Episode Info
- Season11
- Episode5
Hosted by Christina Ruffini and Sir Richard Dearlove
Guest
Episode Summary
The former head of MI6 does not often take questions from the public. To mark One Decision’s first year, Sir Richard Dearlove agreed to take a few submitted by our listeners via social media and the web site. He provides analysis, intrigue and his behind-the-scenes insights on the issues that are on the top of your minds. We look back at pivotal points in recent history like the Iraq War and the role that intelligence played in the West’s decision to go to war. We look ahead to what China is likely to do on Taiwan. We look around at how the world is responding to the threats of climate change, changing demographics, and our polarizing political environment. This is a truly unique episode created by our audience across the globe.
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Transcript
INTRODUCTION
Lockwood: You're listening to One Decision, the program that looks at the choices made that have international impact. And we are officially one year old. We are so grateful to have you, our listeners, on this journey with us as we seek out conversations and reflections with the key decision makers, experts and activists of today and consider how those in charge arrive at the choices that they've made and how those decisions stand today. Along the ride from day one has been my cohost, Sir Richard Dearlove, the former chief of MI6. He's had to make one or two important decisions in his time steering British intelligence during some of the rockiest years of UK national security from 1999 to 2004, a time that, of course, spanned the earlier years of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the transition of Western security services around the world seeing a rapid retuning from being forces responding to the end of the Cold War to ones tasked with fighting insurgencies in the Middle East and responding to the security threats following the 9/11 attack. For this anniversary episode, we turned to you, our audience, to send us questions on what you think are the key challenges facing our leaders today. What choices need to be made and what you wanted answered from us. I'll start with one that comes from Oswald who has written to us on Twitter. It's a very big question, so I think we should open on this. His question is demography. What will our world look like in a hundred years? Is anyone interested in optimizing for the outcome in Western societies versus next ten years or election cycle?
DEMOGRAPHICS
Dearlove: My word. That is such a tough question to give a logical reply to. I suppose the first thing I would say is I don't think we pay enough attention to demographics. It's a crucial issue for many many countries. There is not much discussion at the moment. We focus on climate change, but we don't focus on population change, either growth or decline. And there was a period of time in my earlier career when everybody spoke about population growth. I mean it was a constant topic that came up and it somehow seems to have been pushed to one side and off the agenda. So it's a good question. But I think that it's much more straightforward than that in a way, in the extrapolations from current trends, looking at population growth or decline are not necessarily logically mathematical. And I think there are many examples where predictions have turned out to be not just wrong, but wildly wrong. So the current prediction that global population is in decline is probably a dangerous one if you take it as too much of a certainty. But on the other hand, it's not what the sort of experts say, but if you're thinking about climate change, one of the more reassuring facts, if we have the time, is that there are less people in this world.
Lockwood: Yeah, I think it's interesting because as you say, it's something that's difficult to predict because if you look at China, which was the, well, which still is, but will shortly no longer be the world's biggest population. The legacy of the one child policy where they took out drastic policies to try and cut the number of people and the huge birth rate. And now they have the opposite problem where they're trying to get people to have children and you have now a lot of Chinese citizens actually hesitating when it comes to having more children or starting a family because they say they can't afford it. And that's a trend that you see in a lot of developed countries, which is interesting because in some developing countries, the birth rate is large because having children and having a large number of children is an economic argument, it helps sustain the family. Someone was telling me a very interesting anecdote about Chinese press.
Dearlove: I think it was actually a Chinese Communist Party statement or announcement when it was saying to Chinese women, do not, as it were, depend on meeting Mr. Right. Depend on meeting Mr., well, he'll do.
Lockwood: Oh, it's the death of romance, isn't it? If you think about it, it's quite a depressing message for a government.
Dearlove: You know, to be disseminating, and it shows a certain desperation. But actually, if you look at the demographics of Russia, if you look at the demographics of China, they're really appalling. They contain very, very serious implications for the leadership because you have an aging population, you have a declining workforce, you have all those problems of how a smaller workforce is gonna pay for a lot of uneconomical citizens who are gonna live a long time because of improvements in medical health.
Lockwood: But on the other side of the scale, have countries with very large and very rapidly increasing birth rates, and you have countries like Nigeria. I'm very interested in what happens in Nigeria in the decades to come because they have a growing population. It's a very young population. The number of people in Nigeria is going to grow. And it's also a country that is very, very dependent on oil. And so what happens if they cannot diversify their economy? You have a very, very growing population in Central Africa, and then you mentioned climate change. What is gonna happen with climate change and we're seeing desert drift? I don't know the technical name for it, but temperatures rising across the world, and we're seeing climate migrants.
Dearlove: Well, you get climate migrants, which I think is already a significant feature of the African continent. I mean, I lived in Kenya, which wasn't that long ago, it was in the late sixties, it was my first overseas posting. The population was somewhere, I think, between fifteen and sixteen million. And Kenya is an immensely productive country agriculturally. It had no problem feeding its population even then. I think now the population of Kenya is somewhere between thirty five and forty million. That's just in the latter stages of the twentieth century. If you actually go and travel in bits of Kenya, you will see that the disintegration of the land holding the tiny little farms, are now uneconomical. I mean all the immediate problems of that huge social transformation.
Lockwood: And the population has more than doubled in forty years. This is such a huge question that we could spend a whole podcast on. But I would just say that my personal opinion, and it isn't a cynical negative one, I'm afraid, but I think that we are in no way prepared for some of the challenges that await us. And I think what happened with COVID really demonstrated that we live in systems that are very precariously balanced, whether it's the just in time supply chain or the way we live our lives and how we go to work and how we structure our lives. Everything from the fact that we rely on digital systems, which are vulnerable to attack, and the fact that we have not even begun really thinking about the issue of water scarcity and all that, we were not prepared. Rising sea level. Exactly and then, yeah, the city that I was born in Jakarta is, they're wanting to up sticks and relocate their capital.
Dearlove: They're rebuilding the capital. In Balikpapan, yeah, and so I think. And I've been in Jakarta when it's flooded. I've actually, that was a long time ago, but it floods so quickly and so easily. It's extraordinary. And of course it's got much worse. Built in the swamp in Jakarta. No, but you look at a map of Europe, but you can see predictions in thirty years time of which bits of coastal Europe will not really be hammered.
Lockwood: I do think we're sleepwalking into a number of issues. And I think it's a pertinent part of that question where Oswald raises, you know, is anyone going to be prepared to tackle that outside of an election cycle? The question, the answer to that, I think personally, is probably not. Well, let's move on to the next one. This comes from Brian in Ireland. How will the China Taiwan situation play out over the next five to ten years? Now, I think that's interesting because we've just had President Xi Jinping opening the twentieth party congress in Beijing, and he had some words to say about Taiwan, and he has caused a lot of concern when it comes to Taiwan. And what we've had recently is the head of the US Navy warning that the American military must be prepared for the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before 2024. They think that the Chinese are actually going to do what I think has been generally accepted as the unthinkable, which is to actually move in on Taiwan in the very not too distant future. Do you think that's a real threat?
CHINA AND TAIWAN
Dearlove: Personally, I think an amphibious invasion of Taiwan is unlikely. Although Xi Jinping, if I understand it correctly in his speech, specifically did not rule out a military solution to the problem of Taiwan. But I think if you look at it logically, the Chinese can achieve what they need to do or what they would want to do through a blockade. And a blockade would be a totally different strategy because it would take time for them to achieve their political objectives. But I mean, if China really seriously went about a blockade, then life for the Taiwanese would be incredibly difficult given that it's an island that can be relatively easily blockaded. So without a sort of military conflict, it could become an issue of negotiation. But negotiation under the coercion of a blockade, I think personally, that's the way things would develop if China becomes more aggressive, which they're likely to do. It will depend on China's internal politics. It will depend on how the leadership in Taiwan stands in relation to one system, you know, two states aspect of the Taiwanese relationship with China at the moment. But the problems of an amphibious invasion are pretty extensive. And I think the Chinese probably would hesitate before they take that very decisive military step, particularly having seen what has happened to the vaunted Russian military and trying to invade Ukraine, which is much more straightforward when you just have to roll across a land border.
Lockwood: I mean, it's clearly that that invasion has not gone how Xi thought it was going to go, having signed up to that interesting meeting with Putin where they declared their friendship without limits. And clearly, Putin sold him an idea of, oh, I'm going to take a chunk out of Ukraine, but don't you worry, it's gonna be over in a few days. And the Chinese were willing to get into bed with the Russians on that. And I remember analysts were speculating whether Xi had asked Putin to hold off invading Ukraine until after the Winter Olympics were over. But remember, we spoke to Bob Gates, the former Secretary of Defense, and he put down the argument that China doesn't need to physically invade Taiwan. They can very easily, as you said, put a blockade on it. They can do a lot of things with cyber. They can do a lot of things financially. They can make life pretty impossible for the Taiwanese until they essentially submit to Chinese rule. Whether Beijing starts on a war of attrition, I think one thing that that would do is put the US in a very difficult position because if it's a supply chain blockade or if it's tightening economic screws on Taiwan, does the US really want to risk military confrontation with China on the basis of small incremental steps of the Chinese?
Dearlove: I think that's a very good point. I mean, what is interesting recently is that Biden actually made a statement that the US would intervene if there was a military invasion. And I don't think there has recently been such a clear statement. There's always been doubt about what the US disposition would be. So you're quite right. It would be very much more awkward for the Americans if there were just a sort of incremental increase in pressure and no clear invasion. Well, they couldn't really then mount a military response. I think the logic of the situation is pretty clear. A full scale military invasion of Taiwan is, in my book, highly unlikely. Unless there is a crisis in China, and Xi Jinping feels that he needs to, as it were, make a demonstration of his strength and power, because he is dealing with, let's say, oppositional pressure to him from within the Chinese Communist Party. And that sort of internal political instability, if it were to happen, I'm not saying it will, but it could, then it's something like that that could trigger this type of crisis. But in the normal run of events, a military invasion at the moment is in my view unlikely.
Lockwood: Right, I mean, that is something that's sort of straight out of the playbook of a number of authoritarian leaders around the world, externalize the threat, create an enemy outside of our borders and to better unite the country. But what I think has been really interesting in the lead up to the twentieth Party Congress, to say it's a sensitive time in China right now is such an understatement, because this is an event that has been so carefully choreographed for so long. And in fact, Xi Jinping has introduced policies in the last few years designed to pave the way for as positive as possible a situation, domestically, politically, economically, to help safeguard and pave the way for him having this unprecedented third term in office. And it's gone to pot, really. I mean, we've talked about the Evergrande property bubble crisis in China, we've talked about that on the podcast before. There's a growing number of little incidents which are just bubbling below the surface, which demonstrate that Chinese are increasingly unhappy with the direction of his government. And there was that incredible image that has been circulating this month with that huge banner on a flyover calling for boycotts and the removal of Xi Jinping on this bridge, the Sitong Bridge. And, you know, all the censors that China has, they were not able to pull those pictures down fast enough before they spread like wildfire across Chinese social media. On that banner, it said, we want food, not PCR tests. We want freedom, not lockdowns. We want respect, not lies. We want reform, not a cultural revolution. We want to vote, not a leader. We want to be citizens, not slaves. I mean, he's in a difficult position. Do you think if he were to order an invasion into Taiwan, do you not think that that's gonna make things even worse for him?
Dearlove: Well, probably would, but on the other hand, it is an autocracy, and I'm sure that one of the key party mechanisms is the party keeping control of the People's Liberation Army. So membership of the politburo, membership of the military commission is a sort of key aspect of how the levers of power are operated by the Chinese Communist Party. And I don't see Xi Jinping really losing control at the moment of the Chinese military. So I think he's in a powerful position. But you're quite right. There is a malaise in China, and I understand this from talking to my friends who are sort of expert analysts. They say that, you know, there's a complete loss of enthusiasm, especially amongst the younger generation for the idea of the success of the communist revolution. I think there's some particular phrase that the Chinese use to describe the phenomenon amongst young people, which is like switching off or detaching yourself and just, you know, hunkering down and not looking to left and right and taking no interest and just surviving. And I think Xi Jinping's problem, which he doesn't seem to be solving yet, or there's no evidence of it in terms of the party congress, is how you regenerate enthusiasm for China and China's rise in the world. Because in a way, you know, China has done incredibly well in lifting people out of poverty. I mean no other country I think can claim quite what the Chinese have done in lifting millions of their population out of poverty. So it's not that they are without success, but there is a complete lack of enthusiasm for the political system and the way that it functions. And I think your example of that banner appearing on that bridge is a very astute sort of description of perhaps what's wrong. And we know things are badly wrong, but I don't think there's yet any instability there.
Lockwood: Let's move over to a question from the United States. This comes from Michael O'Hanlon. Sir Richard Dearlove, due to your role as head of MI6 during the Iraq war, I'd be curious how much of an intelligence stream existed between yourself and our government here in the United States. Would you perhaps be able to recall any conversations with Donald Rumsfeld or Colin Powell?
INTELLIGENCE AND THE IRAQ WAR
Dearlove: Well, the answer to can I recall conversations with him is yes. Can I talk about them in detail? I'm rather reluctant to. Oh, go on, Richard. But no, I'm gonna just say one thing to answer this question. And if this individual is particularly interested or if he's writing a PhD or something like that, I might be prepared to talk to him off the record. Well, I'm very interested. But what I'll say is, look, Rumsfeld had an ideological view of Iraq. He had what I would describe maybe as a sort of neocon fixation of the way that a successful invasion of Iraq might evolve politically afterwards. And I don't think that Rumsfeld was particularly interested, except maybe at a tactical level in what the intelligence picture looked like. Because there was this sort of neocon fixation on what the regime would look like after the invasion. So he was coming from what one might call almost an idée fixe and it wasn't going to be much changed. Colin Powell was completely different. He was pragmatic. I think Colin Powell would probably say today to an extent that he was misled over the intelligence picture. That's a complicated thing to comment on. You remember he made that statement at the UN with the then head of CIA sitting behind him. He had a much more flexible, pragmatic view and I think was prepared to shift and change it. So he was not part of that inner neocon group. So that's my answer to the question. That's as far as I'm gonna go at the moment. And I spoke to both of them. I'm happy to say I did speak to both of them, obviously I spoke to both of them. Never together, separately.
Lockwood: Well, one of my favorite conversations that we've had on this podcast this year was with the former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, who was also director of the CIA. And speaking to the both of you at the same time, it was really interesting hearing how your views sort of bounced off each other and also your recollection of significant foreign policy events in our recent times. And we were talking about the withdrawal in Afghanistan and the Taliban takeover of Kabul and well, of the entire country, really. And one of the questions I asked him was, you know, was the intelligence flawed? Did the intelligence not warn that a sudden withdrawal would lead to a power vacuum, in which the Taliban would sweep in and just take up the entire country. And he didn't believe that it was an issue with the intelligence. And I remember you said something about how the difficult position is occupied by intelligence services and when intelligence gets politicized. And you said, I've been on the pointy end of that myself. And you didn't say anything more on that. But I have had that up my sleeve because I've wanted to return to that and wanted to ask you if you maybe wanted to talk a little more on that thread.
Dearlove: Not really. I think, well, I'm happy to limit myself really to material, which is perhaps already in the public domain. But I'll make one comment in relation to Iraq, but illustrative of the problem. When political leaders have to take very tough strategic decisions, particularly if those that support them are not, as it were, happy with those decisions, they tend to wish to have a specific explanation for what they're gonna do. In the case of Iraq it was based by Blair in parliament, so that he could take the parliamentary labor party with him on the intelligence. Now if you look at international decision making as a whole, intelligence is a contributor, but it's never, in my view, or very seldom should be a primary factor in decision making. And I think what I said publicly about Iraq was that it like a beam in the construction of a house, it was the king beam. The intelligence was the king beam. And it shouldn't have been. And more weight was placed on it than it could carry. The intelligence was much less wrong than people realize historically. That's a statement which is controversial, but I would be happy to sort of extrapolate and explain why.
Lockwood: You say more importance was placed on it than it should have been. Is that because of the intelligence from Iraq? Or is that because of the nature of intelligence itself, which is... Or the nature of intelligence that you know say unsubstantiated rumor.
Dearlove: No, I think it's the nature of intelligence itself. You know, if you take a big policy decision, there are all sorts of considerations that should be used to justify the policy consideration. The intelligence is gonna be a contributor, but it's not gonna be the main reason. I think that the problem with Iraq was the intelligence, as it were, apparently became the main reason. Interestingly, it didn't in the United States. Bush made a policy decision, which was a policy decision based on their strategic considerations of what was going on in the Middle East. And he never really majored on the intelligence case. I mean, to an extent, but not to the same degree as Tony Blair. Tony Blair, for parliamentary reasons, majored on the intelligence case. You know, with the benefit of hindsight, that was not a good thing to have done.
Lockwood: I remember sitting through his five hour press conference reacting to the Chilcot inquiry, and I remember it so badly because it was my birthday and I was desperate to leave and I had to sit through the whole of this thing to cut up clips for the BBC News. And I think it was clear that he personally very much believed that it was the right thing to do, and I think partly the reason why he stayed so long to answer all these questions is he was desperate to try and prove that it was a decision that he has lived with. Blair absolutely was convinced it was the right thing to do. But he used pressure on the intelligence services to prove the theory?
Dearlove: That is a kind of influence, you know getting. Well I think there was pressure for us to come up with more and more evidence. It was the right decision to take. I mean I personally believe it, at the time it was the right decision to take. Because of the opposition in parliament to the decision, there was this pressure to persuade MPs to agree with Blair.
Lockwood: So I mean, historically, it was quite a complicated issue. Do you think that's a process that really should not be repeated? And in a sense that there is political leaning on intelligence services to prove a certain outcome rather than for them to...
Dearlove: Well, I think that's a very undesirable situation to be in. The intelligence should speak for itself. And then the politicians should make their decisions based on that. And there should be a sort of disjuncture between the two. I mean, there's no question about that. So that's much as I'm gonna say.
Lockwood: Let's go to an interesting question from Aldis in Latvia. He asks, Vladimir Putin showed interest to join NATO at the beginning of the twenty-first century. What do you think was his motivation and considerations?
RUSSIA, NATO AND UKRAINE
Dearlove: Well, I think when Putin originally came to power, there was a general discussion about the role of NATO, the future of NATO. And set in the context of the Cold War and the end of the Cold War, I suppose there was a certain logic in its extension eastwards. I mean, personally, I was very skeptical that there was any sense in the idea of Russian membership. And in a way, had Russia become a member, what exactly would have been the point of NATO? I mean, what would its role have been? And I think there were a lot of questions were anyway being asked at the end of the Cold War even without its extension eastwards. Does NATO have a purpose? Well, of course, it's turned out, thank goodness, NATO survived. Thank goodness, it acquired new members that had been part of the former Soviet Union because we now realize that, you know, Russia has not necessarily fundamentally changed its historic character as a nation and that the Soviet Union and Russia were perhaps more similar than we care to understand. So I think there's a logical explanation for the whole idea that NATO would change its shape, change its geometry, change its purpose when the Cold War ended. And there was a lot of discussion then about the peace dividend. There was a lot of discussion about significant reduction in expenditure on arms. I mean, if you remember, that discussion didn't actually last very long. And as former members of the Soviet empire joined NATO, particularly the Baltics, then it became much less likely that Russia itself would join. Obviously, the question hung over Ukraine, but I mean, I always took the view, and I think a lot of us took the view that Ukraine as a NATO member was a bridge too far because it would have been so unacceptable to the Russians, which has proved to be even with, as it were, Ukraine inclining westwards, but not joining.
Lockwood: What do you make of the current state of the war in Ukraine? And particularly, how this mobilization is going down very badly. And according to a lot of observers, is having an outsized impact on some of Russia's ethnic minorities and across Siberia that a lot of people feel like some of Russia's minorities are becoming Putin's cannon fodder sent to rapidly dispatch to the front lines in Ukraine with minimal training. And in many cases, apparently with minimal kit.
Dearlove: It looks as though it's been a disaster, or it's been a failure and will turn out to have been a disaster. I mean, the Russians have already, or Putin already seems to have backed off the decision saying the mobilization has come to an end. But you've had these vast numbers of young men who've done a runner out of the reach of the Soviet authorities. And I was just listening today how attendance at Moscow's most popular strip club has gone down 50%.
Lockwood: Well, you know things are serious when that happens.
Dearlove: Which is a rather bizarre fact. But then also, you know, a lot of popular restaurants in Moscow have lost their custom.
Lockwood: Do you think the EU slash the West should offer asylum to conscientious objectors, people who refuse to take part in Putin's war, and men who were drafted?
Dearlove: Good question. I suppose my only question is how do you distinguish them from, you know, Russian sleepers coming West with a detrimental effect on the security of one's nations. I mean given that there would be people amongst them who would perhaps be particularly disadvantageous or dangerous for our national security and I'm talking about any European country. And I think there's an argument for saying, you know, if we're to see things change in Russia, it's in our interest that these young Russians should stay and fight politically against the regime, why not? Rather than coming and finding sanctuary in the West, that's not gonna change anything in Russia over time. So I have mixed feelings about that. I can see that on the one hand, maybe we should offer asylum, but on the other, I feel uncomfortable about that as well.
Lockwood: So we have an interesting question from Matthew from the UK. He says, I really enjoy listening to your in-depth knowledge and analysis on various topics. Matthew, your check is in the post. What do you think of the hypothetical prospect of an independent Scotland and the relationship with NATO, or that of a possibly independent Shetland and its relationship with the UK, Norway, and NATO?
SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE
Dearlove: I'm going to Shetland tomorrow. Really? They don't have any power. They've lost power. They have power, but they don't have an internet connection. But I think it's being restored today. Well my daughter lives in the Shetland Islands. I think that Shetland's not gonna go back to Norway. It became part of Scotland in the Middle Ages through a dynastic marriage, if I've got my facts right. And I don't think it's gonna drift off into the North Atlantic and become a Scandinavian outpost. So whatever. It remains part of Scotland. Scottish independence. I'm a huge opponent to Scottish independence. It would be very damaging for the United Kingdom. It would be, I think, damaging for Scotland's economic interest. And I think the Scottish nationalists have a pretty dubious record as a government in Scotland given that they've made a terrible mess of a number of things. But the ardent nationalists don't seem to care too much about that, which is rather strange and peculiar. But maybe, Julia, you have sympathies for Scottish nationalism, knowing that you have some Scottish friends.
Lockwood: Well I think the rise of the SNP is an incredible political story. And I think where the SNP have been hugely successful in, is that they have been able to fly the flag and totally obliterate the political opposition in Scotland. And it is interesting because you have this sort of terminal contradiction, which is that Scotland tends to be anti-conservative, and England tends to be very conservative. And so, if you're a Scot who constantly is voting against the Tories every single election, and you find yourself to be perennially ruled over by the Conservatives, the answer, a lot of Scots will say, is independence, so we can choose our own government and choose who we want in power. What I would really want from the SNP, they seem to suffer for a party that hate Boris Johnson so much. They're very similar, I find, to the Boris Johnson brand, which is all the positive campaigning, the things can be better. I'm going to sell you a pipe dream and we're going to vote for positive change. And yet, we don't really have the details of what that involves. And there's all sorts of confusing things like we would have a Scottish pound that's pegged to pound sterling, we don't need a central bank. The SNP promise a successful future as an independent country that would be part of the EU, and I have yet to find an official in the European Union who says, yes, Scotland could be part of the EU. They've all said no. They've all said Scotland will never get into the EU. Because the Spanish will stop it. Exactly. Not just the Spanish, there are other countries. But virtually, all the Cypriots have an issue. We had that interesting conversation with the president of Kosovo, you know, Kosovo is waiting for EU accession, and when I brought up the comparison with Scotland and independence, she said, No, you know, Kosovo is different from Scotland, we're not a breakaway region, we are an independent country, legally recognized by a majority of nations. We should have EU accession immediately, a renegade Scottish state that does not have the authority to hold a referendum that's got a legal stamp of approval. Well, at the moment, we don't know if the Scots could hold a referendum, that process is currently underway in the courts. First minister, Nicola Sturgeon, I think she will find a way of holding a referendum, even if it's a sort of a popular referendum that has no legal standing, but that she can then use to say, look, Scots want independence, the tide is...
Dearlove: Yeah. I think she risks losing it. And I think that's the problem at the moment. I mean, she makes this great sort of statement and play. But if you look at Scottish opinion, if she has a majority, it's very marginal. So it's a huge political risk she's taking. Because if she calls a vote even one which is demonstrable rather than legal and loses it really, that's the end of the SNP. So I think she's in a much better place just spinning it out politically. And particularly when you know there's such political problems in Westminster, that sort of adds to the case. But I don't think at the moment, there's no way that any UK government, Labour or Conservative, are gonna legally allow another referendum. And if this high court ruling, which is imminent, says, well, you can't hold mine without the agreement of Westminster, then I think the issue is parked for at least another ten years.
Lockwood: Yeah, I mean I think that there are economic arguments to be made and there are emotive arguments to make. And I think there is absolutely an economic case for Scottish independence. If one could guarantee the SNP platform of EU membership, and the Scots, they are very pro-immigration compared to the English, they were very pro-EU. There are ideological differences between the Scottish culture and English culture. But I think if you cannot guarantee membership of the EU, you are gambling with Scotland's future and promising something that the Scots may not have. And we've seen how difficult Brexit has been to actualize. And that was a similar sort of a promise of a bright, rosy future and less on the actual brass tacks of how that would be realized. I have one final question here, which is from Michael in Lebanon, and I'm going to be very brief. For Julia, when you presented your question to Erdogan, did you have any resentful fears for your life? This is at the NATO summit this summer, and I asked President Erdogan, given his human rights record, whether Turkey really had any business belonging to NATO, given the NATO charter and the principles it sets out. Michael, no, I don't have any resentful fears for my life, but let's put it this way, having spoken to some colleagues at CNN who've been through something similar, I have no plans to go to Istanbul anytime soon. But hopefully that may change one day. I think we're at this important juncture where an independent media has never been more needed. And one generally tries to avoid talking about previous employers, but I think it is a real shame that the World Service have been scaling back on their Persian and Arabic services and shutting down some of their services that they provide, because I think those language services, I mean, asking Erdogan a tough question at a press conference is one thing. But these journalists, they put their lives on the line every day. There was a producer on BBC Persian who was Skyping her relatives back home in Iran. And it later transpired that outside of frame were two members of the Revolutionary Guard while that conversation was going on. I mean, the people who work for some of the language services are the bravest people you'll ever meet, and the UK is lucky to have the World Service.
Dearlove: Yeah. Well, the soft influence of the World Service is a big deal. But what happened was that the independent funding of the BBC was transferred to the Foreign Office budget. I'm pretty sure that that is still the case. So a very significant part of the World Service has been cut. It's been cut. So it's just been cut and cut and cut. So a lot of the language bits of the World Service, like the Arabic broadcasting, have been cut back, whereas the English bit survives. But I think it's a great shame because it reached a fantastic global audience and was highly respected for the integrity of its news broadcasting as well. So it would be great if that budget were sort of revisited and perhaps increased again.
CLOSING REFLECTIONS
Lockwood: I mean, it's been quite a turbulent year to launch a foreign policy podcast. Richard, it's been quite a ride, and I've certainly really enjoyed it. I hope our listeners have. Here's to many many more years of fascinating conversations with you and with people around the world.
Dearlove: Well, I would say it's been uniquely turbulent. And we've never really had so many extraordinary events crowding in on one another. So it's been a privilege to have this opportunity to talk extensively about so many important issues. And I hope that our listeners have enjoyed listening, but I also hope that they've expanded and increased their knowledge and understanding of international issues.
Lockwood: I couldn't have worded it better myself. If you liked this episode, sign up. And if you've enjoyed it, why not leave us a review? This has been our first year of One Decision. We hope you'll stay on the ride for many more years to come. From me and the team, thanks for listening and see you next time.
