Episode Info
- Season14
- Episode2
Hosted by Christina Ruffini and Sir Richard Dearlove
Guest
Episode Summary
The day before Putin's State of the Union address, President Joe Biden emerged in dramatic fashion beneath Ukraine's glimmering golden domes. A secret operation got him on the ground to meet with Volodymyr Zelensky in the Ukrainian capital. Air raid sirens blared out as Biden strolled the streets of Kyiv with Zelensky - the first time in modern US history a serving president visited a warzone without the aegis of an American military presence. The former head of MI6 Sir Richard Dearlove talks about the significance of such a visit and what it portends for enduring American support. Plus, the NATO Secretary General is publicly floating the idea of Finland being fast-tracked to membership in the alliance without their neighbor Sweden, with whom they presented a joint bid. Sweden’s Foreign Minister joins us to discuss how worried his country is about Turkey’s intransigence on the issue.
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Transcript
INTRODUCTION
Mcfarlane: You're listening to One Decision, the podcast that looks at how single choices made by individuals can influence the world. I'm your host, Julia McFarlane, along with the former chief of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove. Among the biggest stories last year was the historic breaking of neutrality by Sweden and Finland. They announced that in the light of Putin's invasion of Ukraine, they would seek NATO after decades outside of the alliance. This week, we're joined by the new Swedish foreign minister, Tobias Billström. But before we look at what the latest is on Sweden's membership to NATO, we had to address what has been a pretty busy few days in international politics. Richard, it's been a pretty eventful week this week. This is, of course, the week where the world is going to be marking the one year anniversary of Putin's invasion into Ukraine, which he launched last February 24. And so it has been the week of the one year of Putin's war, and we've all known that was coming, but what we didn't know was coming was that President Biden was going to go to Kyiv on this surprise visit. Now there had been a lot of speculation that Biden may have gone to Ukraine, because his trip to Poland, to the Polish capital of Warsaw, has been on the agenda. But it was something that was rather like Zelensky's trip to London and to Europe, something that was conducted in top secrecy because of the obvious security risks. Biden took a ten hour train ride to Kyiv, and he spent about four hours in the capital and then hopped on another ten hour train ride back to Poland, rail force one, as it's been nicknamed on social media. That was really interesting. I mean, how important do you think was it for President Biden to go and visit President Zelensky in his city, in the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv? And what do you imagine Putin would have thought when the Russians were informed that this was happening? We do know that the Americans did tell the Russians that President Biden was on his way to Kyiv a few hours in advance. How bad did that look for President Putin symbolically? I mean, it was a massive middle finger to Putin, really, from President Biden rocking up in Kyiv, the day before he was set to deliver his State of the Union speech.
Dearlove: Well, I think it's a huge blow to Putin's prestige that Biden undertakes a journey like that. I think, you know, obviously, the timing was, quite apart from the anniversary, I think the timing was carefully chosen because you've got this movement amongst the Republicans in Congress to try to reduce and audit the funding and support going to Kyiv. And I think it was clearly important for Biden, as it were, to make a counter statement, to show the world really that he was solidly behind the Ukrainians and that they could continue to rely on American support. And additionally, I mean he gave another great slug of money or a big commitment for more monetary and weapons support. So I think it was obviously the timing was really vitally important. And I think also to do Poland at the same time, and as it were to contest the anniversary, because Putin obviously made this big speech within the same time frame. And I mean, Putin's speech is really extraordinarily awful in terms of some of the things that he said. I see the BBC have done a fact check on it, but I haven't yet gone through the facts, you know, the whoppers that Putin can stand up. I just wonder what these, you know, anybody who's dealt with the Russians knows that they're very intelligent, perceptive people. I mean, what on earth are they thinking when they stand up and listen to this rubbish?
Mcfarlane: Yeah. I mean, that speech was vintage Putin, in a number of ways. He mentioned that, you know, the people of Donbas have been fighting since 2014, he admitted to say, against Russian invading forces. Bizarrely, he railed against gay marriage in the UK. He accused the West of starting the war first. One thing that was interesting was he announced that he was formally pulling Russia out of the New START treaty. That is this mutual arms treaty between the United States and Russia, and it's meant to limit the amount of nuclear weapons that both countries have. The way that this works is that both sides commit to talks with each other in negotiations and allow each other to inspect nuclear weapons arsenals. And it's something that both sides have to proactively engage in. And what's happened is that the Russians, since last year, actually, they have stopped talking with the Americans. They have ceased all sort of cooperation with enforcing the New START treaty. They have refused to allow any inspections to take place. So he announced something that has in practice, you know, really been the case for months, really. And then he also threatened to restart nuclear weapons testing. I have to say there wasn't really any huge announcement. I mean, that quitting New START, you know, as I said, he was only really articulating something that in practice has really been the case for a few months already.
Dearlove: I think you put your finger on it when you said, well, there wasn't really anything in Putin's speech other than some, you know, the usual absurdities and some very extreme and rather ridiculous statements, which almost make the West laugh.
Mcfarlane: But it wasn't just the Russian president making big speeches this week. President Joe Biden, shortly after returning from his surprise visit to Kyiv, took the train back to Poland and to the capital of Warsaw. On Tuesday evening, he made an address that mirrored the one he gave in that very same city eleven months ago at the Royal Castle in Warsaw, a month after Putin invaded Ukraine. This time, Biden warned Putin that Ukraine would never be a victory for Russia, saying brutality will never grind down the will of the free. But this wasn't just a speech aimed at the Ukrainians. Speaking in Warsaw, Biden was also addressing Poland and other Eastern European allies when he reiterated the US's rock solid commitment to NATO and the spirit of Article 5, the NATO mutual defense guarantee. It is that guarantee and insurance that countries Sweden and Finland broke decades of neutrality to seek when they applied for NATO membership last year. Submitting their application as a joint ticket, they have both jointly faced a roadblock in the form of Turkish president Erdogan. He wants the extradition of dozens of people he feels are guilty of involvement in the failed coup against him back in 2016. Some of those people are members of the PKK prescribed terrorist organization, but others are teachers, journalists, and critics, putting both Sweden and Finland in a tricky spot. Sweden has a new government in place, a three party right wing coalition, including a far right radical party that was founded by Nazi sympathizers, the Sweden Democrats. Sweden's accession into NATO is an urgent priority for the new government. This week, we sat down with the new Swedish foreign minister, Tobias Billström, and we asked him how the process was going.
INTERVIEW: SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER TOBIAS BILLSTRÖM
Mcfarlane: Minister Billström, thank you so much for joining One Decision today. It's a really, really great time to talk to you. Very, very relevant time to talk to you as Sweden is taking up the presidency of the European Union Council for the first half of this year, and your government has laid out your priorities for the bloc during this time. I believe, security, unity, competitiveness, green and energy transitions, democratic values, and the rule of law. We spoke to your Finnish counterpart, Pekka Haavisto, who was very optimistic at the time of reaching agreement with Turkey. They have demanded that Sweden and Finland address their security concerns when it comes to Kurdish militants whom the Turks see as terrorists who allegedly took part in that 2016 failed coup against President Erdogan. And Ankara is demanding over 100 suspects from both Sweden and Finland. I wanted to ask you, minister, what's the latest in your negotiations with the Turks? I mean, I know Sweden extradited one Kurdish man who allegedly had ties to the PKK, but then the Swedish courts last year, they blocked the extradition of a journalist that the Turks wanted to get their hands on. It's a good time to ask you because there's been a lot of tensions rising after these protesters in Stockholm, in your capital. They hung an effigy of the Turkish president Erdogan. There was also outrage after a far right politician burned a Quran outside the Turkish embassy in Stockholm. Have these incidents thwarted your bid to join NATO? Is it more of a question of waiting until the next Turkish general elections perhaps, or are you inevitably going to have to send Ankara their political prisoners in exchange for NATO membership?
Billstrom: Thank you very much for the questions. First of all, the issue of Sweden and Finland becoming NATO members is, of course, very high on the Swedish government's agenda, and it remains like that because of the dire security situation that we have in our part of the world and also, of course, on a global scale following Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Now I would like to be very clear on two things since you brought forward quite a long list of things that have happened. First of all, there are, of course, no negotiations. Negotiations, they were finalized at the Madrid summit, and they concluded with the signing of the trilateral memorandum between Sweden, Finland, and Türkiye, where we lay down certain issues where Sweden and Finland should deliver on a number of matters where Turkey felt that their security needs were to be satisfied. Now we have said repeatedly for the Swedish government, where I'm foreign minister, but we, of course, are going to do everything which is laid down in the memorandum, and we have done so. And we have now reached the point where we believe that every issue has been dealt with and where the Turkish parliament should start the ratification process. Now, of course, this is a question where the process is today. We believe that there shouldn't be any kind of hindrance in the way for the Turkish parliament to continue and follow up on the ratification. As I've said also, everything within the memorandum should be fulfilled. Any demands outside of the memorandum could only be met by the Swedish or the Finnish government if they are within the framework of our constitution, our legislation, and normal principles, or fundamental principles, I should say, for rule of law.
Mcfarlane: Right. I mean, that is something that is almost sort of open to interpretation from the Turks' point of view because they, in the subsequent appearances after the signing of that memorandum, they appeared to be under the impression that Sweden and Finland promised extradition of the people that they want to get their hands on. Whereas Sweden and Finland have been very clear that they promised that they would process extradition requests, but not necessarily grant them. So is that something that you can negotiate with Turkey, or do you think they're going to be pretty bullish about demanding these people that they want out of your country?
Billstrom: Well, first of all, as I said, you know, the negotiations were finalized in Madrid. And if for anyone who reads this memorandum and it's open, there are no secret protocols or anything to it. Everyone can see what's written into it. And there are no mentioning of either individuals or extraditions as such. It says that if there are demands put forward, they will be dealt with within the framework of the European Convention of Extradition, a document or a treaty where both Sweden, Finland, and incidentally also Türkiye signed up to. So I believe that there is no nothing unclear or opaque with the memorandum. And so, again, we have fulfilled what we promised to fulfill when this treaty was signed in Madrid.
Mcfarlane: Recently, the NATO secretary general suggested that Sweden and Finland may not have to join NATO as a pair. Now some officials have said that Stoltenberg's comments potentially reflect a shift in attitude, that Finland's long 1,300 kilometer border with Russia makes it more critical that they be admitted into NATO as soon as possible, even if it means leaving Sweden behind. I mean, Sweden and Finland, you have both presented your bids as a joint ticket to NATO. So was this recent suggestion by the NATO chief a blow for your country?
Billstrom: No. I don't see it that way, especially not since I saw the follow-up press conference where secretary general Stoltenberg made it very clear that in his opinion, Sweden and Finland should join together, and that this is a good thing for NATO as an organization, and that it will strengthen the organization's capability of securing peace and stability. So from our point of view, things are exactly the same. But having said this, it has been quite clear right from the outset that the decision of bringing on new members into NATO is a question of state sovereignty. It is always the individual parliaments, Sweden, Finland, Turkey, and all the other members up to the 30 members that the organization have. They all make individual decisions. So I think that sometimes it has been a bit overstated, this question. We know that this is the case, that Sweden has to make one decision, Finland another, Turkey a third, and this has been known from the outset. And we now have 28 member states of the 30 that has already decided upon Sweden and Finland and said that they are welcoming us, and we repeatedly get messages coming out from all the capitals in both Europe and across the Atlantic, from both Washington and Ottawa, that they are welcoming Sweden into the family. It is only Hungary and Turkey that remains who will have to take the decision.
Mcfarlane: I wanted to ask you about that interesting news last year of the arrest of two Russian spies in your security apparatus. There was that story last year where Swedish prosecutors, they charged two brothers of Iranian origin for allegedly spying for Russia's GRU, military intelligence service for ten years between 2011 and 2021. And one of those brothers had apparently even served in your intelligence service, SÄPO, and in intelligence units in the Swedish army. So I wanted to ask, where does Russia rank in your perceived threats to your nation? And, you know, does this figure in your push for NATO membership? I'm sure it does. But, you know, will NATO membership, do you think, elicit perhaps more aggression from the Russian intelligence services? Or will it be a deterrence, do you think?
Billstrom: Well, I would like to start by pointing out that we are not alone in this. As a matter of fact, given the consequences of Russia's aggression on Ukraine, we have seen in many states within the European Union and also abroad, the same phenomena that spies are being revealed because the activity of spying organizations in Russia has increased, thanks or due to the war. So that should be mentioned as well. This is not a separate Swedish issue. It's something which you can see in a or should be seen also in a broader sense. But again, well, of course, we know fully well that Russia's intention against Sweden and Finland has been to keep us outside of NATO. And that, of course, was the basis for the letter which was sent on the 17th of December 2021, where Russia declared that Sweden and Finland were to be forbidden to join NATO, and also that we somehow should be incorporated into a sphere of interest where Russia should decree what individual countries should do or should not do regarding their security situation. This has to be brought into context with the war in Ukraine, and the thing that prompted Sweden and Finland to join NATO was the understanding that Russia is fully capable of using military means to achieve their political means. And this in itself was, you know, the reason why we should understand the need to join NATO, in our case, to change our 200 year old policy of not being aligned, as we have said, to any kind of military alliance, which was a huge step. But when you see what Russia is doing in Ukraine, one understands exactly why we have to do this, and the same goes, of course, with Finland, who has a direct border with Russia. We understand that from this letter and from everything that has been going on in Ukraine and with the rising hostility of Russia towards its neighbors, we have to be very vigilant. We have to come to terms with the fact that Russia has hostile intentions to all of us who are its closest neighbors.
Mcfarlane: Right. One of the things you said in your recent speech was that the consolidation of democratic values, that means resilience and enlargement, was a key priority. And you mentioned that this was best realized by keeping the EU's door open to Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and countries in the Western Balkans. Obviously, all countries in Russia's sphere of influence. The Moldovan government recently announced that there had been a coup attempt in their country. And also here in the UK, there have been concerns raised that the Russians may turn their eyes to Moldova as well. What do you understand of the threat to these countries in Russia's sphere of interest, and what can the EU do? You said that the EU should keep its door open to Ukraine, Moldova, and these Western Balkan nations. But what does that mean? Keeping the door open? The door has been open to these countries for years. Will you actively seek to start the process of having these countries join the EU?
Billstrom: Well, it's always a question of keeping the door open. That is important. It is important to bring forward the concept of enlargement to the people of these states which you are mentioning, you know, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, etcetera. And I think that we should do that. It is our intention as presidency of the European Union to conduct such a policy, and it should be the intention of the European Union as a whole to have that kind of policy with the open door. But having said this, this has always been a question of a merit based process, where these countries who want to join the European Union have to fulfill certain criterias. And since you asked, you know, the door has been open for years, well, it do take years sometimes to fulfill the criterias, and it is right and proper that it should take years to do this because sometimes it means changing legislation, changing the concept of how the state functions, fighting corruption, which I have to say that Ukraine now, even under these hard circumstances that the war has brought on, it has actually been able to deliver. And this is exactly why the Swedish presidency have said that Ukraine should receive during this spring of 2023, a report back to Kyiv, how they have fulfilled the criterias, again, to show the concept of the open door. But you reach control stations, and you receive a mark of how well you are performing. And I could say the same with both Moldova and Armenia and Georgia, an ongoing process. And Ukraine, of course, is a special case because Ukraine has certainly merit a membership in the European Union in due time, and we should show that this is the way forward for this fighting country and its people. That is our belief, the Swedish government's belief.
Mcfarlane: I have one last question for you because I know we're running out of time. And I wanted to ask you about climate change, because Stockholm has said that it wants tackling this challenge to be a key priority as you take up your EU presidency. But the WWF and the Green Party, they're quite concerned about some of the policies of your new government. In October last year, they, along with a number of other Swedish conservation groups, they said that the climate policies presented by your new center right coalition will likely contribute to, they say, a drastic increase in greenhouse gas emissions during your mandate. Equivalent, they say, to around half the country's annual emissions. This is largely, I understand it, due to the lowering of the fuel reduction obligation that the governing parties and the coalition are wanting to implement. The Green Party spokesman, he said this is a real paradigm shift in Swedish politics. Environmental policy is going from full throttle to full speed backwards. Does he have a point?
Billstrom: Well, every country which is democratic normally has an opposition, a loyal opposition, as you say, in the UK, exception. And I, you know, fully honor the fact that the Green Party, of course, is quite entitled to their opinion. However, it doesn't match with reality, I should say. We have, from this government, a very, very strong emphasis of performing green transition. We believe that it is in the interest of the Swedish industry and by far also with the Swedish society if we want to remain competitive on the world market. Where Sweden has to be since we are an export dependent nation and our wealth and in consequence, also our welfare is dependent on us being able to sell products and services on a global market, which are green products and green services. So we put an emphasis on this, and we have green tech, I should say, a green tech process going on amongst Swedish companies, a bit regardless actually of what the government is doing because we can see already that many of them have changed. They have done this transmission out of their own accord. There is one component though, which I would like to stress, and that is energy. There we can see a big challenge for Sweden in the years to come. Unfortunately, the previous government, where the Green Party was a part of, has made some very drastic reductions when it comes to the Swedish energy market, particularly on nuclear power, where they have been responsible for shutting down fully functional nuclear reactors. Now, that has led to a deficit when it comes to energy production in Sweden, which we intend to amend by building new nuclear power stations. And we have made a big bid from the Swedish government in this direction. Let's hope that in the years to come, we will find financing solutions together with the Swedish industry, which has shown a great interest in this concept. And so we will be able to rebuild back and build back better as the term goes when it comes to the energy production in Sweden, which is extremely important for us as a nation.
Mcfarlane: Yeah, that's fair enough. I mean, you're essentially saying that you're lowering your targets with reducing fossil fuels. You're essentially saying that's being offset by some of your other green policies.
Billstrom: At the end of the day, it is the energy that is the key when it comes to transmissions in Sweden. If we are to change also the vehicle fleet as we have in Sweden with personal vehicles. If we are to change that from people driving on petrol instead of driving on electricity, we also have to produce more electricity. And it is a huge deficit when we look at the statistics from where we are now, where we have to be in, let's say, 2030 or even more 2040. So we have to do a lot of homework if we are to be able to reduce this gap, which we are now when it comes to energy production. And the energy has to be cheap, it has to be clean, and it has to be safe. It also have to be delivered on time, which is sometimes a problem with the wind power.
Mcfarlane: I appreciate it. Thank you so much, minister Billström. Really appreciate your time talking to us today, and I hope you'll join us on the podcast again soon.
Billstrom: Thank you very much. My pleasure. Bye bye.
ANALYSIS WITH SIR RICHARD DEARLOVE
Mcfarlane: The Swedish foreign minister Tobias Billström speaking with me earlier this week. We'll bring in my cohost, Sir Richard Dearlove, back now because the issue of Kurdish targets in Sweden who are wanted by Turkey doesn't look to be an issue that could likely be resolved anytime soon. The Turks, essentially, they want dozens of Kurdish targets to be extradited from both Finland and Sweden. Finland has half the number of people that Ankara want extradition of. However, something interesting that happened earlier this month was the NATO secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, at this summit of defense ministers that happened earlier in the month. He came out and he suggested that perhaps Finland could join NATO before Sweden did. And given that they share a 1,300 kilometer border with Russia, it was perhaps more important that they joined before Sweden. And it's interesting because until now, the Finns and the Swedes have presented their application for membership as a joint ticket. And so it was quite an interesting time to talk to the Swedish foreign minister about this because one might imagine that that would be a bit of a blow for Sweden if their sort of partners in this application process were to be admitted before them because there are these sort of sticking points between Sweden and Turkey that are proving a bit tricky to resolve. He tried to downplay the idea that it was a blow to them. He was supportive of Finland joining, but it is a priority of the new Swedish government that their membership to NATO be ratified and completed as soon as possible. And it's proving really a bit tricky at the moment. I mean, what did you make of his response to my question? And I'll ask you the same question I asked him. Do you think it's just a matter really for Sweden and potentially Finland of waiting until the Turkish general elections, which are due to take place later this year, for that to take place first?
Dearlove: Erdogan's acting in character and being a real pain in relation to this problem of Kurdish refugees, I mean they are PKK members and obviously the Turks view them as sort of enemies of Turkey, but terrorists rather than political enemies. There are many more, as you say, in Sweden than there are in Finland. I mean, my prediction is that the Finns will join first, and that there isn't really a significant blockage, I think, in terms of Finnish accession, and that probably the Swedes will have to wait because that's where the major problem lies. And you're right, they did make a joint application, we're expecting to join together. I'm not sure how long that Erdogan can hold out on this issue. I mean, I think you have to realize that Erdogan himself, he has not come out of this terrible earthquake very well. And that must, as it were, damage his political base because of the violation of the building codes and, you know, the huge problems of construction which derive really from corruption at the local government level. And I think Erdogan is going to reap that whirlwind. So the last election he faced, if I'm right, was a local election in Metropolitan Istanbul, and that went, I mean, he won it, but it was pretty close round thing and his opponents did quite well. So I think that looking to the future, probably you'll see the Finns come in, the Swedes wait till the election, and then we'll see where we stand after that. I think Erdogan is going to go on making life difficult for Sweden for the moment. But this accession to NATO is hugely significant, because, you know, this all started, and what I mean by that is the war started really to prevent Ukraine going west, if you see what I mean, whether it was membership of the EU or eventual membership of NATO. And the accession of these two countries make the Baltic really into a NATO lake. The Finnish military is hugely sophisticated. It probably has the best winter fighting capability in Europe. It has a small professional military but a huge call up. And they have the best artillery in Europe. I mean they are a formidable force and of course in the Finno-Russian war they showed their mettle, although they were fighting on the side of Germany in the early years of World War Two. It's quite complicated, so we're going to leave that historically. But they acquitted themselves amazingly well against the Red Army. And then the Swedes have a great air force, which has a very high level of competence, and a very, very effective navy. Land forces are not such a big deal. And then they have all sorts of other capabilities in terms of intelligence collection. And the Finns have that too. And, of course, their location in relation to Russia makes them really valuable. And this hugely strengthens the northern flank of NATO. It's a very big deal.
Mcfarlane: But I should note, going back to the extraditions that the Turks are seeking from Finland and Sweden, they're not all political party members. I mean, the BBC spoke to a few of those people on Ankara's list. I mean, one of them is a journalist. One of them is a teacher who fled Turkey. Another is someone who is convicted of arson and damage against the Turkish embassy over a decade ago. They managed to track him down, and he was quite surprised to find his name on the list because he served a short sentence for his arson. He paid damages to the embassy, and, you know, the case was closed according to him and the Finnish authorities. He's now actually a citizen. Some of these demanded extraditions by Ankara look a tad vexatious possibly, possibly bargaining chips or just simply critics of Erdogan that he just refuses to tolerate. And I think you're totally right that Erdogan has not come out of this earthquake in a strong position. And I wonder if that's gonna make him dig in a bit more when it comes to dealing with Finland and Sweden.
Dearlove: It is partly about internal Turkish politics and Erdogan's attitude towards the Kurds. And you're quite right. Some of them will be journalists, teachers, you know, cultural people or educators, you know, who have aspirations for a Kurdish independent state, you know, which is quite common in the Kurdish community. But Erdogan also, I think, is using this to maintain his relationship with Putin. And, you know, he's able to say to Putin as an interlocutor: Look, I'm doing you a big favor because I'm holding up the accession of these two countries to NATO. And I think Erdogan still probably has pretensions to be some sort of peacemaker or negotiator, and therefore it's quite natural that he should put himself in this sort of position using the Kurdish issue. It's not purely about Kurds, it's about Erdogan's arrogance and self esteem, and the fact that he sees himself as a geopolitically significant player.
Mcfarlane: One thing I wanted to ask you, another interesting development that we've seen in recent months is that Europe has been cracking down, has it not, on Russian spies. I mean, we have seen a few stories now of these arrests in Germany and Sweden. The Swedish spy story was interesting. That involving these two brothers who were accused of passing secrets back to Moscow. One of them was an intelligence officer in the Swedish security services. You know, very le Carré stuff. Do you think this is, I mean, obviously, like, Russia has spent decades trying to infiltrate Europe's security apparatuses. And these arrests that have taken place and these unveiling of these spies at these embassies across Europe has given us a little bit of a window. When I say us, I mean us mere mortals who have not had a background in working for MI6 as you have done, but of, you know, the sort of reach that the Russians can and do have in our security networks. I mean, what do you make of these recent arrests? And, you know, as much as you can divulge to us, you know, the job of unmasking Russian spies across Europe, across the UK, it's a difficult line to tread, is it not? Because on the one hand, if you unmask these people, and you flush them out, you lose the intelligence you can potentially get on them and potentially what the Russians can get up to? I'm talking about counterintelligence and things like that.
Dearlove: Well, I think, you know, this espionage activity goes on, and it has gone on all the time. I mean during the Cold War, since the end of the Cold War, there's no question at the moment that the situation is heightened because of Ukraine. And I mean, you're right, there has been a spate of arrests of pretty well placed Russian spies within, well, one in Germany who was clearly quite worrying, a relatively senior BND officer, that's a huge penetration and then another one, you're right, a pair of brothers in Sweden, and there have been others, there's an arrest in Norway of a GRU illegal. I mean, you get a spate of arrests like that, it probably suggests to someone with a professional background that the West are doing quite well themselves in penetrating Russian intelligence. The easiest way to catch Russian spies is to penetrate the Russian services. And in fact, I think in the conditions of conflict that you have in Ukraine, there will be not necessarily lots but there will be disillusioned Russians who are themselves proud, you know, to be recruited by the West. And the West will be looking for Russians who have access to important intelligence and trying to recruit them. So, in a way, it's almost inevitable that this aspect of conflict will go on beneath the surface almost continuously, with ups and downs in the graph of activity. And at the moment the evidence unsurprisingly suggests a significant tick up in the graph, and that there's quite a lot going on.
Mcfarlane: Right. I mean, was it a kind of like, you know, endless fires you're having to put out, you know, as head of MI6? Was it something that was a constant issue?
Dearlove: Well, I'm not gonna say too much about this. But, I mean, basically—
Mcfarlane: But say a little.
Dearlove: A little. Well, I mean, there's a lot in the public domain. And I mean, bear in mind that SIS is an offensive intelligence service. And the best way to defend yourselves is to be offensive, if you see what I mean, and to penetrate the other side. The security service or any European security service is there to catch spies, but it's a lot easier for them to catch spies if they're told, okay, we know there's a penetration, we've got this little bit of information, here's a thread that you can start pulling on, and hey presto, you found the person that you're looking for. But I mean this activity, the Russians are pretty good. The external service, which is called the SVR, the old first chief directorate of the KGB, are pretty clever at espionage. They've got deep roots, it goes right back to the early stages of the Soviet regime. And they put a big amount of effort into this type of activity. And, you know, historically, there's stacks of stuff in the public domain about it. You only have to read a book like the Mitrokhin Archive. Mitrokhin was the chief archivist of the KGB, and he kept massive records and notes illegally, which he transcribed in the office and smuggled out in his trousers and then buried under his dacha, and for complex reasons eventually decided he was going to defect to the West, which he did at the end of the Cold War in the early 90s. And when he came out, he came out with this trunk of KGB archives, which are unique, and they're all published now, so you can sit down and read it. But I mean, if you're really interested, that's probably the most authoritative work in the public domain which explains what this was like during the Cold War and actually his book goes right back to the early stages of Trotsky and Lenin as well. It's fascinating and it's authentic. I mean, I think Mitrokhin is deceased now, but it's an extraordinary story. And it was a massive intelligence coup at the time, and I do remember that the Russians were falling over themselves, their individual officers, to buy copies of the book, which was published initially in the UK and in English. And we saw them running around town buying like 50 copies in one day.
Mcfarlane: I need to watch that film. I mean, yes. I mean, an incredible story. I just quickly wanted to ask you one last question. We saw in Putin's speech, and we've heard him say this before, this is, you know, this is a fight against the West. This is a conflict against the West. How long can he continue to keep framing it in that way and still confine his military tactics to within Ukrainian lines? I mean, I'm essentially asking, like, how worried do you think Poland, the Baltic states, how worried they should be?
Dearlove: Well, I think their membership of NATO actually gives them very significant protection. So Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which guarantees NATO intervention if the Russians were to cross that red line and go beyond Ukraine. And I mean that is a massive or would be a massive escalation and the Americans and we on our side and Europe on our side have been careful not to take steps which are provocative in terms of creating an escalation. The thing is that it's a European war and it, as it were, contains the elements of a European conflict, but it's being fought by a proxy. The West's proxy is Ukraine. And we are very fortunate to have courageous Ukrainian soldiers, men and women, fighting for a principle that we wish to defend. And I mean, I think what's extraordinary about this is that Ukrainians aren't asking us to do the fighting with them, they're asking us to provide the means for them to do the fighting. And I think, you know, this is a huge issue in Europe, and of course incredibly important. And I think that if Ukraine were to fall, and I mean almost completely, not just part of it, I think that's unlikely. But if it were to happen, then I think there is a broader risk to other countries of the former Soviet empire, particularly the smaller ones like the Baltic Republics. And you know, obviously you've got the example of Moldova as well, which is highly vulnerable for reasons of geography.
Mcfarlane: Oh yes, I mean, Moldova is a topic for its own podcast in itself, but the recent reports of an attempted coup are absolutely fascinating and definitely deserve, we need to go into that in more detail. But just finally, I just wanna pick you up on something really interesting that you just said. You said that, you know, Ukraine is the West's proxy. And, you know, it's interesting because that's exactly what Putin argues, that the West is using Ukraine as a proxy against Russia. The Ukrainians also say, you know, we are fighting Europe's war. We are your front lines. We are fighting not just for our safety, but for European safety. But it's the West and particularly, you know, Biden this week really trying to frame it not in those terms, trying to frame this as Ukraine's fight, which the West supports. But I do think it is interesting because narrative and framing is incredibly important, particularly when you have someone like Putin who uses narratives, a lot of people will say false narratives, to justify to his home population exactly what his strategic goals are. And he is deliberately trying to frame this as a war that the West is fighting, against the Russians. And we see the West bending over itself to try and not frame this in a way that gives any kind of credence to Putin's claims of, like, NATO expansionism or anything like that, to try and deny Putin any kind of justification or any kind of credibility for his justifications. But the Ukrainians and the Russians are sort of saying the same thing, that this is a battle between Russia and the West, but it's one that the West really does not wanna face up to right now.
Dearlove: I mean, I agree that there is a complexity of explanation and framing. But if you wish, what we're witnessing is a significant part of the previous Soviet empire, and a strategic part as far as Russia is concerned, breaking away. I mean, this is the end of the Soviet imperium. And I think I've said it before, Russia without Ukraine is a much diminished power, because you know, if you look at Russian history, you go back to Catherine the Great, she understood that the natural wealth and riches of Ukraine would make Russia great. And, you know, she founded the city of Odessa for the export of grain to the world. And this has a very, very long history. And I think for a long, long period of time, the Ukrainian identity was suppressed, or at least had no sovereign expression of significance. And of course, I think this is where Putin suddenly made such a severe misjudgment, because in that period of the early 90s onwards, I think what's extraordinary is the speed at which Ukraine has turned into a sovereign nation, determined to preserve its culture and its identity, and they're prepared to fight to the death to do it. And then the interests that have become invested in this war become very potent. You only have to look at a map and see where Ukraine is to understand why and how this has happened. I think if you have an understanding of modern European history, then there is a track down through historical events to where we've ended. And of course the irony is, we wouldn't be at war with Russia through Ukraine if Putin hadn't taken this extraordinary decision and, you know, marched his army into the country. I mean, the thing is it's absolutely black and white, really.
Mcfarlane: It's something that Putin continuously omits from all of his speeches and every word that he says about Ukraine.
Dearlove: Of course. And it started off as a special military operation. It wasn't even an invasion. But of course now, you know, it's matured, the terminology has changed, our perception has changed, it's become a globally potent issue. And I think, you know, we're all sitting there at the end of year one trying to anticipate and predict where it will go, but my word, it's difficult to be accurate. The only thing I think we can say with great accuracy is that Putin's initiative in doing this has failed. And you know, we're now into the complexity of where it goes and how it develops further. But what he set out to do, he failed drastically and decisively. And you've already quoted the example of NATO emerging from this massively strengthened, which is exactly what Putin wanted to achieve the opposite.
Mcfarlane: That's it for this week's episode of One Decision. We drop new episodes every Thursday. Like and subscribe so you never miss an episode. Drop us a line. Tell us your thoughts. What decisions have impacted you and where you live? You can write to us. Our email is 1decision@1decisionpodcast.com. From me and the team, thank you for listening, and see you next time.
