Episode Info
- Season16
Hosted by Christina Ruffini and Sir Richard Dearlove
Guest
Ken Moriyasu
Ken Moriyasu is Nikkei's Diplomatic Correspondent reporting from the G7 summit venue in Hiroshima on Japan's agenda as host and China's aggressive posturing towards Taiwan.
Episode Summary
In this week's One More Decision, former Director of Global Engagement in the Obama White House, Brett Bruen is joined by Nikkei's Diplomatic Correspondent Ken Moriyasu from the G7 summit venue in Hiroshima to discuss Japan's agenda as it plays host to world leaders in the city that suffered the first nuclear attack in the world. They discuss what will come from the high-stakes gathering, China's aggressive posturing towards Taiwan, the buildup of Japan's own military defenses, and how world leaders are reacting to United States President Joe Biden cutting a dinner and his Asia trip short to focus on negotiations to avoid a potential catastrophic debt default in the United States.
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Transcript
INTRODUCTION
Mcfarlane: I'm Julia McFarlane, host of One Decision, the podcast that looks at the choices made that shape our world. Together with my cohost, the former chief of British intelligence, Sir Richard Dearlove, we unpack the key decisions, past, present, and future, that matter to us all. We drop new episodes every Thursday. But today, we're bringing you one more decision, smart analysis of the latest breaking news around the world with global situation room president Brett Bruen, who served as the White House director of global engagement during the Obama administration. Over to you, Brett.
INTERVIEW
Bruen: Joining us today from Hiroshima, Japan, where the G7 is about to meet is diplomatic correspondent for Nikkei News, Ken Moriyasu. Ken, welcome to One Decision.
Moriyasu: Thank you for having me, Brett.
Bruen: I would just like to start with the atmosphere. You are sitting right now, as you just showed me, in the Press Center at the summit. What are the topics of conversation in the halls and over tea and meals that you're hearing from the journalists as well as the officials gathered there?
Moriyasu: So, unfortunately, the biggest news of this G7 is the fact that Biden is quickly going home after the three days are over and not going to Papua New Guinea and Australia where the Quad meeting was supposed to go. So everybody is talking about how serious the US domestic issue is and how that might influence the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.
Bruen: And indeed, we have a potential catastrophic, one might say, US default that is looming large. How do you think both the domestic politics, the increasing toxicity and the polarization here in the US is impacting America's influence, is impacting the confidence of allies, especially those that are gathering from the largest economies in the world there at the G7.
Moriyasu: It's a great example of how international politics can only be conducted firmly if one politician has a stable footing in domestic politics. And I think the same goes for Biden and the same goes for Emmanuel Macron, who in a recent visit to China raised eyebrows by saying that Europe should not be dragged into a conflict between the US and China over Taiwan and that Europe has to maintain a strategic autonomy. I think he's very much playing to his domestic audience, much to the chagrin of the other leaders of the Indo-Pacific. And I think this might have an impact on Fumio Kishida, the Japanese prime minister. He is rumored to be contemplating calling a snap election after the G7. I think this only reinforces the need for him to do so, because if he doesn't, he would look very weak.
Bruen: And what can we expect then coming out of this summit? Are there results that can restore confidence, a modicum of stability in the global economy as well as obviously addressing some of the real geopolitical crises that we confront at the moment, whether it's with the war in Ukraine, also obviously increasing challenges in a post-pandemic period?
Moriyasu: Well, since it is held in Japan, the focus is going to be more on China than Ukraine. And the Japanese diplomats have been putting a lot of effort into the wording of how the G7 communiqué will describe Taiwan. And I think this G7 will go down in history as a pivotal turning point, where the G7 made clear that the Taiwan crisis is not a Chinese domestic issue, but a matter of international concern. And the wording about Taiwan was first included in the G7 statement two G7 summits ago in 2021 in Cornwall, where the leaders just said they underscore the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. This time, they're going to add another line after that saying the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait is important, and it's an indispensable element of security and prosperity of the international community. So it's really underscoring the fact that it's not a Chinese domestic issue, and the G7 is in effect saying that if China conducts a military invasion of Taiwan, the G7 would not consider it as an internal affair of China, and it will respond as an international incident.
Bruen: Ken, this question of China and what may or may not happen with their aggressive posturing towards Taiwan, what is needed at this point from a Japanese perspective that we're not doing to create greater deterrence? It feels like one of the lessons learned from Russia's invasion of Ukraine was that the international community did not have sufficient deterrence in place.
Moriyasu: Right. So this is a very important point. I think Japan's strategy is to form a unified coalition that stands up against forces that are trying to rewrite the international order. So Japan doesn't necessarily subscribe to President Biden's categorization of democracies versus autocracies because that excludes too many countries. Japan is trying to make the dividing line between those countries that want to maintain this free, open, and stable international order, and those countries like China and Russia who believe that the current order is unfair, and therefore they need to create a new order that they are more comfortable in. Japan believes that such a new order will fit the Chinese Communist Party, but will be in effect something equivalent to might is right. So they're bigger, so they get more and more leeway. So Japan is not going to be comfortable in that order. So not only is Japan opposing the creation of such an order, it's trying to prevent such an order from emerging.
Bruen: Can we talk a little bit about the military transformation that is taking place in Japan right now? Obviously, in the post-World War Two period, Japan had largely stayed in the national defense posture, did not have a great deal of military capacity. We saw how in the run-up to the war in Iraq, Japan started to come out of that a little bit. And now, with obviously both threats from Russia as well as China, Japan is looking at a new military structure. Can you tell us what is happening on that front, and what do you think internally can be supported? I imagine there are quite vigorous debates about this.
Moriyasu: Well, in one sentence, Japan looked at what happened in Afghanistan, and it also looked at what happened in Ukraine. So when the Afghan troops could not fight anymore and gave up to the Taliban, the US wasn't there to help them. They left. And Japan feels that in the traditional arrangement with the US, the US role was to be the spear, and Japan's role was to be the shield. And Japan would focus on defending the Japanese mainland, and the US would do the fighting. But more and more, the Japanese decision makers are realizing that that probably won't work and that Japan has to take some role in acting as a spear as well. And also, it looked at what happened in Ukraine when the Ukrainians were willing to fight, and it was the Americans and the whole of NATO behind Ukraine, then America will be much more comfortable in fighting for Ukraine or helping Ukraine in a serious way. So I think those are the lessons Japan took. And also, Japan isn't, like, so-called militarizing. None of the defensive buildup is intended to take an inch off Chinese territory, for instance. It is all defensive. And moreover, it is to restore the balance, the power balance in the Indo-Pacific, which has tilted too much in China's favor. That's what Japan believes. And that is most exemplified in the difference of number of intermediate and middle range missiles. China has 2,000. America has zero. America has zero because it was part of the INF treaty with the Soviet Union. And for years had not built these missiles. But China, not being part of this treaty, was allowed to build up its arsenal and now it's a 2,000 to zero difference. And Japan believes that in the next five to ten years when the Taiwan crisis reaches its peak, in those five to ten years, America would not be able to fill the gap on its own. So that's why Japan and Australia and the UK have to join forces to fill in this gap to rebalance the deficiencies in the power balance.
Bruen: When I was in the Obama administration, we had this famous pivot to Asia, which didn't perhaps fully take place, in part because we were contending with the rise of ISIS and other challenges. Then during the Trump administration, you had the creation of this concept of the Indo-Pacific region trying to bring in the world's largest democracy in India into this fold of nations that stretched out from South Asia all the way through to the Hawaiian Islands and the California Coast. How's that going from where you sit in Hiroshima? Have we effectively stitched together a strong coalition? Does Japan see this coalition as a central part of its efforts both to contain China as well as to cooperate on other economic and political fronts?
Moriyasu: Right. So the inclusion of India in the Quad and more and more joint exercises in the security front is very crucial in this chess game with China. And not because India will join the US and Japan in defending Taiwan, but because India itself has so much tension with China on the border in the Himalayan Mountains that if in the time of Taiwan crisis, if India is strong on the Himalayan front, that creates a two-front problem for China, which would only benefit the US and Japan. Also, on the Korean Peninsula, if the US and South Korea are strong, that creates another headache for China. And also in the South China Sea and the South Pacific, with the AUKUS arrangement, if Australia, the UK, and the US strengthen their deterrence in those areas, that's a fourth front for China. So not just focusing on the Taiwan Strait issue, but creating all these problems with China kind of balances out the problems, and that is very beneficial for US and Japan.
Bruen: One last question, Ken, and our program is called One Decision. Today, I'd like if you could take our audience into that cavernous hall where you currently sit. There are a lot of preparations that go into hosting a summit like the G7, and the host country has the ability to make small decisions, but small decisions that can be important in terms of either the type of events that take place, the protocol, some of even the food and the cultural program. What are you seeing there in terms of what Japan has done and how they put this G7 together that perhaps in small but significant ways is helping to drive Japan's agenda towards the outcome that it would like to see from this important gathering?
Moriyasu: So the most important characteristic of the Hiroshima G7 is the fact that it's being held in the city of Hiroshima, which is the first city in the world to suffer the attack of a nuclear weapon. And it also happens to be the constituency of Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida. Kishida-san was very determined to bring the G7 to his hometown while he was prime minister, but it also symbolizes a contradiction that Japan has. Kishida and Japan would like to see a world without nuclear weapons, but the reality is that Japan is protected by the extended deterrence, the nuclear umbrella of America. So it is very difficult for Japan to openly say, we want a world without nuclear weapons right now. The task at hand is kind of how to make sure that the extended deterrence is working and that China will think twice or North Korea would think twice about taking action. So here, Japan has a very difficult balancing act. But I take a wisdom from Michelle Obama, who on her book tour always talks about, can women have it all? Can they have a career and can they have a family life too? And she says, you can have it all, but you can't have it all at once. So I think this goes with the saying of Japan. Japan would like a world without nuclear weapons, but it can't have it right now. It will one day be able to survive this crisis that we're in now under the nuclear umbrella, but then reach a world without nuclear weapons, hopefully, in the future.
Bruen: Well, an interesting point to end on. Certainly the backdrop of this summit being held in Hiroshima does not go unnoticed. And, Ken Moriyasu, I very much appreciate your time stepping away from the summit to speak with us here on One Decision.
Moriyasu: Thank you very much for having me.
Mcfarlane: That's it from this world update from the One Decision Podcast. If you enjoyed this little conversation, why not check out our channel for our main offerings which drop every Thursday? Just search One Decision wherever you find your podcasts. From me and the team, thank you for listening, and see you next time.
