Episode Info
- Season6
- Episode3
Hosted by Christina Ruffini and Sir Richard Dearlove
Guest
Justin Scheck
Justin Scheck is a Wall Street Journal investigative reporter and co-author of Blood & Oil: Mohammed bin Salman's Ruthless Quest for Global Power.
Episode Summary
The Russian war on Ukraine has western leaders looking once again to the Middle East to ramp up oil supplies to bring relief at the gas pump as they try to squeeze Russia’s economy. But energy giant Saudi Arabia and its crown prince Mohammed bin Salman have so far been cool to western efforts to get him to pump more oil to get gas prices down. And the Arab Gulf states as well as Israel have been cautious to date about declaring allegiance in the struggle between Russian President Vladimir Putin and the West. Wall Street Journal investigative reporter Justin Scheck, co-author of a book on the Saudi crown prince: Blood & Oil: Mohammed bin Salman’s Ruthless Quest for Global Power, joins former MI6 chief Sir Richard Dearlove, and guest host Laura Rozen, to discuss how MBS and the Middle East are trying to navigate a world reshaped by the war in Ukraine.
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Transcript
INTRODUCTION
Rosen: Welcome to One Decision. I'm Laura Rozen, your guest cohost. I'm joined today by former head of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove. Today, we're discussing how the Middle East is navigating a world reshaped by Russia's war on Ukraine. Putin's invasion has Western leaders looking to the Middle East as they try to squeeze Russia's economy. But Saudi Arabia and its crown prince have so far been cool to Western efforts to get him to pump more oil to get gas prices down. And the Arab Gulf states as well as Israel have been cautious to date about condemning Russia. Joining us today is Wall Street Journal investigative reporter Justin Scheck. Justin is coauthor with Bradley Hope of a recent book on the Saudi Crown Prince called Blood and Oil: Mohammed bin Salman's Ruthless Quest for Global Power. Thank you for joining us, Justin. Sir Richard, you've spent a lot of time dealing with the Saudis and with the Russians. Start us off with what you're thinking about as you watch these momentous events in and out of Ukraine, especially for Western leaders trying to unify against Putin and squeeze his economy while not starting World War Three or losing their jobs in upcoming elections over issues like high gas prices?
INTERVIEW
Dearlove: Well, because we're talking about energy supply, I suppose the primary point that we have to make is that following Putin's, in my view, surprising decision to invade Ukraine, the consequence is that every European nation has to completely reassess its energy security. So what has happened is that energy security has become the sort of primary issue in terms of looking at nations' national security policies, and although this has been implicit below the surface, in my view for quite some considerable time, hasn't been an issue which has been admitted openly by European leaders. And of course what we're faced with in particular is a crisis in regard of some of the primary European powers, Germany in particular, that had developed an energy policy unwisely in my view, which was almost totally dependent on Russian gas. So and then of course there are other nations like Italy which, and some of the lesser European nations, mean lesser in terms of geopolitical influence and power like Bulgaria whose dependence on Russian energy supplies is absolutely massive. So overnight, you know, they've had to sit down and rethink entirely the policies in a way which are most fundamental to the security and future of those nations. So we're at a very important turning point in European politics, probably the most significant series of events since the immediate postwar period in 1945.
Rosen: If you were advising Prime Minister Johnson or President Biden, and you're looking at this turning point and one of the enablers of Putin is high energy prices, how would you advise them to deal with other ruthless autocrats in the Middle East who have the power to affect, most rapidly affect those prices?
Dearlove: Well in a way I think it's a little unfair you know to draw a comparison between autocrats. You know, because on the one hand Russia's behavior has been extreme. On the other hand, if you look at the Middle East, I mean let's be pragmatic and realistic, and I've dealt personally with the Saudi leadership in the past at a considerable amount. The Saudis, in terms of geopolitical influence, let's say have one and a half levers which they don't necessarily get an opportunity to operate very often, and at the moment they find themselves in a crisis which in my mind is not that surprising, and how the Saudis behave you know is for them a matter of huge internal importance. And what I mean by that is that Saudis in my experience are very very difficult to deal with when they believe that they have a handle on a lever which is of importance to the rest of us. I mean this is a tribalized society with a very heavy, let's say, internal focus in terms of their own interest, and therefore dealing with the Saudis when we have a situation as we have now is not going to be straightforward an issue, because all sorts of other rather personal, rather petty considerations come into play, and Mohammed bin Salman is a very young man without a lot of geopolitical experience. He's been thrust into a position of huge influence and responsibility in terms of Middle Eastern politics, and therefore he is not going to be sure footed or easy to deal with, because he's going to want to extract the maximum from, as it were, the opportunity that he's presented to him. And of course there is the personal animosity between him and the let's say democratic leadership in the United States, and then of course there's a further dimension behind this which is you know whether the original signatories to the JCPOA, the agreement with Iran, you know whether we're moving towards reconfirmation of that agreement, which of course to the Saudis is anathema. So I mean this is a multidimensional problem, and I mean what I would say is I don't think you should judge where the Saudis are now at the moment in terms of where they might eventually be, because there's a lot of emotion and a lot of inexperience tied up with their reaction. And you know if you take Mohammed bin Salman in the Emirates, I mean he also is a notoriously difficult character when he's trying to play both ends against the middle, which he's doing at the moment, and Mohammed bin Salman I think has frankly at the moment misplayed his hand and not really faced up to the reality of Saudi's geopolitical position. Where we end up, well we'll see, but this is not resolved, it's very very early days in a major crisis.
Rosen: That's interesting that you don't think necessarily like an ultimatum when dealing with someone who may be emboldened, over emboldened and inexperienced is this way to manage it.
Dearlove: Let's be realistic, Saudis can play footsie with the Russians in the middle of this crisis, but that's not where they're going to end up. Saudi interests do not lie by any stretch of the imagination in an alliance with Russia.
Rosen: Justin, tell us about the Saudi crown prince and, you know, as I'm sitting here in Washington and we see the Republicans being very confident that the high gas prices are going to, you know, help elect them into majorities in the midterms in a few months. What does MBS want from Biden?
Scheck: You know, yeah. What does he want from him? Well, I think Sir Richard makes a really good point about how Saudi tends to be inward looking. And when they have a lever, oftentimes, they use it for purposes that are not just about foreign policy, but that are internal. I think with Mohammed bin Salman, a lot of those issues are magnified because he's not the king. And this is maybe not as big an issue now as it was three or four or five years ago, but he's still the crown prince, and he still has reason to wanna prove to his people that he's kingly material. And you don't prove that you're kingly material by backing off or by taking a stand that you then look like you have given in on. So when he does something out of emotion or out of stubbornness, he then kind of backs himself into a corner and can't really easily pull out of it. So in this case, you've got this issue where he is dealing with an American administration who, I think, on a personal level, doesn't like. Like, he doesn't like these people. He knows them from the Obama administration. And his first exposure to them, as you write in the book, was when Hillary Clinton came to Saudi and his father brought him into a meeting when very few people knew who he was from the American delegation. He stood up and he criticized Hillary Clinton. And he's repeatedly gone after them over the Iran deal and made it so that he's been difficult to work with for these guys. And he's been very easy to work with for the Republican administration, for the Trump administration. And so now he is inexperienced, but he's shrewd. And he understands when he has leverage. He understands that the longer gas prices are high, the more likely it is that Democrats lose in midterm elections. And anything he can do to reduce the Democrats' power or even just to make them uncomfortable and make them feel like he has control of it, he's going to do. That seems to be the way he makes decisions, or his decisions are generally tactical and not strategic. And they have to do with what can you do right now to get leverage over whoever he's dealing with. So it kind of puts the US in a very difficult position because you don't wanna reward this kind of behavior. You also don't wanna lose the leverage.
Rosen: So is it, you know, if the Houthis got, US put the Houthis back on the terrorism list, is there some transactional formula that he would be able to show his population? You know, he's the big guy. He got these concessions, and they'll pump more oil. Or you think that it's something that he's sort of determined to increase his leverage possibly by using high oil prices to elect?
Scheck: It's a great question. I don't know. Because I think, you know, Yemen is such a hot button issue because these guys, initially, the Biden administration, back when these same people were in the Obama administration, were the ones who kind of sort of gave a tacit go ahead to the bombing of Yemen, but were never really comfortable with it and never really got behind it. And I think have regretted not being more forceful in opposing it early on. And that's a cause of ongoing resentment for Saudi and the UAE that the US has never gotten behind them in Yemen. So now to go and sort of say, okay, we approve of this bombing that's been on for years, I think would be a tough pill to swallow for the Biden administration. I don't really know what they could give MBS that he could hold up as a victory other than some kind of slowdown of negotiations with Iran. I think that's a real thing.
Dearlove: I agree with that. I think that the issue, the sort of subtext here is Iran for the moment, and I mean bear in mind in the last few weeks we've had Houthi attacks on various oil installations continuing in Saudi Arabia, this is a big deal. And I mean in a way what the global community haven't considered is a double oil crisis, whereby you have a conflagration in the Middle East between Saudi Arabia and Iran at the same time as we have a problem in Ukraine, and I mean the implications that lie behind that is that you know we could see oil being driven to $200 a barrel with a consequent impact. I'm not saying it's going to happen, but what I'm saying is that this is a multidimensional problem. It's not just about Ukraine, it's not just about Russia, and I think that you made a very very good point about the shrewdness of the, I mean there may be an inexperience, but the Saudis in my view are extremely shrewd in terms of the way they see tactical issues, and they are very tough in protecting their own areas of unique interest, and they're very very difficult to deal with. I mean I've had a lot of experience being on visits to Saudi Arabia, really having a pretty dreadful time because even people who can seem so courteous and gracious when they receive you socially and they entertain you, when you get down to hard tacks, boy they can be unbelievably difficult, unbelievably. I mean I can't speak openly about my experience because it contains things which reflect on British national security, but I mean some of the visits I've made to Saudi Arabia to talk to the Saudis where they said, let's say the head of intelligence rather than a minister, because ministers didn't like doing business with them on certain issues, I mean the experience can be deeply unpleasant, you have no idea quite what it's like. And I mean that's the situation that we're in at the moment between, I mean there is this I think personal element of animosity between Salman and the Biden administration, there's no question that that exists. And I mean let's face it, Trump's attitude on Middle Eastern issues and Saudi Arabia in particular really shifted the tectonic plates in a way which is quite surprising, and that continues in the background because you've got these meetings now taking place at a lower ministerial level including the Israelis. And you know there's been a huge shift in the Middle East and you can't ignore that that's happened because it has momentum behind it. I mean I recently was talking to a young Bahraini minister and it would be indiscreet to name names, but I mean he was sort of explaining to me the benefits to them of the links that they now have with the Israelis, and this is unimaginable from the past. So there has been a shift, has been a movement, things have moved onwards.
Rosen: Absolutely, I mean there was this extraordinary meeting the past couple days you saw in Israel with the Israelis hosting several Arab foreign ministers and Blinken, and it's apparently going to be a semiannual event. And, you know, Bahrain and the UAE and Egypt and Jordan and Morocco participated. And even though Saudi Arabia hasn't joined the Abraham Accords yet, there have been reporting that Mohammed bin Salman would be interested. It's his father, the king, who is probably putting the brakes on that for now. Can I ask, Justin, because your paper reported a couple weeks ago that Mohammed bin Salman supposedly rebuffed a White House effort to see if he would be interested in a phone call with President Biden? What did you make of that report and the Kremlinology kind of event?
Scheck: It was fascinating. This whole dance around who Mohammed bin Salman's gonna talk to on the phone has been going on for a while. Because for some time, there was this stance in the US that the president speaks with heads of state, and people who work for the president speak to the sons of heads of state. And, you know, Biden didn't want to get on a call with Mohammed bin Salman. And so now there is sort of this crisis, and there's a reason to do it. Mohammed bin Salman is kind of, again, tactically able to win this little battle. And it looks a lot like playing games. And I think ultimately it is. But back to something Richard had said, I think what a lot of this is rooted in is that, you know, he doesn't see this as I need to deal with America and there're going to be ups and there're going to be downs in the relationship and it's a relationship. I think he sees this as he had these really difficult Americans who were in charge. And then the Trump people came in and they had this totally different worldview where in the eyes of the Trump administration, the Middle East was like good guys and bad guys. And the good guys are Israel and Saudi Arabia and UAE. And the bad guys are Iran and Qatar and maybe Turkey. And there was inevitably going to be a conflict. And the US was fine with hastening that conflict and finally taking sides. He loved that. That's his vision. That aligns with his vision. Now he's back to these guys who want some kind of stasis and they want a balance of power and they want to sort of help out the bad guys and kind of tamp down the good guys. And it's, he doesn't like any of this. So everything he does is little things like not taking a phone call and not being willing to negotiate. I figure very much rooted in this idea in his head that he has a choice in which Americans to deal with.
Rosen: Well, there's someone else that Trump got along well with. You know, Trump got along pretty well with Putin, and he didn't care about his human rights record. He didn't care who he was poisoning in London or anywhere else. And you see that series of these events, and he didn't care about Putin's interference in the United States elections. What I'm talking about is there seems to be a risk of overreach on the Saudi part, you know, thinking that, you know, they'll get another Trump. Well, we've seen now that the US and the Western world has turned very hard against Russia. Putin did overreach, and a lot of Americans are not going to be sympathetic to MBS looking like he's trying to interfere in the United States elections and get more autocratic type figure like Trump in power. Can you speak to that a little bit? Because, you know, Biden has been talking about this battle between democracies and autocracies, and I don't think it's totally cynical.
Dearlove: I mean, I'm largely agreeing with Justin's analysis. I think, you know, his sort of reflection on the pettiness and the inwardness of the consideration of some of these issues. We see them from a different perspective, but you've got to, if you go to Riyadh and you sit down and interact with these people, you begin to understand why they have a different view.
Scheck: And the idea of politics being personal is totally amplified there because it's like much more literally.
Dearlove: Yeah, it's extreme. I mean, it's an extraordinary experience to have to, as it were, deal with this. And then the way that you are treated in relation, even if you've got really important things to say, it's all designed to sort of suck you into their local vision of how these things work, and I think, you know, we impose on them a vision which is not the way that they're thinking on a day to day basis. Maybe strategically, eventually they'll end up in a similar position to us, but not at the moment. Anyway, Justin, you go ahead.
Scheck: Well, one thing I just want to kind of digress for a second. When I kept on reading and hearing about this phone call issue with Biden it kept on, you know, I kept getting into this weird sense of deja vu. I went back and went through my book. And my co-author Bradley and I wrote about this one episode early on when after Salman became king, where Mohammed bin Salman asked the US ambassador if President Obama would meet with him. He wanted it to be one of his first meetings as, you know, as a prominent prince. And the ambassador said, no, you know, the US president meets with other heads of state. And at that point, Mohammed bin Salman wasn't even officially the crown prince. And so what Mohammed said in response was, okay, fine. I've got an invitation to meet Putin. I'm gonna go to Russia and meet him. So there is, you know, like this is a repeat at a very personal level of things he's been doing with these same people in the administration now for years. And so the question about autocracies and democracies, it's a really hard one for Saudi to stomach, I think, because Mohammed bin Salman is not like embarrassed about running an autocracy. He has never said he supports democracy. He doesn't seem to be sympathetic in any way to a participatory government. He is 100% comfortable with running this place as an absolute monarch. And I think the way he sees it is the US has been his country's ally for close to a century. And the monarchy has benefited the US and the monarchy has been loyal to the US. And so now to say, the US to say you don't like monarchies or you don't like autocracies is a betrayal to him. He sees that as a betrayal. And he sees this is an old friend that's not valuing the friendship. And so a lot of these things he's doing are ways of reminding the US of the value of the friendship. And it's a tough position for Biden. This is the US president. You don't want to be going around saying we hate autocrats except for our friendly autocrats. And they're great. It seems very hypocritical. But also when you say things like, you know, autocracy is bad, it can have a really, you know, corrosive effect on relationships like Saudi and UAE.
Rosen: Yeah. I mean, Sir Richard, I don't sense that the US, and I don't know about Britain, are really pushing that hard for the Saudis to, you know, democratize. I sense that it's also, even with Biden, a somewhat transactional relationship. Is that a fair characterization?
Dearlove: Well, I think that's fair. I mean, there's no way when British ministers go to Saudi Arabia, whatever they may say publicly, that they're seriously pushing the Saudis to democracy. I mean, if you experience Saudi society, there's no way that Saudi society in its current form and its religious structure is going to move in that direction at all. I mean it's going to, as it were, claim that they have a phrase which I think which Justin will be familiar with which is consultative democracy. And that means you go out and you have, you know, you're sure and you meet with the people and you listen to what they have to say, but do they get a chance to vote or express their political views? No way. I mean you know the structure of Saudi society is essentially tribal and you know it's focused on tribal relationships, on the mosque, on various ways that you can express your views through those structures, but the idea that it's going to be, you know I think it's misguided of us to think that we can impose our political structures on them. And I mean Justin made this point, you know this is a 100 year old reliance, it goes way way back. And we have to recognize that there are autocrats, if you wish me to express it that way, and you know there are other autocrats who behave in their way which we thoroughly disapprove of. We disapprove of the Saudis in all sorts of ways, you know, they've just executed, you know, public execution of 81 criminals or something. Do we approve that? No, we deeply disapprove. But I mean the fact is that geopolitically they are our allies and they are relatively important geopolitically at the moment, particularly as they have this one lever which is, you know the price of oil and to an extent the price of gas, and they're going to play that for all it's worth in the current circumstances. But I mean the idea that the Saudis are going to cozy up to Russia in the long term I think is for the birds. I just don't think that that's going to happen. They can threaten us, they can make us believe that maybe that's what they're going to do, but that's not going to happen. Mohammed bin Salman, that's just a little bit different because they have a financial system there which is attractive to Russian oligarchs and autocrats, and they're desperate to sustain their financial center and their influence, and maybe Russian money will help them do that in a way that at the moment is looking pretty flaky and not so certain for the future. And I mean Mohammed bin Salman has always been equivocal, difficult to deal with, has played the West off, you know, France against the UK. There are all sorts of issues that I could create as an example, but I mean they're not going to change the geopolitics of the region, they're too small frankly.
Rosen: Let me ask, the Saudis are not the only players in the Middle East, the Emiratis have played a somewhat more ambiguous role, taking a somewhat more neutral position on Putin and making some more friendly noises in Biden's Washington on whether they'd support OPEC Plus increasing oil supplies. So, Sir Richard, tell me a little bit about the UAE and its balancing act as a smaller power. But it's also, you've seen this amazing in recent weeks, you know, the Abu Dhabi crown prince meeting with Assad, also meeting with the Israeli leaders. He was meeting with, going to meet with Blinken in Morocco. I mean, he seems to be the most diplomatically ambitious of the Middle Eastern leaders.
Dearlove: Yeah. Well, I think they are. I mean, you know, their power has a very narrow base, but on the other hand, they are currently geopolitically in the region influential because they've built up their defense capabilities, they're a confirmed opponent of Iran, they have a role to play. But as I say in the past, you know they're very good at, you know blowing hot and cold with you. It's very difficult on a year by year, month by month basis to understand exactly where you stand with them. They're tricky to deal with, but on the other hand they're essentially, you know, part of let's say the Western interest, if I can put it that way, in the Middle East, but they're not a sort of reliable and dependable partner. And I've mentioned this issue of, you know, they're trying to build a financial center in that part of the world, and you know they're obviously rather in awe of let's say the money of Russian oligarchs if it's going to move its focus out of London, which it certainly is now, and then be deposited in that area, and they could or would benefit from that. I still don't share the view that you're going to see them, as it were, alienating their relations with the West generally because of this crisis in Ukraine. They're going to try to play it to their own advantage, which is what we see at the moment. So there's going to be enormous awkwardnesses, disagreements, and problems, but do they have a longer term perspective? I'm not sure. I mean this issue comes up with the Chinese and their attitude towards dealing with the Chinese, and you can see that they're trying to play it both ways without, you know, burning their boats with the West, because ultimately they look in the West's direction, but on the other hand it's very tempting for them. And actually, I mean the irony is that Israel itself has been through this issue of close relations with China and pretty much come out the other side and decided that you know, although it has a surprisingly good relationship with both China and Russia, ultimately they look towards the United States as their primary ally.
Scheck: Yeah, I agree with that. I think on the Chinese front, China's sort of the interesting thing in the background because it doesn't make sense for Saudi Arabia and UAE to pivot from the US to Russia. You know, forty years ago, you could pivot from the US to the Soviet Union, and you could make a credible argument then for why you do that. But Russia is just not economically powerful enough. It's not stable enough. It's not significant enough globally to ally as a substitute for the US, whereas China arguably is. And I think there's a problem with trade because nobody buys or sells things in yuan. But in other ways, I think, you know, in theory, they could pivot to China. It doesn't seem like it would be in their best interest. At least it wouldn't be in their best interest the way they've been framing their interests for decades. And I think they do look to the West. And I also think, you know, something Sir Richard said just now is that this issue of, like, what is their long term strategy? What are their long term goals versus what's short term? And that's, you know, that's always a weird question there because Mohammed bin Salman has talked so much about how his top priority is getting away from the dependence on oil and becoming this global economic hub and becoming a place where oil isn't the only engine of the economy. Because for years, they've been worried about the oil running out. And more recently, they're worried about the demand running out. They're worried about electric cars and all these other measures that could reduce oil demand. And so I think he's very concerned with getting away from the reliance on oil. But he's also, in the very short term, using oil as this lever that could undermine some of the longer relationships.
Dearlove: I mean Justin's spot on because I mean look, let's just remind ourselves Russia has the GDP of somewhere between Italy and Denmark, and its prospects in the medium to long term as we cut, as it were, reliance on carbon energy are really poor. Its population last year declined by over a million, no one quite knows why. I mean this is not a major power, it's a major troublemaker that has phenomenally good rocket forces and a good underwater warfare capability, but it's invaded a near neighbor who it outnumbers ten to one, and it hasn't even succeeded militarily in gaining Ukraine. I mean, what's happening at the moment is appalling for Russia in terms of its global reputation, absolutely appalling, whatever we may think and however badly it turns out for Europe. I mean this is, you know the prime example of post imperial angst and decline. I mean Russia is on a very very slippery slope, and it'll cause great tragedy for a lot of people as it goes down this slope. China is a different issue, and of course you know it has the primary forces and the primary powers that Russia lacks.
Rosen: You're making me think that, in a way, this could work out pretty well for China. Right? Because over the past recent years, it's increasing its alliance with Putin, but Putin's becoming very dependent on them and weaker in between the two of them. Right? According to, you know, in relation to the West. And China, it seems, in a few years, would be the one to be able to emerge to tell Russia how it's going to be in their relationship.
Dearlove: Well of course it will because you know if we isolate Russia to the extent that sanctions suggest, well I think the unfortunate aspect of that is that we drive Russia into the arms of China, and you know how the, but I mean in terms of international acceptability and respectability, how Xi Jinping now plays his cards in terms of the global security system will tell us a great deal about the nature of the Chinese state, the Chinese administration, and what sort of partnership. I mean let's face it, if you look to the future the crucial partnership is going to be between the United States and China. It's not between the United States and Russia, and you know Xi Jinping has to worry much more about what the Americans think he's up to with Putin. And I mean the key question I think that we all need to answer in our minds is did Putin tell Xi Jinping at the Winter Olympics meeting that he was going to invade Ukraine?
Rosen: So Western, I mean, if you listen to Biden it sounds like Putin may not have told him the whole plan.
Dearlove: Well, you know, let us hope for Xi Jinping that he didn't tell us, because you know if Xi Jinping turned around and said to him, fine, go ahead. I mean you know there's an absolutely key question here about our future relations and the way that you know Pax Americana will adapt to a world in which it's, you know China as a partner. So I mean what's happened in the last six to eight weeks is absolutely seminal in terms of our future interpretation of international security. I mean this is both tragic, but it's also fascinating if you're a student of geopolitics.
Rosen: Is there any wedge to be partially driven between Russia and China over these horrific events? If you're Biden, are you, you know, he talked with Xi and Jake Sullivan was meeting with his Chinese counterpart last week. And, you know, are they trying to actually drive a wedge between China and Russia, or you think they're just trying to, I don't know. I think that's a good question.
Scheck: I'm sure they are trying to drive a wedge, but it's unrealistic. I don't know how much leverage they have. Because it's like, this is one of these things where I think the ball is in China's court. Because China doesn't, I think China's players, have that much to gain by really going out and supporting Russia, doing something that most of the rest of the world condemns. But also doesn't have that much to lose other than goodwill and maybe the convenience of the relationship with the US. So it's hard for me to see what leverage the US could put on them. But it's also hard for me to see why China would want to really go out on a limb and really help Russia out here. I don't think China has that much to gain by furthering this war and furthering the invasion.
Dearlove: So I think that if you follow Chinese politics closely, there's been a definite, let's say, restraint in some aspects of Chinese foreign policy in the last eighteen months. They have been in a way less aggressive than they were during a certain period, and I think there's an element within the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party which is saying look hang on a moment, soft power for China has always been a hugely important benefit. We have not been seen as an internationally aggressive nation, that's despite their behavior in the South China Sea. And I think that I agree with Justin about what do they gain from coming out as a sort of backer of Putin? It damages Chinese international image to a point which I think works very adversely in terms of China's long term interest. And of course you know we have the dreadful parallel sitting there potently of Taiwan. But I mean the crucial question for all of us is what lesson do the Chinese draw from Ukraine if they look at Taiwan? And I mean the likelihood is that they draw caution. You know, an amphibious invasion of a mountainous island, you know, where the military which is, I mean on Taiwan, which is highly sophisticated, armed by the West, have all the advantage of modern weapons, the Chinese must be thinking, yes, maybe political pressure is the way to go, not military pressure. I mean obviously they've obtained their military capability and it will look like pressure, but you know so there are some really potent questions raised about the bigger, you know, the bigger issue of our future relations with China, and of course at the moment we can't think too much about those because the tragedy of Ukraine is so overwhelming.
Rosen: It is overwhelming.
Scheck: Yeah, I'm far from an expert on China, but one of the differences between China and Saudi Arabia when we're talking about their relationships with Russia is that whereas China has not really had an appetite for loss of life and military adventures that can result in a lot of dead people, Mohammed bin Salman has shown a real willingness to engage in deadly conflict, essentially for political purposes in Yemen. And when the Yemen bombing started, he said it would be over two weeks. And that was close to seven years ago. And he's shown a willingness to continue dropping bombs that are killing civilians and continue taking actions that are resulting in widespread humanitarian crises for essentially a political war.
Rosen: And all this time, I mean, the Houthi missile strikes and drone strikes on Saudi Arabia and the Emirates are becoming even more alarming, right, than when the war started during the Obama administration.
Scheck: Right. But if he tries to stop those drone strikes by stopping the bombing, then he looks like he lost. And he can't afford to look like he lost because, yeah. I mean, he backed himself into a corner. He's not the king yet. He has to be able to claim victory. And so it's very difficult when you're dealing with someone whose foreign policy is based largely around bolstering their own standing within their own country. It's a very difficult situation.
Rosen: Absolutely. So I was in Vienna recently watching the Iran nuclear talks when they seemed like they were almost going to reach conclusion a couple weeks back, and, literally, it was the day after the war in Ukraine had started. And at that point, the, you know, the Russians and Chinese and Americans and Europeans all seemed to be working pretty well together. And it literally shifted over the next two weeks as it was clear that the instructions from Moscow to Russia's negotiator in Vienna were shifting as Western sanctions were imposed on Moscow. And you saw Russia, for a time, suggest that it might put up roadblocks to letting the Iran deal come into force and Iran bringing all its oil onto the market. That hurdle seems to have been overcome. Now we're waiting, it seems, on a couple last decisions related to the terrorism designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. But I would say we've seen eleven months of negotiations, and the deal looks pretty close. How do you both see, I would say, the likelihood of the Iran deal being resurrected affecting the Saudis and this whole puzzle?
Dearlove: I've always been a skeptic about the JCPOA. I think it's given the, you know, Iranians a ticket to misbehave across the Middle East, having made this deal on one issue. Frankly, I think in the current circumstances, despite the fact that supposedly these last bits have been put in place, I think we may find that there's a sort of deep freeze on the issue and there isn't final agreement. That would be my prediction, but I'm not closely informed, this is purely a guess on my part, and in a way I'd have to, as it were, reveal a personal preference for the JCPOA not being renewed.
Rosen: All right Justin, what about you?
Scheck: I don't know, I think it's a great question. I think it's obviously a priority of this administration to come to some agreement with Iran. They feel that's the most likely route toward a peaceful Middle East. And I think we don't know the lengths to which the Saudis and the Emiratis are willing to go right now to try to get in the way of that. I think in the next couple of weeks, we'll see it play out if they decide to continue holding off on nuclear fuel production or give some more meaningful support to Russian sanctioned oligarchs or something as a way of getting in the way of the deal. I think it could be a long time before something happens. At the same time, during the initial iteration of the Iran deal, it was hardly catastrophic for Saudi or UAE. They worry about it as an abstraction and as what does it mean, what are the long term implications. But life went on as normal. And in theory, the way the US sees it, Saudi Arabia will be a safer place for the deal. So I think a lot of it is about principle and about not wanting the US to support Iran rather than about practicalities of the deal. And so that makes it very unpredictable to know or to, you know, to say what they're gonna do or how they wanna proceed.
Rosen: Right. And we saw Mohammed bin Salman, I think, in an interview a couple weeks back, kind of said, you know, he has, Saudis have to live with Iran in the neighborhood. He said something slightly more conciliatory than the types of things he was saying about Iran during the Obama administration when there was really a lot more panic, I think.
Scheck: I agree. Yeah. Because some things you see more conciliatory and other things, it was like, wow. He really is, you know, going all out in a very aggressive way. So I agree. That was really interesting.
Rosen: And do you have anything on just the Saudis agreeing to talk with the Iranians in Iraq? I know it's been interrupted for a few weeks by the Iraqi government formation, the stall, and that the Saudis have been willing to sit with the Iranians since Trump left.
Scheck: Yeah. I mean, that seems like a very large step forward because in the past, it was almost unthinkable. I don't know what that means in practical terms. So Richard might have a better insight on that than I do because to me, it seems like, it's not like their problem is that they lack common ground in which to negotiate. They have a ton of common ground. They're unwilling to see it because Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed for their whole lives have felt that the Persians are their mortal enemies. That's what they call the Persians, their mortal enemies. And the only way to deal with it is to vanquish them. So I think it would be a first if they were to sit down and say like, oh, well, look, what's good for you is what's good for me, and let's not bomb each other. I mean, that alone would be like a huge step.
Dearlove: All I would say is that I'm deeply skeptical, the Saudis and the Iranians. I mean there's a huge amount of initiative behind the scenes, like on the part of Oman, to get the two sides talking to each other, and I mean, you know, if you spend time in the Middle East, you know that there are the basic civilities as to how you deal with your enemies or how you actually can at certain points in time sit down and talk to them. Substance? No way. Thank you both very much for this interesting discussion. That's it for this week's episode of One Decision.
Rosen: I'm Laura Rozen, and it was a pleasure being a guest host. Don't forget to subscribe so you never miss an episode. From me and the team, thanks for tuning in. See you next week.
