Episode Info
- Season16
Hosted by Christina Ruffini and Sir Richard Dearlove
Guest
Episode Summary
Russian forces captured the city of Bakhmut largely led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner mercenary group and its fighters—who suffered heavy losses on the battlefield. One Decision’s Julia Macfarlane and former MI6 Chief Sir Richard Dearlove discuss Russia's next move as it prepares for Ukraine's counter-offensive, and what's behind the border skirmishes in the Russian town of Belgorod.
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Transcript
INTRODUCTION
Mcfarlane: You're listening to One More Decision, a short update from the team that brings you One Decision, the podcast that looks at the big choices made that shape our world. I'm your host, Julia McFarlane, journalist and broadcaster, and along with my co-host, Sir Richard Dearlove, the former chief of Britain's Secret Intelligence Services, we examine how the big geopolitical decisions of the day are made, who they impact, and what may happen as a result. We drop our full episodes every Thursday. But today, we wanted to take a brief look at some of the news that's been making headlines this week. So, Richard, there have been some interesting developments in the war in Ukraine at the moment. I wanted to start off with the battle of Bakhmut, which at least according to the Russians appears to be over, largely led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner mercenary force. And it's his fighters who have really been bearing the brunt of this fight for the Russian side. He declared victory earlier this week. He basically claimed that pretty much the entire city had been taken. He used the word liberated. And he also said that as a result of finally being able to gain control of the city in its entirety, he says, he was now going to be pulling his forces out of Bakhmut, and it's now gonna be up to the Russian conventional army to hold the city. I mean, this battle of Bakhmut, it's a small city. Before the war, there are around 70,000 people who were living there. It was mostly known for a sparkling wine plant that was operating outside the city. And before the war, it didn't, it wasn't really hugely significant at all. But it's become the symbol of Ukrainian resistance because the Russians have really, really, really wanted to take it. And Ukrainians have really, really, really wanted to not let them do that. And so it's become this sort of this icon of Ukrainian resistance and really key to the morale of the Ukrainian people. You know, Bakhmut resists has been a repeated phrase by many in this war, and it's taken almost a year for the Russians to get a hold of it. It's their first military success since last summer. How much of a blow do you think it is if the Ukrainians have entirely lost Bakhmut? And while the Ukrainians, they publicly have disputed Prigozhin's claim that they now control the whole of the city. There are Ukrainian forces in the outskirts. They more or less have sort of conceded that they have lost it for now, but they are pushing to retake it now that the Russian conventional army is going to be in charge of holding it?
ANALYSIS WITH SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE
Dearlove: I don't think it's a blow really to the Ukrainians at all. Okay. It has a symbolism. I accept that. But it's clearly, if it's a victory at all, it's totally pyrrhic. And the Russian losses are massive and huge. And what have they gained? They've gained a city which they've destroyed totally, well that's my understanding, through a huge amount of bombardment and destruction. And they have really nothing to show for it except massive losses. I think what it tells us is that the Russian military in its current form is not capable of what I would describe as combined feat of arms. I would be very very surprised now if the Russians can, as it were, mount an offensive, which combines infantry, high speed mobile armored units, aerial support. They don't seem to be able to do it. So this has been a slogging match in which Prigozhin's Wagner Group have played an important role, because they've fed these convict recruited forces into the meat grinder. As I understand, they've used these expendable troops, and that's a catastrophic really concept, expendable troops, to identify Ukrainian positions, and then these have been heavily shelled. So you can see the ground techniques that the Russians have used. I think what's happened is that the Russians have learned a lot of hard lessons, but really the lessons that they've learned are probably now, as far as they're concerned, of defensive values, not offensive values. So they've learned a lot about Ukrainian capability, but on the other hand, what the Russians probably are thinking about now is defending and trying to hold the territory that they've taken and using the knowledge that they've gained about Ukrainian capabilities to reinforce their defensive positions. But it doesn't look to me as though they have gained any capability for tactical moves of combined arms to gain more territory. And I mean what's interesting also is that the Ukrainians seem to have advanced on both flanks of the city. I would guess that the Ukrainians have almost withdrawn deliberately from the city because what's the point? Whereas they've gained territory on the flanks and maybe if there's a counteroffensive they will show that they have a capability to maneuver and to combine arms and shift and take territory. I think the problem for the Russians looking ahead will be if the Ukrainians can break through these defensive lines that they've built. How will the Russians respond? Because the response will require an enormous degree of coordination amongst their various military, and all the evidence points to the fact that they can't do that at the moment. I mean, it's a really extraordinary situation, I think.
Mcfarlane: Yeah. I mean, you say that you question whether Russia will be able to use controlling Bakhmut. Well, if they will be able to use that as a launching pad for further advancements. But that's what they said was the point and why they were fighting at such expense in the Bakhmut meat grinder and losing thousands of soldiers in the process because they wanted to take over the town in order to launch attacks on Lysychansk, in order to attack Kramatorsk. But when you say there are lessons to be learned, more from defense than offense, if we go back to the battle of Kherson, when the Russians invaded the city of Kherson and then the Ukrainians were able to take it back last year. That wasn't a case of the Ukrainians advancing and then pushing the Russians out. That was the Russians making what they called a tactical withdrawal and the Ukrainians moving in at a time where no one was expecting them to advance back into that city and taking a lot of people by surprise? Or do you think what's going to happen, i.e., the Russians, is the Wagner mercenaries are going to withdraw actually tactically in a way that doesn't make them jeopardize their gains and leaves that city vulnerable to the Ukrainians taking it back?
Dearlove: Well, I think the cost of taking back what is so high that the logic probably is that the Russians will, as it were, build their defensive lines around the city. I mean, what's the point otherwise of engaging in this slogging match? I mean, in a way, the Russians have caught themselves on a hook, because it now seems that you know, all of their planning and their effort is going into coordinated defense. And they have improved their position, there's no question, and they have, as it were, clearly made an analysis of their weaknesses and they understand, I think, much better what the Ukrainians are good at. But, I mean, they haven't yet, as it were, faced a revamped Ukrainian army, which has got more modern tanks, more modern armored personnel carriers, which has got new training, and possibly a degree of air support as well. I mean, it'd be very interesting to see what happens next. I mean, we're all sitting sort of talking about this counter offensive, but I think that from the Ukrainian perspective the war probably is much more multi-dimensional. And what I mean by that is, you know, there will be counter punches in a variety of places, and I think what they will try to do is to break through these Russian offensive lines and come around behind them. You only have to think back to the First World War and the disaster of the Maginot Line that the French built to resist a German invasion.
Mcfarlane: That was a bit before my time, Richard.
Dearlove: Well, if you read the history of the First World War, you will quickly encounter in the early stages what's something called the Maginot Line, which the French built as a consequence of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, and they built these border defenses. Well, the Russians seem to be doing something rather similar. Well, the trouble is, if you break through these lines, static and defensive positions are not necessarily what you want to have, because suddenly if you've got a mass group of modern tanks coming around behind your defensive lines, you're going to be in a very serious and difficult position. So we'll see how this plays out strategically. I think that what one has to remember is that there is one political pressure pressing on the Ukrainians which isn't much mentioned, which is the Vilnius NATO summit in July. And I think that the Ukrainians will be desperate to demonstrate to NATO that they can achieve a new measure of military success on the battlefield, because that will influence how NATO, as it were, regards them as a potential future ally member. And I think they have that very much in their mind. So, you know, but the idea there's gonna be one big counter offensive, forget it.
Mcfarlane: You say that with good authority because you very recently returned from a trip to Ukraine where you spoke to a lot of Ukrainian leaders and a lot of people who are directly involved with the war effort and the battle tactics and strategy. You mentioned briefly the importance of air support. And, of course, you know, Zelenskyy has managed to get quite an important victory ahead of that summit in July, and that is because following on from the recent G7 in Japan in which president Zelenskyy was invited and was attending, The US president, president Joe Biden, made the much anticipated, at least for Zelenskyy, announcement that he would allow Ukrainian pilots to be trained on American made F-16 jets. This is something that the Ukrainians have been asking for over and over and over again. Zelenskyy has made so many personal appeals, a lot of them face to face with Western leaders. And president Biden finally caved into a lot of pressure from his own allies in the West who have already issued support for arming the Ukrainians with these modern NATO jets, with at least training up their pilots. And one of the reasons that the F-16s are so important to the Ukrainians is that they allow the Ukrainians to carry out longer range attacks against the Russians without the need for making their pilots vulnerable. A lot of the current Soviet era jets that they are currently using have very short ranges. So in order to attack strategic weapons, depots, military bases in Ukraine that the Russians control, the Ukrainian pilots have to fly deep into areas that the Russians occupy and make them vulnerable to surface to air missiles and anti aircraft attacks. Whereas with F-16s, they can do this from a much greater distance, and it's safer for their pilots to do so. So that's a big win that Zelenskyy has managed to secure from Biden ahead of that NATO summit. But, of course, a lot of those, while that announcement will have been very helpful, it's actually not gonna make any material impact to the war on the ground at the moment because this is something that is gonna take months and months in order to be made actionable. But it is the symbolic victory and the show of support that he was wanting.
Dearlove: It's important symbolically. I agree. But I mean, let's face it, the Ukrainians won't be flying F-16s offensively much before the autumn, if even then. I mean, every F-16 requires a ground crew, requires expert supply. I mean the ground crew is essential to keep these aircraft flying, they're complex systems. And you've got to think about all the ancillaries quite apart from the pilots being trained, aircraft being available, the dimensions beyond that are many and complex. And of course, the Ukrainians can't set up these resources that they need in areas of vulnerability to Russian attack. I mean, logistically, I'm not quite sure how they're going to do it, the natural thing would be for some of the resources and the supplies to be located outside Ukraine in Poland or in Slovakia or in other territories bordering the country.
Mcfarlane: Well that begs an interesting question. What happens if the Lockheed Martin engineers or the ground crews or all of the technicians and you know, all of the infrastructure that is needed around these jets. If that starts involving NATO members, Poland or Lithuania or Estonia or whoever, if they start getting involved in the Ukraine war by having their territory being used, if they start basing their operations off Ukrainian soil and onto European NATO soil, do you think that is a dangerous step towards growing confrontation directly between Russia and NATO?
Dearlove: Well, hitherto it hasn't been. If they're not NATO installations, they're national installations. So what you're looking at is a bilateral arrangement, let's say between Slovakia and Ukraine. And I mean, this issue, it isn't exactly old hat, but it's come up already. So for example, you're, I mean the Ukraine is having huge problems getting ammunition for their old Russian model artillery, which is of a different caliber to NATO artillery. So the logic is that those factories will not be based in Ukraine because of their vulnerability, they'll probably be based across the border, because other nations that were formerly part of the Warsaw Pact has a need to, as it were, create supplies of those caliber artillery shells. So the precedent already exists that you can have these resources based across the border in other countries. Okay, I agree that when it gets onto F-16s it's getting a bit more complicated, but I would expect that some of the resources will. I mean, like when we went to Kyiv, we flew to a border town in Poland and we came into a regional airport. I was sitting on the side of the plane, which looked across the airport towards the military installations. That airport was absolutely stuffed with military kit. It was clear that this was one of the main jumping off points for military kit to be supplied into the Ukraine. And there's a railhead there, so presumably the stuff goes in on trains overnight and all the security precautions are taken.
Mcfarlane: Right. I mean, the question really more is whether Moscow will concern itself with the optics. And if Moscow will interpret, you know, ground staff and American technicians or engineers or western technicians who are coordinating F-16 sorties against Russian soldiers.
Dearlove: But I think one can say one thing with absolute confidence is that when you get into thinking about the Russian military, the Russian general staff, they know that their military has performed catastrophically against Ukraine. They've really had a rough time of it. The Russian general staff, I think, are probably sitting there thinking, my god we cannot afford a military confrontation with NATO, we'll get slaughtered. Because of the sophistication of NATO's resources, particularly the resources of combined arms which NATO can deploy very, very quickly. So I think that there is a stronger wish on the Russian side to avoid confrontation with NATO because of what the implications of that might be. I would say, well, just as strong as we wish to avoid a direct confrontation with the Russians on NATO soil. So I think that there's almost an understanding, I wouldn't say an understanding, but there's a standoff there, which I think probably gives us a certain amount of reassurance that support installations located outside Ukraine but close to the border probably would not get attacked.
Mcfarlane: That's interesting. I have one final question for you, which is the border skirmishes which we have seen in the news in the Russian town of Belgorod. This is a town that is close to the Ukrainian border. It is quite close to Kharkiv in the Northeast. Moscow claims that armed insurgents crossed the border from Ukraine in order to launch attacks in the Belgorod region. And it said earlier in the week that they have now been defeated. Villages near the border were evacuated, and the Russians say that around 70 attackers were killed. And they insist that the fighters are Ukrainian. Now Kyiv has denied any involvement. They also denied any involvement in that drone attack that allegedly was a targeted attempted assassination on Vladimir Putin just over a month ago. Kyiv says that two Russian paramilitary groups were behind the incursion. And there are these two groups who have now sort of come out of cover and said that they are the ones behind these attacks. And they are the Freedom of Russia Legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps. And they are these anti Putin Russian militias, and they are led by some rather dubious characters. There's a guy called Maximilian Andronikov who is the sort of the self proclaimed commander of the Freedom of Russia Legion. And he has, until now, led this group which largely acted in the shadows and wanted to keep its membership secret. These groups have got associations with white nationalists and some rather dodgy characters, but what they say is they want to liberate Russia from Putinism. I mean, this attack on Belgorod, the Ukrainians, I imagine, would be quite happy to see what appears to be Russia on Russian attacks. It came as quite a useful sort of distraction from around the time that the Russians were announcing that Bakhmut had been taken over by their own forces. What do you know of these groups, Richard? What do you know of the people who are involved in this? And do you think this is a serious sort of problem for Russia?
Dearlove: I think it is a serious problem for Russia. But let me put it like this. In a way what we're seeing between Russia and Ukraine is in my book a type of civil war, because ethnically the countries are so close, historically united, massively intermarried. There are many prominent Russians who are part Ukrainian and there are many prominent Ukrainians who are part Russian. So the division, the ethnic division, is hard to identify, and of course has been identified by the mere fact that Russia has invaded Ukraine and therefore this as it were is a defining moment and there's a whole lot of previous history where that definition was never made. So I think it's a classic of warfare that with a war of these characteristics that you're going to have groups that will purport to be, let's say, Russian nationalist groups that are going to skirmish across the border and cause Russia massive problems of security. And the Ukrainians will deny that they're involved. But I'm absolutely, well, I shouldn't say I'm absolutely sure, I would speculate that the Ukrainians are rather sympathetic towards these groups. What the nature of the support and backing is, I do not know. And this is all speculation, but I don't think any of us should be particularly surprised, because this is how these conflicts evolve. Particularly one which is so akin to a type of civil war. We can't really give it that name because it isn't a civil war. You've got two separate nations. But the ethnic ties between the two countries are enormously complex.
Mcfarlane: Do you think perhaps it's a sign of splintering support within Russia for Putin and his war and what his war is costing the Russian people in general, or do you think that's too much to go off on paramilitary groups?
Dearlove: Well, I'm not sure I would connect these movements with that sort of splintering. I think that there is, I've always said, and I'm absolutely convinced that there must be massive tensions between elements of the Russian intelligentsia, the Russian sort of leadership groups. We know that there are. I mean, it was a question I put to the intelligence people that we met in Ukraine. They wouldn't talk about it in detail, but they did say quite clearly, look, there are huge problems inside the Kremlin, of which we are aware. And if you're born and brought up as an intelligence officer like I was, you will know that a situation like we have in Ukraine creates enormous conflicts of loyalty. And there will be lots of Russians, particularly in the diaspora, influential Russians in the diaspora. What I mean by that is there are lots of wealthy Russians outside Russia who have very close contacts with the Kremlin and people inside the Kremlin. These sorts of people will have a pretty clear view of what's happening and a lot of this will be known to the Ukrainians for sure because they're ethnically all of one group. I could sit down and write for you, but I'm not going to talk about it, you know, an intelligence scenario which would describe how the Ukrainians are almost certainly taking advantage of the situation. And these cross border incursions are just a minor part of a much bigger scenario which is playing out and which we can't observe because it's sort of below the radar. It's secret. It's hidden. But as sure as hell, it's going on. That's it from this world update from the One Decision podcast.
Mcfarlane: If you enjoyed this little conversation, why not check out our channel for our main offerings which drop every Thursday? Just search One Decision wherever you find your podcasts. From me and the team, thank you for listening, and see you next time.
