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Exclusive: Former Head of MI6 Visited Ukraine. Here’s What He Learned

4:00 AM EDT on May 4, 2023

Episode Info

  • Season15
  • Episode6

Hosted by Christina Ruffini and Sir Richard Dearlove

Guest

Episode Summary

One Decision's Sir Richard Dearlove was a guest of the Kyiv government during the last week of April - coinciding with the day that Russia launched its biggest air strikes on Ukraine in two months. Sir Richard reveals the details of his unfortunate night spent in a bomb shelter in Kyiv, what he learned from conversations on the ground with high-level government officials, Ukraine's focus on NATO's upcoming summit in Vilnius, preparations for the long awaited 'spring offensive' and why the Discord intelligence leaks worked to Ukraine's advantage.

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Transcript

INTRODUCTION

Mcfarlane: You're listening to One Decision, the show that looks at the choices made that shape our world. I'm your host, Julia McFarlane. Today, I'm doing a one on one with my cohost, Sir Richard Dearlove, the former chief of MI6, because he's just come back from a very special trip to the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv. We've been covering the development and impact of Putin's reinvasion of Ukraine rather a lot on this podcast. We've spoken to leaders and decision makers across Europe and the West with skin in the game and unique insight. But this week, Sir Richard was able to talk face to face and on the ground to the men and women in charge making the day to day decisions in Ukraine itself, including the man who's currently serving as Ukraine's head of foreign intelligence, Richard's counterpart, if he was still in post as chief. Richard was part of a special delegation made up of influential leaders in the security space and policymakers from allied nations. They attended a series of meetings with the Ukrainians during a pivotal moment in the war as Ukraine prepares to make its long awaited spring offensive. A closed press tour, unfortunately for myself and other journalists, but one that allowed for unprecedented access and incredibly candid conversations about the big decisions that are coming up in this war that threatens to suck in more and more of Europe economically, politically, and strategically. I should say we recorded this conversation just before the Russian government's claim that Ukraine carried out an attempted assassination attempt on Vladimir Putin in Moscow. We will be looking at that story a little later this week. As for our discussion on Richard's meetings in Kyiv, I asked him first of all why he was invited to go to Kyiv at this particular moment in time.

INTERVIEW

Dearlove: I think it was to show a relatively influential group to give us real profound insight in what's happening in Kyiv governmentally, their attitude to the war, and how they view the situation developing both militarily in the short term and politically in the longer term. I mean, the two other Brits with me were Tobias Ellwood, who is the head of the defense committee in parliament and obviously in an influential position, and then Sir Richard Shirreff, who you may remember was a senior general in the British Army and held a senior position in NATO as well, and now also sort of works privately in an advisory capacity, and myself. And we saw mostly very senior ministers on the security side. We unfortunately didn't see Zelenskyy, but our visit coincided with the arrival in Kyiv of the Czech and Slovak prime ministers. So there was another sort of very high level visit going on at the same time, and our security sort of crossed paths with them on two or three occasions.

Mcfarlane: That's so interesting. So which senior figures from the Ukrainian government did you meet and did you get any sort of one to one time? Did you have any interesting conversations in particular?

Dearlove: Well, obviously had some interesting one to one conversations with one or two of the people. But I'm not going to go into detail about who they were and the contacts, I think that would be indiscreet. But we met the head of the National Security Council, we met the head of the Security and Defense Committee in Parliament, we met the Assistant Defense Minister, we met the Head of Military Procurement, you can see it was a very high level access and had been superbly arranged. We met the Prosecutor General who is the person who's indicted Putin for war crimes and had a long discussion with him. So they really did a thorough job. And I met personally, I think I can say I met the head of foreign intelligence, or we met the head of foreign intelligence, and I had a long conversation with him.

Mcfarlane: Because he's essentially your, or would have been your, counterpart in Ukraine. Right?

Dearlove: I think it's worth explaining there are two. Obviously, there's a military intelligence organization, which is huge. It's seven, eight times bigger, I think, than foreign intelligence service, and that's the very young man who you see on television quite often is Budanov. But Budanov was absent at the meeting, in Warsaw, a regional meeting, which a number of countries were attending. The foreign intelligence is much smaller, but I think much more strategic. And what's happened, of course, because of the conflict is these two organisations have become much more mature, much more self confident, and probably play a really important role behind the scenes. That's certainly the impression I got talking to the head of foreign intelligence, who's a very interesting, incisive...

Mcfarlane: What's his name?

Dearlove: Strangely, Lytvynenko.

Mcfarlane: Oh, yes. Of course. I didn't know that. The foreign intelligence service, that is not the same as the SBU.

Dearlove: I think it's what used to be part of the SBU. What the SBU used to be part of. I mean, think what you have to understand is the SBU was originally, you know, you go way back, a regional directorate of the KGB. A significant regional directorate. And of course it's now matured into a completely independent service, it's a very different animal from what it was when Ukraine first gained its independence. So there has been a huge shift and change inevitably driven by the conflict. But I think that although there was an air of normality about Kyiv, it came across a bit like a sort of bustling European capital. Under the surface of things, you really do feel this is a country at war. And what's interesting talking to the Ukrainians, they see this as a really profound political conflict about Ukraine's future place in European security. I mean, the irony is you've got Putin's special military operation, which, of course, is now a rubbish description of what's happening. But the Ukrainians see this very much through a sort of political optic, and they are very much talking about the politics and the underlying implications of the politics.

Mcfarlane: Well, speaking of political optics, what did you make of the atmosphere and the conversations that you'd had? What could you pass of the general mood of the Ukrainians that you met? Did you get the sense that perhaps they were maybe using this trip to paint a pretty positive picture of how the war was doing? Or could you detect that there was nervousness, that there was concern, that there was frustration with how slowly the West's promises of military assistance is trickling through? What did you detect in your meetings in Kyiv?

Dearlove: Well, a lack of complacency about the situation, very realistic focused attitude, real dynamism amongst the leadership, not over optimistic, but pragmatic, and massive commitment to what Ukraine has to do. And one was really struck by the cohesion and the enormous motivation. And a lot of the people, our interlocutors, were surprisingly young, I mean, early 40s, maybe even one or two of them younger than that. Some very dynamic women, obviously hugely able. It was an incredibly impressive and rather a humbling experience. But I wouldn't say that they're overconfident. I think they are confident about Ukraine, Ukraine's identity. They're confident that if we help sustain them, and I think this is a big if, and they get the right equipment, they are confident that they can win this war. And I'll put it as bluntly as that.

Mcfarlane: I particularly remember before the war, before COVID, in fact, the Zelensky's new government had a delegation, they sent a delegation to London, and there was an event at Chatham House, and Andriy Yermak was there and a few other cabinet secretaries. And they were all either late thirties or very early forties. And it was very, very striking how young Zelensky's team around him were. And it's quite a contrast to the old men, the old KGB geezers who are dotted around the Kremlin. Do you think that in the conversations that we've had about how the Ukrainians are stepping up to this fight, given all their disadvantages, they are being a lot more ingenious. They're really thinking outside the box and trying to be more dexterous and more creative in getting around some of their shortcomings, such as the fact that they do not have the amount and the scale of weaponry that the Russians have?

Dearlove: Well their inventiveness, their creativity is really quite extraordinary. And their ability, as you say, to compensate for the difference in weight, you know, David and Goliath. They are doing rather brilliantly in cutting what I would describe as the sort of lumbering Russian giant down to size. And they're massively entrepreneurial. And I think this is where one aspect and an important aspect of the war, which is really almost impossible to measure, is what I would say the human factor. You can talk about weapons. You can talk about numbers. You can talk about the logistics of warfare. But the human factor on the Ukrainian side, I think, probably gives them a massive advantage over time, as long as they can sustain it, as long as they don't become war tired. And obviously, they are hugely concerned about having the means to preserve that energy and that drive. But, I mean, for example, we met the guy who was head of the railways, and the railways have been incredibly important in keeping the country running. There's a wonderful comment whereby, in the early stages of the conflict, the head of the railways apologized to the president because one of the trains to Kharkiv was ten minutes late in the middle of... he's now been transferred out of the railways because he's clearly so brilliant.

Mcfarlane: Well, he's been asked several times by British journalists if he can come over here and run our rail networks for us.

Dearlove: Well, he's now running all the military procurement and this is a guy with a black t shirt with a wonderfully sort of plaited hairdo, clearly superbly able and clearly a very good inspirational leader. And he's now dealing with the vexed question of ammunition supply given that the Russians are firing... I think that the proportion of Russian shells fired to Ukrainian shells is six or seven to one and there are big problems of supply, these things that are worrying the Ukrainians. And I think the other area which is clearly sensitive, and they weren't precise about it, but in Bakhmut, I think they clearly have also had significant losses. And the loss of experienced seasoned soldiers who've been fighting since 2014, and their replacement with less seasoned troops, but they've put a huge emphasis on training and preparation for the battlefield, so we'll see what happens.

Mcfarlane: I knew that you were in Kyiv on this trip, and I have to say I was a little concerned when I heard that there were renewed airstrikes on the city on one of the nights that you were there. Did you see or hear of those strikes? And the other thing is I imagine, the former chief of MI6 on Ukrainian soil, I mean, sorry to put it like this Richard, but you must have been quite a high value target, no? What were the security precautions that you took while you were there?

Dearlove: I did have some special security, okay, that's true. But let's leave it at that. Well, funnily enough, I'm a sound sleeper. I slept through the sirens, the air raid sirens going off. And the hotel had to send someone up to my room to wake me up. Basically what happened was, I guess it was about three in the morning, we all had to rush down to the hardened shelter in the basement of the hotel. And we were down there, I don't know, for an hour and a half until the all clear was signaled. I personally didn't hear or see anything, but one of the members who were accompanying our group, she was staying in her flat, actually not that far from the hotel, and she saw and heard the Ukrainian missiles shooting down successfully because all the stuff that was targeted at Kyiv was shot down, and some of the debris actually fell in her street. So you can, it gives you a sense of the sort of presence. I mean, you drive around the town and there's a sort of veneer of normality. Around the government quarter, there are lots of really hefty military blockades. And all the big essential government buildings are heavily sandbagged. So you do feel if you sort of turn away from some of the commercial streets of the government quarter that you are in a war zone. But everyone's very calm. And soon after the air raid in the morning I saw mothers pushing their babies around in the park and, you know, life getting back to normal. And most of the day the situation is relatively normal. And there's not much visible damage in the center of Kyiv.

Mcfarlane: Was that your first time under fire?

Dearlove: No. I've been in tricky situations before. Bearing in mind, I've been in Iraq and in Afghanistan previously.

Mcfarlane: It must have been quite a scary night. How was everyone else in the...?

Dearlove: Well, I think it was extremely calm. I don't want to say we were blase, but I just think we all thought, okay, get out of bed, go down to the cellars, sit down there with a cup of tea chatting. And the only problem was it was too late to go back to bed with the sirens. So we had a very disrupted night. I think by the end of the following day, some of us were nodding off in meetings.

Mcfarlane: I hope you've caught up with your sleep since then.

Dearlove: I've caught up now, yeah.

Mcfarlane: That's good, that's good. I mean it's an interesting time for you to have gone to Ukraine and to have had the access to senior figures and leaders as you did, particularly because this is only a matter of weeks after those intelligence leaks were published. Some of them quite potentially quite damaging for the Ukrainians. There were some leaked documents that appear to suggest that the US had suggested that Kyiv was not actually heading towards victory in this highly anticipated spring offensive. And also there were leaked documents suggesting that their air defenses were vulnerable, that they were severely lacking in Soviet era air defense systems and their stocks would soon be running out, which would mean a huge gaping vulnerability which the Russians could very easily exploit.

Dearlove: Well ironically I think that the Ukrainians seemed, I wouldn't say relaxed about the leak, but they did see that in some ways it might have worked to their advantage.

Mcfarlane: Did you discuss it with them?

Dearlove: Yeah. We did discuss the leak with them, and they didn't make a big deal out of it. I think it's important to say there's not the focus professionally in the government on the spring offensive that there is by our media. What the Ukrainians are saying is that this war will not be won with a single punch. It will be won by three, four, five, six punches. So they see the war in a much more multi dimensional fashion. I think it's our media that have somewhat misled us. And in a way, once their shortages were publicised, they felt this had impressed on their allies the urgency of their need. So in some ways, it's worked to their advantage. I think their main concern that one sort of picked up, not directly but as an implication of some of the discussions we had with them, their losses of experienced fighting troops have probably been quite significant, and the training and preparation of troops to fill those holes isn't straightforward for them. So, if there's a strategic issue which they focused on, it's that. Okay, the other big issue is clearly supply of artillery ammunition and supply of what they hope will be F-16s. It was rather amusing. One of the people on the parliamentary defense and security committee that we met was a very interesting young woman. I mean, couldn't be more than 35, clearly very bright, very intelligent, very fluent, and she had a t shirt on which said, which I thought was wonderful, girls don't want flowers, they want sixteens. Which of course you put on for our benefit, but it was...

Mcfarlane: There has been so much about Ukraine's requests for F-16s. We do know that some Ukrainian pilots are already being trained in how to fly NATO standard jets, and the reason why they could be so pivotal to the Ukrainians is that they allow for longer range missile attacks than the Ukrainians currently have the ability to carry out. What we are seeing on the battlefield is the Russians are keeping all of their military depots, their field command centers, and all of the sort of key strategic sites where you would want to bomb if you were the Ukrainian air force. They are all stationed well away from the front lines and sort of out of reach of the Ukrainians. And the only way for them to hit those targets now is if their pilots fly deep into Russian territory, very vulnerable to the Russian air defense capabilities. And so that's why the Ukrainians really want those F-16s. What else is it that they need from the West? Or really is the F-16s, is that the thing that will win them the war? And if they don't get those F-16s, will it cost them victory?

Dearlove: Well, I think what's worrying them is the weight of the Russian Air Force. The fact that it hasn't been much deployed because of its vulnerability to attack and its standoff capability. And to counter that, I think, particularly if they begin to secure a significant military advantage on the ground, then they need these more sophisticated aircraft. They also obviously need sustained supplies of tanks, preferably Leopard 2, so they don't have too complicated a mix of machinery. And then of course they need with that logistics of spare parts, servicing and all of that, which is really important. They need artillery ammunition, and it's complicated because they need ammunition for their old Soviet stuff, and they need 155 millimeter ammunition for their new NATO stuff. And then, of course, what they also need, which is vital, is sophisticated training, both infantry training and weapons training. So I think if this war goes on for any length of time, the logistics of supply of what I've listed becomes really, really important. And this is what, as it were, evens the equation between Russian quantity and Ukrainian quality. And what the Ukrainians clearly do have is quality and sophistication. I mean, they also took us to a sort of very interesting startup hub run by a very dynamic young woman, which is specifically designed to get new weapon systems into the battlefield in a matter of weeks or months, where they've got people using their IT skills and their digital skills to invent stuff. And particularly, what's become both tactically and strategically important is the use of drones, which we've all read about, and they've been hugely inventive in using drones and they're continuing down that track. But there are all sorts of other bits of kit, and they're doing what Israel has done, building a very rapid process where you can get stuff from a workbench into the battlefield to be tested in a matter of weeks. It's so impressive. And what they've done is completely digitized the battle space, and they've done it for a shoestring in a matter of months. The British Army has been trying to digitize this battle space for a decade and is still struggling with it.

Mcfarlane: All that aside, it's still a question of maths though. I mean, one of the leaked intelligence reports, one of those leaked documents predicted that the Ukrainians would run out of missiles for their S-300s and their BUKs, which are these Soviet era air defense systems. And these systems apparently make up almost 90% of Ukraine's air defenses and their protection against Russian aircraft and bombers. Those documents estimated that they would be out of those stocks by the beginning of May, which is now. And so no matter their sort of battlefield creativity with drones and things like that, if they run out of their air defence missiles, I mean it's game over, is it not?

Dearlove: I think there's a rush now to fill that hole. I mean, I can't say that authoritatively, but one didn't sense that sort of concern in our meetings. And I'm sure if it had been that potent a concern, we would have picked it up. They seemed to be relatively confident that the problems that they've got were in the process of being solved. But there is still a question mark. I think that the fact that these problems were exposed publicly strangely might have worked to their advantage because a lot of people have sat up and taken notice. And there's a lot of work being done in countries like Poland, Slovakia, The Czech Republic, who are massively concerned and I think are working overtime to do everything in their power to assist the Ukrainians. But I think that what was fascinating talking to them was this emphasis that for Ukraine this is an intensely political war, and that the key strategic decisions are political, and they're very focused on the upcoming NATO summit in Vilnius. There seems to be a belief that Zelensky is unlikely to go unless he's specifically invited. And I think they've got great expectations, but there's no way they're going to be offered membership straight away. But what they need to be offered at Vilnius, and it'll be really important for them psychologically, is security guarantees for a long period, because they will be unable to join NATO whilst they have a territorial border dispute, because of the terms of Article 5. But the alternative is a clear willingness on the part of NATO to say, okay, eventually you will or can become a member, and in the meantime, here are the security guarantees.

Mcfarlane: Okay. That's interesting. I was gonna ask you about the timing of all of this, and particularly a little bit of a semi veiled criticism from you, Richard, on how the media is handling this anticipated spring offensive. And we have had the Ukrainians speak publicly about this saying that it's not going to be one big major offensive with trumpets blaring. It's going to be in phases. There'll be several fronts. It may not take the shape that a lot of people in the media are reporting it to be. But is it part of perhaps a timeline that they are working towards? Because this NATO summit in Vilnius takes place on, I believe, it's the eleventh and twelfth of July this summer. And between now and then, maybe Ukraine's most key months in order to demonstrate whether or not they are able to reclaim some of the territory that they have lost since 2022. Because if they don't, at this summit when all the parties gather, all of its allies and all its backers who are spending a lot of money on Ukrainian support, if its allies will eventually push it then to meet with Russia at the negotiating table if there hasn't been some kind of demonstration, some kind of spring offensive or offensives where they are able to demonstrate that they can start to take territory back from the Russians and the momentum can be moved towards their favour. So are they working on that kind of timeline? Are they going to go to NATO with that request for security guarantees as you mentioned? Or will it be more? Will it be they're gonna renew their push for F-16s? Or did they tell you anything about what they were doing to prepare for that?

Dearlove: Well I think you've got to see that the Ukrainians are very good at strategic deception so they're not going to sit there and tell anybody, even a high level friendly delegation, what's going to happen next. So this is a question of speculation. All I would say is I think that what is happening militarily on the ground in the lead up to the Vilnius summit is gonna be important because it will influence the discussion. And this is what I mean by the Ukrainians taking a highly political view of this war. The other thing I would say, which was absolutely crystal clear, the Ukrainians will not, under any circumstances at the moment accept a ceasefire, they will not, under any circumstances, accept a negotiation which does not meet the terms already laid down publicly by Zelensky, which if you read them, the Russians are not about to agree to. So the sort of talk of peace negotiations as far as the Ukrainians go is completely irrelevant at the moment. They are suffering aggression, naked aggression on their territory. They didn't cause the war, and they see that they have the military capability at the moment to regain territory, so their focus is on doing that. And I think that there will be a significant event pre Vilnius, but whether that is the counter offensive, I think you've already indicated there could be two, three, four. And they're very good at strategic deception and that partly misleading the media and surprising the Russians about what they actually do.

Mcfarlane: The other thing that's happened recently, just ahead of your trip to Ukraine, was that recent phone call between President Xi Jinping and President Zelenskyy, which came off the back of a bit of a diplomatic storm that was set off by the Chinese ambassador to France, Lu Shaye, who sparked quite a lot of outrage after suggesting in an interview that all former Soviet states were not sovereign nations, sort of insinuating that they didn't really exist, in having an effective status in international law. And as one might imagine, all the Baltic nations were apoplectic at this, they summoned all of the Chinese representatives in their countries after that. And then Beijing was forced to backtrack with the foreign ministry saying that Lu Shaye's remarks were not expressing policy, but rather personal opinion. And then a short time after that was when this Xi-Zelenskyy phone call happened. And we know that President Xi promised his government would send a peace envoy to Ukraine and some other nations as part of his efforts to work on mediation between Moscow and Kyiv. And so were there any conversations about that Zelenskyy-Xi phone call? And what do you make of China's new thing, trying to act as peace broker?

Dearlove: I think the only comment that we heard was that it was important that the call had happened, but the content wasn't particularly significant. And it wasn't actually discussed very much, I don't want to mislead you, give the impression that it was. I think that after that ridiculous statement by the Chinese ambassador in Paris, in a way Ukraine was reassured that the phone call happened because I'm sure that Xi didn't apologize, but I think there was a symbolism about him calling and just to sort of indicate that was very, very misleading when it came to what China's position was. But what's also fascinating about the whole political situation is the amount of discussion in Ukraine about the aftermath of the war, and this came up a lot. And I think my views have changed before I went, but it certainly confirmed my view that it's gonna be impossible now after the war for Ukraine not to be a member of NATO because there is a clear sort of, I wouldn't say threat, but the Ukrainian line is after this war, Europe cannot afford to have Ukraine outside the European tent because you will have a massive military power, particularly if Russia has lost, who would then be isolated and would become a sort of militarized power in the center of Europe, who would become suspicious of all its neighbors because of what had happened. It would be a bit like an Israel locked in the center of Europe. So I'm certainly of the view now that there has to be a clear path for Ukraine towards eventual membership of NATO. And of course membership of the EU looks actually much simpler and interestingly we met the minister responsible for what's called European integration and she said very specifically that just 20% of her time was spent on EU integration, which seems very straightforward. NATO, you know, 80% of her time because it's much more complicated. And what I didn't realize, but I think is an interesting fact, that no new EU member country recently, the ones that have joined, they all joined NATO first. Okay, you could say that's by chance, the Bulgarians and Romanians. But I think that is a very significant fact too, as far as the Ukrainians are concerned in terms of thinking about themselves and what happens next. But I think this whole issue of them talking about the aftermath is absolutely fascinating because it does then make you think about the significance of this as a European conflict.

Mcfarlane: One new significant area of challenge which is facing Ukraine, which the West is going to have to get involved in somehow, is perhaps one of the biggest demining tasks we've seen in recent history. What exactly are the Russians doing? We are seeing reports that they're preparing to pull out of Zaporizhzhia, and they're preparing to strategically withdraw in some areas, and perhaps those are areas which are going to be full of booby traps and mines. I mean, did you discuss demining with the Ukrainians? Do they have an adequate sort of demining capability, or is that something that the West is going to absolutely need to get involved in?

Dearlove: Well, they have their own demining capability, and it is quite significant. They've actually had a demining capability which Ukraine has deployed internationally, so they've built it up before the war. They are demining contractors and they've worked all over the world in countries which have this particular problem. But this will be, they say, the biggest demining operation ever because of the way that the Russian front lines have been mined and are being mined continuously, and they're saying that the task in terms of the square kilometreage and the speed at which this can be done, with current capability it's a two hundred year task if you can believe it. It's very significant because it will affect food production in the areas of regained territory, because this is one of the big grain growing belts in Europe. So there's, at the moment, a sort of race to try to find new technology which will actually make this a quicker and simpler task, if that is possible. The Ukrainians say it will be a crucial part of reconstruction. Reconstruction and demining will come hand in hand and it will have to be a massive effort.

US SUPPORT AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

Mcfarlane: Speaker McCarthy was at a news conference in Israel recently, and he took a question from a Russian reporter who works at the state news agency, RIA Novosti, asked him whether he would continue supporting the sustaining of aid and weaponry for Ukraine.

Mccarthy: I support aid for Ukraine. I do not support what your country has done to Ukraine. I do not support your killing of the children either. You should pull out, and we will continue to support.

Mcfarlane: There were some influential Americans on your group. What were the conversations about the support for Ukraine, which is currently bipartisan, but we do know that former president Trump who's running for reelection, governor Ron DeSantis, who at some point soon is going to announce that he is running for election. They have said that Ukraine is not America's problem. What was the strength of feeling from the Americans that you were with and also the Americans that you generally talked to about this support for Ukraine?

Dearlove: I think they would say that that view in the Republican Party at the moment is a marginal view and that the core of the Republican Party are solidly behind Ukraine. I think obviously it's something that could be affected by how the election campaign in The United States evolves. I think that my American interlocutors are pretty upset by some of the things that DeSantis particularly has said, but they say that DeSantis is very poor on foreign policy, and that he doesn't really, it's not his forte, he doesn't understand it, his big stuff is domestic policy and domestic economic policy. So they were not particularly concerned. To the extent that there is this small group who tends to have these views and says the supplies should be limited and audited much more carefully, but it's a marginal view. And I think that at the moment there's pretty solid cross party support and the Ukrainians don't seem to be worried, and the Americans I spoke to don't seem to be worried. However, the mere fact that this fraction, maybe you can call it, of the Republican Party exists, is a little concerning.

Mcfarlane: One thing that is really not up for debate is the opposition to China among the Republican establishment. I mean, do you think the fact that Putin has had to basically put in his lot with the Chinese for his continued survival. Is that something that works in Ukraine's favor when it comes to being able to garner and rustle up support from the Americans?

Dearlove: Possibly. I mean, I'm not sure that that makes a significant difference because I think that the motivation in supporting Ukraine is largely about a just war. This is an act of massive aggression, breaching every international convention and law. And I think that's the main driver. In a way, China is an important player, but it's a part player. At the moment, it's not central. And there's no question that Xi Jinping is being pretty cautious in the way that he's playing Chinese cards in relation to the crisis. He certainly hasn't fallen out with Russia, but on the other hand, the mere fact that he rang Zelenskyy after this ambassadorial boob in Paris.

REFLECTIONS FROM THE GROUND

Mcfarlane: I just want to go back to your trip again, which must have been fascinating because you are so well connected in the spheres of intelligence and defence and security. You speak to plenty of people who have a really good handle of what is going on the ground, but this is the first time that you have been able to make those observations yourself. And that is, of course, the world you used to live in. So, from your view as a former spymaster, what struck you? What was different on the ground than what you perhaps had been told by others? What sort of surprised you from your vantage point of an old spymaster?

Dearlove: I don't think anything particularly surprised me. What really impressed me was the strength and the cohesion, the determination, of the Ukrainian leadership. And the irony of this whole war is that if Putin had not invaded but had sat on the border with heavy military forces and left the Ukrainians to argue amongst themselves about Ukraine's future, he almost certainly would have got 90% of what he was after. Zelenskyy was polling, I mean there are all sorts of things that you have to realize and Ukraine would never have taken a definitive step towards NATO. NATO probably wouldn't have accepted Ukraine ever as a member state, but the fact of the invasion, well you've got to go back to 2014, the invasion started then but the escalation of the war in February 2022 has just changed everything and in fact has totally reversed Russian policy. And what was extraordinary, there was even talk amongst the Ukrainians of Russia itself breaking up if they win this war because, they say, they won't go into detail, they won't tell you really what they might know, but they say there are definitely stresses and strains, massive stresses and strains inside the Kremlin. And let's say if this counter offensive goes well, if the Russian army were to collapse, if the front were to collapse, goodness knows what the follow ons are going to be. I personally don't think that will happen, but I think that you could well see a break through the Russian lines and some quite significant further military deterioration from the Russians strategically. And even that will put them on a back foot and I think cause problems. So the situation is very, very potent and very much in the balance. And although it was a fantastic experience of rolling into Ukraine on an overnight train, arriving in the station, there's apparent sort of normality. But then within a couple of hours there, you realize the situation is not normal at all.

Mcfarlane: Do you agree that Putin however has time on his hands? He has, despite how many people are trying to dodge the draft, he has a seemingly inexhaustible supply of cannon fodder at which to throw into the Ukrainian meat grinder. He has his weapons factories on a war footing working twenty four hours a day, that's not happening in the West. Do you think the only thing that stands between Putin winning this war and achieving his objectives is the speed at which the West can restock Ukraine's apparently dwindling supplies of the military hardware that it needs, shells, missiles, jets, and tanks?

Dearlove: I'm not sure it's as clear cut as that. Obviously, Western supplies are crucial, but the Ukrainians have been incredibly inventive in, as it were, trying to put in place their own arrangements for military production, which would probably mean factories and production lines in Poland and Slovakia close to their borders, which are not vulnerable to Russian attack. Okay. It may be that that's an insufficient supply line to make the difference. And obviously, the longer the war goes on, maybe Russian quantity begins to tell. But I think the West is realizing, and I think that's why a visit like the one I've made is really significant with people like myself and others passing out the message now publicly, that a sustained support for Ukraine is vital. And this is about the future of European security. And when DeSantis says it's a war for territory, the man's crazy. It's not a war for territory, it's about the political future of Europe and Ukraine. What's happening, if you get back to the fundamentals, it's about Ukraine's inclusion in the Western community. And that's why this war is being fought. And that's where we should and will end up if we conduct ourselves, and I'm talking about the West, appropriately and properly in the face of this pretty catastrophic event.

Mcfarlane: And do you reckon Zelensky is going to give an exclusive interview to One Decision?

Dearlove: I'm certainly going to see if we can get back to Ukraine and do that. I mean, I'm not joking. It might be a possibility. And I think a lot of people in Ukraine are gonna listen to this podcast. And I think they're going to realize that we've got a big audience and this is a very good way of spreading, I think, an accurate message which isn't really like an ordinary media report. This is something I think more profound and that's, I think, one of the reasons why it's so good that we have the access that I enjoyed when we were actually in Kyiv.

Mcfarlane: Couldn't have put it better myself. Thanks Richard, it's almost like you do this for a living.

Dearlove: Well, I am doing it for a living now. That's the joke.

Mcfarlane: That's the joke, Richard, among other things. Thanks for listening to this episode. Drop us a line. Tell us your thoughts. What decisions have impacted you and where you live? You can write to us. Our email is 1decision@1decisionpodcast.com. From me and the team, thank you for listening, and see you next time.

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