot of those things with these loans, African leaders took advantage of that. Unfortunately, because of various exogenous impacts, including COVID, obviously, the run up in the dollar, as our Federal Reserve tries to fight inflation, which has resulted in many African currencies themselves depreciating and then having negative turns of trade. There are, as you point out, several African countries, particularly Ghana, are in serious debt distress. And so practically, they need to go where the money is. And in the case of Ghana, a lot of that money is in China to find some solution. But I think I don't think it's the case that African acceptance of Chinese loans and Chinese largesse through the Belt and Road Initiative was a turning away from either America or the West. I think aspirationally, African governments still aspire, and African people in particular still aspire to have countries that look a lot more like Western democracies than a Chinese dictatorship. But they also look to leverage the opportunities that are on offer. And China has been very forthcoming with opportunities through its Belt and Road Initiative.
Pittman: This is Bobby Pittman. On your initial framing, I might even just quibble a little bit in the sense of, well, two components. One is I think the grouping of China and Russia is always a challenge. I mean, Jendayi made the point on the strategic vantage of China, to John's point, I think that's often very much welcomed on the receiving side. Whereas I think Russia is much more opportunistic and sometimes trouble making intentionally so, which I think is like a fundamentally different strategy. I mean, we might be somewhat at times at odds of either, but I think it's quite different. I think the truth is, I mean, you mentioned the kind of the colonial backdrop. I mean, in my opinion and experience, I think we do still many Western countries and partners still do have a tone issue that's less about the legacy in terms of African governments thinking about the legacy and more about the continued tone, and I do think it's welcome to take a more strategic approach. I think Chinese companies and the Chinese government are taking a very strategic view in all their interactions. And I think sometimes that that legacy and kind of a pejorative tone from certain Western elements does not help in that approach. And I think to Jendayi's point, we've had some ebb and flow, but mostly from the US perspective, there's been a lot of continuity. I would argue that the ebb and flow is sometimes that intensity of a strategic lens. And when we have a less strategic lens on the continent, I think we're in a weaker position in terms of those diplomatic relations.
Simon: I, to Bobby's point about the difference between China and Russia. I mean, China is the largest trading partner of most African countries these days. China does have a very strong presence of its corporations like Huawei on the continent. Russia basically brings the Wagner Group. And so, you know, there's not much other interaction that you see besides that on the part of Russia. So I think it is a fundamentally different approach. That's a really, really important thing to note.
Mcfarlane: I just wanna go back because Bobby mentioned the issue of tone, which I think is really, really important. There was a memo written by you, Bobby, in this chapter in Stephen Hadley's book, Handoff, the foreign policy George W. Bush handed to President Barack Obama. And it is a memo from 2009. It's primarily about US conflict strategy. But there were some things that really took my notice. It says Africa conflict strategy during the previous administration largely focused on addressing humanitarian needs. The previous administration was constrained by limited budgetary resources and attention by senior policymakers. I mean, there's a few questions that arise from that memo, which did go on to talk about how a significant percentage of African aid was focused on humanitarian issues. That memo was written in fairly neutral terms, but there's a hint at what your thoughts might be there, Bobby, about some of the issues of US policy re Africa. And that is that you're looking at this hugely vast, diverse continent through largely the prism of humanitarian aid. And that senior policymakers gave it, in your words, limited attention, perhaps because of that. Am I misinterpreting your words by sort of thinking that what you appeared to be saying is that America was, at least back then, looking at Africa like a charity case and policy on Africa translating mostly into aid, which was really providing a sticking plaster to some of the issues holding various nations back. I mean, was it inevitable that the framing of this entire continent led to a vacuum or perhaps an opportunity for a player like China to come along? Viewing Africa not as a charity case, you know, worth only to give scraps from the table, but as potentially a partner that could provide China with things that they need. And there was an inherent value. Dozens of different nations with valuable resources, both in terms of minerals and materials, but young and vibrant populations, decades younger than many other parts of the world. How important is that tone and that framing for holding back working with Africa and changing the framing of partnerships with African nations?
Pittman: Thanks, Julia. I mean, one thing I would say upfront is, obviously, we talk about the African continent, it's, as we all know, it's quite dynamic, there's quite a lot of variance. And I also think we have to be honest about change over time in terms of those dynamics as well. I mean, I think I wrote that memo or it was part of, my name gets on it in 2008, you know, and everyone on this as part of this group was, you know, at least as much as me, if not more involved in the policy. I think one of the things really to what we were really trying to signal at that time to an inbound administration in the Obama team was really that tone and engagement that really was set by President Bush. I mean, President Bush, even on the campaign trail, had really signaled that he was not gonna dictate to African partners what their growth strategy was gonna be or what their approach was gonna be. Right? He was gonna listen. He was gonna engage. Most people know that, you know, more African leaders were hosted in the Oval Office in those first few years of the Bush administration than any administration in history from a US side. That engagement really set a tone for all these other details that we talk about, including just the learning you get from that engagement, right? When you have those kinds of discussions, you learn things from your partners in terms of what their priorities are. I also think you get a very different tone in terms of what's possible.
Mcfarlane: Would you also say the Obama administration a disappointment then in that sense that perhaps, you know, they didn't match that level of engagement given that it was America's first African American president?
Pittman: I think, again, I think all these things are very challenging because there's a lot of moving pieces. But, certainly, I don't think any administration has matched the engagement of President Bush personally and the tone he set for his team. Because, again, it trickles down. Right? Then you get cabinet secretaries and others who follow the president's lead. Again, there's a lot of different reasons that that can happen, but, certainly, President Bush led with that, and many of us were really excited to be a part of that effort. I think from in my opinion, when the Obama team came in, there were some other issues they were focused on early on. I would say, you know, or kind of at the end of President Obama's first term and the beginning of the second term, he really had the stepping up of his engagement. You had that first White House Africa summit, which I think was at a very high level. And President Obama set that tone. And, you know, what's interesting in that example is not just did he lead, you know, cabinet secretaries, but because of President Obama's unique brand, he was able to bring a lot of corporate America into the room, into those discussions in a different way. So I think for him, he also had that success. It wasn't as early on. It was a little later, but I think that personal engagement by the president themselves really just has a big impact on the policy overall.
Mcfarlane: Jendayi, you mentioned earlier that there was a bit of an issue with the Trump administration, which perhaps interrupted a lot of US policy and a lot of diplomatic sort of workings and partnerships with a lot of countries on the African continent. President Trump said some not very nice things about African nations during his time as president. What damage did that do America's standing on the continent? You previously served as the US ambassador to South Africa. From your understanding and your experience and your contacts with a lot of people on the continent, what were you hearing when President Trump was saying these things on the global stage?
Frazer: Yeah. I think that when President Trump came in, there was a lot of expectation and hope, you know, because Republican administrations in the past had been fairly strategic in their approach to Africa. And so I think that there was this expectation that that would be the case again. But President Trump, and if you look at the national security strategy under that time, the only country that's mentioned other than the United States in the Africa section is China. And so the fact of the matter is the administration signaled very, very early on that their interest in Africa was China. There was sort of an inherent interest about the maintenance or the continuation of US Africa engagement independent of other countries. And so I think that was a big letdown and a disappointment to them. You know, African leaders are, they've been in tough situations. Somebody calling them names is not going to necessarily change how they would want to engage with that country. The fact that President Trump said the things that he said, yeah, you know, that doesn't really matter too much in terms of state to state relations. What mattered more was at the beginning of his administration when he decided to put his ban on Muslim countries immigrating into the country. The majority of those countries actually were African countries. That's what matters, you know, to these countries, not sort of, you know, some bad words that he said about them. The fact that he never actually traveled there. He had very few meetings as well. I think he met with the president of Kenya. He met with the president of Nigeria in the Oval Office, but I don't think any other presidents really during his four years. And so, he just completely failed to engage. He completely failed to understand the history and the legacy of US Africa engagement, you know, from every administration. And that was the problem, really.
Mcfarlane: I mean, I think it's such a cogent point about Trump's interest in Africa really being through his lens of how he views China as a competitive threat. There is national security angles to Africa when it comes to China. There's a section in Hadley's book that points out in 2017, China acquired military basing rights near the US naval expeditionary base in Djibouti. China's growing dominance in Africa's telecommunication infrastructure poses a counterintelligence threat to the United States and to other African countries. African countries that make up more than a quarter of UN member states now regularly vote in line with China's political agenda. So there's two things. There's national security and then there's also geopolitics. What are the national security implications of growing Chinese influence on the African continent? And is a risk that growing awareness of the negative aspects of dealing with China, its debt trap diplomacy and all the dodgy, the predatory loans, is growing awareness of that on the African continent, is that enough to help African nations, you know, wake up to the realities of dealing with China? And also what can the US do about these implications?
Simon: I think we should not exaggerate the Chinese influence on the African continent. As I pointed out, their trade numbers are up. Their investment numbers are up. There's a lot that they're doing on the continent, but I don't think that necessarily, you know, African leaders or African people, you know, equate all that to necessarily wanting to follow the Chinese model or align themselves with China every instance. I do think in many instances, you will see African countries pushing back against Chinese desires in those countries, whether that's desires for concessions for minerals or whether that's desires for them to have more Chinese citizens employed in those countries or whether that's desires for countries to utilize their platforms versus platforms for other places. Like, as I said, African leaders are very practical. When there's an opportunity to take advantage of an offer that's on the table, they're gonna take advantage of it. But I don't think, you know, they're fooled at all that China is in some way a substitute for good relations with the United States or for other countries. And I think the one area where the West and the United States in particular needs to step up relative to China is with commercial engagement. So as I said, China's trade numbers have gone through the roof in Africa. In many instances, African consumers would prefer an American product to a Chinese product, but the American product was not on offer. And that's something where, you know, during the Bush administration, through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, we tried to do a lot more in terms of US engagement in Africa. The Obama administration had an initiative called Prosper Africa that's still around that tried to do that. I think there's a lot that we've tried to do in that area, but there's a lot more that can be done. The one last point I'd actually make though, in terms of the damage that's done from seeing Africa solely through the prism of US Chinese competition, is now when you go to the United States Capitol Hill, politicians will almost always look at approach to Africa as what's this mean vis-a-vis China. And that's not the way to necessarily get the best policy on Africa. There are a whole lot of other interests we have as a country in Africa that have nothing to do with China. And we shouldn't try and stick the whole relationship into this, as Jendayi said, the way the national security strategy of the Trump administration characterized it as solely an issue of our competition with the Chinese.
Frazer: There are strategic lines of communication, though, that we should be concerned about, you know, as China's having more airports and seaports in those areas that, you know, the United States does have to be concerned about our capacity on the communication, transport, overflight, all of those areas. We do need to be concerned about that. And so in many ways, China has gotten a foot up on us over the last few decades.
Pittman: Well, just to build on Jendayi's point, one of the things, I think it's interesting to talk about an Africa strategy that was articulated under the Trump administration that certainly highlighted China more than it highlighted anything in Africa. That said, during that time on the media front, Chinese companies, Chinese government continued to provide much more access to Chinese media and news on the continent than the US was doing. So, you know, one of the things that I think there continues to be a challenge on is that this might be rhetoric on some of these issues and even the importance, but actual sustained work, you know, again, through that strategic lens, you know, in my opinion, you know, you have markets like Lagos, Kinshasa, Addis. These are going to be, they already are some of the largest cities of young consumers in the world. That's only going to get bigger. And in ten years, you wonder, I think John's correct that right now a lot of those consumers prefer US products. I think if their primary news is delivered by CCTV for the next decade, I wonder if it's still gonna be that they primarily prefer American products, and that's something you can't just decide to change in ten years. You know, this is, I think China by and large is taking a much more strategic long term view and executing policies as such. And, you know, certainly, I think the three of us would like to see more of that in the details on a range of fronts with that long term strategic view in mind. And I think to Jendayi's point, I certainly see this especially on the communications and media side. You know, we tend to be regressing and even pulling back on some of those efforts. While I think on the China side and even Russia, there's a lot of focus and build out on the media and communications infrastructure across Africa today, and that will have a long term impact.
Mcfarlane: I think that's such a good point. And an interview that we did on this podcast last year, it was with a journalist called Erich Schwartzel. And on surface level, it was to talk about his book, which on the surface was a book about Chinese influence in Hollywood. But on a deeper level, his book was a book about the importance of soft power and soft power abroad. And there was this fascinating chapter in this book. I don't know if you guys came across this book. And it was so interesting because this was something written not by a geopolitics journalist or a development journalist, but an entertainment journalist writing from an entertainment angle. And he was talking about how China has installed all of these satellites across countries in Africa. Kenya, I think was the main example, which beamed CCTV into a lot of African people's homes, but also had on an array of Chinese movies, Wolf Warrior Two and some of their big blockbusters that they're trying to make into the Chinese version of Captain America. And the Chinese did not have a great amount of success in trying to persuade people in villages, towns, cities across Africa in tuning into Chinese shows, Chinese movies. They have spent decades trying to emulate Hollywood and Hollywood's secret sauce for promoting American propaganda essentially is what Hollywood is, particularly with films like Top Gun, which in this book he argued was essentially propaganda for the US military. Hard to argue with that. They spent decades trying to do the same thing with some of their big blockbusters. And by and large, they didn't really have a huge amount of success. And, you know, part of the difficulty is because Mandarin is a really impossible language to learn. But even with English subtitles, a lot of African people who were receiving these sat dishes across Kenya, across a lot of the countries where they had these initiatives, they weren't really interested in watching these movies. And so there is a really important role that soft power can play. And so I wanted to ask you guys what you think should be done about that. You know, the Voice of America has a strong presence on the African continent. But I have to bring up, and we were talking about this just before we went on as we were all logging on, the fact that the BBC World Service has had to shutter a lot of their African offerings on the continent because of cuts. BBC Afrique, which is a channel for Francophone Africa, has had to close. And that is a huge, surely a huge loss of the promotion of Western values and soft power abroad in the African continent. What should lawmakers in the US, in the UK do about this?
Pittman: I think when you look across the board, on the culture side, certainly the US has had a big advantage on that for a long time, and I certainly would expect Hollywood and the music industry to continue to play its role there. I think on the news side though, it's quite different, I would cite two differences. One, the one you're raising, I think from a resource perspective, we, the Western side, not just in the US but also in Europe, are actively pulling back from a lot of that support. You mentioned Voice of America, you mentioned BBC, while China is doing the opposite. And then I would also say we just have to recognize that from a news content angle, Chinese news is much more proactively positive about the Chinese government. I would argue that Western news is not necessarily positive about the home country that they live in. In fact, sometimes highly critical. So and again, I'm not saying our news should be different than that, but I think we have to recognize that when you're thinking about molding minds and views over time. There is a lot of new research showing the impact of that news battle and how a lot of citizens across the world, not just in Africa, are very impacted by access to Chinese news, very impacted on their view going even back to Jendayi's point about the China model versus a Western model, that their consistent, persistent exposure to Chinese news does change their view on that. And so I do think from a policy angle, we're definitely on our back foot right now from resources and focus on this issue, and China certainly seems to have this as a major priority.
Simon: The one point I was gonna make is Voice of America, BBC, these are things that are extraordinarily cheap at the price in terms of public diplomacy influence. And from my perspective, any sort of public diplomacy strategy needs to presume very strong support for those things. So it is very upsetting to hear about what happened to BBC Afrique. And, certainly, like I say, it's small dollars for very big impact to put your money into those things. I do think your example of China trying to compete with Hollywood points out both the strength and the weakness of the Chinese approach and vis-a-vis the US approach. On the one hand, China can direct its corporations to go into new markets, including Africa, and be present in a way that the US cannot direct its corporations to do. At the end of the day, our corporations have to be responsive to the market. They can't just get a dictate from the White House. You need to sort of expand into Nigeria. You need to expand into Ethiopia. The flip side of that, of course, means that our companies, including Hollywood, including consumer products companies, are responsive to the market. So they're producing products that people wanna buy. And as Bobby said, that may not be true in ten years if the market gets saturated with alternatives. But right now, that's a huge strength. And the other strength is that our companies can deliver round up innovation. So for instance, today in Rwanda, all the blood that's being delivered to hospitals is being delivered by drones that are built by an American company, Zipline. They're operated in the country by Africans, but basically if someone needs blood in a facility in Rwanda, that blood is likely coming on a drone. And the result is that there's been an eighty-eight percent decrease in maternal mortality in hospitals in Rwanda because now when women go into hemorrhage postpartum, the blood's only forty-five minutes away, no matter whether there's blood there or not, which was a fundamental change from what was there before. That's an American company doing what it's supposed to do, sell a product that has obviously a huge effect on people on the ground and a huge effect in the way people view both that company and the United States as a whole. And I think that's an area where we can do a lot more work to try and get the best of our free enterprise system to be part of the economies and the markets in Africa.
Mcfarlane: We've talked about tone and framing in this discussion. And I wanted to ask how useful or perhaps not useful is it that so much of how we in the West, how we see Africa is through Africa as a continent. We lump all of the countries of Africa together in this one big homogenous block in our minds when there are so many different constituent parts of Africa. I had one guy on Twitter today on my timeline speaking about Africa like it was a country, and that is something that a fair number of people do. And in a way, it works that we think about Africa, about the African continent as a group of nations. We deal with the African Union as a key partner, and that's because there are nations in Africa that are unstable and we rely on regional leaders and certain stable nations to take the lead in a lot of policy, whether it's peacekeeping missions, whether it's aid and infrastructure and things like that. Is that the right way to go forward? Is the African Union, how is it working with them on a policy basis? Is it something that we need to rethink? And does the grouping together of African nations on the African continent, is that the best way to promote understanding and awareness of all the different individual nation states in Africa?
Frazer: Yeah, that's a great question. And really, it gets back to what Bobby was talking about and what the Bush administration did so well, which is you have to have a strategic approach to the continent. Because if you do treat it as 54 separate countries, or one whole, one single country, you're not going to be able to achieve your objectives. And so, really one of the ways in which Africa has a certain dynamic that, you know, if you're engaging with the continent, if you're engaging with the leaders, you'll start feeling that center of gravity is for any particular policy choice that you have. One of the clear centers of gravity is the subregional organizations and treating the subregions as having their own dynamic. Right? And as you said, the leaders of those subregions typically will be addressing some of the challenges that are there and trying to knit together opportunities. And so I think that you, I don't think it's any different than understanding a Middle East policy or European strategy policy. There are certain countries that have been aligned with the United States forever. There are certain countries that have the capacity to influence the region more than other countries do. So, those countries have to be especially engaged is the way I would put it. So, you cannot treat it as one whole, nor can you treat it as 54 separate countries that you can engage equally. And I should say this, one of the frustrations that Africans have is that the United States often treats Africa as a divided continent with the North Africa being part of the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa being Africa. And that's extremely frustrating for African leaders, particularly if you look at that Sahel Belt. And so you cannot talk about countering, you know, terrorism or countering proliferation or anything, and you ignore Morocco, right, or you ignore Tunisia, or you ignore Algeria or Egypt. It's simply impossible. They're connected to the continent as a whole. And so we need to treat Africa as a whole continent, but have strategy towards doing that.
Simon: And building on Jendayi's point about the subregions within Africa, one of the most important ways that we can engage with Africans as partners is through their regional institutions, through not just the AU, but also ECOWAS, the East African Community, and SADC. And those organizations that are built by Africans where the Africans have a voice and by engaging with them, again, as partners, not as imposing our own thoughts on them, that's one way that we can build that equal type of relationship that we really, really, really aspire to.
Mcfarlane: That's it for this week's episode of One Decision. We drop new episodes every Thursday. Like and subscribe so you never miss an episode. Drop us a line. Tell us your thoughts. What decisions have impacted you and where you live? You can write to us. Our email is 1decision@1decisionpodcast.com. From me and the team, thank you for listening, and see you next time.
